Iranian Alert -- August 22, 2003 -- LIVE THREAD PING LIST

The Iranian Student Movement Up To The Minute Reports ^ | 8.22.2003 | DoctorZin

[DoctorZIn]

The regime is working hard to keep the news about the protest movment in Iran from being reported.

From jamming satellite broadcasts, to prohibiting news reporters from covering any demonstrations to shutting down all cell phones and even hiring foreign security to control the population, the regime is doing everything in its power to keep the popular movement from expressing its demand for an end of the regime.

These efforts by the regime, while successful in the short term, do not resolve the fundamental reasons why this regime is crumbling from within.

Iran is a country ready for a regime change. If you follow this thread you will witness, I believe, the transformation of a nation. This daily thread provides a central place where those interested in the events in Iran can find the best news and commentary.

Please continue to join us here, post your news stories and comments to this thread.

Thanks for all the help.

DoctorZin

[DoctorZIn]

Russian Government Approves Draft Agreement with Iran on Nuclear Fuel

August 22, 2003
The Associated Press
Steve Gutterman

MOSCOW -- The Russian Cabinet has approved a draft agreement requiring Iran to return to Russia all spent nuclear fuel from a reactor it is helping build in Iran, the Interfax news agency reported Friday.

Russia, which faces criticism from the United States over its nuclear cooperation with Iran, has said it will not ship any fuel for the reactor in the Persian Gulf city of Bushehr until an agreement stipulating that Russia must return spent fuel is in place.

Russia has been negotiating with Iran, with the goal of signing the agreement -- making it enforceable.

U.S. officials have said the agreement -- aimed at ensuring that Iran would not be able to get plutonium, which can be derived from reprocessing spent fuel from reactors -- would reduce Washington's concerns about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

Russian officials have been saying for months that they are close to signing the agreement. Iran's ambassador to Russia said in early June that Iran was ready to sign the agreement but that Russia needed to sort out internal obstacles linked to its environmental protection legislation.

U.S. officials have worried for years that Russia's $800 deal to build the reactor could help Iran develop nuclear weapons. Russian officials have said the fears are unfounded, but have showed signs recently that they may be becoming more cooperative with the United States on the issue.

Russia has urged Iran to sign a document allowing closer inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to ease concerns that may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons, it has not linked Iran's signing of the document to completion of the Bushehr plant.

http://www.nj.com/newsflash/international/index.ssf?/cgi-free/getstory_ssf.cgi?a0657_BC_Russia-Iran&&news&newsflash-international

[DoctorZIn]

U.S. Wants U.N. Security Council to Deal with Iran

August 22, 2003
Reuters
Carol Giacomo

WASHINGTON -- The United States, convinced Iran is deceiving the world about its nuclear ambitions, has launched a campaign to bring the issue before the U.N. Security Council, including a top official's trip next week to Moscow.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton, the Bush administration's senior non-proliferation official, will urge Russia and other countries to lay the Iranian nuclear issues at the feet of the international community's premier body, U.S. officials told Reuters on Friday.

One official said Russia, under U.S. pressure to halt cooperation on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, has postponed delivery of critical reactor fuel until spring 2004.

He dismissed a report by the official IRNA news agency on Friday that Iran was ready to sign a protocol to return nuclear waste to Russia. Such a move could undercut U.S. charges that Tehran is bent on producing nuclear weapons.

"The Iranians have been 'ready' to sign a spent-fuel take-back agreement for over a year," he said.

Bolton, a leading hard-liner, will be in Moscow when the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is expected to issue its second report on Iran's nuclear activities.

His visit also coincides with the launch of six-party talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear program.

While Bolton's Moscow discussions likely will include North Korea, Iran is the main focus. The IAEA governing board plans to meet in Vienna on Sept. 8 to consider next steps on Iran.

Experts say Iran could be one to three years from having nuclear arms.

COOPERATION LACKING

In its first report last June, the IAEA rapped Tehran for failing to comply with nuclear safeguards.

Since then, U.N. inspectors have found enriched uranium in environmental samples taken in Iran. This could mean Tehran has enriched uranium without telling the IAEA, heightening suspicions of nuclear arms activity despite Iran's denials.

The second report is expected to "show a continuing lack of cooperation by Iran (with the IAEA) and shifting stories on what they did or didn't do," a U.S. official told Reuters.

Iran has offered no proof of its claim that its nuclear activities support a civilian power program, he said.

Also, Tehran still refuses to sign the "additional protocol" that would allow the IAEA to make more intrusive snap inspections. It told Britain, Germany and France in a recent letter that certain conditions were required first, he said.

President Bush in June declared he "will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon" in Iran.

Although Iran let IAEA inspectors check various sites, U.S. officials insist cooperation has been very grudging.

"It's a pattern of behavior and deception that is entirely consistent with the idea that they are trying to conceal a nuclear weapons program. That's why we think its time to move the issue from the IAEA board of governors to the Security Council," which could impose sanctions, a U.S. official said.

Although Russia and key European allies increasingly have come to share U.S. concerns, U.S. officials said it is unclear if they are ready join Washington in elevating the Iran nuclear issue to the Security Council.

"But we think the circumstances and the timing and the urgency of the matter are such that we are making a major effort," the U.S. official said.

Despite pressuring Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, Russia continues to work on Bushehr and lay plans for possible future contracts to build other nuclear facilities for Iran.

Earlier this year, Bolton queried the Russians on their intentions and was told "it was just a broad political decision -- there's not decision to sign anything." But in view of fresh reports of Russia-Iran dealmaking, Bolton is expected to raise the issue again when he is in Moscow, U.S. officials said.

