Michoud External Tanks May Hold Clue About Columbia Accident

Nasa, Michoud ^ | 2/4/2003 | Joseph Ranos

[Sonar5]

Michoud, Michoud, Nichoud. You will learn that name like you did with Martin Marrietta as it relates to Challenger.

This can be a very confusing issue to undestand. If you have a question, I will be happy to answer it, but if you are confused about something I wrote, Please ask me about it, and I will clarify the context for you. Thanks.

I have been working on this since yesterday morning. I am just linking my discussions on other boards so that you can see what I have found. Others have contributed to these findings, so you have to be willing to follow the links and take a few hours to fully grasp its contents.

I am a licensed Private Pilot-Single Engine Land.

My original hypothesis was posted here: http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4703.html

*******************

In it I wrote: My Own research of course. Follow Closely now. I am 100% Serious, and I am not trolling, so please don't flame me, as I believe I am on to something here.

***********************************

ET = External Tank

LWT = Light Weight Tank

SLWT - Super Light Weight Tank

***********************************

I was involved in a thread on flightsim here: http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4703.html

In that Thread, I screwed up and called the ET (External Tank) An External Tank Booster. I was promptly corrected and I fixed it.

Anyway, that led to further speculation on my part regarding the ET, which is Manufactured by Michoud, a Lockheed Martin Company. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/et/et_index.html

Anyway the ET used on this mission was an older model, called a LWT. The Newer ones started flying in 1998, and are 7500 Pounds Lighter and are designated SLWT. (The SLWT's weigh in 7500 lbs lighter than LWT's and 17,500 lbs. from the original.)

You can see the designation numbers here from Michouds website: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/et/shuttle_flight_info.pdf

Here is the breakdown of ET's according to missions flown.

STS-107 ET-93

STS-113 ET-113

STS-112 ET-115

STS-111 ET-113

STS-110 ET-114

STS-109 ET-112

STS-108 ET-111

STS-105 ET-110

STS-104 ET-109

And there are 8 other shuttle missions that used higher ET Numbers. You have to go back to STS-99, ET-92 for a prior flight which was launched on February 1, 2000.

Here is why this may be relevent. In the fs thread, we talked about the sprayed on insulation, and I was theorizing about it when thinking this ET was a newer, 7500 Pond Lighter SLWT.

I was wrong. But That is what NASA said in its Press Kit for this flight, which you can read here: http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/STS-107

On Page 18, it says: "External Tank ET93-A Super Light Weight Tank"

On Page 142, The Press Kit describes SLWT and not LWT.

So what did I do.

I emailed Michoud, a contractor who makes the ET's, and asked them.

They Replied back to me by email with this: "ET-93 was a LWT. It was delivered to NASA Nov. 2, 2000"

Except they spelled delivered wrong, and I corrected that.

I will not disclose the names of people I corresponded with, so Don't ask.

The Info matches the delivery dates of 11/2/2000, and the on-dock date of 12/20/2000.

I also have sent emails to NASA to inquire about this, along with my condolences.

Here are my questions.

1) Is the reported weights in the Shuttle Press Kit correct, or 7500 Pound too light, which is the difference in weight between the LWT and the SLWT.

2) Will the Insulation sprayed on the ET degrade over a period of 2 years such that it will break off on Launch. (Which it appears has happened)

3) Why did they even use a LWT, since the newer SLWT have been used since 1998.

4) If the insulation did not fall off the ET, It would not have damaged the Wing, hence potentially no disaster.

Folks, I am absolutely serious about this and have spent all morning researching this.

Here is what The news is currently reporting:

"The report said that a foam insulation patch about 7 inches by 30 inches in size popped off the fuel tank about 80 seconds after Columbia had left its launch pad, Readdy said. NASA engineers spotted the peeling insulation on high-speed cameras that recorded Columbia's launch."

That lead to other comments in that thread: Well, Ron Dittemore of NASA just said on the news conference, he is speculating the ET as the main cause.

Flame me all you want.

I know my theory is sound.

He also stated they were comparing debris from STS-112. STS-112 had an ET number of ET-115, delivered 9/26/01, On-dock 12/19/01.

