Posted on 03/05/2003 10:13:01 AM PST by Stand Watch Listen
Should The U.S. Military Increase Its End Strength To Meet Present And Future Operations And Contingencies?
YES
By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.
More demands are placed on American servicemembers as deployment frequency and length continue to increase. Operations tempo doesn't appear to be slowing anytime soon, and neither does the continued reliance on National Guard and Reserve troops, who are participating in missions on a larger scale than ever.In this framework, some think current U.S. troop strength is too low while others believe it's sufficient. Frank Gaffney and Loren Thompson discuss the issue.
The debate over whether the United States needs more military forces feels like, as Yogi Berra once said, "déjà vu all over again." After all, I spent the 1990s arguing against the deep reductions in force structure that were the centerpiece of bipartisan efforts to cash in the so-called peace dividend. I warned repeatedly that we were in what would later be recognized as an interwar period, one like the last century's early 1930s when another war seemed unimaginable and the Western democracies foolishly disarmed - even as what Winston Churchill later called "the Gathering Storm" ominously developed in Europe and East Asia.
For example, in 1991, I sharply disagreed when then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell declared, shortly after defeating Saddam Hussein's Iraq in Operation Desert Storm, "I am running out of enemies." He felt unable to justify retaining anything like our globe-straddling Cold War military in a post-Cold War world. I argued that, because Saddam was left in power, he would eventually be back at our throats and that, if history is any guide, others would be emboldened by what they perceived to be our diminished might.
I also was among those who viewed as incredible the claims made by Defense secretaries Les Aspin, Bill Perry, and William Cohen to the effect that the Clinton administration's defense posture continued to support a strategy of winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. It was obvious to me, and presumably to prospective enemies, that the "swing" forces that afforded such a capability were what was sacrificed when the armed forces were cut from 2.1 million men and women under arms to roughly 1.4 million.
I found even more preposterous assertions to the effect that the United States could maintain sufficient forces to meet its worldwide responsibilities with defense budgets well below $200 billion a year.
One could be forgiven for expecting that the news these days would mean that the need for significantly greater U.S. military force structure and capabilities is no longer debatable, that the requirement for being able to fight and win on two fronts simultaneously now is so clear as to silence even the most unreconstructed critics.
Today, after all, we are confronting the real-world circumstances of dealing concurrently with an actual global conflict with al-Qaida and other terrorist networks and the imminent prospect of a full-blown war with Iraq. Meanwhile, a nuclear crisis has erupted on the Korean Peninsula that may precipitate military conflict there. And the nation is asking its armed forces to shoulder a growing burden with respect to defending the American homeland.
The truth of the matter is that our armed services are stretched to the breaking point, using people and equipment in an unsustainable way. And, despite Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's recent reaffirmation of our declared goal of being able to fight and occupy the capital of one enemy while defeating another one elsewhere, it is no secret that we currently lack the capability to execute this strategy fully.
To be sure, improvements in the lethality of our weapons contemplated to flow from the Bush-Rumsfeld plans for transforming America's armed forces can compensate, to some extent, for having an unduly downsized military. In particular, the outstanding performance of small numbers of U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan points to the promise inherent in combining advanced technology and the extraordinary skills of highly trained warriors.
Such state-of-the-art equipment must be made available in sufficient numbers, however - something that present and projected Pentagon funding levels do not guarantee. In fact, most of the increases in defense spending approved to date and sought for the future are allocated to defraying the costs of greatly intensified operations.
History has shown that the world is a safer place when American power is preeminent and that, when that power is perceived to be in decline or inadequate, enemies are encouraged to act aggressively against our friends and interests. Had we not fallen prey during the 1990s, yet again, to the siren's song of reckless disarmament, we might not be facing the dangers confronting us now. We certainly would have been better positioned to contend with them, and at much less cost, than is the case now that we must rebuild our military force structure for that purpose.
Should The U.S. Military Increase Its End Strength To Meet Present And Future Operations And Contingencies?