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=3324570

[DoctorZIn]

U.S. Wants U.N. Security Council to Deal with Iran

August 22, 2003
Reuters
Carol Giacomo

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/968433/posts?page=22#22

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail me”

[DoctorZIn]

Iranian Officials Raped Reporter, Then Killed Her

August 22, 2003
NY Sun
Adan Daifallah

WASHINGTON — Iranian officials raped Canadian-Iranian journalist Zahra Kazemi before she died and put chemicals in her body to speed up its decomposition, according to a lawyer who recently visited Iran and an opposition group.

A Toronto-based lawyer, Hamid Mojtahedi, told Radio Farda, the American-funded radio station beamed into Iran, that Kazemi was raped by intelligence agents who worked with Tehran prosecutor Said Mortazavi, a man referred to as the “Butcher of the Press” by Iranian dissidents.

Mr. Mojtahedi, who traveled to Iran last month with a delegation from the Canadian chapter of the group Lawyers Without Borders, also told the radio station that a forensic autopsy of Kazemi’s body might be impossible since Iranian authorities injected it with chemicals to speed its decomposition.

The Student Movement Coordination Committee for Democracy in Iran, a dissident organization based in Dallas, made same claims in a report yesterday.

The Canadian government, Kazemi’s mother and son have demanded answers from Tehran about what really happened to the journalist, and these latest claims throw Iran’s previous explanations into further question. Requests to have her body exhumed and sent back to Canada have been refused; Canada recalled its ambassador from Tehran in protest.

Kazemi, an Iranian-born photojournalist who lived in Montreal, died in a Tehran hospital July 14 after being arrested and branded a spy by police after being caught taking pictures outside of a prison in northern Iran on June 23.

The Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran’s official news outlet, originally claimed she died of a “brain stroke”; days later, a presidentially appointed investigating committee of Cabinet ministers said she was beaten and died from a fractured skull, and then Iran’s vice president, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, said, “The murder was caused by brain hemorrhage due to a blow inflicted on her.”

France Bureau, a spokeswoman for the Canadian foreign minister, Bill Graham, told The New York Sun that the Canadian government is “looking into” the new claims. Canada had unsuccessfully requested to be a part of the investigation into Kazemi’s death.

“We asked to participate or help in the investigation but they’re doing it on their own. We’ll see what the report says when it comes out,” said Ms. Bureau, the spokeswoman.

Calls to Kazemi’s son, Stephan Hachemi, who lives in Montreal, were not returned yesterday.

The handling of the Kazemi case has angered Iranian democracy activists who say the Canadian government is being too deferential to Iran.The Islamic Republic is conducting an investigation of the journalist’s death without the involvement of Canadian or international authorities.

“Letting Iran investigate this crime is like allowing a murderer to be his own judge and jury,” said Manouchehr Ganji, a long-time opponent of the mullahs. “They’ve been doing this all these years.The whole world has been watching as a passive observer.”

Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi, an Iranian dissident whose father, Iranian journalist Siamak Pourzand, is in jail in Tehran, said that it is unfortunate it took someone with dual nationality like Kazemi to die before the Western world realized the way the “axis of evil” regime treats artists and journalists.

“On top of their disregard for journalists, they do not legitimately accept dual nationality. Someone with a dual nationality has to be killed for the free world to notice,” Ms. Zand-Bonazzi said.

Meanwhile, Agence France Presse reported that Iran’s former ambassador to Argentina, Hadi Soleimanpour, was arrested in northeast England in conjunction with the 1994 bombing of a Buenos Aires Jewish community center that killed 85 people.

Mr. Soleimanpour will appear before magistrates today at a central London court, Scotland Yard said in a press statement.

http://iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2003&m=08&d=22&a=11

[DoctorZIn]

Iran, player or rogue?

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - By David Albright & Corey Hinderstein
Aug 22, 2003

The deadline is now. Will Iran come clean about its nuclear doings?

Iran has been secretly developing the capability to make nuclear weapons—in particular, developing the wherewithal to produce separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Since they first learned of Iran’s secret activities last year, officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been concerned that Iran has been violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and they have struggled to convince the country to make its nuclear activities more transparent. Citing Iran’s failure to disclose various nuclear materials, facilities, and activities, on June 19 a “Chairwoman’s Statement” summing up the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors criticized Iran for its failure to fulfill its safeguards obligations under the NPT.

Worries about Iranian nuclear activities were heightened in early July after Iran conducted a successful test of the Shahab-3 missile, which can carry a 2,200-pound payload as far as 1,500 kilometers. The timing of Iran’s announcement about the Shahab-3 and the size of its payload suggest that the missile is intended to carry a nuclear warhead.

Although the IAEA acknowledged that Iran has taken some cooperative steps since its facilities at Natanz were first revealed a year ago, it called upon Iran to take additional steps, including answering additional questions about alleged undeclared uranium enrichment activities, uranium conversion work, and programs involving heavy water.

As for whether Iran will comply, Mohammed El Baradei, the IAEA’s director general, said after the board meeting, “the jury is still out.” He expressed the hope that by the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting in September, the agency would be in a “much better position to make a judgment” about it.

The board wants Iran to “promptly and unconditionally” implement an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. Unless the protocol is implemented, the IAEA said in a safeguards implementation report, it will have limited ability to provide credible assurances that Iran’s nuclear program does not include a secret nuclear weapons component.
In an unusual move, the chair’s statement encouraged Iran to delay introducing nuclear material into the Natanz pilot uranium enrichment plant, calling the delay a “confidence-building measure.”

Although the statement did not call on Iran to end the program, there is growing support for the view that acceptance of the protocol may not be enough to resolve the nuclear issue. Iran may need to abandon or sharply limit its construction or operation of facilities that can be used to produce separated plutonium or HEU. Unless it is stopped, Iran will eventually be able to rapidly break out of the NPT, creating an even more dangerous situation in the Middle East.

Iran’s reaction

Iran’s immediate reaction was to reject the notion that it had a nuclear weapons program. It intends, Iranian officials said, to install some 7,000 megawatts of nuclear electrical generating capacity over the next 20 years, which will require a substantial investment in a wide range of peaceful nuclear activities. Iran described its level of transparency as typical, and reiterated that it had been cooperating fully with the IAEA and would continue to do so.