If the ET from STS-112 is a SLWT, He was trying to compare two different tanks. The press kit from STS-112 also says it was a SLWT.

The ET-93 is a year older.

These are valid questions.

One more note. I have every right to speculate as does NASA. It was an accident, yes, but there is something called accountability, and I I have a theory, so what.

Ron Dittemore basically said in the Press Conference right now he considers the ET the cause as well.

He also just said they had had debris fall from the Et on STS-50. That launched on June 25th, 1992, and had ET-50, delivered on 10/31/88, and on-dock on 1/27/1992.

So it sat for over 3 years, before use.

************************

And in this thread: http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4703.html

I said: Well,

The evidence is forthcoming.

Engineers did speculate a large gash had occured, and their memo was dismissed for reasons unknown.

I'm sorry. They knew or should have known if the engineer group last Thursday concluded it was a problem, they should have told the crew.

If they didn't tell the crew, many heads will roll, and that was wrong. They had 2 days to inform them. I hope it turns out they did tell them.

That Shuttle Commander is exactly that. Pilot in Command. He had a right to know and NASA has let us down again, IMHO.

Do Accidents happen. Yes. But when the engineers acknowledge a problem in an investigation they were charged with carrying out as is this case, whoever stopped that memo or refuted it has some responsibility, IMHO. It should have been investigated, and the landing postponed. They have postponed landings before, and they do have contingent procedures for that as well.

The engineers should be commended for writing the memo.

Next up, get rid of that Insulation, or find a way to reduce or eliminate that ice, and then we can fly again.

It wasn't the design of the shuttle, IMHO. It was a defect in design on the External Tank (ET) that I feel is complicit at this point.

EDIT: I was wrong, I called the ET The External Main Booster, which Ned pointed out to me. Thanks Ned. It is The External Tank

Here is the link for the ET http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/et.html End Edit:

I saw an astronaut on FOX showing how easily those tiles could be chipped away once the perimeter has been breached. It chips away quite easily.

Furthermore, that damage may have a causal effect in the induced drag that NASA has acknowledged on the left wing. This may have forced the Shuttle into a path not conducent to a proper landing trajectory which may also have contributed.

IMHO, the pieces are already falling into place, and while other events may turn up something different, I feel my and others theories similar to mine are sound and logical.

********************* And: Hi Josh,

Someone made a decision that was wrong, IMHO.

I firmly believe if we had to, we could have went and got them.

Look at the miracle of Apollo 13, and what they did to bring those heroes home.

I have confidence in the program even after this event. Someone dropped the ball here. The engineers felt differently than you stated, and that will be released soon enough.

As to the External Tank ET, I have corrected that in the post above. Thanks.

The current tank system has been used since STS-91 in 1998. The Liquid Hydrogen Tank and The Liquid Oxygen Tank are made of Aluminum Lithium, which according to NASA is 30% Stronger and 5% less dense than the prior metal alloy.

I am going to do some more research on the ET and see what the MFG says about the sprayed on insulation compared to the prior ET. The new ET is 7500 pounds lighter and thus allows heavier payloads to be delivered to the ISS. I would be interested to see how the Ice formed is either less or more in similar weather conditions.

Your point about Humidity is valid. Maybe we should look at another location for launches. Maybe Edwards would be better, who knows. Good Question though, as I have not looked at that yet.

You Said: "there weren't contingencies to rescue the crew on orbit. There was nothing that could be done."

I disagree. They saved Apollo 13's astronauts. I think if we had to retrive in orbit, someone would have designed a plan. Would it have worked. Who Knows.

But the important thing is that all of these questions, yours, mine and others need to be asked.

And about the Crew knowing.

Guess who has the decisions on all of the Abort Contingencies currently in place. Not The Ground.

It is the Flight Crew that determines the abort procedure carried out once launched. They should have been told. Period.

As to the Insulation, I did say: "Next up, get rid of that Insulation, or find a way to reduce or eliminate that ice, and then we can fly again."

