Posted on 03/15/2003 3:44:32 PM PST by Indy Pendance
NEW YORK - The U.N. Security Council has lived through decades of sterile Cold War shouting matches ended by vetoes, a Korean War approved only with the Soviets out of the room, and French and British defiance of the council with their 1956 invasion of Egypt.
But no previous crisis was as threatening to the established diplomatic order as the bitter public battle pitting the French and Germans against the Americans and British over whether to make war on Iraq (news - web sites), say veteran U.N. officials and foreign policy watchers.
Almost as surprising has been the American determination to exercise power regardless of world opinion, and the resistance of many nations to the U.S. agenda — which together threaten a collapse of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
"The debate is only half about Iraq. The other half is about how a world with a single superpower will work," said Sir Brian Urquhart, a retired U.N. undersecretary-general.
"Some countries think that the purpose of the Council is to restrain the world's 'hyperpower,'" said Ed Luck, a professor at Columbia University's School of International Affairs and ex-president of the U.N. Association of the USA.
As a stage for dramatic public diplomacy, the Security Council has gone through four distinct acts in its 58 years.
ACT I: Fleeting Trust
After the creation of the United Nations (news - web sites) in 1945, a year or two of relative cooperation disintegrated into a Cold War superpower deadlock. The change is illustrated by the fate of a U.S. proposal in 1946, when America had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, to turn them over to a Security Council subcommittee if other nations would also transfer control of their nuclear materials.
Moscow demanded that America turn over its nuclear weapons first; Washington insisted that other nations cede control of their atomic programs before it disarmed. The plan fizzled in the thickening atmosphere of the Cold War.
ACT II: A Veto Settles Any Disagreement
In the four-decade second act, said Luck, "a series of Cold War crises were shouted back and forth" but a council deadlock and a veto were always expected, leaving little suspense.
Since 1946, 252 vetoes have been cast in the Security Council, 238 of them in the Cold War years.
The Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, have used the veto more than any other country, 117 times — mostly during the Cold War.
The United States is second with 73. Since 1990, America has cast more Security Council vetoes than any country, many of them to block censure of Israel, a longtime ally.
But Moscow fumbled one of its most important veto opportunities.
In January 1950, under instructions from Stalin, the Soviet ambassador walked out of the council to protest the seating of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Chinese government, in exile on Taiwan, in China's Security Council seat.
The Soviets were still absent — and unable to veto — in June when the Security Council ordered North Korea (news - web sites) to cease its invasion of South Korea (news - web sites) and approved a 22-nation U.N. Command for the mostly American troops sent to repel the northern invaders.
Today's trans-Atlantic split on the council most resembles the Suez Crisis of 1956 when French and British troops, in cahoots with the Israelis, invaded Egypt to seize the Suez Canal.
The United States and Soviet Union turned to the Security Council to try to untangle the mess, but the French and British vetoed resolutions calling for their withdrawal. So the United States used a little-known loophole that allows the U.N. General Assembly to respond to threats to peace if the council is deadlocked.
The General Assembly voted for French and British withdrawal and sent U.N. monitors to oversee the pullout. Britain did retreat — and France reluctantly agreed — but London acted more in fear of oil shortages due to an Egyptian boycott than in respect for the United Nations.
ACT III: Tea for Five
As the Cold War wound down in 1989, British U.N. Ambassador Sir Crispin Tickell took advantage of the thaw to organize the "tea party," a series of informal meetings of the five permanent Security Council members, called the P-5: Russia, China, the United States, Britain and France.
At these meetings, the East and West sorted out their disengagement from proxy wars, in one case granting independence to Namibia while South African occupation forces withdrew and Cuban expeditionary troops departed neighboring Angola.
The backstage meetings at P-5 diplomatic missions produced veto-proof resolutions that were then presented as a fait accompli, often to the annoyance of the 10 temporary council members.
America, Britain and France often set the agenda, persuading post-Soviet Russia to come on board. China's ambassador, diplomats recalled, often stood looking out the window and sipping tea while listening to the discussions. If he raised no objection, the P-5 had a unified resolution.
The 1990 and 1991 series of resolutions presenting ultimatums to Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s Iraq after the invasion and occupation of Kuwait was the climax of P-5 diplomacy, helping build the Gulf War (news - web sites) coalition that lent legitimacy to Operation Desert Storm.
The effectiveness of the P-5 was sapped in the mid-1990s by the Security Council's ineffectual response to Serb aggression in the Balkans, its inaction during the Rwanda genocide, and its lack of resolve after Pakistani and U.S. peacekeepers were ambushed and killed in Somalia.
U.S. confidence in the council ebbed to the point where NATO (news - web sites) planes were dispatched to bomb Serb troops to protect Kosovar civilians in 1999, with the Security Council ignored until after the fact.
ACT IV: Bickering Onstage
The current breakdown of the U.S.-European alliance over Iraqi disarmament has astounded veteran U.N. watchers, who say it represents a new phase in council diplomacy — or lack of diplomacy.
"I can't think of anything quite like this," Luck said. "This is so unpredictable. It's a new set of actors."
Former U.N. official Richard N. Gardner, recalling decades of U.S.-European disputes over issues such as France's exit from NATO and U.S. basing of missiles on European soil, judged that NATO and the alliance would survive.
"I think this is as bad, or worse, than any of those," said Gardner, who at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the deputy assistance secretary of State for U.N. affairs. "This may be the roughest."
Jean Gazarian, a longtime U.N. official, has been astonished by the public rancor. "It's all happening in public. ... This is a very unusual departure," he said.
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EDITOR'S NOTE — Peter James Spielmann covered the United Nations from 1988-93.
So the United States used a little-known loophole that allows the U.N. General Assembly to respond to threats to peace if the council is deadlocked.The General Assembly voted for French and British withdrawal and sent U.N. monitors to oversee the pullout. Britain did retreat — and France reluctantly agreed — but London acted more in fear of oil shortages due to an Egyptian boycott than in respect for the United Nations.
Also, a nice short synopsis on the Suez Crisis.
Time to rock and roll.
5.56mm
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