Iran rejected the request to implement the additional protocol without a quid pro quo. On June 29, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi told the Associated Press, “When Iran signs the protocol, others should take positive steps,” including providing nuclear assistance. Iranian officials want additional power reactors, or at least a U.S. commitment to stop its attempts to block Iran’s acquisition of nuclear power reactors from Russia or elsewhere. Some Iranian officials have implied that more reactors may not be enough, that Iran wants access to all peaceful technology, including sensitive fuel-cycle facilities like enrichment plants and plutonium separation facilities.

In late February, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), told the Boston Globe’s Elizabeth Neuffer that Iran wanted Germany to fulfill its prior obligation to provide low-enriched uranium fuel, part of the deal when Germany was building the Bushehr power reactor. Germany decided over a decade ago not to finish the reactor, but Aghazadeh complained that Iran now has to pay to get the fuel from Russia.

Truth and consequences

Although the United States did not succeed in its attempt to convince other nations that Iran had violated the NPT sufficiently to warrant a harsh international response, the chair’s June statement represents a dramatic international rejection of Iran’s demand to receive something in return for signing the protocol. Most nations resisted taking action based on the U.S. evidence, which they viewed as circumstantial. They were particularly hesitant given the widespread skepticism about U.S. intelligence information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. But the United States did manage to gain support for putting additional pressure on Iran to be fully transparent, with an implicit deadline of the September board of governors meeting.

Russia, Japan, and the European Union have historically rejected the U.S. policy of isolating Iran, choosing engagement instead. But they are now all firm in demanding that Iran sign the protocol and fully answer the IAEA’s questions.

Before the recent crisis, the EU had a policy of engagement with Iran known as “conditional dialogue,” which aimed at improving trade and cooperation, provided Iran made improvements in the areas of nonproliferation, terrorism, and cooperation with the Middle East peace process. However, EU foreign ministers emphasized in a statement on June 16 that Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA and “implement urgently and unconditionally” the additional protocol, declaring that trade talks and the nuclear issue were “interdependent.” British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw traveled to Tehran in late June with a message that unless Iran implements the protocol unconditionally and quickly, “confidence will not be improved, and the international community will be profoundly reluctant to lift the sanctions.”

Russia has been Iran’s main nuclear supplier, selling Iran the $800 million Bushehr reactor, which is scheduled for completion in 2005. Russia is expected to start sending fuel for the first loading in mid-2004, after it has obtained an agreement from Iran to send spent fuel back to Russia. Russia, embarrassed by all the revelations of secret nuclear activities, has also urged Iran to be more transparent.

In May and June, President Vladimir Putin was reported to have told the United States and Britain that Russia would not provide fuel for Bushehr unless Iran implemented the safeguards protocol. Although subsequent messages from senior Russian officials appeared to contradict Putin’s statement, the overall message from Russia is that Iran must be significantly more transparent.

One Western official pointed out that Russia could hesitate to finalize its spent fuel agreement with Iran, and without it, not send fuel for Bushehr. Or, he said, Russia could delay the shipments, permitting it to exert pressure on Iran without formally conditioning the completion of Bushehr on Iran signing the protocol.

Japan is also putting pressure on Iran. Senior foreign ministry officials visited Tehran in mid-July to convey the message. Media reports did not indicate any significant breakthroughs. Japan has so far resisted U.S. pressure to link Iran’s signing of the protocol with its current negotiations with Iran to develop the large Azadegan oil field in southwest Iran. Japan fears that if it makes such a linkage, Russia or China will win the contract instead, undermining Japan’s objective of securing long-term oil supplies. Still, lack of progress on transparency may lead Japan to slow down negotiations or take other actions.

Although U.S. efforts did not convince its allies to cut off economic or nuclear assistance, if Iran refuses to address the IAEA’s concerns by the end of summer, in September the board of governors may refer the issue to the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council could then decide to impose economic sanctions. Many states would feel compelled to reduce trade with Iran or halt joint energy projects.

The latest safeguards report

At the heart of the current dispute is the IAEA’s report on Iran’s implementation of safeguards, issued publicly in June 2003. The IAEA describes a series of developments and concerns that were the basis of the board’s finding that Iran had failed to meet its obligations. This report also provides the most detailed publicly available information about Iran’s extensive nuclear activities.

Iran has built significant parts of its nuclear program in secret over the last decade. Aghazadeh has said that Iran accelerated its uranium enrichment and heavy-water production programs in about 1998.

Iran revealed many of its activities to the IAEA only after they were revealed publicly in the last half of 2002, and the IAEA suspects that Iran may have additional undeclared nuclear activities or facilities. As a result, the inspectors have asked Iran for considerably more information and access than they normally do without a protocol in effect. But they have not yet asked formally to make a “special inspection” at any site, preferring to seek voluntary cooperation instead.

Gas centrifuges

The most important unresolved issue centers on Iran’s gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, which El Baradei characterized as “sophisticated” when he visited Natanz in February. Following that visit, the IAEA asked for details about the program.

The IAEA has been trying to understand the centrifuge program’s history—the experiments Iran conducted to prove its centrifuges, and the sources of its technology, including foreign procurement. Iran has provided written information, permitted inspectors wide access at the Natanz facilities, and allowed the IAEA to take environmental samples at Natanz and other centrifuge-

related locations. These samples are critical to modern inspections because they can detect minute traces of enriched uranium and plutonium. The results of the environmental samples were not available by the June board meeting, but on July 18 and 19 the media reported that an environmental sample taken at Natanz in the winter or spring contained traces of enriched uranium. The enriched uranium was probably brought to the site inadvertently on equipment or tools from elsewhere, perhaps from an overseas supplier or from an undeclared Iranian facility. Other samples from Natanz have also been found to contain enriched uranium. Results from other sites have shown no enriched uranium.

