The Chinese People's Volunteers and the Strategy of People's War(BARF ALERT)

Over the years, the bourgeois press has tried to downplay the brilliance of people’s war as carried on by the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korea. Various imperialist mouthpieces have made racist portrayals of the so-called hordes of Chinese stupidly making wave upon human wave of useless frontal attacks against a firmly entrenched enemy, accumulating losses that were unnecessary. But the real story — which has been noted by honest journalists — is that the Chinese People’s Volunteers developed a unique and effective style of fighting that took advantage of the various strengths and weaknesses of their own army and that of the enemy.

As a Chinese commander explained, "The enemy’s frontal defense is so tight and its firepower is so well-organized that a frontal attack against such a defense line won’t be effective. On the other hand, what the American troops fear most is being cut off from their communications and retreat lines. Given these strengths and weaknesses we shall try to carry to its full effect such tactics as determined and audacious penetration, close-combat battles, and night operations."1

One historian described the U.S. reaction to the CPV attack against a U.S. battalion at Unsan: "The Americans were shaken by the ferocity of the attack. The cavalrymen had never experienced anything quite like it. The enemy moved catlike in the darkness. Infiltrators made good use of cover, probing unerringly for weaknesses in the defense and exploiting each advantage with uncanny speed. It was as if the offensive had been painstakingly researched. The attackers pressed on regardless of losses, although there were few head-on assaults. All this to the blowing of bugles, whistles, and the occasional beating of gongs."2

The official U.S. Marine Corps history of the war cites the derisive comment of one marine: "How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?"

The Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett wrote: "The Americans explained every defeat as due to ‘overwhelming hordes,’ irresistible as the sea, but on innumerable occasions they suffered heavy defeats by tiny groups of men whose morale was high and who had boundless faith in their cause. It was painful for the Americans to have to admit defeat at all, doubly painful to admit they were defeated on equal terms and ten times as painful to admit they were defeated by inferior numbers of ‘Gooks’ and ‘Chinks,’ as they referred to Koreans and Chinese in their racial arrogance."3

A ROAD-BOUND ARMY A number of historians have commented that in the realm of supply, supposed strength was turned into weakness for the U.S. Army. They point out that the great advantage of the U.S. military forces was its awesome firepower. But great firepower means that great amounts of ammunition had to be transported to the battlefield. Also, the reliance upon heavy weapons like tanks, artillery, and tracked and wheeled vehicles, meant that the U.S. troops were tied to the roads of their Main Supply Routes. The long lines of vehicles were continually attacked from the surrounding hills of the mountainous Korean terrain. When the Main Supply Routes were cut anywhere along the line, the U.S. forces couldn’t be provided for. If the U.S. reopened the Main Supply Route at one place, the People’s Volunteers had only to cut it somewhere else to put the U.S. troops into jeopardy.

With all their tanks and trucks carrying the great assortment of wares befitting an imperialist army, the U.S. soldiers were road-bound. When the U.S. soldiers went into battle, they hated to leave the safety of their trucks and slog across the hills. Meanwhile, the Chinese People’s Volunteers continuously baffled the U.S. soldiers with their ability to advance speedily across apparently impassable ground.

The Chinese People’s Volunteers had to rely largely on their own human or animal transport to move supplies to their front line troops. They got by with fewer supplies than the U.S. soldiers, but what they did get was not solely dependent upon the roads. Rather, the Chinese could move on foot through the mountains on steep trails and through roadless valleys and emerge behind U.S. forces to set up roadblocks and cut off or surround the enemy troops.

Chroniclers of the Korean War have observed that even on foot, the CPV could achieve extremely high march rates— 18 miles a day for 18 days straight for one unit. When the Chinese army had to transport supplies by road, they mainly moved at night and without headlights. Lookouts were posted on the highest hills to spot for enemy planes and warn the truck drivers to take cover.

LIVING HARD,FIGHTING HARD As one observer noted, when the U.S. soldier went into battle he went as part of a pampered army. "Not for them a pound or two of parched grain-meal in a cloth roll on which a Korean or a Chinese fighting man could survive with no more than water. America combat rations then ran to meats, poultry, hamburgers, vegetables, fruits, biscuits, coffee, sugar, milk, vitamins, confectionery, packaged to attract the eye of a supermarket customer. Wherever the troops passed there was a litter of empty or wasted packages."4

Further, the U.S. forces had just been having a holiday as occupying troops in Japan. They spent more time forcing themselves on Japanese women than practicing military skills. Now, they were suddenly lifted from their cushy life and dropped head-up against the Chinese People’s Volunteers.

