Stratfor War and Geo-Political Analyais (Don't miss this one!)

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[advocate10]

Iraq, The War, and the next 5 years

An Analysis
 

This is a summary of a SSSB-organised Conference Call with Dr George Freeman,  Chief Intelligence Office of a Geo-Milito-Political Consultancy firm in the US, called Stratfor, which is based in Boston. The call is from earlier this week. The following analysis should not be taken to be the opinion of the summariser, nor the view of SSSB.

Executive Summary

Ø     This is a war which is definitively going to happen.  Ø     It will most likely commence between 27th February and March 2nd.  Ø     It will be over by mid-April.  Ø     Regime change is the objective.  Ø     The US is committed to a major military presence in the area for the foreseeable future.  Ø     The purpose of the war is to position the US in the heart of the region, so as to be able to bring to bear overwhelming pressure on surrounding States, so that they ruthlessly 'deal with'  the Al Quaeda network in their countries ... or else face the US.  Ø     Ultimately, Pakistan is on the US agenda.  Ø     India, as a consequence, is going to become a major US ally.  Ø     China will acquiesce, as will Russia, in return for US recognition of their respective rights to 'deal with' 'insurgency' as they see fit.  Ø     Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia are the biggest losers .... and Iraq.  Ø     The current international landscape is about to fundamentally change ... war will become a permanent feature of the next 5-10 years.     

Prospects for war: Converging with the 20 century mean

  The backdrop of Stratfor's analysis: 
We are re-entering 'normality',  and that the 1990s were a period of abnormality.
That stockmarkets have gone up and down during conflicts [Korea, Vietnam] and that war is neither extraordinary in terms of the 20th century, nor is it inherently bad for markets.
The Iraqi invasion itself is not about Al Quaeda being in Iraq.
Nor is it about oil.
The US is committed to a long-term presence in the region. 

Ø      It is about Iraq being the single-most strategically placed country in the Middle-East ... having at its borders Syria, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Kuwait.

The US rationale

To date, the US has always been an outsider when it has come to dealing with issues in the Middle East, and as direct consequence it has always needed alliances ..... this will change, definitively, when it becomes the dominant and overwhelming military power in the region. The whole dynamic of the Middle East will shift as a consequence.

What is the purpose of the war?

Ø      The purpose is to redefine the geopolitics of the region, in order to be able to bring direct and unavoidable pressure upon countries who are intentionally, or by default, are allowing Al Quaeda to operate.

Ø      The driving logic is to create a new reality: that it is far worse not to co-operate with the US than it is to ignore Al Quaeda within their own countries, for fear of internal problems.

Nevertheless it is a scenario which these countries have recognised is increasingly likely to come to take place.

The opposition from Iran and Saudi Arabia has little to with Iraq, and everything to do with the wider implications of a long-term US presence in the Middle East.

Is it likely to take place?
War is a certainty [according to Stratfor]

Ø      The US administration is absolutely committed to going to war.

Ø      It does not want a UN 'government' in place.

The immediate upshot of war:

Ø      Syria will be surrounded by hostile countries [Turkey, US/Iraq, Israel]

Ø      US naval dominance will provide overwhelming reach.

Ø      Saudi Arabia will be surrounded by Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, US/Iraq, Qatar.

Ø      Iran will be flanked by US-supporting Afghanistan on its East, and in the West by the US/Iraq, Kuwait.

Fighting the war:

There are currently two opposing perceptions of the forthcoming war:

The US perception/assumption: The Iraqi army is incapable of fighting.  As the US command views the situation, the predominant supposition is that the regular Iraqi army collapsed when the US took it on in Kuwait. The assumption in 1991 was that US casualties would be high: the US establishment feels that they over-estimated the Iraqi army. As a result, the theme now is that the Iraqi regular army cannot fight. Stratfor states that this shows a strange schizophrenia , in that the public are encouraged to believe that great sophistication is being shown by the Iraqi subterfuge and deceptions regarding the mobile chemical bio-chemical weapons which are being moved about the country at the moment, whilst little competence is accorded/transferred to the army. 