That is still valid. If they find a way to eliminate that Ice, or that Insulation from the outside of the ET, there would not have been contact with the shuttle wing. That is what I should have said above.

The only thing I can think of right now, is the Double Hull Theory currently used on Oil Tankers.

If the ET Had a double shell with the insulation sprayed on the inner shell and then the outer shell may be protected from the ice. It is a thought. The question is, how can we eliminate the sprayed on insulation. Well, how about moving it to the inside shell. Just an Idea.

******************************** You Said: "-This ET was not one of the new Super Lightweight tanks, it was one of the last two Lightweight tanks (that have been flown since very early in the STS program)."

Please cite your official source on that, as mine states that it was a SLWT. And then I will post Mine.

The Weldalite on the ET is less than a Half Inch Thick. Yes they are on version #3, which has saved a total of 17,500 pounds from the original.

The ET-93 Was delivered by the MFG on 11/2/2000 and on dock, 12/20/2000.

You may be right about it not being a SLWT, but I do show differently.

The MFG says that ET-96 was the first SLWT Jettisoned form the Shuttle.

I just shot off an email to an official source, so I'll let you know what I get back.

And: It was a LWT.

I just got an email back from Michoud.

"ET-93 was a LWT. It was delivered to NASA Nov. 2, 2000."

I do wonder why they used an older model since they have been flying the SLWT's since 1998. Seems kind of Odd.

I got my Info from a NASA Press Kit, Page 142, which was obviously wrong, and on Page 18 where it states:

"External Tank ET93-A Super Light Weight Tank"

NASA has some more explaining to do. That is a major error in my book. Did they get the weights wrong, or is this just a Grammattical Error?

That would be a 7500 Pound Difference in Weight.

But I trust it was most likely a typo.

We'll see.

Here is a Link for the Press Kit last updated 12/8/2002, Page 9: http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/STS-107/

I also sent a request to NASA for addtional Clarification on the Press Kit Discrepancies.

And: Ok the closest comparison would have to be with STS-50, which was also Columbia, and took off in June of 1992.

It had ET-50 delivered on 10/31/1988 and on-dock 1/27/1992.

Same Shuttle, although it does not state whether it used a LWT, it most likely did.

Columbia last flew in March of 2002 (STS-109) with a SLWT, menaing it had 7500 lbs. less of an External Tank, thus allowing more payload. That mission was a Hubble Maintenance Mission.

The comparison of STS-112 Atlantis (The debris comparison by NASA) Should not have been done as this was a different lighter shuttle, and a Lighter External tank. (A newer SLWT).

Can you compare a tire going flat on a Michelin to a Goodyear. Two totally different designs.

2 different shuttles 2 different External Tanks

Now, it still has to be ascertained whether the sprayed on insulation process is different, and Michoud says it is, and different amounts are sprayed on the tanks at a different thickness.

Folks, all I am saying as this. NASA has been very forthcoming, but come to your own conclusions as well.

Their press conferences have already made mistakes in accuracy, and the Press is giving them passes, maybe because they don't realize this.

Their Press kit is wrong, and the press may be relying on some of that info as well.

********************** In This Thread:

Braun over at Avsim posted this: http://ftp.avsim.com/cgi-bin/dcforum/dcboard.cgi?az=read_count&om=1422&forum=DCForumID6

From the NASA Page:

During the STS-87 mission, there was a change made on the external tank. Because of NASA's goal to use environmentally friendly roducts, a new method of "foaming" the external tank had been used for this mission and the STS-86 mission. It is suspected that large amounts of foam separated from the external tank and impacted the orbiter. This caused significant damage to the protective tiles of the orbiter. Foam cause damage to a ceramic tile?! That seems unlikely, however, when that foam is combined with a flight velocity between speeds of MACH two to MACH four, it becomes a projectile with incredible damage potential. The big question? At what phase of the flight did it happen and what changes need to be made to correct this for future missions? I will explain the entire process.

http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/space/updates/sto32.html

bt

Braun Tacon

**********************************

I added: Good Find,

Another example of why we need to keep asking questions.

basically what I have learned is they spray a different thickness on different parts of the ET's.