Iran had told the IAEA it had not enriched any uranium, despite having installed a large number of centrifuges in a cascade at the Natanz pilot plant. Normally, a program would operate single-centrifuge “test stands” that would enrich small amounts of uranium to test and optimize centrifuge designs. Iran declared that although it began research and development about five years ago, it depended on extensive modeling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors with and without inert gases. These tests were conducted at several locations, including Amir Khabir University and the IAEO in Tehran, without using any nuclear material. Iran said it intended to start single-machine tests with uranium at the Natanz pilot plant this summer.

This approach is very unusual, and the IAEA doubts that Iran could be so far along in the development process without enriching any uranium. Absent considerably more detail—possibly including the extent of information and expertise gained from abroad—the IAEA will have a difficult time accepting Iran’s statement.

Based on open source information about possible enrichment activities at the Kalaya Electric Company in Tehran, the IAEA asked to visit it in February and take environmental samples to determine if any enriched uranium was produced at the site. Iran responded that the facility is a watch factory, but that it also makes certain centrifuge components. It initially denied the inspectors’ requests, claiming that it did not have to allow access until it implemented the protocol.

Iran subsequently reconsidered and allowed the IAEA limited access in March and full access in May, but it refused to permit environmental sampling. Iran still refused to allow sampling during El Baradei’s visit in July.

In March, the IAEA was denied access to two rooms or workshops. A senior Western official interviewed in late March worried that Iran had denied access to allow time to clear out any evidence of uranium enrichment. He suspected that the rooms had held centrifuges, perhaps in a cascade, and had enriched uranium. According to U.S. media and experts quoting Bush administration officials, satellite images showed trucks going in and out of the site, implying that the rooms had been sanitized. The images, however, were inconclusive upon close scrutiny, according to a member of the media who asked senior officials about them. Because of all the suspicions, environmental sampling may be the only way to determine conclusively whether the site has enriched uranium.

The IAEA has asked to visit additional sites, some of which were selected based on information provided in May by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group. The group identified two sites west of Tehran that it said were related to small-scale gas centrifuge development work, which, when finished, could serve as alternative locations for cascades. According to a senior Western official, two of the people listed by the opposition group as involved at these sites are known to be involved in Iran’s gas centrifuge program. Commercial satellite images show that at least one of the sites has extensive physical security.

Iran has told the IAEA that the sites are related to its nuclear organization, but are involved in agricultural and medical work—a description at odds with the high security seen at the sites. By mid-July, the inspectors had not visited or obtained sufficient information to make any judgments about their purpose.

Questions have also been raised about the uranium conversion facility that Iran is building at Esfahan. This plant is designed to make large quantities of uranium hexafluoride in addition to uranium dioxide and uranium tetrafluoride. Iran claims not to have operated any laboratory or pilot facilities before building this major plant. Because learning to make uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for a gas centrifuge plant, is not easy, some believe that Iran must have an undeclared pilot plant or have operated one in the past.

Additional issues

The safeguards report laid out other developments that contributed to the board’s finding that Iran failed to meet its safeguards obligations. These include:

An undeclared uranium import. In response to an IAEA request, Iran recently acknowledged that in 1991 it received from China 1,000 kilograms of natural uranium hexafluoride, 400 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride, and 400 kilograms of uranium dioxide. This material was stored at the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayam Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), located at the Tehran Research Center.

Iran said it did not have to report the import of a relatively small amount of natural uranium. The IAEA, however, said reporting was required for the material, its subsequent processing, and the locations where it was received, processed, and stored. Iran had provided none of this information until the IAEA asked for it. To make matters worse, China provided the IAEA with information about its export only after repeated inquiries.

Undeclared uranium metal production. Iran stated that it converted almost all of the uranium tetrafluoride into uranium metal at JHL. The production of uranium metal is unusual and can indicate a nuclear weapons effort that uses metallic forms of natural uranium or highly enriched uranium. The IAEA has asked Iran about its planned use for the material. Iranian officials have stated that the purpose of the uranium metal is as shielding against radiation in containers that store irradiated fuel or materials. Such a use is suspect, however, because the uranium metal appears too refined for shielding material.

Natural uranium target production. Iran said that it had used some of the uranium oxide to make targets for irradiation in the Tehran research reactor. The targets were then sent to another Tehran facility to separate iodine 131 in a lead-shielded cell. Such an activity is legitimate; iodine is useful in medical and civilian research applications, and the Iranians involved in this work have published their results in open technical reports.

The question is whether plutonium was also separated from these targets, or whether other undeclared targets were produced, irradiated, and processed to obtain separated plutonium. Such activities would allow Iran to learn to separate plutonium, a necessary step in using plutonium in nuclear weapons.

Missing uranium hexafluoride. Iran stated that it did not process any of its imported uranium hexafluoride, and specifically, that it did not use any in gas centrifuge testing. However, nearly 2 kilograms are missing from the storage cylinders. Iran claimed that the material had leaked out of the cylinders more than a year earlier.

The IAEA is still investigating this claim. A small centrifuge testing program would be expected to use about 10–15 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, but it could get by on 1–2 kilograms. And the fact that Iran used much of its imported uranium dioxide and tetrafluoride makes it harder to accept the possibility that it did not use any of the hexafluoride.

A heavy-water reactor. In May, Iran told the IAEA for the first time that it intended to build a 40-megawatt-thermal heavy-water reactor at Arak. This is the site of the heavy-water production facility whose existence was first revealed publicly by an Iranian opposition group in August 2002. According to a senior Western official, reactor construction is expected to start next year. Iran also announced that it intends to begin building a fuel-fabrication plant for the reactor at Esfahan later this year.

