Iranian Alert -- September 7, 2003 -- IRAN LIVE THREAD PING LIST

The regime is working hard to keep the news about the protest movment in Iran from being reported.

From jamming satellite broadcasts, to prohibiting news reporters from covering any demonstrations to shutting down all cell phones and even hiring foreign security to control the population, the regime is doing everything in its power to keep the popular movement from expressing its demand for an end of the regime.

These efforts by the regime, while successful in the short term, do not resolve the fundamental reasons why this regime is crumbling from within.

Iran is a country ready for a regime change. If you follow this thread you will witness, I believe, the transformation of a nation. This daily thread provides a central place where those interested in the events in Iran can find the best news and commentary.

Please continue to join us here, post your news stories and comments to this thread.

Condoleezza Rice: "Turn Them Over"

September 07, 2003
Fox News
Transcript

Transcript: Condoleezza Rice on 'Fox News Sunday' - (Iran)

SNOW: What about the reports that Al Qaida and much of its key leadership is now hunkered down in Iraq with the protection of the — I'm sorry, in Iran — with the protection of the Iranian government?

RICE: We have said clearly to the Iranians that we believe that there are several key members of Al Qaida who fled to Iran. We don't know their exact status. Sometimes you hear that they've been detained. But we've asked that the Iranian government do what is right here, which is to transfer these people out.

SNOW: But they haven't done it. You surely don't expect them to do it. They haven't...

RICE: Well...

SNOW: ... after the request from the Saudis. They haven't done it after a request from the Egyptians. They haven't done it after a request from their own neighbors. Certainly, they're not going to do it after the great Satan asks.

RICE: Well, we have a lot of people asking, not just the United States.

And Iran is going to have to make some choices. I don't think Iran in the long run will want to be associated with Al Qaida. And they obviously have some work to do to convince the world that they are really fighting terrorism. Iran has been a source for terrorism. This is also unsurprising, but we continue to tell the Iranian government, "Turn them over."

SNOW: And if they don't, what do we do?

RICE: Well, we'll continue to tell the Iranian government to turn them over.

SNOW: The reason I ask that, I get a lot of people who send us e-mails and talk to us and say, "Look, Iran's a big problem, and the administration doesn't seem to place them in the same league as Iraq or even North Korea." Why is that?

RICE: Different circumstances require different solutions. And Iran is a complicated place. It is a place where the Iranian people have repeatedly expressed their desire for freedom. And the president has associated himself with those aspirations.

SNOW: So our administration believes that, in fact, regime change is possible from within, and we don't want to mess it up?

RICE: Well, certainly, this is a place that has had elections, where the people of Iran have expressed themselves, where there continues to be a flow of people back and forth. There is a lot here that could support freedom. We want to be certain that we always use the right tools in the right circumstances.

And with Iran, there's no doubt that this is a regime that poses very difficult problems, not just for the United States, but for the rest of the world.

RICE: If you look at what they're doing in their nuclear program now, where the International Atomic Energy Agency has been, I think, surprised and alarmed at some of the things they found in Iran, people are taking a second look at Iran, and we're encouraging that second look.

SNOW: Would that also include a trip back to the Security Council for some censure for Iran?

RICE: Conceivably. The timing of that will need to be right.

But we are in constant discussion with all of the states that have relations with Iran, as well as the international institutions, about the challenge that Iran poses.

....................................................................

Full Transcript: Condoleezza Rice on 'Fox News Sunday'

The following is a transcribed excerpt from "Fox News Sunday," Sept. 7, 2003.

TONY SNOW, FOX NEWS: The Bush administration has asked the U.N. Security Council to consider a resolution that would give the United Nations a larger role in Iraq's reconstruction.

Key points of the draft reportedly include a multinational force under unified — meaning American — command, assistance from member states for military forces, and financial assistance from banking institutions for the Iraqi Governing Council.

France and Germany say the draft does too little to transfer political authority to Iraqi citizens. They also say the U.N., not the U.S. and the coalition of the willing, should assume primary responsibility for building up Iraq.

For more, we're joined by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice.

Dr. Rice, first I want to ask about the United Nations resolution. When did the president decide that he wanted to go before the U.N. again?

DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER: Well, Tony, more than two months ago the president asked Secretary Powell to start exploring what would make sense, in terms of bringing resolutions before the United Nations.

And this is one in a series. We had Resolution 1483, which was right for the time, Resolution 1500, and now we believe that this is now the right time to have a resolution that may give to some states that have made it clear to us that they need such a mandate the ability to perhaps contribute more to the effort in Iraq.

But the president's been thinking about this some tent's been thinking about this some time, and it's really several weeks ago that Secretary Powell began exploring this. There was a united, coherent process in place to try and bring about a resolution that we thought would address some of the concerns of others, and we put that forward a few days ago.

SNOW: The primary aim, then, is to permit nations like India, perhaps Turkey, Pakistan, to commit troops, because they say they need the U.N. stamp of approval.

RICE: Well, there are really several elements to it. Yes, we would like to empower nations that would like to contribute to Iraq, but believe that they need some kind of U.N. mandate. Some of the countries that you've mentioned, but there are others.

It's also important...

SNOW: Which others?

RICE: Well, there are other countries that may not be able to contribute troops, but it's important to have financial contributions, for instance. And I would not underestimate the importance to international financial institutions of a next step in work with the United Nations.

But again, this is in a series of resolutions that we've had with the United Nations, and we believe this could enhance the international role in Iraq.

SNOW: This will not be the last resolution, then?

RICE: It will probably not be the last resolution, because events are evolving on the ground in Iraq, and it's important that the U.N. role keep pace with those events as they evolve.

SNOW: Are the German and French going to sign up?

RICE: Well, we will see. But we have had, with the Germans, the French, the Russians, others, very good conversations in which they have said they want to look at the resolution, they want to study it. We expect that they may have ideas that they would like to put forward. Everybody wants to do this in a cooperative spirit.

But we think the important thing here is to recognize that the United Nations, which the president said all the way back when he was with Prime Minister Blair in Ireland, would have a vital role, has been active in Iraq, will be active in Iraq, and the international community, which has been active in Iraq, will perhaps be more active now with a U.N. resolution.

SNOW: The American general in command in Iraq says that they don't need any more troops. So why are we worried about getting more foreign troops?

RICE: The purpose, Tony, is also to increase the participation of the international community. This is something that we all need to do together.

The president is going to tell the American people tonight that we are still in the midst of the war on terrorism, that Iraq is a central battle in the war on terrorism. And the war on terrorism is against people who are against freedom and against civilization.

RICE: That is the task and that is the struggle that every country in the world who values freedom, values security, wants to be a part of and should be a part of. And so that is why this U.N. resolution is important.

I should also say that we're looking not just at numbers of troops — that's, of course, important — but the composition of forces is important. We have been through a period of time in which we fought a big ground battle. We don't need large tank armies. We need forces that can patrol. We need more police forces. And the mix of skills that can come from the international community can be very helpful to the American effort.

SNOW: The following question on this: Isn't it true also the Germans and the French want to make some money off this? They want access to contracts.

RICE: People want to be involved in the future of Iraq, obviously in the future reconstruction of Iraq. But we all need to stay focused on the Iraqi people.

This is a population that has been through the greatest horrors, having this brutal dictator. If we can all stay focused on what it will take to reconstruct Iraq, to create an Iraq that is stable and prosperous and therefore a linchpin for peace in the Middle East, we will come to solutions about how to do that: the role of the U.N., the role of other countries, the role of the coalition authority, and most importantly, the role of the Iraqi people themselves.

SNOW: Let's talk about the Iraqi people. First, we are told in today's Washington Post that Al Qaida had been infiltrating and setting up operations in Iraq. Is that true?

RICE: I think that the evidentiary basis here is not so strong. But we are getting pieces of evidence, certainly, that Al Qaida is interested in Iraq and may be trying to operate there.

There are clearly foreign fighters coming into the country. There's no doubt about that.

But Tony, nobody would be surprised if Al Qaida is trying to set up operations in Iraq. They know that Iraq is the central battle now in the war on terrorism. They know that if Iraq becomes stable and prosperous that they will have been dealt a mortal blow. And it would not be a surprise that Zachawi (ph), who is mentioned here, would be operating in Iraq because as told the American people before the war in Iraq, Zachawi (ph) had been operating in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's regime.