In contrast, the long years of the Chinese Civil War had battle-hardened the People’s Volunteers. They had learned to live hard, constantly in need of adequate transportation, ammunition, food, and other supplies. Most of the time the Chinese soldiers walked into battle with little sleep and having only eaten some rice for a meal. They had to be very careful not to waste ammunition, sometimes counting their bullets before an all-out assault. The People’s Army had none of the comforts of a modern army. Learning how to fight under such conditions turned great weakness into great strength for the Chinese army fighting in Korea. They lived hard and fought hard.

Through the first few battles of the Chinese First Offensive, the enemy’s weaknesses began to show. In a pamphlet entitled Primary Conclusions of Battle Experience of Unsan, the Chinese summed up their appraisal of the fighting ability of U.S. troops: "When cut off from the rear, American soldiers abandon all their weapons, leaving them all over the place, and play opossum.... Their infantrymen are weak, afraid to die, and haven’t much courage to attack or defend. They depend on their planes, tanks and artillery. At the same time, they are afraid of our firepower. They will cringe when, if on the advance, they hear firing. They are afraid to advance farther.... They specialize in day fighting. They are not familiar with night fighting or hand-to-hand combat.... If defeated, they have no orderly formation. Without the use of their mortars, they become completely lost.... At Unsan they were surrounded for several days, yet they did nothing. They are afraid when their rear is cut off. When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to fight."5

LURE THE ENEMY IN DEEP The CPV had fought well during the First Offensive and mainly they were successful in battle. In addition, they seized tons of military equipment that the U.S. soldiers left while in full retreat. As the Chinese Volunteers remarked: they liked fighting the U.S. Army more than the ROK troops because when the U.S. soldiers fled, they left behind all kinds of useful equipment.

But many had escaped from the net during the first battles, so the Chinese command set to work planning a new offensive against the U.S. forces. The CPV commanders wanted the imperialists to be surprised by a sudden, massive offensive that would prove to be totally devastating. For this to happen, the U.S./UN forces would have to advance further into a trap.

The First CPV Offensive had made the U.S. more conservative in their advance. They continually stopped and probed for signs of strong resistance. The Chinese command had to devise a plan to lure the U.S./UN forces in more deeply, and more quickly. For as time went on, there would be more opportunity for the U.S. to discover exactly how many Chinese troops were actually in Korea. But the element of surprise was still very much in their favor. Although there was now certain evidence of the People’s Volunteers in Korea, the U.S. refused to believe that there was much of a Chinese force at all.

The CPV tricked the U.S. by releasing prisoners and withdrawing from the battlefield, giving the illusion that the Chinese were far fewer in numbers and that the U.S. Eighth Army was mainly fighting against the North Koreans who were demoralized by the reverses in the war. The many bourgeois accounts of the war confirm that the U.S. commanders were thoroughly confused. First, a ruthless attack, followed by stillness on the battlefield. It was most puzzling...as if their adversary had disappeared into thin air!

But the U.S. imperialists, forever arrogant and deluded into thinking that all was clear, continued their push to the Yalu and played right into the hands of the Chinese command. On Nov. 25, with great fanfare, the U.S. launched its "Home by Christmas Offensive." The U.S. forces moved northward against light resistance, driving toward the China-Korea border. They hoped to catch the "retreating" Chinese and Korean troops between two prongs of a great pincers between the Eighth Army and the X Corps against the Yalu River. Prior to moving out, the U.S. airforce unleashed a massive bombing campaign to destroy the bridges across the Yalu from China. The U.S. hoped that by destroying the bridges, it would cripple any attempts at reinforcement from the People’s Republic of China. But despite the tremendous tonnage of bombs dropped, only four of the twelve bridges were destroyed.

Meanwhile, Chinese People’s Volunteers had concentrated their forces to hit the imperialists hard. Six field armies numbering about 180,000 were thrown against the U.S. Eighth Army. Three of those armies blocked the advance of three U.S. divisions driving toward the Yalu. The plan was to allow these divisions to advance but hit them before they could consolidate their new positions. The Chinese masterfully chose the terrain on which to fight. About 15 miles north of the Chongchon River, from which the U.S. launched their offensive, the ground rises sharply into rough mountainous terrain with narrow valleys extending northward to the Yalu. It was in the hills overlooking these valleys that the CPV secretly amassed...just waiting for their enemy to approach. The U.S. forces were not at all prepared for the CPV onslaught, which sent them into headlong retreat back across the Chongchon River. If the spiriting of the Chinese People’s Volunteers into Korea was one of the greatest examples of deception in military history, then this second offensive ranked right alongside their previous feat.