The Iraqi perception/assumption: Saddam Hussein believes that he will win. This is based on the premise that the US does not want to suffer high casualties, as evidenced in the 1990s by Somalia, Beirut, and the1991 war. Far from being a massive defeat for Iraq, Hussein/Iraq views the Gulf War as, at best, a draw, and at worst as being defeat for the US. Why? Because the perception is that, beside being ejected from Kuwait, when the US met the Iraqi Republican Guard, the US gave up and gave in. Thus, now Iraq believes that just so long as they can inflict high casualties upon the US early on, and then have an urban battle in Baghdad, that the US will revert to type, and that a UN-based ceasefire will come into acceptance.....and that Saddam Hussein and his regime will continue to survive. 

So, we have two very different perceptions of the past, upon which the present is now predicated.

When will War begin?

Ø      Between February 27th and March 2nd.

Why then?

Ø      Because that, for the US, is the optimal period of the phases of the moon.

Ø      The US wishes to commence the attack in darkness. Night darkness favours the US, because Stealth bombers can only be picked up optically, and not by radar. Also, darkness will aid special forces going in under cover.

By when will it end?

Ø      The most likely deadline for the resolution of the war, from the perspective of the US, is mid-April. This is because should Iraq decide to use Chemical weapons against the US, the above-85 degree temperature will render the anti-chemical suits virtually inoperable, with US fighting basically ineffective.

Ø      It cannot wait until mid-autumn because the US currently has six army divisions around Iraq ....the 'family jewels' have now been committed. A force with overwhelming battle-strike potential is now in place. There is no way it will be held there indefinitely. This war will, and has to be, fought to conclusion.

Is there a possible earlier start date?
Ø      Yes: If Iraqi troops in the North and South, near the oilfields, and around Baghdad, were suddenly to be moved, then it is very possible that bombardment would begin.

How will it be fought?

      First: Complete suppression of Iraqi air-defences, using cruise missiles,  Stealth bombers, and heavy strikes against all Iraqi  command centres.

Ø      Simultaneously, ground operations would begin early on.

Ø      From the South the US would advance into the oilfields rapidly, in order to prevent their destruction. The purpose of this is two-fold: to secure the oilfields, for future usage; and to secure the road infrastructure leading up to the region, which will be critical for the successful follow-up of troops and armour.

Ø      Also of paramount importance: of the six bridges which cross the Euphrates river, three must be taken intact by the US, or else critical time will be lost in re-bridging.

The First Military Objective:

Ø      The primary initial objective of the US forces is to seize the afore-mentioned bridges. Special forces will enter first, followed up by heavy armour.

Ø      Stratfor states that success is expected, due to the absolute excellence the US has at this sort of operation.

The Ultimate Military Objective:

Ø      To take Baghdad and effect 'regime change'.

Ø      Easier said than done...

Ø      Taking a major capital is a scale of task hitherto unattempted in US military history, and indeed only attempted successfully on a few occasions worldwide [Berlin by the Soviet Union was successful, but Stalingrad and Leningrad both were too much for Germany].

If Iraq can fight effectively from the outset [contrary to the US assumption, in Stratfor's view] then there is a serious problem.

This will be a key point in the success of the overall campaign.

There are currently four brigades of the Republican Guard in Baghdad. The US has never yet encountered them in battle.

Ø      The key question is: Will the Republican Guard fight?

Ø      The importance of morale on this point, within Iraq, is crucial.

Ø       If the Republican Guard can fight the US to a standstill/standoff, then it will have achieved its aim.

Ø      The reality here is that no-one, not the US, and not even Saddam Hussein, knows the answer to this question for sure.


In purely military terms, there is no question that the US can take Baghdad: the question is, however, at what price?

The US cannot afford to be seen to be targeting civilians - something which was not an issue in either Berlin or Stalingrad in WW2.