He was the one who got medical treatment in Baghdad. He was the one who left his network in Baghdad to carry out operations. So it would not be at all surprising that Zachawi (ph) is there.

SNOW: Do you believe, because this is continually a subject of debate, that there was a link between Al Qaida and the regime of Saddam Hussein before the war?

RICE: Absolutely. And Zachawi (ph) made the coming back to his old stomping ground. But we know that there was training of Al Qaida in chemical and perhaps biological warfare. We know that the Zachawi (ph) was network out of there, this poisons network that was trying to spread poisons throughout...

SNOW: You're talking about the Ansar al-Islam base in northern...

RICE: Yes. And there was an Ansar al-Islam, which appears also to try to be operating in Iraq. So yes, the Al Qaida link was there. And maybe they're trying to reestablish it.

SNOW: What about the reports that Al Qaida and much of its key leadership is now hunkered down in Iraq with the protection of the — I'm sorry, in Iran — with the protection of the Iranian government?

RICE: We have said clearly to the Iranians that we believe that there are several key members of Al Qaida who fled to Iran. We don't know their exact status. Sometimes you hear that they've been detained. But we've asked that the Iranian government do what is right here, which is to transfer these people out.

SNOW: But they haven't done it. You surely don't expect them to do it. They haven't...

RICE: Well...

SNOW: ... after the request from the Saudis. They haven't done it after a request from the Egyptians. They haven't done it after a request from their own neighbors. Certainly, they're not going to do it after the great Satan asks.

RICE: Well, we have a lot of people asking, not just the United States.

And Iran is going to have to make some choices. I don't think Iran in the long run will want to be associated with Al Qaida. And they obviously have some work to do to convince the world that they are really fighting terrorism. Iran has been a source for terrorism. This is also unsurprising, but we continue to tell the Iranian government, "Turn them over."

SNOW: And if they don't, what do we do?

RICE: Well, we'll continue to tell the Iranian government to turn them over.

SNOW: The reason I ask that, I get a lot of people who send us e-mails and talk to us and say, "Look, Iran's a big problem, and the administration doesn't seem to place them in the same league as Iraq or even North Korea." Why is that?

RICE: Different circumstances require different solutions. And Iran is a complicated place. It is a place where the Iranian people have repeatedly expressed their desire for freedom. And the president has associated himself with those aspirations.

SNOW: So our administration believes that, in fact, regime change is possible from within, and we don't want to mess it up?

RICE: Well, certainly, this is a place that has had elections, where the people of Iran have expressed themselves, where there continues to be a flow of people back and forth. There is a lot here that could support freedom. We want to be certain that we always use the right tools in the right circumstances.

And with Iran, there's no doubt that this is a regime that poses very difficult problems, not just for the United States, but for the rest of the world.

RICE: If you look at what they're doing in their nuclear program now, where the International Atomic Energy Agency has been, I think, surprised and alarmed at some of the things they found in Iran, people are taking a second look at Iran, and we're encouraging that second look.

SNOW: Would that also include a trip back to the Security Council for some censure for Iran?

RICE: Conceivably. The timing of that will need to be right.

But we are in constant discussion with all of the states that have relations with Iran, as well as the international institutions, about the challenge that Iran poses.

SNOW: Middle East: Mahmoud Abbas has resigned. He said he's not coming back.

We have said — that is, the United States has said, "We're not going to deal with Yasser Arafat." Is there any conceivable successor appointed by Yasser Arafat to Mahmoud Abbas with whom we would work?

RICE: The key here is to focus on the institution of the Palestinian prime minister and what it's capable of doing.

Mahmoud Abbas, who is a really fine man, has said very clearly that he was not given the authority and the powers to do what he needed to do on behalf of the Palestinian people. So the next prime minister, whoever that is, is going to have to have the authority to unify the security forces and to fight terror, or it won't be possible for the Palestinian people to move forward.

SNOW: So, unless this next prime minister has independence from Yasser Arafat and has control of all nine of the security apparatuses — the security organizations — no deal?

