Posted on 05/13/2002 7:28:40 PM PDT by The Right Stuff
Sixty Years Ago ...
Dateline: 7 May 1942
The Battle of the Coral Sea
Pacific Theater of Operations
by Jennifer King and Timothy Rollins
May 13, 2002
First of Two Parts
Reflections on World War II
A Special Note to Our Readers: As we head into the Battle of the Coral Sea, we will be looking at how both sides - the Allies and the Japanese, were preparing as best they could and doing all they could to best read and anticipate their opponent's next moves. With the Allies running scared and the Japanese in a very confident position - "Victory Disease" if you will - which they had every right to be in, given their overwhelming successes so far at this stage in the war, the Allies knew something had to break their way and soon if they were going to stand any chance whatsoever of ever recapturing the Pacific. This is the first of two parts detailing the Battle of the Coral Sea. Part Two will run on Wednesday. - Jennifer and Tim
On 9 March 1942, after Java fell to the Japanese, President Roosevelt cabled the following message to Winston Churchill (right): “The Pacific situation is now very grave.” This “understatement of the year” reflected a reality which steadily worsened through the next few months. The Japanese “octopus” had reached its tentacles down to the very door of Australia, and totally encompassed almost the whole of the South-Western Pacific.
In almost every instance, save the Philippines, the Japanese troops initially were greeted like liberators in the former European colonial provinces. Meanwhile, Allied forces in the Pacific were spread thin, military assets were scarce and the Allies had been defeated in every action to date.
The Japanese, even the normally conservative Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, were flush with “victory disease”. The goals laid out in the War Plan of 1938, and the seemingly soon-to-be accomplishment of “Hakko Ichiu” (the eight corners of the world under one roof) had been achieved in half the estimated time. Japanese losses up to 1 May, 1942 amounted to only 23 naval vessels, 67 transports and merchant ships, a few hundred planes and a few thousand soldiers and sailors. No ships larger than a destroyer had been sunk.
The Allies, on the other hand, were on the retreat in every theater of the War. Germany was making headway in North Africa, and there was great fear that Rommel (1891-1944, left) might seize the Suez Canal. The German Wolfpack preyed freely upon ships in the Atlantic. During the first three months of 1942, the Allies lost over two million tons of merchant shipping; during the next three months they would lose two million and a quarter tons more. The Japanese were wreaking havoc in the Pacific, and General MacArthur and Admiral King (right) complained bitterly to Washington about their lack of resources.
Roosevelt and Churchill, in an agreement signed on 17 March 1942, had given the responsibility for the defense of the entire Pacific to the United States and responsibility for the defense of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to the Brits. The Pacific command was further divided on 30 March, with MacArthur being named Commander-in-Chief of the newly created Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA); and Admiral Nimitz being named Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA), which roughly fell north of latitude 20 degrees north, and east of longitude 160 degrees east.
Nimitz’s command would be further divided with the creation of the South Pacific Area, South Pole, which would be commanded by Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, from his CP in Noumea, New Caledonia.
General Douglas MacArthur (left), ensconced in his HQ in Australia, soon began to discover bitter disagreement among Australian politicos and military policy advisors. Many, not wishing to repeat mistakes made earlier in the war, did not feel that Port Moresby, in New Guinea, could be held and did not wish to expend personnel and material in what might be a failed effort. MacArthur vigorously disagreed, arguing that Port Moresby was vital to the defense of Australia, and instrumental in keeping open the indispensable shipping lanes.
The Japanese, meanwhile, were having some disagreements among themselves. The Army wanted to consolidate gains, and strengthen positions already held; while the Navy wanted to extend the defensive perimeter. Admiral Yamamoto, especially, wanted to neutralize the American carriers that had been missed during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Jimmy Doolittle’s raid spooked the high command and solidified Yamamoto’s hand. Further offensive actions were planned - the conquest of Tulagi and Port Moresby in order to secure the Coral Sea and provide a base for bombing northern and eastern Australia; the capture of Midway and the western Aleutians as bait to lure out the American fleet; and the occupation of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, cutting communications between the United States and Australasia.
The first phase of the plan, named Operation MO, was the seizure of Tulagi and Port Moresby. As with many Japanese naval operations, the plan was somewhat more complex than necessary. The forces consisted of: the Port Moresby Invasion Group under the command of Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka; the smaller Tulagi Invasion Group under the command of Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima; a Support Group under the command of Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo; a Covering Group commanded by Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto; and a Striking Force which consisted of two carriers with a destroyer and cruiser attachment commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi. Overall command of the mission was given to Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet.
Allied plans, both in the Battle of the Coral Sea and particularly in the spectacular victory at Midway, owed their success to one man - Colonel William Freidman, a brilliant logician who had finally broken the Japanese code, nicknamed “Magic”.