Iran has said that this reactor is part of a long-term program to manufacture heavy-water power reactors. But long before any such plan might be realized, the reactor at Arak would produce 8–10 kilograms of plutonium annually, or enough for about two nuclear weapons each year. Before it could use any of the plutonium in a nuclear weapon, however, it would first have to separate the plutonium from the irradiated fuel. Although Iran is not reported to have stated that it has conducted any plutonium separation activities, the irradiation and processing of natural uranium targets increases suspicion that Iran is researching plutonium separation.

The Natanz enrichment plant

The IAEA report includes new information about Iran’s gas centrifuge program at Natanz. This site houses a pilot gas centrifuge plant and a much larger, production-scale centrifuge facility.

The pilot plant is slated to hold about 1,000 centrifuges by the end of 2003. In February, it had about 160 centrifuges operating without uranium. Iran said it planned to introduce uranium in June. Despite the board’s request, Iran introduced uranium into single test centrifuges soon after the board meeting. Initially, at least, Iran planned to use another safeguarded source of uranium hexafluoride in these early tests—a small stock that has been maintained under safeguards, acquired years ago from a European country.

The imminent operation of this plant alarmed the board of governors and led to the request that Iran delay the use of uranium. The IAEA had not had sufficient time to implement a safeguards plan for this important facility, another reason why it asked for a delay.

According to senior Western officials, the current Iranian centrifuge has a separative capacity, or ability to enrich uranium, of about 2 separative work units (swu) per year, per centrifuge. Media reports of significantly higher capacities are erroneous, according to these knowledgeable officials.

Because the centrifuge uses an aluminum rotor with a diameter of about 100 millimeters, this capacity would be consistent with a supercritical, optimized aluminum-rotor machine of the “G2-type.” Gernot Zippe was involved in building this type of machine in Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is composed of two almost 50-centimeter-long aluminum rotor tubes connected by a bellows.

Media reports state that Iran got design assistance from Pakistan or from individual Pakistanis more than a decade ago. Iran’s centrifuge design is similar to the type that Pakistan obtained secretly in the mid-1970s from Urenco facilities in the Netherlands. The G2 and its predecessor G1-type aluminum machines, developed by Zippe and his colleagues, were not very efficient. Zippe’s G1-type machine had a capacity of about 0.6 swu per year, implying an output of 1.2 swu per year for the G2 design. Iran is believed to have optimized or otherwise increased capacity to about 2 swu per year.

Although the pilot plant is relatively small, it could produce as much as 10–12 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium a year, depending on the “tails assay” (the fraction of uranium 235 remaining in the waste) and the manner in which the centrifuges are organized into cascades. Because centrifuges are flexible, even if the cascades are arranged to produce only low-enriched uranium, weapon-grade uranium can be produced by “batch recycling” the end product back into the feed point of the cascade until the desired level of enrichment is reached. Thus, by the end of 2005, this plant could produce 15–20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, enough for a nuclear weapon.

According to the IAEA safeguards report, Iran plans to start installing centrifuges in the main enrichment halls of the Natanz facility in 2005, after testing and confirming its centrifuge design in the pilot plant. Eventually, these cascade halls will hold 50,000 centrifuges, according to the report. No project completion date was provided, but indications are that it would take five to 10 years to install this number of centrifuges.

Separative capacity of later centrifuges would probably increase, but Iran may not succeed in installing all 50,000. In any case, based on the current plan, we project that the Natanz facility will eventually have a capacity of at least 100,000 swu per year. This is roughly the capacity to provide annual reloads of one Bushehr reactor, but far short of the enriched uranium needed to provide fuel for all the nuclear power reactors Iran plans to build over the next 20 years.

The same capacity would be sufficient to produce about 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15–20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for roughly 25–30 nuclear weapons per year.

If Iran operated Natanz to make low-enriched uranium fuel until it decided to make weapon-grade uranium, it would be able to rapidly enrich the low-enriched material to weapon-grade. For example, if Natanz was operating at full capacity and recycled low-enriched uranium (5 percent uranium 235) as “feed,” the facility could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in a few days.

What should be done

In the worst case, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by the end of 2005. Under many scenarios, it could obtain and significantly expand its nuclear arsenal in the second half of the decade by producing both HEU and plutonium. Although some would argue that a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem can be delayed, the longer the wait for a solution, the more extensive Iran’s program will become and the harder, politically, for Iran to reverse itself.

The international community is justified in demanding that Iran become fully transparent as soon as possible. No one can dispute Iran’s growing capabilities to make nuclear weapons. Certainly, increased nuclear transparency, including answering the questions raised by the IAEA in its June safeguards report and implementing the protocol, is both important and necessary. In addition, Iran’s implementation of the protocol would severely complicate any effort to conduct clandestine nuclear fuel-cycle activities and could act as a deterrent against significant clandestine activities.

Toward those goals, El Baradei met in Tehran with senior Iranian officials on July 9. He was armed with results from IAEA environmental sampling of various locations in Iran.

Although Iranian officials promised cooperation and reported positively about their meetings with El Baradei, he left without gaining a commitment from Iran to sign the protocol or to resolve the remaining safeguards issues. Senior safeguards officials who remained were also unsuccessful in achieving any major breakthroughs and returned to Vienna earlier than scheduled.

Nonetheless, the IAEA received a pledge from the senior leadership of the Iranian government that it would reach a decision by the end of July on whether it would agree to the IAEA’s proposed actions and a schedule for resolving each major safeguards issue. These issues center on Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, allegations of undeclared enrichment of uranium, the ability to take environmental samples at Kalaya Electric and elsewhere, the role of uranium metal in Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle, and its heavy-water production and reactor programs. The IAEA needs Iran’s full and prompt cooperation so that it can finish its work and send a positive report to the board of governors in late August.

The IAEA has also told Iran that it must sign and at least provisionally implement the protocol soon.

If Iran does not meet the IAEA’s conditions, the board of governors will be under intense pressure to send the issue to the U.N. Security Council. That step could result in the imposition of punitive measures, including economic sanctions by key nations or the Security Council. These actions might well lead Iran to reconsider and accept the IAEA’s conditions.