STS-87 had an ET-89 which Had a delivery date of 6/26/1997 and an on-dock date of 7/15/1997.

STS-87 flew on 11/19/1997, which was alos Columbia and it sustained extensive tile damage during launch according to Michoud.

***************************

Also: MOST IMPORTANT Discovery Yet. Someone pointed it out to me. This NASA Engineer Knew.

Same Article: http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/space/updates/sto32.html

Whoaa..

Look at what this guy said: Greg Katnik 12/1997 (Engineer at Kennedy Space Center) " The tiles do a fantastic job of repelling heat, however they are very fragile and susceptible to impact damage."

Further down, the questions that he asked:

Now the big question -- why? The evidence of this conclusion has now been forwarded to Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) because this is the design center for the external tank. MSFC will pursue the cause of damage. Here are some descriptions of some of the possible causes:

POSSIBILITY 1 The primer that bonds the tank foam to the metal sub-stream was defective and did not set properly. This was eliminated as a cause because the photography indicated that the areas of foam loss (divots) did not protrude all the way down to the primer.

POSSIBILITY 2 The aerodynamics of the roll to "heads up." The STS-87

mission was the first time this maneuver had ever been completed.

POSSIBILITY 3 The STS-86 mission revealed a similar damage pattern but to a much lesser degree than STS-87. The STS-86 tile damage was accepted ruled as an unexplained anomaly because it was a night launch and did not provide the opportunity for the photographic evidence the STS-87 mission did. A review of the records of the STS-86 records revealed that a change to the type of foam was used on the external tank. This event is significant because the pattern of damage on this flight was similar to STS-87 but to a much lesser degree. The reason for the change in the type of foam is due to the desire of NASA to use "environmentally friendly" materials in the space program. Freon was used in the production of the previous foam. This method was eliminated in favor of foam that did not require freon for its production. MSFC is investigating the consideration that some characteristics of the new foam may not be known for the ascent environment.

POSSIBILITY 4 Another consideration is cryogenic loading, specifically hydrogen (-423 degrees Fahrenheit) and oxygen (-297 degrees Fahrenheit). These extreme temperatures cause the external tank to shrink up to six (6) linear inches while it is on the pad prior to launch. Even though this may not seem much when compared to the circumference of the external tank, six inches of shrinkage is significant.

This is where the investigation stands at this point in time. As you can imagine, this investigative process has required many hours and the skills of many men and women dedicated to the safety of the shuttle program. The key point I want to emphasize is the PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION, which is coordinated amongst many people and considers all possibilities. This investigation has used photography, telemetry, radar coverage during the launch, aerodynamic modeling, laboratory analysis and many more technical areas of expertise.

As this investigation continues, I am very comfortable that the questions will be answered and the solutions applied. In fact, some of the solutions are already in progress. At present the foam on the sides of the tank is being sanded down to the nominal minimum thickness. This removes the outer surface, which is tougher than the foam core, and lessens the amount of foam that can separate and hit the orbiter.

****************************************

Well, It seems they were aware of this problem, huh?

Good for NASA, but it didn't work, IMHO, whatever changes they made still continued to occurr.

We are darn lucky that other shuttles have not crashed before this. This is a very serious issue.

************************

I am convinced that Michoud's name will be learned as well as Martin Marrietta was in relation to Challenger.

The External Tank was the Cause, and the tiles were the effect.

Fix the ET's and we can get back where we belong. I have taken an enormous amount of grief over this, but that is ok. I'm used to it.

Regards, Joe

LINKS:

Michoud Shuttle Flight ET Info:

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/et/shuttle_flight_info.pdf

External Tank Info:

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/michoud/et/description.htm

STS-107 Shuttle Press Kit

http://www.shuttlepresskit.com/STS-107

Thread Links:

BBC Shuttle News Video: http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4711.html

Shuttle Damage:

http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4703.html

NASA Discrepancies you won't see on CNN

http://www.flightsimnetwork.com/dcforum/DCForumID2/4712.html

Nasa Avsim:

http://ftp.avsim.com/cgi-bin/dcforum/dcboard.cgi?az=read_count&om=1420&forum=DCForumID6