The other three CPV armies attacked the main U.S. positions on the Chongchon somewhat inland from where the first three U.S. divisions were attacked. The success of this phase of the offensive depended on a strong frontal attack against the U.S. positions. This frontal assault was designed to hold the attention of U.S. units on the threat in front of them. But the major blow actually fell on the ROK II Corps which was supposed to protect the right flank of the whole Eighth Army. Again, the ROK units were the weakest link in the U.S. chain and the CPV broke it. When the ROK elements crumbled, this left the door open for the Volunteers to hit the exposed eastern flank of the U.S. Eighth Army and allowed the CPV to roll up the enemy from east to west. Consequently, the U.S. 2nd Division caught the full force of this attack on the front, rear, and flanks just outside of the town of Kunu-ri. All U.S. units were ordered to retreat. The Chinese units were now concentrating and moving in broad daylight in pursuit of the retreating U.S. troops.

But more was to come. The Chinese command planned a major ambush for the fleeing U.S. 2nd Division. While other U.S. troops had escaped along a road running west of Kunu-ri, the Chinese command hoped that the 2nd Division would try to escape south down the Kunu-ri/Sunchon Road. In the great confusion of retreat, the U.S. 2nd Division commanders sought exactly this alternative as they thought it to be the shortest and safest route to the rear. Also, there were rumors that the Chinese had set up roadblocks to the west of Kunu-ri. While the U.S. commanders knew that CPV units had been working their way behind the Division, they thought that the Chinese troops were not in any significant numbers. In reality, though, the CPV had already dug in on the high ridges overlooking the road. Further, the Chinese baited the hook for the U.S./UN force by letting a platoon of Sherman M-4 tanks make an unchallenged run down the threatened road. They were after bigger fish!

The only problem for the Chinese forces was how to stop the fleeing U.S. convoy on the road. Once the retreat order was given, the U.S./UN units lost any cohesion as a fighting force and disintegrated into groups of individuals just trying to save their own asses. As a tremendous barrage of firepower rained down onto the seven-mile-long column and fierce fighting erupted amidst napalm attacks by U.S. planes, a small volunteer unit armed with satchel charges crawled up to the front-most tanks and wrecked them, blocking the way. The Kunu-ri/Sunchon road became a gauntlet of death for the U.S. 2nd Division. Finally, the U.S. engineers were able to remove the debris obstructing the road and the remaining units ran for the rear. One bourgeois historian commented on the U.S. losses, "The retreat to Sunchon cost the Americans more than 3,000 casualties, half their guns, and much of their transportation. This was no worse than Washington’s losses at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777. But the U.S. 2nd Division suffered most of them in a single afternoon."6

A NIGHTMAREFOR U.S. IMPERIALISM While the Chinese People’s Volunteers attacked the U.S. Eighth Army in the west, they also launched an offensive in the east against the Marine X Corps in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir. A series of bloody battles were fought among the surrounding hills in sub-freezing weather against the Marines attempting to take the advantage of the high ground away from the CPV who had cut the imperialist’s main supply route. The U.S. Marines were forced to fight their way out through a gauntlet of narrow passes suffering heavy losses. They finally succeeded in making it to the port at Hungnam where they loaded onto ships and escaped. The evacuation of the Marines occurred on Dec. 24, the day before Christmas, thus ending the U.S. "Home By Christmas Offensive."

In the eastern theater of operations in Korea, the U.S. X Corps took to the seas in retreat. In the west the U.S. Eighth Army finally stopped their headlong retreat and drew up defensive lines across the midsection of the Korean peninsula. The war dragged on until negotiations ended the fighting in 1953. Although the Chinese People’s Volunteers were not able to totally annihilate the U.S. forces, the defeat of the U.S. had great international significance. The Chinese forces, together with their Korean allies, had won a victory—at least in the sense of fighting the mighty U.S. forces to a standstill and winning an outcome much more in line with the strategic objectives of the revolutionary forces than those of the imperialists.

At the same time, this was an important learning experience for the Chinese revolutionary army. Throughout the war, and in its aftermath, they carefully studied the strengths and weaknesses of each side, as revealed in the conflict. While it is beyond the scope of this article to sum up all of this, a few further points can be noted. For example, some have commented that while the U.S. "heavy tail" of logistics and supply was a vulnerability, as summed up above, the relatively undeveloped logistics and communication on the Chinese side made for difficulties in sustaining and pursuing an offensive over long distances (different from their strengths in local offensives), in particular up against the firepower and air strength of U.S. imperialism. All this was and is important experience to learn from. As Sun Tzu (an ancient theorist on war, often quoted by Mao) put it, "Know yourself and know your enemy and you can win a thousand battles."