But assuming Iran agrees to all of the IAEA’s major conditions—which remains highly uncertain at the time of this writing—the controversy will not be over. The protocol is unlikely to be sufficient by itself to stop an emerging Iranian nuclear threat that could manifest itself if Iran renounced the NPT at some point in the future and began rapidly acquiring nuclear weapons. Because of the complex and dangerous security situation in the Middle East, an Iran perpetually on the brink of building nuclear weapons, even with advanced safeguards, poses too great a threat to regional and international security. Such a situation is likely to provoke its neighbors to seek nuclear weapons or improve their existing arsenals, significantly increase their conventional armaments, or obtain chemical or biological weapons. Predicting the outcome of such buildups is very difficult.

Iran cannot be expected to cancel its fuel-cycle programs unconditionally, though. Many nations would oppose any demand that it do so, and Iran can argue that having such facilities, if they are fully inspected, is completely legal under the NPT.

Coercive, unilateral options are undesirable and could be counterproductive, regardless of Iran’s choices. Military strikes against nuclear sites are unlikely to succeed, given the dispersed and advanced nature of the Iranian program. Such strikes would only serve to accelerate and expand Iran’s efforts to obtain a nuclear arsenal. In addition, a strategy of regime change may be unsuccessful, or could easily lead to a new government that also seeks nuclear weapons. The United States should decouple any proposed solution to the nuclear problem from regime change efforts and preventive military strikes.

The United States, in cooperation with its allies—particularly the EU, Japan, and Russia—needs to develop a set of incentives to entice Iran away from developing nuclear weapons capabilities. There are a wide variety of items that could be put into an incentive package—lifting economic sanctions, high-tech assistance, assurances of a nuclear fuel supply for the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and other energy or economic assistance.

Iran’s motivations for seeking nuclear weapons should be taken into account. Discussions should be considerably easier now, given the downfall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Such discussions could contribute to achieving a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. International efforts should focus on both preventing countries in the region from obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities, and seeking ways to eliminate such capabilities where they already exist. Inevitably, restraints on Israel’s nuclear capabilities make sense.

To achieve such a goal, the United States and its allies should seek to restart the Middle East regional arms control discussions that have been moribund since the mid-1990s. These discussions may have a greater chance of success with the inclusion of Iran and Iraq, two countries excluded from earlier talks.

Behind these inducements, the United States, the EU, Russia, and Japan must be willing to exert concerted and tough diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. Former Defense Secretary William Perry has called such efforts “coercive diplomacy” in the context of North Korea, but a similar strategy can be applied to Iran. Perry was quoted in a July 15, 2003 Washington Post article: “You have to offer something, but you have to have an iron fist behind your offer.”

With the protocol in place, a package of economic and political incentives, and reduced tensions with the United States and its neighbors, Iran would have no need or excuse to maintain a nuclear weapons capability. Because Iran has many motives to reduce its international isolation, it would have a difficult time resisting such a package.

David Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. Corey Hinderstein is a senior analyst at ISIS.

http://www.daneshjoo.org/generalnews/article/publish/article_1884.shtml

[DoctorZIn]

Iran, player or rogue?

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - By David Albright & Corey Hinderstein
Aug 22, 2003

The deadline is now. Will Iran come clean about its nuclear doings?

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/968433/posts?page=25#25

DoctorZin Note: Sorry this post is a large one, but important.

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail me”

[F14 Pilot]

US: Terrorists Entering Iraq From Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran
VOA News

22 Aug 2003, 23:33 UTC

A top U.S. diplomat says Washington is greatly concerned by the infiltration of foreign terrorists into Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made the comment in a Friday interview with the Arab language Al-Jazeera television network.

Mr. Armitage made it clear the United States is not saying the governments of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran are responsible for the infiltration. But he also said the terrorists are not being stopped at the borders.

U.S. officials have long suspected some terrorists have come through Syria and Iran, and have warned both countries against interference in Iraq. Saudi Arabia has not been previously singled out.

On Friday, U.S. General John Abizaid, the top U.S. military commander for the Persian Gulf region, said terrorism is becoming the number one security threat in Iraq. The general called Iraq "the center of the global war on terrorism."

General Abizaid also said a revived terrorist group, Ansar Al-Islam, is now firmly established in Baghdad. The group has been linked to the Al-Qaida network.

http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=C81E700D-0950-4F7D-AD033050450025AD

[F14 Pilot]

IS CUBA ABOUT DIVORCING IRANIAN AYATOLLAHS FOR BUSH?

WASHINGTON 21 Aug. (IPS) The Islamic Republic of Iran might lose one of his very few friends in the world, namely the Marxist regime of Cuba which, according to American officials, has officially informed them that Iranian embassy in Havana was the source of jamming programs by the US-based Iranian radio and television stations that are beamed to mainland Iran.

The jamming of Telstar-12, a commercial communications satellite orbiting at 15 degrees west, 22,000 miles above the Atlantic that carries programs from .....

http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2003/Aug-2003/satellite_jamming_21803.html

[F14 Pilot]