Thus the US hope that there may be one of three outcomes in Baghdad:

That the Special Republican Guard decides not to fight.
That there is a coup within the Iraqi military high command and immediate surrender to the US.  This is not something which should be dismissed as a possibility - certainly their loyalty has in the past by no means been assured: viz. the periodic purges of the military elite during the 1990s.
The US manages to win the city without excessive civilian casualties.Take time to      

What does this successful US outcome do for geopolitical alliances in Europe?

Ø      That both Germany and France have made a major miscalculation.

Ø      The assumption that a united European response was not the natural corollary to the US position was wrong.

Ø      Too many European countries do not want a dominant Paris-Berlin coalition, according to Stratfor, for fear of 'generational domination'. Hence the support of the Iberian peninsula, most of Eastern Europe, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Of greater consequence is: What will happen to other states?

Ø      Saudi Arabia will be in difficulties.

Ø      Syria will be under immense pressure in the future.

Ø      Iran will be faced with a far more immediate challenge to its internal structure.

Ø      India will benefit considerably both in terms of business and political relationships.

Ø      Why? Because, ultimately, after Iraq, dealing with Pakistan will the next overriding objective for the US.

The Oil Effect?

Ø      Stratfor assert that this is not about oil...

Ø      There will be a minimal effect on oil prices from the war.

Ø      The Venezuelan effect will have had a bigger impact.

Ø      There are already US contingency plans in play. The worst case situation is already in the price.

Ø      At worst, 1.5mil bpd will be off the market, but not permanently.


Wider implications of the Iraqi war

      War is going to be a permanent backdrop for the next 5-10 years.

Ø      There will be a de facto 'extension of an informal US empire'.

Ø      Markets, will have to learn to live it, and they will do so.

Ø      The Structural impact on the US economy will range between neutral to positive.

Ø      There will be 'considerably more friction between the US and other countries'.

Q &A Session in Conference Call

In 2003/4, post-Iraq, what priorities does the Bush administration have vis-à-vis the wider region?


Ø      The US view is that it cannot do anything about anti-Americanism.

Ø      It will not attempt to win the hearts and minds of people locally.

Ø      It will attempt to 'create a sense of fear and impotence' within the region.

Ø      It will ensure that nation states are more afraid of not cooperating with the US than simply ignoring terrorism within their own countries. 

Ø      This is where the Al Quaeda aspect will enter: the US will exert extremely heavy pressure on suspected countries, forcing them to deal with Al Quaeda effectively.

Ø      ... should cooperation be found wanting, the US will not baulk at launching covert operations and extreme pressure onto non-cooperating countries...

Why take this strategy?

Ø      Because the thinking is that Al Quaeda cannot afford to become a larger organisation, because  - the theory asserts - the larger it becomes, the less secure it becomes.

Ø      Structurally highly-secure growth of Al Quaeda is of greater concern to the US..

Impact/Implications for other countries

North Korea

Ø      North Korea, according to Stratfor, is little more than a side issue. It is merely playing the latest round in a decade-long game where it seeks to gain economic concessions from the US/Japan/South Korea in return for ratcheting down military rhetoric.

Ø      There is a 'qualitative difference' to the Korean threat; it is not likely that the US will get involved.

Russia

Ø      There have already been quiet talks between Washington and Moscow over Chechnya. There will be a change in US policy towards Chechnya, which will be the price of Russian co-operation.

Ø      The Russian administration will be 'very happy' with the new paradigm.

Ø      They do not care excessively about Iraq: they will settle for an increased market share in Oil.

Iran
Ø      Iran will choose to close down internal debate as it steps up its security levels.

Ø      Long-term, it knows it is in danger: the US-Iran issue will be a serious issue for the future.

Ø      There may well be considerable internal change further down the line.

France/Germany
Ø      France is not posturing for commercial reason, as some commentators are suggesting.

Ø      On the contrary, they have made a serious strategic miscalculation, and are now staring at an'abyss' in which they have alienated the US, and have caused considerable resentment within Europe for their current stance.

Ø      The German-French response to the US has as its overall purpose the creation of a European counterweight to US power.
Israel
Ø      The US, whilst 'absolutely committed to the survival of Israel', does not want to involved itself in the resolution of what it regards as an essentially, if not exclusively, internal issue.

