Posted on 10/09/2002 3:41:57 PM PDT by SJackson
You can delegate authority, but you can't
delegate responsibility. That's why we
elect different people president. Otherwise,
Clinton or Bush, it wouldn't matter.
One day I'll make a list and know who to ping
I agree. Which begs a question:
Why is Tenet still in charge at CIA?
The President is out on the hustings, selling the need for action in Iraq. At the same time, his Director of CIA is publicly disagreeing with him.
What purpose is being served here, letting Tenet foul the bedding in the Congresional and media nests? I presume, of course, that there is purpose...
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How sweet it is to hear someone other than myself say it.
There's a culture of bland uselessness practiced by families coasting on repution and contacts who go into politics as a pretentious diversion.
I recently sent a 50 page analysis of a book to a friend. Part of that analysis deals with this issue. I can only get to part of it to post here. Parts of it will eventually published as an article elsewhere. be In it I tlak about the elite Republican's hotility and fear of Reagan prior to the 1980 presidential campaign:
" In callung the Soviets an evil empire Reagan committed an unforgivable offense against their (the effete elitists) shield of bland propriety. No, George Bush was their boy. He would protect and perpetuate their system of privileged bland incapacity. Reagan was a too-vigorous intruder. There is nothing of the mental acuity of the founding fathers in the Bushs, Rockerfellers, Gores, Bentsens, Harrimans, Kennedys, and so forth. Congenial blandness and etiquette are used to mask weakness and uselessness.
The controlling elitism envisioned by the founders was one of mind conceived as being earned and merited, not inherited. Anything which threatens to reestablish this conception is considered a rude and intolerable shock to the soft nervous systems of those classes coasting on inherited position.
The article written here is essentially right on the button.
A bit off topic, something more to think about, from a rather good source, regarding the necessity of using overwhelming force against a weak enemy, or facing eventual demoralization or defeat.
Interview with Martin van Creveld
Broadcast: 20/3/2002
Interviewer: Jennifer Byrne
Professor Martin van Creveld, of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is Israel's most prominent military historian. In this interview with Jennifer Byrne he claims that despite the recent increase in Israel's military operations, the huge Israeli defence forces will inevitably lose to the Palestinians.
Transcript:
Byrne: Thanks for joining us tonight on Foreign Correspondent. How has it come to this, Martin... how is it that the mighty Israeli army – one of the world’s most powerful - with its helicopter gunships, with its tanks, with it’s missiles, can be losing to this relatively small, relatively under-armed if fanatical group of Palestinians?
Van Creveld: The same thing has happened to the Israeli army as happened to all the rest that have tried over the last sixty years. Basically it’s always a question of the relationship of forces. If you are strong, and you are fighting the weak for any period of time, you are going to become weak yourself. If you behave like a coward then you are going to become cowardly – it’s only a question of time. The same happened to the British when they were here... the same happened to the French in Algeria... the same happened to the Americans in Vietnam... the same happened to the Soviets in Afghanistan... the same happened to so many people that I can’t even count them.
Byrne: : Martin you used the word ‘cowardly’ yet what we’ve seen tonight – these commando units, the anti-terrorist squads – these aren’t cowardly people.
Van Creveld: I agree with you. They are very brave people... they are idealists... they want to serve their country and they want to prove themselves. The problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker than yourself. They are in a lose/lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel... if you let him kill you, then you are an idiot. So here is a dilemma which others have suffered before us, and for which as far as I can see there is simply no escape. Now the Israeli army has not by any means been the worst of the lot. It has not done what for instance the Americans did in Vietnam... it did not use napalm, it did not kill millions of people. So everything is relative, but by definition, to return to what I said earlier, if you are strong and you are fighting the weak, then anything you do is criminal.
Byrne: : You are a military historian, but let’s face it the Prime Minister was a general... how could General Sharon – Prime Minister Sharon – be getting it so wrong, by your analysis?
Van Creveld: It’s not a question of personalities, it’s a question of the balance of forces. I’ll use a metaphor that I’ll take from Lao-tzu – the Chinese sage who lived about 2,400 years ago – ‘a sword put into salt water will rust’ – it is only a question of time. And this is happening to the Israeli army and to the Israeli society, almost regardless of who is leading it.
Byrne: : Are they losing, or have they lost, in your opinion?
