Posted on 10/16/2002 4:42:48 PM PDT by Brytani
N. Korean facilities are deep underground, probably under a huge granite rock formation. As far as I know, Americans tried to find their existence by looking at unusal amount of warm water in the suspected areas where there is no geothermal activity.
But such things can be also camouflaged, by diverting warm water out of reactor cooling system out to water coming out of factories, for example. Or creating multi-level cooling water tanks underground so that the temperature difference between adjacent tanks will not be noticeably high. If you have one tank being used to cool this reactor, it would be difficult to hide the temperature difference below the temperature of factory waste water.
If N. Korea makes one concession or move, it has the next step, especially the "worst case" next step mapped out. So if it admitted that it has been working on nukes, it has enough of finished nukes to give their adversary some heartaches. But N. Korea will go there in slow steps, trying to incur maximum psychological impact in the process.
They are taking NPT regime as their hostage. If N. Korea publicly deploy nuke weapons, that will be the end of NPT regime. After that, there will be all-out confrontation. So N. Korea will be using this doom's day scenario as their bargaining chip.
I think that this is why N. Korea is suddenly going in peace offensive to S. Korea and Japan. They want to contrast America's approach and the others, the clear contrast of all-out war and the peace on N. Korea's terms. They are trying to isolate America. That is their intent. It is another question if the event will play out as N. Korea wishes.
That is another possibility. To achieve it, though, will reqiure more hightened level of tension. For example, their public announcement that they will deploy missiles with finished nukes unless America does ....
We will see if they will do it when America is about to invade Iraq.
I agree with your assessment.
INTELLIGENCE STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH CARL W. FORD JR. BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
June 5, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my pleasure to come before the Subcommittee today to discuss the issue of what we in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research assess to be Cuba's efforts to date in the area of biological warfare. My remarks in this open forum will necessarily be limited owing to the need to protect sensitive intelligence information, but I would welcome the opportunity and am prepared to give classified remarks in a closed session.
On March 19, in my statement in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I stated INR's judgment that:
The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states.
That assessment and our concerns have not changed in the intervening 2 and half months.
Among the various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disciplines, biological warfare (BW) is perhaps the most difficult to clearly identify, absent unambiguous reliable intelligence information, owing to the dual-use nature of the technology and materials used to support a BW program. In today's world, many nations, including Cuba, have in place robust biotechnology infrastructures, as some of the world's best scientific talent has turned to this avenue of modern science to promote medical and agricultural advances in their countries. Distinguishing legitimate biotech work from work that is pursued to support either offensive or defensive BW efforts or programs continues to be a difficult intelligence challenge. In a nutshell, since basic BW production does not require large, sophisticated programs or facilities it makes the intelligence assessment function more complicated.
Cuba has several facilities involved in biological-related efforts in agriculture, medicine and veterinary science, which, as in any country, could be used for illicit purposes. This dual-use problem presents all who are committed to combating the BW threat with the dilemma of how best to assess the capabilities of any given facility against the intent to develop biological weapons.
What then can I say about the evidence for our assessment? The nature of biological weapons makes it difficult to procure clear, incontrovertible proof that a country is engaged in illicit biological weapons research, production, weaponization and stockpiling. Cuba's sophisticated denial and deception practices make our task even more difficult. That said we have a sound basis for our judgment that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research and development effort. I am prepared to discuss the evidence we do have in a closed session or leave behind a classified statement for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, maybe that's what they're thinking.
But this sounds like it would be a hard one for them to pull off. They'd be saying, "We secretly violated the last treaty we signed; now that you know what our signature is worth, how much will you pay us to sign a second version of that same treaty?"
So9
You are correct, please except my apology, that was wrong of me to compare
Because, in the world of realpolitik, N. Korea is a Chinese satellite. Do you doubt that the PRC can hit us?
When we talk about S. vs N. Korea, we are really talking in code about the US vs China.
Zemin didn't make that tour to Panama, Cuba, et all for the sightseeing. He was looking for proxies.
Regards, Ivan
Don't even bother to try. Keep talking about Clinton.
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