Other Tile Damage: Nasa Knew:

http://ftp.avsim.com/cgi-bin/dcforum/dcboard.cgi?az=read_count&om=1422&forum=DCForumID6

My Memorial to Columbia:

http://http://home.attbi.com/~Sonar5/Shuttle/memorial-sts-107.jpg

[#3Fan]

Imagine this scenario, uh crew, the shuttle is severely damaged and will not make it back on reentry, you only have a week of life support left, there's no way we can get to you, you can either die from lack of life support or die reentering. A horrendous situation. It was the right call, because in this situation it was definitely better to not know.

You are correct. No one would want a 1 week death sentence.

[Sonar5]

Please reread the links to fully understand this.
I Apologize as this issue is complicated.

You Said:
"Uh, Dude
SLWT is used for ISS missions, the LWT is used for non-ISS misions. The difference in weight is a big deal for final orbit. Non-ISS mission = use old tank from stock.
This was covered in some depth in a press conference BTW.
Sorry you had to waste your morning.
Have fun.

---

First off, I am not having fun, and I do not feel I have wasted two entire days on this thus far. Your implication of that is not very nice.

Second:

Please go look up these missions.

STS-109 ET-112 NON-ISS SLWT Columbia 3/1/2002
STS-99 ET-92 NON-ISS LWT Endeavour 2/11/2000
STS-93 ET-99 (SLWT #4) Columbia 7/23/99

So I am afraid that is not the case. The SLWT has been used on Non-ISS Misions.

And there are a total of 3 different tanks.

Tank #1 Used 6 times.
Tank #2 LWT 10,000 Lbs, Lighter than #1
Tank #3 SLWT 7,500 Lbs Lighter than LWT. (First Flown in 1998)

Please read a bit more. And ask for a clarification, and I will be happy to provide it.

And as to the press conferences, I would not hold all my weight as to what they are saying, as they have made quite a few mistakes already, and they just made another one 30 minutes ago when they incorrectly stated there were only 3 instances of debris. There have been at least 5 Confirmed by their own websites.

Regards,
Joe

[GovernmentShrinker]

Do you know what tank number was the last one of the LWTs? (I'm assuming no LWTs were produced after the production of SWLTs began -- anyone know if that's a safe assumption?)

[GovernmentShrinker]

I don't think Sonar5 is being critical -- just analytical.

[ContemptofCourt]

I did not see the press conference, so I do not know the context of the question asked, but they may be stating the truth....STS-27 also suffered severe tile damage, which they postulated occured on liftoff...however, they could not confirm this.

So it depends on whether the question was if something hit the tiles on liftoff or if there have been instances of foam coming off the ET.

[Sonar5]

I Just saw this:

You Said:
"Imagine this scenario, uh crew, the shuttle is severely damaged and will not make it back on reentry, you only have a week of life support left, there's no way we can get to you, you can either die from lack of life support or die reentering. A horrendous situation. It was the right call, because in this situation it was definitely better to not know."

---

Ok,

That is not what shoudl have happened. NASA'a own Abort procedures spelled out in the Shutttle Press Kit's linked above stipulate that it is the flight crew that chooses which abort procedure is used once the Shuttle is launched. That is official NASA Procedure.

That flight crew had a right to know. It is unclear if they did or not. I have not heard, but I may have missed that.

Someone asked what me being a Pilot matters.

This is why. When I fly, I am known as Pilot-In-Command by FAA Regulations. Commander Husband was also the PIC as Shuttle Commander on this mission. Anything that happens to that ship after Launch is ultimately his decision to make.

If it turns out that the crew did not know or was not informed. That is another breakdown at NASA that would need to be remedied.

Every interview I have seen with an Atronaut has said they would have wanted to know. (Of those that were asked)

The other thing is this.

The Shuttle Press Kits are incorrect. Maybe that is the only error, maybe not.

When I fly my aircraft acts differently when I am flying alone or when I am flying with my wife and two kids.

The Combination of Columbia, being the heaviest shuttle, in combination with a LWT, being 7,500 lbs. heavier than a SLWT, means there are potentially higher forces on the Shuttle causing higher vibration and maybe loss of Insulation.