The ability to decode “Magic” transmissions, plus air reconnaissance and some intelligence on the ground from spies based in New Britain, showed the Allies that the Japanese forces were amassing. Admiral Nimitz guessed that they would move around the first week in May, and he also correctly surmised that their target was Port Moresby.
Nimitz assigned two Task Forces to counter the Japanese assault. Task Force 17, under the command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher; and Task Force 11, commanded by Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch. Admirals Fletcher and Fitch had been classmates at the Naval Academy. According to esteemed historian Samuel Eliot Morison, Fletcher had graduated “well up in the first half”, but Fitch “very near the anchor.”
Admiral Fitch, however, was considered the most experienced carrier admiral in the Navy. Fitch had been flying since 1930, and he had commanded patrol wings, naval air stations and three “flat-tops”. He was now the flag officer in command of carrier Lexington, with Captain Frederick C. (Ted) Sherman as C.O. Lexington (left), or Lady Lex, as her crew called her, had seen combat duty already in the Pacific war. She was home to several famed aviators, including John C. Thach and “Butch” O’Hare (right).
Carrier Yorktown was commanded by Admiral Fletcher, who was put in charge of the entire operation. Fletcher’s nebulous orders were to, “Operate in the Coral Sea commencing 1 May 1942.”
The two Task Forces were joined by veteran commander Rear Admiral J.C. Crace, RN and his Task Force 44, comprised of two Australian and one American cruisers, and later joined by two destroyers. Crace was ordered to join Fletcher in the Coral Sea on 4 May.
In the meantime, Admiral Inouye was fully expecting that the Allied forces would engage him. He hoped to catch them unawares in a pincer movement in between Admirals Goto and Takagi, sink as many ships as possible and then proceed through the Jomard Pass into Port Moresby. ***
COPYRIGHT © 2002 BY THE AMERICAN PARTISAN. All writers retain rights to their work.
One interesting note. The Japanese did not sink the Lex. It was so badly damaged that there was no way it could make a safe haven for repairs so it was ordered to be torpedoed by US destroyers to keep it from falling into the hands of the enemy.
JR, a future topic perhaps? Just for significant events? It would be nice to be able to highlight timely threads on our nations history. Lots of knowledgable (sp?, not me I can't spell) freepers, a history topic of some sort would be fascinating.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
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WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
Online Library of Selected Images: -- EVENTS -- World War II in the Pacific --
Battle of the Coral Sea, 7-8 May 1942 --
Overview and Special Image Selection
The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought in the waters southwest of the Solomon Islands and eastward from New Guinea, was the first of the Pacific War's six fights between opposing aircraft carrier forces. Though the Japanese could rightly claim a tactical victory on "points", it was an operational and strategic defeat for them, the first major check on the great offensive they had begun five months earlier at Pearl Harbor. The diversion of Japanese resources represented by the Coral Sea battle would also have immense consequences a month later, at the Battle of Midway.
The Coral Sea action resulted from a Japanese amphibious operation intended to capture Port Moresby, located on New Guinea's southeastern coast. A Japanese air base there would threaten northeastern Australia and support plans for further expansion into the South Pacific, possibly helping to drive Australia out of the war and certainly enhancing the strategic defenses of Japan's newly-enlarged oceanic empire.
The Japanese operation included two seaborne invasion forces, a minor one targeting Tulagi, in the Southern Solomons, and the main one aimed at Port Moresby. These would be supported by land-based airpower from bases to the north and by two naval forces containing a small aircraft carrier, several cruisers, seaplane tenders and gunboats. More distant cover would be provided by the big aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku with their escorting cruisers and destroyers. The U.S. Navy, tipped off to the enemy plans by superior communications intelligence, countered with two of its own carriers, plus cruisers (including two from the Australian Navy), destroyers, submarines, land-based bombers and patrol seaplanes.
Preliminary operations on 3-6 May and two days of active carrier combat on 7-8 May cost the United States one aircraft carrier, a destroyer and one of its very valuable fleet oilers, plus damage to the second carrier. However, the Japanese were forced to cancel their Port Moresby seaborne invasion. In the fighting, they lost a light carrier, a destroyer and some smaller ships. Shokaku received serious bomb damage and Zuikaku's air group was badly depleted. Most importantly, those two carriers were eliminated from the upcoming Midway operation, contributing by their absence to that terrible Japanese defeat.
Wouldn't you agree it would make a great topic, maybe more activity?
Prayers for your Dad in heaven. We have a good family friend who was also aboard the Lady during Coral Sea. Sounds like a great ship (described by Samuel Eliot Morison as "a happy ship", with many of her original crew aboard.
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