To this day, the memory of the Korean War is a nightmare for the U.S. imperialists. Following their defeat in Korea, the U.S. imperialists were again defeated in Vietnam. In Korea, as Mao said, the Chinese fought the U.S. imperialist forces directly and took their measure—gaining a deeper and concrete sense of their strengths and their weaknesses, and learning ways to combat them. While many particular features of the U.S. armed forces have changed since the time of Korea, some basic, underlying strategic weaknesses were revealed there. In the context of the revolutionary wars of today — and tomorrow — the experience and lessons of "taking the measure" of U.S. imperialism in Korea remains important to the people of the world.ld.

No, not at all. The high command approved the invasion of NK, including Truman personally. MacArther discounted the possibility of Chinese intervention when pressing all the way to the Yalu river at the northern border, and his advice on the subject was accepted. His reasoning was that the communists - including Russia - would only start a general war if they wanted to for other, overall strategic reasons, and that they would not move or refrain from moving based on what line US forces reached. This proved to be a spectacular miscalculation - but it was accepted before the intervention by the Joint Chiefs and by Truman, who were deferential to Mac's expertise on the subject, knowledge of conditions in Korea, and recent enourmous successes from Inchon to the fall of 1950.

The split came -after- Chinese intervention, and concerned what to do about it. In an overall atmosphere of declining confidence in MacArther by the Joint Chiefs (not just Truman). MacArther responded to the scale of the defeats at the hands of the Chinese by calling for escalation. He wanted to turn loose Chiang's forces on Taiwan to fight against Red China, opening another front outside of Korea. He wanted strategic air, and naval air and gunfire, to attack targets in Red China was well - especially in Manchuria, but also opposite Taiwan. And he urged the consideration of use of nuclear weapons. He presented these recommendations inside the chain of command, and portions of them outside, through the press. It was the last of those that most got Truman's goat.

Meanwhile, he was giving more and more pessimistic reports from the front, saying in effect "agree to my urged escalation, or I will be forced to evacuate Korea". The Joint Chiefs responded by ordering him not to escalate, to fight to hold on in Korea if possible, and to withdraw to Japan if absolutely forced to do so - which they regarded as his call, and he wanted to make their call. He was, in effect, blaming defeat in Korea on failure to escalate - in an effort to bring about an escalation, which he thought it was his duty to achieve, to support his men in the field.

Ridgeway arrived in command of 8th Army while Mac was still in charge of the joint Far East HQ in Tokyo. Ridgeway was the one who turned in around on the ground. The awful conditions he found - morale in the basement, a high command out of the loop, in constant battles upward rather than giving direction downward, the Chinese with the initiative, jumbled units, no clear plans - showed to a demonstration that Mac had lost control of the battle. The Joint Chiefs were aware of the disconnect between the gloom coming from Tokyo, and a new confidence in the ability to defend in Korea, after making essential changes, coming from 8th Army.

-Then- Mac was recalled. He was most definitely -not- recalled because he had been "too successful". That is revisionist horsefeathers. He got knocked silly as a pure military commander by the Chinese intervention he had failed to predict, and never regained his footing. Ridgeway fixed the mess than resulted. Mac deserves great credit for the Inchon plan and the success it brought the previous year against the North Koreans alone - but it was Ridgeway, not Mac, who mastered the Chinese.

Ridgeway is not nearly so well known to the general public as Mac, because he wasn't a media star (unlike Mac or Patton) and never went into politics (unlike Ike or George Marshall). His leadership style was to let his subordinates get the limelight, as long as he got results. But within the army, his performance is well known - particularly in the art of the defensive, against long odds.

For those unfamiliar with him, Matthew B. Ridgeway practically created the US airborne during WW II. He commanded the 82nd airborne from 1943 through Normandy. General Gavin, his successor in command of the 82nd, was one of his proteges. General Taylor, commander of the 101st, did a stint under him in the 82nd before getting his own division. Ridgeway was the commander of the 18th airborne corps during the battle of the Bulge, when the 101 in Bastogne, and the 82nd first in St. Vith and then to the west, stopped the breakthrough. It is no exaggeration to say that he is the guy who won the battle of the Bulge, in its defensive phase (in the counterattack, Patton had a major role, as most know).

He achieved the same quiet, stellar record in Korea, leading 8th army to mastery of the Chinese before succeeding Mac at Far East HQ in Tokyo. He is one of the unsung professionals of the US army of the era, and made an enourmous difference, doctrinally, and organizationally long after his time. Press level or political accounts of the war tend to play up the drama of Mac and Truman, as politicians, over the issue of escalation. But the military reality on the ground is that Mac failed purely as a general, giving up as hopeless (without escalation) a fight Ridgeway showed could be won.