That Tank was unsafe for use, IMHO, and they should have used an SLWT at the least. But those may also have problems. But all these problems relate back to Michoud and their external tanks.

Regards,
Joe

[Sonar5]

Good find. Thank You.

I have not looked at all the missions, since I have been responding here and on a couple other places.

STS-27 ET-23 Atlantis 12/2/1988 LWT

Michoud states:
Atlantis Sustained Extensive Tile Damage on Liftoff Primarily due to debris from the solid rocket boosters.

Unsure if that inludes ET, since an ET is not a booster. But that is another one where they mentioned debris.

That is Now SIX Missions.

I'll be back, I'm going to read all of them.

Regards,
Joe

[GovernmentShrinker]

I think you'll need to add gap time from delivery to on dock to that table you're working on.

[Cold Heat]

I was trying not to be critical of his analisis, however I stayed up all night and yesterday arguing and going over these very same points and data.

Sorry if I appear a pompous butt.

[Sonar5]

Ok, Complete list of Tile damage on lift-off according to Michouds website and NASA Disclosure, at least for now, unless something else is released by NASA or Michoud.


STS-1 ET-1 Columbia 4/12/81 ET
All or part of 16 orbiter tiles were lost and
148 others damaged during the mission.

STS-3 ET-3 Columbia 3/22/82 ET
Thirty-six orbiter tiles and portions
of 19 others were lost during the mission.


STS-27 ET-23 Atlantis 12/2/1988 LWT
Atlantis sustained extensive tile damage
on liftoff primarily due to debris from the
solid rocket boosters.

STS-86
The STS-86 mission revealed a similar damage pattern
but to a much lesser degree than STS-87. The STS-86
tile damage was accepted ruled as an unexplained
anomaly because it was a night launch and did not
provide the opportunity for the photographic evidence the
STS-87 mission did. A review of the records of the
STS-86 records revealed that a change to the type of
foam was used on the external tank.
From: http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/space/updates/sto32.html
NOT DISCLOSED BY Michoud


STS-87
Columbia sustained extensive tile
damage during launch.
ALSO:
The pattern of hits did not follow aerodynamic expectations, and the
number, size and severity of hits were abnormal. Three hundred
and eight (308) hits were counted during the inspection, one hundred
and thirty two (132) were greater than one inch. Some of the hits
measured fifteen (15) inches long with depths measuring up to
one and one-half (1 1/2) inches. Considering that the depth of the
tile is two (2) inches, a 75% penetration depth had been reached.
Over one hundred (100) tiles have been removed from the
Columbia because they were irreparable. The inspection revealed
the damage, now the "detective process" began.
From: http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/space/updates/sto32.html

STS-112
Disclosed by NASA at Press Conference- Not disclosed by Michoud on website.


STS-107
Self-Explanatory

Hope This Helps,
Joe

[GovernmentShrinker]

STS-27: ET-23 delivered 9/24/84, on dock (Kennedy) 3/30/88, launch 12/2/88 -- over four years between delivery and launch (delay due to Challenger, which affected many other ETs as well). This was the first ET with more than a year between delivery and on dock (I don't have flight dates).

[Sonar5]

ET DELIVERIES

1st Date Delivered on
2nd Date On-Dock Date
Mission date will be different from On-Dock date

