Iraq & Weapons of Mass Destruction

Various links. | Republican_Strategist

[Republican_Strategist]

Unclassified CIA Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001. Acquisition by Iraq.

Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. In spite of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow-on inspection regime comprising the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systemsinstalled by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are still not operating. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.

Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used the intervening period to reconstitute prohibited programs. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate its CW programs within a few weeks to months. Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program hascontinued. Without an inspection-monitoring program, however, it is more difficult to determine the current status of these programs.

Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of FFCDs that were supposed to have revealed the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM has assessed that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. Iraq also has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and Iraq’s growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.

Iraq has worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy." The Intelligence Community remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer-range systems. Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the 31 December 2000 Al Aqsa parade. The solid-propellant missile development program may now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two such airframes and TELs were paraded on 31 December—and possibly longer range systems may be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs. Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.

Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful enforcement of the UN arms embargo. Baghdad has acquired smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft and air defense systems, primarily over porous land borders via a thriving gray arms market. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items through the Oil For Food program. Iraq continues to aggressively seek ACW equipment and technology.

Worldwide Threat - Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Iraq

Let me turn now to Iraq. Saddam has responded to our progress in Afghanistan with a political and diplomatic charm offensive to make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible on UN sanctions and inspections issues. Last month he sent Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and Beijing to profess Iraq’s new openness to meet its UN obligations and to seek their support.

Baghdad’s international isolation is also decreasing as support for the sanctions regime erodes among other states in the region. Saddam has carefully cultivated neighboring states, drawing them into economically dependent relationships in hopes of further undermining their support for the sanctions. The profits he gains from these relationships provide him the means to reward key supporters and, more importantly, to fund his pursuit of WMD. His calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people.

Let me be clear: Saddam remains a threat. He is determined to thwart UN sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf war. Today, he maintains his vise grip on the levers of power through a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force—which is less than half its pre-war size—remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups and threatening Iraq’s neighbors.

As I said earlier, we continue to watch Iraq’s involvement in terrorist activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It has also had contacts with al-Qa’ida. Their ties may be limited by divergent ideologies, but the two sides’ mutual antipathy toward the United States and the Saudi royal family suggests that tactical cooperation between them is possible—even though Saddam is well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences.

Rumsfeld, Myers Discuss Iraq Situation On Talk Shows

WASHINGTON, Sept. 8, 2002 – The Defense Department's senior leaders discussed the Iraq situation on the Sunday national television talk shows, just days before the one-year anniversary of 9-11.

Appearing on CBS's "Face the Nation," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld pointed out that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has repeatedly broken promises Iraq made at the end of the Gulf War to disarm and to discontinue its weapons of mass destruction programs.

The secretary also asserted that Iraq is on the list of the world's terrorist states, and under Saddam Iraq continues to possess chemical and biological weapons, and seeks to acquire nuclear arms, as well. As such, he said, Iraq represents a clear and present danger to America -- and to the world.

Show host Bob Schieffer asked Rumsfeld if the United States was close to going to war against Iraq. The secretary said President Bush has decided that a regime change in Iraq is necessary, but hasn't yet decided how it would be accomplished. The nation's leader is slated to go before the United Nations to "make what he believes to be is a recommendation to the international community and to the world" about what to do about Saddam and Iraq, Rumsfeld said.

Iraq, Rumsfeld said, has invaded its neighbors, persists in violating U.N. resolutions it had agreed to, and continues to amass weapons of mass destruction, creating a significant problem for the international community.

The world can approach the problem of Saddam in a number of ways, Rumsfeld remarked. However, he emphasized that he agrees with the president in that doing nothing is not an option.

People seeking a "smoking gun" -- absolute, conclusive evidence that Saddam has nuclear weapons -- Rumsfeld noted, is like developing a case in a court of law by proving a person's guilt without a reasonable doubt.

"The way one gains absolute certainty as to whether a dictator like Saddam Hussein has a nuclear weapon is if he uses it. And that's a little late," Rumsfeld emphasized.

The secretary pointed out how some U.S. intelligence on Iraqi capabilities may not be revealed to the public for good reason. Putting certain intelligence out to the public could "put people's lives at risk," he noted. However, the secretary said more information about Iraq would likely become known in the days and months ahead.

Rumsfeld noted there is also "a category of things we don't know." After Operation Desert Storm, he noted, American officials discovered that Saddam was six months to a year away from developing a nuclear weapon. The best previous intelligence had estimated it would take two to six years for Saddam to obtain a nuclear bomb, Rumsfeld said.

"Until you're down on the ground, you can't know precisely," Rumsfeld noted. Yet, he added, "the intelligence we have is clearly sufficient for the president to say that he believes that the world has to recognize that the Iraqis have repeatedly violated these U.N. resolutions."

The Iraqis, Rumsfeld continued, have "told the international community they have no respect for the U.N., no respect for their resolutions and no respect for the agreements they've signed."

Earlier in the week President Bush and his top advisors discussed the Iraqi threat with senior members of Congress, and more such meetings are planned, Rumsfeld said. On Saturday, the president and his advisors met with British Prime Minister Anthony Blair at Camp David, Md., to discuss Iraq, among other topics.

Asked if America was going to go after Saddam alone, Rumsfeld acknowledged that it would be nice to have everyone agree with you, but that is not always the case.

However, the secretary noted that today's coalition against global terrorism involves 90-plus nations -- half of the world's countries.

"It is the biggest coalition that I can ever imagine in my lifetime," Rumsfeld remarked, adding, "that coalition wasn't there on Sept. 11th of last year … It was built one country at a time, over a long period of time.

"If you're right, if you provide leadership, and if you stake out a direction, people over time find a way to support that leadership," he added.

Rumsfeld reiterated that Iraq is a terrorist state, has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, and is one of few countries in the world where the leadership in power, Saddam Hussein, has used such weapons against his own people and neighbors.

"We'd prefer that he not use them against us," Rumsfeld pointed out, noting that unlike the 3,000-plus casualties caused by the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, weapons of mass destruction losses could be in the tens of thousands.

Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated to ABC This Week host Sam Donaldson that Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons.

Saddam, Myers added, also wants "to better his nuclear program."

"He's going to go to any means to do that, we think," he said. "Our estimate is at this point he does not have nuclear weapons, but he wants one."

Sept. 11 showed that the intent of the terrorists -- and of those that would supply them with weapons of mass destruction -- is very clear, Myers noted.

"They're to wipe out our way of life, (including) friends, allies, and innocents," the general said.

"And so, when you put that intent with capabilities, such as Iraq has, with chemical, biological, and the quest for nuclear weapons, then you have to be very, very concerned," Myers concluded.

During his TV appearance, Rumsfeld told host Schieffer that Pentagon Renovation Program Manager Lee Evey and construction workers "did a wonderful job" repairing the damaged building before Wednesday's anniversary observance of the attack.

"Lee is really a superb leader," the secretary said, "and the construction crews are so proud of what they've done -- and they ought to be."

[finnman69]

L-29 aircraft

Span 31 ft, .5 in
Length 39 ft, 9 in
Height 15 ft, 7 in
Weight 7617 lbs
Armament 23 mm GSh-23 two barrelled cannon and various combination of bombs
Engines One 16.87 kN Ivenko AI-25 TL turbofan
Crew 2
Maximum Speed 466 mph.
Cruising Speed 379 mph
Range 1087 miles
Service Ceiling 36,100 ft