Looks to me like you need to learn a little more to read what people actually write, instead of what you want them to have written. I said the Chinese beat us without a numbers edge in the initial attack - meaning the winter of 1950-1951 - due to surprise and their superiority in the high country. And it is not just me that says so, the US army says so - and that's where I learned it.

I also said that -after- Ridgeway had developed the defensive system that stopped them - meaning by the summer of 1951 - they were indeed reduced to attrition by "hordes". When all they had left were "hordes", we beat the heck out of them. When they had a quality edge (in "mountain infantry") and the jump on us (early), despite not yet having superior numbers in the theater, is when they nearly beat us. Wars are won and lost by military technique and leadership.

And falsifying history by pretending otherwise is not absence of pedantry, it is begging to pay for the same mistake twice - in blood.

And possibly, 20 million Americans might have died in a general nuclear war in 1951. Which would have been oh so loverly. Revisionism is an amusing sport but doesn't decide anything. Counterfactuals are false premises from which anything follows, inside a "maybe" that isn't so.

Whereas the historical facts that are known are (1) Mac said the fight on the ground in Korea was impossible and China would eject all UN forces from Korea by force if his escalation policies were not implimented, (2) he said so while his command was falling apart on his watch, out of a sense of helplessness induced by his own command failures, which him proceeded to blame on his superiors, (3) Ridgeway then proved him completely wrong by beating the Chinese and holding South Korea.

Command shock exists. It is a military reality. No one is immune from it. When an enemy does unexpected things, disrupts all of one's previous calculations, seizes the initiative, destroys portions of one's force, makes men one is responsible for and to suffer in appalling ways, breaks the spirit of some of them, and appears to resist the application of the obvious levers one has at one's command, then it is possible - not necessary but possible - for any commander of whatever quality otherwise and previously, to "snap", get depressed, spread gloom to those around him, lash out at men on his own side above or below in the chain of command, lose contact with ongoing developments, brood on what might have been, what went wrong, imagine entirely different trajectories of events in which the unpleasant realities do not transpire, live in the world of those fantasies, seek unworkable solutions or grasp at straws, demand reinforcement, escalation, withdrawl, relief, ascribe all contrary or optimist advice to others supposedly being out of touch with gloomy realities, and the like. It is a real psychological, military phenomena of the greatest practical importance. When it occurs, it needs to be recognized and faced, and then dealt with ruthlessly. By relieving any commander "hit" by it, no matter how distinguished in rank or past accomplishments, immediately.

This happened to Mac in Korea. You don't have to like that fact for it to be true. You don't have to like what happened for it to be true. You can wish the cold war went entirely differently, can think Truman was a boob, whatever. The military, not the political reality, remains. Mac suffered command shock and lost control of the battle; Ridgeway's vastly superior performance with the same "hand" proved it.

That is not the critical point. The critical point is not advice about which course of action was advisable, it was starkly different assessments of what was militarily possible. Mac said that without escalation UN forces would be ejected from Korea and forced back to Japan. Ridgeway said that with the existing forces, he could stop the Chinese and hold southern Korea. To accomplish this, he needed to replace failing commanders and change our tactics, but did not need either significant escalation or withdrawl.

This was an assessment of practical possibilities, which Mac should have been able to make. And the corrective actions taken by Ridgeway were ones Mac should have already taken. Mac did not make the correct assessment of the state of the battle, nor see the problems to correct, nor how to correct them, nor the weaknesses of the Chinese in Korea to exploit.

He failed to see these things properly because he was in a state of command shock. His recommendation of escalation was not merely a difference in policy objective. He thought without it, we'd flat lose. And that assessment was wrong, empirically. His pessimism and his recommendation fed on each other. Optimism about the battle in Korea seemed to him to preclude significant escalation.

He saw the worst, and argued the worst, hoping a gloomy enough assessment of the situation, accepted by the Joint Chiefs in Washington, would lead them to make his military problem significantly easier by either taking responsibility off of his shoulders for a withdrawl from Korea, or by large scale reinforcement of his available means. He was not seeing the situation objectively. He had lost touch with the critical variables at the front (particularly US troop morale, and Chinese supply constraints).

Ridgeway's critical argument was not about a hypothetical escalation, but about the non-escalation that actually happened. He told the Joint Chiefs that with command reshuffling and changes of tactics, he could beat the Chinese and hold Korea with his existing force. Mac said it could not be done. Ridgeway did it.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.