Van Creveld: No they have not yet lost, but they are as far as I can see, well on the way to losing, which is why Israel over the last few weeks has been positively begging the Palestinians for a ceasefire. We have arrived at the point where, if you will, like Johnson in Vietnam, we are constantly asking the other side for a ceasefire, and the other side either will or will not respond as it pleases him – the reason being of course that they have so much less to lose.
Byrne: : The reason being also, in a sense, that it’s what isn’t about, isn’t it? A ceasefire would provide security for the Israelis, which is what they want, but it would not provide statehood for the Palestinians, which is what they want.
Van Creveld: Exactly. The other side will definitely not have a ceasefire without some considerable political achievement. If I were Arafat and the Palestinians, I would not put an end to this intafada, because the way I see it, from the first day of the first intafada they have been winning.
Byrne: : What options does the Israeli army have, do you think?
Van Creveld: Nothing will work.
Byrne: : Nothing at all? Do you think there’s no change of strategy?
Van Creveld: No. There is one thing that can be done – and that is to put and end to the situation whereby we are the strong fighting the weak, because that is the most stupid situation in which anybody can be.
Byrne: : And how do you do that?
Van Creveld: Exactly. How do you do that. You do that by A, waiting for a suitable opportunity... B, doing whatever it takes to restore the balance of power between us and the Palestinians... C, removing 90% of the causes of the conflict, by pulling out... and D, building a wall between us and the other side, so tall that even the birds cannot fly over it.... so as to avoid any kind of friction for a long long time in the future.
Byrne: : Well, that’s a tall list. Let’s start with the last one – the wall... I mean, when I was there last month people were talking about a wall but you’re seriously saying this is an option, to build a gigantic wall.... what.... on the old green line, basically – there’s Gaza – there’s the West Bank – and there’s Israel proper, and they shall never be combined?
Van Creveld: “Never” is too much of a word. Nothing lasts forever. But history proves that walls work. The Roman wall – the Limus(?) – worked for hundreds of years... the Great Chinese Wall worked, not forever, but for hundreds of years... the wall in Korea has been working for fity years... the wall between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus is working.... the Berlin Wall worked beautifully.... Unfortunately, the Israeli army insists against all military logic on being present on both sides of the wall. We could formally finish the problem at least in Gaza, in 48 hours, by getting out and building a proper wall. And then of course, if anybody tries to climb over the wall we kill him.
Byrne: : What about the many thousands of extremely belligerent Israeli settlers that would be on the wrong side of the wall?
Van Creveld: If it were up to me, I would tell those people – and you’re quite right, many of them are quite belligerent – look, ladies and gentlemen, you have been magnificent, you have served us well, you have protected us all those years, but this is coming to an end. If you choose to stay, it’s your problem – you are on your own. My guess is that 95% of them will come home.
Byrne: J: What about another scenario, which has been much discussed in recent months – which is one of full military solution? Basically, the Israeli army just goes in... it doesn’t build a wall – it basically blows up the Palestinian home... razes the camps... stops, as it might say, pussyfooting around, and it’s “curtains”?
Van Creveld: Look... a home that has been demolished offers even better shelter than a home that stands intact. The Americans in Vietnam tried it. They killed between two-and-a-half and three million Vietnamese. I don’t see that it helped them much.
Byrne: : Martin, just personally... can you bear the thought of living in Jerusalem behind a wall – as the only way to be safe?
Van Creveld: Quite to the contrary – I came to live in Jerusalem in 1964... three years before the 1967 war. There actually was a wall, and life was wonderful. Nothing ever happened. Jerusalem was the quietest, safest place on earth. More than that, between 1957 and 1967 the number of Israelis who lost their lives as a result of enemy action was just thirty-five. Now we pray for a week in which we shall not lose thirty-five people.
Byrne: : Martin van Creveld, thank you very much for joining us tonight. Thank you.
Van Creveld: Thank you. Bye.
Clausewitz vs. The Scholar: Martin Van Creveld's Expanded Theory Of War
Yes and no. My impression from other occasional articles of his is that he's decided that Israel, whether out of a sense of "morality", or an impotence born of her overwhelming military superiority, will not destroy the enemy on the ground, redraw the lines, and relocate the population (Sinai would have made a nice home). Since 73, he's right. I hope things change.
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