Ø      The US would prefer to see a timely and equitable resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict; but the pressure it is likely to exert upon the Israeli administration will more probably focus on encouraging the Israeli administration to coming to an 'accommodation' with Hamas, with Arafat side-lined.

China
Ø      China is 'delighted' with the new situation. Why?

Ø      Pre-9/11 the focus of US strategy had decisively shifted towards worsening US-China relations. Now, the entire focus has shifted away from Asia.

Ø      US needs china diplomatically.

Ø      ... but China is also worried by improved and strengthened [in the medium-term] US-India relations.

Ø      China also has its own internal issues - the price of cooperation with the US will be that the US does not interfere with its internal 'security issues'.

Ø      With poor US-China relations out of the way, there will be a new 'lease of life' towards improved commercial and political relations with the US.

India
Ø      India is going to be one of the main longer term beneficiaries of the new situation

Ø      Why? Because the US has decided that it has to deal with Pakistan's linkages to Al Quaeda, and its non-cooperation, hitherto, in dealing with terror cells which the US allege are being given the official 'blind eye'.

Ø      The US will be keen to develop commercial links to solidify this relationship

Will Nato survive?
Ø      Difficult to say: whilst it is not the remit of this discussion ...

Ø      Nato no longer has its ration d'etre [the Soviet Union]

Ø      The US does not want to involve itself with such a consensus-oriented institution.

Ø      Where consensus is so evidently lacking, the US does not want to reveal military plans and secrets to an essentially un-trusted organisation.

So what will emerge?
Ø      Whilst Nato may continue to exist in name, in effect a series of informal and formal alliances will [and indeed have] emerged in its place

Ø      For example: at the moment the Netherlands is supplying Kuwait with Patriot Missiles. Germany is supplying the Netherlands with these. This sort of accommodation will become the norm, as will a lack of formalisation of such alliances.

What are the key initial lead indicators of the possibility of  military success 7-10 days in?

Ø      Are the six bridges over the Euphrates blown effectively by the Iraqi army?

Ø      If they are intact, then it will be assumed that the regular Iraqi army are ineffective.

Ø      Chemical weapons are most likely to be used in this area of the conflict.

Ø      Within the 1st 96 hrs there should be a good picture emerging of Iraqi morale.

What does Iraq/Hussein  want? Simply to survive through to mid-April?
Ø      Yes: Iraq wants to reach mid-April having inflicted thousands of casualties on the US, in the hope that this will erode US public opinion, forcing Bush to seek a UN ceasefire.

Ø      Iraq wants to make a big impact on the periphery of its borders early on, in order to shore up morale and support in the centre if Iraq, ie in Baghdad.

Is there going to be a major terrorist attack in the US during the next 6 weeks?
Ø      There will 'certainly be attempts'.

Ø      But ... Al Quaeda attacks when least expected: we know too little of their overall reach and capabilities to say anything else definitively.

What about the dangers posed by chemical weapons?
Ø      This is a key issue: one of the main reasons that the public is not being told of the whereabouts of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is because what the US fears most is that Iraq learns how much is known about them, and that as a consequence they move and hide the weapons before the US can react.

Ø      The US will already have covert troops targeting the sites they know of, and will hope to take them out early on.

Ø      It is possible they might be used against Kuwait - it is likely against Turkey, and it is possible against Israel.

The Bigger Picture post-Iraq

Ø      Stratfor assert that the current Iraqi situation should be seen as a 'campaign as part of a protracted wider war' which will last for 5-10 years, and which will, by default ,overwhelmingly dominate the international scene

Who will gain most?

Ø      The high-tech sectors

Ø      China

Ø      Russia

Ø      India

Summariser's Thoughts:

Ø      Whilst I am in no way better qualified than anyone to opine upon this issue, I found the above analysis considerably more in depth than anything that I have come across within the UK media to date. To be sure, it is a hawkish view ... but what if it is also right?

Ø      The implications and potential consequences which are highlighted in this piece in particular have brought attention to China, Russia, and India. These may not be short-term 'beneficiaries -even if such a description were to be appropriate - but it is a thought, all the same. 