NO
By Loren Thompson
More demands are placed on American servicemembers as deployment frequency and length continue to increase. Operations tempo doesn't appear to be slowing anytime soon, and neither does the continued reliance on National Guard and Reserve troops, who are participating in missions on a larger scale than ever.In this framework, some think current U.S. troop strength is too low while others believe it's sufficient. Frank Gaffney and Loren Thompson discuss the issue.
America began 2003 facing the possibility of three different military conflicts: war in Iraq, war on the Korean Peninsula, and a global campaign against terrorism. That's a far cry from the "end of history" some observers were predicting when communism collapsed a dozen years ago.
With so many contingencies arising, some believe our military forces have become overextended. The active duty force of about 1.4 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen has shrunk by about a third from the force of 2.1 million warriors that existed during Operation Desert Storm. The Ready Reserve has shrunk considerably too, from 1.6 million to 1.2 million.
However, these trends do not make a convincing case for increasing the number of personnel under arms. A review of military threats, requirements, and management practices suggests there are better ways to prepare for the challenges ahead.
To begin, the security threats America faces today are much diminished from those it faced in the Cold War. Russia is now a democracy, and its former Eastern European allies are clamoring to join NATO. China is gradually evolving toward a market economy.
The threats that remain are not imposing, at least in conventional military terms. If you add up the military spending of every country that poses a danger to America, the total barely equals a tenth of the billion dollars America spends every day on defense. And while some rogue states are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their arsenals look trivial compared with the thousands of nuclear warheads commanded by the former Soviet Union.
Not only is the threat smaller, but it is also different. Instead of massed conventional formations, it consists of proliferating biochemical capabilities, shadowy terrorists, and renegade regimes like the Taliban. Coping with such diversity may require new kinds of capabilities - better intelligence, special operations forces, missile defenses - but it isn't clear more people are the answer. Even if more people are needed, they are probably best deployed outside the military, as spies, law-enforcement officers, emergency responders, and so on.
While these threats have been unfolding, America's military arsenal has become far more powerful, precise, reliable, and affordable. During World War II, the Army Air Forces launched more than 800 sorties against one Japanese aircraft-engine plant and managed to achieve only minimal damage. Today, a stealthy b-2 bomber equipped with satellite-guided joint-direct attack munitions could shut down half a dozen such factories in a single sortie. A carrier air wing can precisely target 700 aim points a day in any weather.
U.S. military technology is advancing at an unprecedented pace, far surpassing the capabilities of any prospective adversary. The leverage provided by the F/A-22 fighter, the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, and a hundred other examples of information-age innovation more than compensates for any reduction in forces. So force structure and head count have become poor measures of military capability.
In fact, force structure may impede gains in war-fighting capacity. The high cost of personnel under the all-volunteer force has been a key factor in slowing the pace at which new technology is purchased for the force. As the military grows increasingly technology-intensive, the quality of personnel - their technical proficiency and professionalism - has become more important to victory than quantity.
Another reason for doubting whether more warriors are needed is the persistence of outdated practices in managing military personnel. Frequent changes in duty stations and responsibilities undercut efficient use of the force, as does the insistence on organic performance of prosaic services readily available from other sources. In the Army, an active duty force of nearly half a million personnel yields fewer than 300,000 soldiers actually available for deployment on any given day.
Finally, there is the question of how to pay for any increase in forces. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the federal government will run a deficit of nearly a billion dollars a day in fiscal 2003, not counting Social Security trust funds. A major increase in military head count thus is not affordable unless there is a truly urgent need. That need cannot be said to exist today, although there is a case for managing existing personnel more effectively.
Reallocate ALL foreign aid money to the military.
Amen.
To occupy Iraq, Iran, SA, Syria,Pakistan and NK (which will unquestionably be required) we need an army of at least ten million.
375,000 males, even if each one was John Rambo, just is not going to cut it.
Its worse than that. Of the 375,000 only about 20% are shooters...
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.