Bail denied to ex-Iranian diplomat implicated in Argentine bombing

Saturday, August 23, 2003
LONDON

A British court on Friday refused bail to a former Iranian diplomat sought in Argentina on charges of conspiring to murder 85 people killed in the bombing of a Jewish community center in 1994.
.
Hade Soleimanpour, 47-year-old former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, made a first, brief court appearance a day after he was arrested in Durham, northern England, where he is a student.
.
The Iranian government has several times denied any responsibility in the 1994 bombing.
.
Soleimanpour, casually dressed in khaki trousers and a white polo shirt, spoke only to confirm his name and age at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court during the start of proceedings for his extradition to Argentina.
.
Judge Timothy Workman ordered him held without bail until his next appearance at Bow Street, Aug. 29. He said the suspect’s lack of ties in Britain was part of the reason for rejecting bail.
.
Soleimanpour has lived in Durham, northeast England, since 2002 on a student visa, police said. His wife and two small children are in Iran, where they went for a vacation.
.
London’s Metropolitan Police said the extradition warrant alleged that on or before July 18, 1994, Soleimanpour conspired with others to murder persons at the Asociacion Mutua Israelita Argentina — the Jewish Community Center AMIA.
.
‘‘The Argentine authorities have alleged he was involved in the planning and commission of the bombing and that he provided information about the place and the timing of the attack,’’ Detective Sgt. Keith Richardson of the police extradition unit told the court.
.
Richardson said there had been a new investigation into the bombing since the change of government in Argentina in May and said that Soleimanpour had been interviewed by police in Britain three times.
.
He said that when police made the arrest, the charge was read out to Soleimanpour and he replied, ‘‘It is false.’’
.
The suspect’s lawyer, Michel Massih, called the charge ‘‘a political vendetta,’’ and said, ‘‘there are political points being scored against the country and against him.’’
.
Massih said Soleimanpour was studying in Durham for a graduate degree in environmental science, and that his wife is a senior university biologist.
.
Argentine federal judge Juan Jose Galeano, who is investigating the terrorist attack in which more than 200 were wounded, had requested the arrest of Soleimanpour, who was ambassador to Argentina at the time of the explosion.
.
Iran on Friday criticized Soleimanpour’s arrest and said the Argentinian warrant lacked a judicial basis.
.
‘‘The measure has been politically motivated and has been carried out under the influence of the Zionists,’’ Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said in a statement posted on the web site of the official Islamic Republic News Agency.
.
‘‘We will hold talks with the British officials, asking them to provide necessary explanations,’’ Asefi added.
.
In Buenos Aires, leaders of the Jewish community center said they hoped the arrest was a breakthrough that would now move the investigation forward.
.
Abraham Kaul, president of the AMIA, lauded the arrest as a sign of the seriousness with which countries around the world are now tackling terrorism.
.
‘‘This shows that terrorism is an issue that concerns countries around the world,’’ he said in an interview with Associated Press Television,
.
He also noted that new President Nestor Kirchner has made a priority of strengthening Argentina’s judicial system and that his recent moves to open intelligence files and compel former agents to testify could help the case.
.
‘‘Justice is much more possible today than it has been in the last nine years. Today a a door has been opened,’’ he said. LONDON A British court on Friday refused bail to a former Iranian diplomat sought in Argentina on charges of conspiring to murder 85 people killed in the bombing of a Jewish community center in 1994.
.
Hade Soleimanpour, 47-year-old former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, made a first, brief court appearance a day after he was arrested in Durham, northern England, where he is a student.
.
The Iranian government has several times denied any responsibility in the 1994 bombing.
.
Soleimanpour, casually dressed in khaki trousers and a white polo shirt, spoke only to confirm his name and age at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court during the start of proceedings for his extradition to Argentina.
.
Judge Timothy Workman ordered him held without bail until his next appearance at Bow Street, Aug. 29. He said the suspect’s lack of ties in Britain was part of the reason for rejecting bail.
.
Soleimanpour has lived in Durham, northeast England, since 2002 on a student visa, police said. His wife and two small children are in Iran, where they went for a vacation.
.
London’s Metropolitan Police said the extradition warrant alleged that on or before July 18, 1994, Soleimanpour conspired with others to murder persons at the Asociacion Mutua Israelita Argentina — the Jewish Community Center AMIA.
.
‘‘The Argentine authorities have alleged he was involved in the planning and commission of the bombing and that he provided information about the place and the timing of the attack,’’ Detective Sgt. Keith Richardson of the police extradition unit told the court.
.
Richardson said there had been a new investigation into the bombing since the change of government in Argentina in May and said that Soleimanpour had been interviewed by police in Britain three times.
.
He said that when police made the arrest, the charge was read out to Soleimanpour and he replied, ‘‘It is false.’’
.
The suspect’s lawyer, Michel Massih, called the charge ‘‘a political vendetta,’’ and said, ‘‘there are political points being scored against the country and against him.’’
.
Massih said Soleimanpour was studying in Durham for a graduate degree in environmental science, and that his wife is a senior university biologist.
.
Argentine federal judge Juan Jose Galeano, who is investigating the terrorist attack in which more than 200 were wounded, had requested the arrest of Soleimanpour, who was ambassador to Argentina at the time of the explosion.
.
Iran on Friday criticized Soleimanpour’s arrest and said the Argentinian warrant lacked a judicial basis.
.
‘‘The measure has been politically motivated and has been carried out under the influence of the Zionists,’’ Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said in a statement posted on the web site of the official Islamic Republic News Agency.
.
‘‘We will hold talks with the British officials, asking them to provide necessary explanations,’’ Asefi added.
.
In Buenos Aires, leaders of the Jewish community center said they hoped the arrest was a breakthrough that would now move the investigation forward.
.
Abraham Kaul, president of the AMIA, lauded the arrest as a sign of the seriousness with which countries around the world are now tackling terrorism.
.
‘‘This shows that terrorism is an issue that concerns countries around the world,’’ he said in an interview with Associated Press Television,
.
He also noted that new President Nestor Kirchner has made a priority of strengthening Argentina’s judicial system and that his recent moves to open intelligence files and compel former agents to testify could help the case.
.
‘‘Justice is much more possible today than it has been in the last nine years. Today a a door has been opened,’’ he said. LONDON A British court on Friday refused bail to a former Iranian diplomat sought in Argentina on charges of conspiring to murder 85 people killed in the bombing of a Jewish community center in 1994.
.
Hade Soleimanpour, 47-year-old former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, made a first, brief court appearance a day after he was arrested in Durham, northern England, where he is a student.
.
The Iranian government has several times denied any responsibility in the 1994 bombing.
.
Soleimanpour, casually dressed in khaki trousers and a white polo shirt, spoke only to confirm his name and age at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court during the start of proceedings for his extradition to Argentina.
.
Judge Timothy Workman ordered him held without bail until his next appearance at Bow Street, Aug. 29. He said the suspect’s lack of ties in Britain was part of the reason for rejecting bail.
.
Soleimanpour has lived in Durham, northeast England, since 2002 on a student visa, police said. His wife and two small children are in Iran, where they went for a vacation.
.
London’s Metropolitan Police said the extradition warrant alleged that on or before July 18, 1994, Soleimanpour conspired with others to murder persons at the Asociacion Mutua Israelita Argentina — the Jewish Community Center AMIA.
.
‘‘The Argentine authorities have alleged he was involved in the planning and commission of the bombing and that he provided information about the place and the timing of the attack,’’ Detective Sgt. Keith Richardson of the police extradition unit told the court.
.
Richardson said there had been a new investigation into the bombing since the change of government in Argentina in May and said that Soleimanpour had been interviewed by police in Britain three times.
.
He said that when police made the arrest, the charge was read out to Soleimanpour and he replied, ‘‘It is false.’’
.
The suspect’s lawyer, Michel Massih, called the charge ‘‘a political vendetta,’’ and said, ‘‘there are political points being scored against the country and against him.’’
.
Massih said Soleimanpour was studying in Durham for a graduate degree in environmental science, and that his wife is a senior university biologist.
.
Argentine federal judge Juan Jose Galeano, who is investigating the terrorist attack in which more than 200 were wounded, had requested the arrest of Soleimanpour, who was ambassador to Argentina at the time of the explosion.
.
Iran on Friday criticized Soleimanpour’s arrest and said the Argentinian warrant lacked a judicial basis.
.
‘‘The measure has been politically motivated and has been carried out under the influence of the Zionists,’’ Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said in a statement posted on the web site of the official Islamic Republic News Agency.
.
‘‘We will hold talks with the British officials, asking them to provide necessary explanations,’’ Asefi added.
.
In Buenos Aires, leaders of the Jewish community center said they hoped the arrest was a breakthrough that would now move the investigation forward.
.
Abraham Kaul, president of the AMIA, lauded the arrest as a sign of the seriousness with which countries around the world are now tackling terrorism.
.
‘‘This shows that terrorism is an issue that concerns countries around the world,’’ he said in an interview with Associated Press Television,
.
He also noted that new President Nestor Kirchner has made a priority of strengthening Argentina’s judicial system and that his recent moves to open intelligence files and compel former agents to testify could help the case.
.
‘‘Justice is much more possible today than it has been in the last nine years. Today a a door has been opened,’’ he said.