Ø      Consideration of the possibility that we may be about to enter a shift in geo-politics so significant that it bears comparison with 1945 and 1989 is also critical for understanding where we are going ... whatever one's views regarding the rights and wrongs therein.

 

[Stefan Stackhouse]

Thanks, no professional, just between jobs at the moment and a little time to think about world events.

[Southack]

"This is a war which is definitively going to happen. Ø It will most likely commence between 27th February and March 2nd."

Oh please.

Idiots. Stratfor doesn't begin understand the magnitude of the game that is being played out right now.

Invading Iraq is SECONDARY.

[colorado tanker]

Nice analysis. It seems to me that the present reason for NATO's continued existence (and expansion) is to make permanent the reversal the Yalta/Potsdam post WWII settlement in Eastern Europe. Which is why the East Europeans are tilting pro-US and anti-France/Germany. Too many times in the past they've been carved up by Germans (including Austrians) and Russians.

If there is a miscalculation it is that the French/German/Russian strategy has triggered a counter-coalition formed around Britain, Spain and Italy, which threatens to seize the EU leadership away from France.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

I think that the French would be just as happy to see the UK out of the EU and excluded from their Europe-only military alliance. It was useful for them to have the UK in during the expansion period of the EU, but now the UK is being more of an obstacle than an asset. As far as the French are concerned, if the UK is out of the EU, that is more costly for the UK than it is for the rest of the EU.

Spain (and in which case, probably also Portugal) would also be no great loss. As far as France is concerned. Italy would be a more serious economic loss and threat to the EU's legitimacy, because it is a major European economic power and one of the original six. But when it comes down to having to make a choice, I don't see the Italians as really having the guts to make such a wrenching move. They will make all sorts of symbolic pro-US gestures, and they won't go out of their way to hurt the US like France and Germany will, but in the final analysis, they are not going to cut themselves out of the EU.

Your analysis WRT E. Europe is right as far as it goes. However, they will increasingly find themselves (as they have for centuries, actually forever) between the rock of France/Germany and the hard place of Russia. Yes, they would love to have the US guarantee their independence, but it could be a tough place to reinforce, and how many hundreds of thousands of troops are we really willing to risk losing if push comes to shove? Our ONLY geostrategic interest in E. Europe is to continue to maintain a foothold in continental Europe (not really necessary) and to prevent the Franco/Russo/German axis from consolidating a contiguous zone of hegemony across the entire continent. This later is a desirable strategic objective, but it competes against many other strategic objectives, and I'm not at all convinced that it ranks all that high in terms of priority. Besides, it must be remembered that simply due to geographic distances, E. Europe's natural trade partners are going to be W. Europe and Russia. The US is just too far away to be a major import or export market for them. You cannot totally divorce these economic realities from geostrategy.

I am forced to conclude that NATO is dead. It probably died not long after Gulf War I and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has continued to exist institutionally, but in reality it is now a disfunctional alliance, and those never last.

[Al B.]

Ping

[colorado tanker]

I generally agree with your analysis A long term French-German-Russian alliance just strikes me as unstable, however, because all three would want control and their interests are a bit different. Russia is likely to play off several blocs and would likely find the US a better fit for an ally in dealing with China and radical Islam. Germany has always been a rival of Russia's for control of Eastern Europe - I can't think of a time they were allied other than the all-Europe coalition against Napoleon. France and Germany have been stable allies so long as Germany deferred to France's leadership, which Kohl was attempting to change. Schroeder is only back in France's pocket now because he's so weak. A stronger future administration in Germany of either major party will likely try once again to vie for leadership.

If France started throwing major European countries out of the EU to preserve it's control it would forfeit any claim to European leadership and could create a Europe once again divided by an alliance system.

If the US wins big in Iraq, as many think, and establishes itself as the unstoppable superpower, we're bound to attract opposition through the operation of old fashioned, Machiavellian, balance of power politics. We're already seeing some of that right now. Just some thoughts. Thanks for your post.