ET-1 6/29/79 7/6/79
ET-2 2/27/81 4/22/81
ET-3 9/28/81 10/4/81
ET-4 1/17/82 1/22/82
ET-5 5/26/82 6/2/82
ET-6 7/26/82 8/2/82
ET-8 9/8/82 9/15/82
ET-9 1/12/83 1/17/83
ET-10 3/1/83 3/7/83
ET-11 5/6/83 5/12/83
ET-12 7/22/83 8/1/83
ET-13 9/13/83 9/19/83
ET-14 11/3/83 11/9/83
ET-15 12/15/83 1/11/84
ET-16 1/27/84 3/5/84
ET-17 3/16/84 4/10/84
ET-18 4/24/84 6/27/84
ET-19 5/24/84 9/7/84
ET-20 7/5/84 12/5/84
ET-21 7/25/84 1/10/85
ET-22 8/24/84 4/4/85
ET-23 9/24/84 10/21/84 (V)
3/30/88 (K)
ET-24 11/16/84 5/8/85
ET-25 12/20/84 6/10/85
ET-26 3/15/85 8/26/85
ET-27 1/29/85 2/28/85 (V)
5/18/89 (K)
ET-28 4/16/85 11/4/85
ET-29 5/15/85 12/12/85
ET-30 6/18/85 7/8/85
ET-31 7/16/85 11/25/85
ET-32 8/14/85 7/31/89
ET-33 10/15/85 3/24/86 (V)
8/10/89 (K)
ET-34 9/23/85 10/18/85 (V)
10/30/89 (K)
ET-35 11/8/85 12/14/89
ET-36 12/10/85 1/15/86
ET-37 1/15/86 2/20/90
ET-38 4/15/86 3/6/89
ET-39 4/15/86 3/26/90
ET-40 6/20/86 5/9/90
ET-41 7/25/86 6/20/90
ET-42 9/19/86 2/26/91
ET-43 11/10/86 11/14/91
ET-44 3/11/87 7/29/91
ET-45 6/8/87 4/22/92
ET-46 9/9/87 9/26/90
ET-47 12/18/87 2/19/91
ET-48 4/22/88 3/12/92
ET-49 8/8/88 7/7/92
ET-50 10/31/88 1/27/92
ET-51 2/3/89 8/19/92
ET-52 5/3/89 5/8/91
ET-53 7/31/89 6/5/91
ET-54 10/30/89 11/3/92
ET-55 2/1/90 6/2/92
ET-56 5/10/90 9/29/92
ET-57 7/26/90 3/26/93
ET-58 10/16/90 11/30/92
ET-59 3/27/91 2/3/92
ET-60 6/27/91 6/22/93
ET-61 10/15/91 7/28/93
ET-62 1/21/92 10/6/93
ET-63 4/21/92 11/16/93
ET-64 7/20/92 1/13/94
ET-65 11/2/92 3/4/94
ET-66 1/26/93 5/15/94
ET-67 5/17/93 6/13/94
ET-68 8/6/93 7/26/94
ET-69 11/3/93 9/20/94
ET-70 2/17/94 11/18/94
ET-71 5/4/94 12/14/94
ET-72 7/1/94 3/15/95
ET-73 10/4/94 4/11/95
ET-74 11/17/94 6/6/95
ET-75 2/3/95 7/11/95
ET-76 3/29/95 8/15/95
ET-77 5/24/95 10/24/95
ET-78 7/17/95 12/12/95
ET-79 9/13/95 1/16/96
ET-80 11/17/95 3/26/96
ET-81 1/19/96 4/16/96
ET-82 3/12/96 5/2/96
ET-83 4/25/96 9/23/96
ET-84 6/17/96 11/12/96
ET-85 8/7/96 10/8/96
ET-86 10/8/96 1/14/97
ET-87 11/22/96 4/1/97
ET-88 1/17/97 4/30/97
ET-89 6/26/97 7/15/97
ET-90 8/8/97 8/25/97
ET-91 11/14/97 12/9/97
ET-96 1/12/98 3/26/98
ET-97 3/30/98 4/8/98
ET-98 6/4/98 6/17/98
ET-99 7/27/98 8/12/98
ET-100 11/25/98 12/18/98
ET-101 11/25/98 1/20/99
ET-102 2/1/99 4/7/99
ET-92 4/19/99 4/28/99
ET-104 6/1/99 6/16/99
ET-103 6/22/99 9/28/99
ET-105 7/16/99 8/5/99
ET-106 12/17/99 3/1/00
ET-107 10/12/00 5/17/00
ET-108 2/10/00 6/28/00
ET-109 5/3/00 10/26/00
ET-110 7/26/00 11/8/00
ET-111 9/22/00 3/22/01
ET-93 11/2/00 12/20/00
ET-94 1/11/01 TBD
ET-112 3/8/01 5/10/01
ET-113 4/30/01 5/23/01
ET-114 6/18/01 9/5/01
ET-115 9/26/01 12/19/01
ET-116 11/28/01 2/6/02
ET-117 2/4/02 4/24/02
ET-118 4/5/02 7/3/02
ET-119 5/28/02 10/31/02
ET-120 7/22/02
ET-121 9/24/02
ET-122 11/21/02
ET-123


Et 117-123 have not flown yet. This list does not match up Missions. That would take a while to compile and the PDF is 43 pages Long. Tons of Cut and Paste.