http://www.iht.com/articles/107460.html

[DoctorZIn]

Diplomatic row over UK arrest of Iranian

Telegraph
By Robin Gedye, Foreign Affairs Writer
(Filed: 23/08/2003)

A diplomatic row erupted yesterday between Teheran and London after the former Iranian ambassador to Argentina was arrested in connection with the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, in which 84 people died.

Iran accused Britain of being part of a "Zionist plot" after Hadi Soleimanpour, 47, was held in Durham on an international warrant for his arrest issued by Argentina.

Years of painstaking diplomacy to restore Anglo-Iranian relations appeared jeopardised as Soleimanpour appeared at Bow Street Magistrate's Court yesterday to face extradition proccedings.

Mr Soleimanpour, ambassador to Buenos Aires at the time of the bombing, had been living in the North-East since February when he became a research student on an environment course.

Mr Soleimanpour spoke in court only to confirm his name and was remanded in custody until Aug 29. Det Sgt Keith Richardson said he told officers that the Argentine accusation was "false."

The court was told that Argentine authorities alleged that Mr Soleimanpour was involved in planning and commissioning the bombing in 1994 and that he provided information about the location and timing of the attack.

Argentine authorities are seeking the arrest of seven other Iranians.

Kamal Kharazi, Iran's foreign minister, tried to protest to Jack Straw yesterday but was unable to reach him in New York where the Foreign Secretary was visiting the United Nations.

Morteza Sarmadi, Iran's ambassador to London, called the Foreign Office to voice his government's anger and Iran's state radio spoke of a "new plot against Iran by the triangle of America, Britain and Israel with the co-operation of Argentina".

Hamid Reza Asefi, an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman said: "The rulings lack judicial and legal basis and are politically motivated . . . under the influence of the Zionist regime."

Formal diplomatic relations with Teheran were restored only four years ago after 20 years of strain following the Islamic revolution. They reached breaking point in 1989 when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against the author Salman Rushdie.

Home and Foreign Office officials insisted yesterday that the "judicial process" in respect of the extradition request would follow its "proper course" and could not be interfered with.

"In the same way that we could do nothing to alter the course of law in the case of Spain's extradition request for [the former Chilean dictator Augusto] Pinochet, so we cannot intervene here," one official said.

The Home Office said the extradition would be a "long drawn-out procedure".

Argentina's decision to reopen the Jewish Community bombing case is part of a wider move by leaders in Argentina, Brazil and Chile to expose the killings and abuse of thousands of their countrymen by Right-wing dictators from the 1960s to the 1980s.

America and Israel have long said they suspected Iran was behind the car-bomb attack, described last month by President Nestor Kirchner, on its anniversary, as "Argentina's Twin Towers".

Eight years of investigation produced few results and newspapers have alleged that the former president Carlos Menem accepted a £7 million bribe from Iran to cover up its involvement in the attack. Mr Menem has denied this.

Last month Mr Kirchner revoked amnesty laws passed in 1986 and 1987 that had protected members of the former Right-wing regimes from prosecution and ordered the arrest of 46 former officials.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/23/warg23.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/08/23/ixworld.html

[onyx]

Thanks again for some excellent and enlightening posts!

You post articles which cut thru the media fog. You are much appreciated!

[DoctorZIn]

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