[cebadams]

Bump - Good analysis.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

You are right, a Franco/Russo/German alliance is difficult to pull off, and difficult to maintain. However, France realizes that the only way to exert any influence on the world stage out of proportion to its size is by asserting a dominant leadership role in a continental alliance. They are willing to take considerable risks, and pay considerable costs, to achieve this.

Note that the French and Russians were allies for a good while in the run-up to WWI. In many ways, they are natural allies, and perhaps the gravitation of the two back to each other now is a natural and inevitable outcome.

Germany, of course, is still living with the aftermath of WWII and the huge mistakes it made. It is one of history's big losers, there is simply no other way to put it. They do realize that because of their economic might, they can be valuable to both France and Russia -- more valuable to them than to anyone else. Germany also realizes that if it lies safely in their arms, neither the Americans nor British nor anyone else is very likely to cause them any harm. Colaborating with the French in booting the Americans out of Europe will at least rid the Germans of the last vestage reminder of postwar occupation, and they may be at the point where this is now important to them.

It is true that the Germans and Russians have historically been competitors in E. Europe. But the Germans are in no position to exert anything other than the most benign political leadership in that sphere. Economics is another matter. As the largest economy bordering the region, Germany is E. Europe's natural and largest trading partner. At the same time, while Russia has a long-term possibility of stronger trade with E. Europe, its economy is in such a mess right now that this matters little. What Russia has, however, is a still-substantial army. Enough to keep E. Europe from being TOO independent in relation to its neighbors. Both E. Europe and Russia need the EU's -- and especially Germany's - capital and technology.

Yes, Russia faces a long-term threat from China. Yet there is also the attraction of good trade relations between Russia and China, and also between China and Europe through Russia. And Russia might have realized that the US might not be as helpful to them as they initially thought, in which case their best bet is to join the European alliance and try to keep China as friendly as possible.

Thus, I do see a Franco/Russo/German alliance emerging, and the mutual interests of each of these three are sufficiently strong to hold them together at least for the time being.

[truth_seeker]

"Thus, I do see a Franco/Russo/German alliance emerging, and the mutual interests of each of these three are sufficiently strong to hold them together at least for the time being."

Parse this. What does it mean to a German worker, faced with hoping Russians will replace Americans, as customers for Mercedes, BMWs, VWs and Audis?

The USSR collapsed because it didn't have a strong enough civilian economy to compete in an arms race with us.

The European countries which have sided with the US include Britain, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Poland and virtually ALL of the old east bloc soviet satellites.

The other side is Germany, France and Belgium.

Japan, the second largest economy in the world is in the US orbit. Add in small (but geographically, strategically important) anglo elements of Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

Russians, Chinese, Pakis, Afghanis DON'T presently buy Mercedes autos. Americans do.

[Stefan Stackhouse]

Yes, but with the exception of a very few places like Cuba and N. Korea, we do not cut off our trade with other countries, even if they are adversaries. Witness the trade we have with China. France, Germany, and Russia have observed this, and concluded that they are free to move against the US politically with very little, if any, downside economically. We are just too nice -- or too unwilling to let political considerations get in the way of our economic interests.

[colorado tanker]

"Thus, I do see a Franco/Russo/German alliance emerging, and the mutual interests of each of these three are sufficiently strong to hold them together at least for the time being."

T'would appear so.

[advocate10]

"Invading Iraq is SECONDARY..."

I thought that's what they said. Guess I'll have to read it again.

[sperz]

1 out of 7 jobs in Germany depend on the success of the automobile industry (1997). Almost 60% of german produced automobiles are exported.

Some export statistics can be found here:

http://www.vda.de/de/aktuell/statistik/jahreszahlen/export/index.html

In the long term though I believe Russia has a bigger potential to become a viable commercial parnter for Germany, even in regards to autos, than US. Protectionist policies (and american consumer culture) ensures the US made products' domestic dominance. American consumer market is saturated with "luxury" products - Russia's is expanding. In addition to this Russia has a surplus of oil, the US hasn't. The quid pro quo could be too tempting for Germany I suspect.