Keep in mind that the mission date may be a lot later than the on-dock date.

For example STS-107 ET-93 had an on-dock date of 12/20/2000, but didn't fly until now.

Hope This Helps,
Joe

[snopercod]

Nice work. As a former KSC Tank & Booster Test Conductor [TBC] I have two "off the cuff" comments.

1. It probably was a LWT. The SLWTs are needed to reduce weight so the Shuttle can reach the high-inclination Russian orbit. There would have been no reason to "waste" a SLWT on this flight.

2. The assignment of which boosters, ETs, payloads, etc. go on which flight are made literally years in advance. The STS-107 mission got jacked around (e.g. delayed) due to the Russian failure to produce their ISS hardware on time. The postponement of STS-107 probably explains the "old" number tank which seems out of sequence.

Once again, nice work and thanks for taking time to post it.

[tubebender]

What was the temperature at launch and what was the temp aloft. What was the speed of the package at 80 seconds of launch and the altitude. The photos of the strike show the object pulverizing like a snowball hitting a windshield at speed. If I hit a block of insulation in my car at 100 mph it may break my windshield and kill me but it is not going to disintregrate on impact is it. It looked more like ice to me than than something solid but I'm willing to admit I have the IQ of a burger flipper.

[honway]

Thanks for the ping.
Excellent work here, IMO.

[Cold Heat]

The aforementioned insulation will break and powder from simply dropping it on the floor. It is very fragile when un mounted or protected.

It would probaby not have broken your windshield, but might have cracked it and would have blown into thousands of fragments and dust.IMHO

[Sonar5]

It was definately a LWT on STS-107. This was confirmed to me by email from Michoud.

You are absolutely correct about loads being determined years in advance.

The Sequence actually fluctuates from time to time because of delays, etc...

Thanks for reading it. :-)

regards,
Joe

[SirAllen]

The point is this: if the crew were faced with the choice of remaining in space until they die from lack of life support, or give reentry a try, they would have given reentry a try. Because no matter how many resources NASA used to determine wing damage, there probably would still have remained in the accessment that there was a possiblity of a successful reentry. The bottom line, the same result would have happened except with weeks(days?) of heart-wrenching drama if they had known beforehand, thus being better FOR ALL that it happened the way it did.

[Sonar5]

You are entitled to your opinion but I disagree.

You Said:
"The point is this: if the crew were faced with the choice of remaining in space until they die from lack of life support, or give reentry a try, they would have given reentry a try."

You cannot make that statement, IMHO. None of us can know what Shuttle Commander Husband would have done.

It is not outside the realm of possibility that they could have pushed to a higher orbit and been rescued by another shuttle or even a soyuz. Who Knows. We never will, nor will we know what you are inferring, that of a decision that was never made.

Under your assumption, do you think the families would have liked one more opportunity to say their goodbyes?

You are making an assumption of an event that never occured.

The only ones that know what decision would have been made, and the ones who should have been given the option to make that decision perished in the Columbia.

And by NASA protocal, the fact remains tha all aborts after launch are decided by the flight crew, not the ground crew.

And that decision belongs to Shuttle Commander Husband.

Regards,
Joe

[tubebender]

I found it very interesting that in yesterdays

press briefing Dittemore went into great detail about the engineering annalists of the strike of the "insulation" on the wing. The report used the term "white" but Dittemore wanted a review asking, Was it white or light colored.

what was the speed of the package at 80 seconds into launch? And what was the temperature at launch? Was it colder than normal?