RICE: The Palestinian Authority has made some progress. For instance, on the financial side, these finances have been cleaned up very effectively by their finance minister. That was causing the flow of aid.

But on the security front, the Palestinian Authority has been hamstrung — the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, the prime minister and his team, have been hamstrung by internal bickering inside the Palestinian Authority.

It is not surprising. Yasser Arafat has been an obstacle to peace before; he's an obstacle to peace now.

People need to say that a Palestinian state is not going to be born of terror. A Palestinian state is only going to be born in circumstances in which the Palestinian leadership fights terror. And they need not just the will, which I'm quite certain this Abbas government had, but also the means.

SNOW: That means Yasser Arafat has to step aside.

RICE: It means that Yasser Arafat should finally recognize that he should no longer be an obstacle to peace for his people.

SNOW: President Bush extracted from Prime Minister Sharon a promise not to, effectively, kidnap Yasser Arafat and take him out of the Palestinian areas. Do we still — is it still the administration's that Israel should do nothing to Yasser Arafat?

RICE: We continue to believe that no good would be served by such a policy if it were pursued. But we do believe that all of those who want peace need to speak clearly with one voice.

There are two obstacles, central obstacles, to — on the Palestinian side to peace. One is the internal politics of the Palestinian Authority. So those who want peace need to tell the Palestinian leadership, "Get an empowered prime minister and let him work."

The other is Hamas and the rejectionists. And it is a good thing that this week the Europeans have made a political decision — the implementation still to follow, but a political decision to declare Hamas a terrorist organization, to freeze their assets. This is extremely important, because the Palestinian people are not going to get to statehood through Hamas, and they're not going to get to statehood through a Palestinian leadership that is not in power.

SNOW: Ariel Sharon has also said members of Hamas are marked for death. Do we support that, the United States?

RICE: We just — we ask Israel to be certain that it's always thinking about the consequences for tomorrow; that it's always thinking about building a Palestinian partner.

We need to keep the focus here on fighting terror. We need to keep the focus here on creating a Palestinian leadership that can get that job done.

SNOW: Does the administration or does it not condemn the attempt to kill the leader of Hamas?

RICE: American policy on this is unchanged.

But again, the focus here has to be on getting a Palestinian leadership that is capable and willing to fight terror. Nobody can ask Israel or any state to live in terror. And the Palestinian people need the Palestinian leadership to fight terror.

The one thing that we are saying quite strongly to the Israelis is that they also have responsibilities. It's important to improve the lives of the Palestinian people. It's important to lift closures, where possible.

We were in a very good period of time, in which the Israelis were turning over cities to the Palestinian Authority. We need to get back to that so that the 200,000 people who apparently went to the beach in Gaza during that period can get back to their daily lives.

SNOW: North Korea. Six-nation talks. Everybody says, "Boy, this is going swell," then North Korea said, "Nope, sorry, we're not going to have any more talks, and by the way, we're going to start testing nuclear devices." Made the Chinese lose face.

Question is whether Chinese opinion and the Chinese attitude has changed toward North Korea, and whether China now is going to step up and place greater pressure on the government in Pyongyang not only to cease and desist, but also to turn over nuclear material and once and for all dismantle its nuclear program.

RICE: The president had an important insight when he said that the United States should not take on this issue with North Korea bilaterally, but rather we needed to get involved all of the states who had both interest in a non-nuclear peninsula, and had instruments that they could use to bring that about.

The six-party talks is a great forum for us, because what you had out of that was five states that were unified in their view that the North Koreans have got to give up their program, their nuclear program, if they ever hope to enter the international community of states.

The North Koreans had to have heard that message, they had to have seen that they are isolated on this front. We will see what they do. But anything that they do that continues to try and escalate this only deepens their isolation.

SNOW: Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the chances that North Korea will, in fact, break down its nuclear program?

RICE: I believe we've got the best chance that we could possible have. Given the six-party format, given the fact that you've got all the relevant states there, and particularly China there, with whom the North Koreans have a lot of interest, I think you've got the best chance now to get an enduring strategy.

It will take a long time, Tony. This is not something that's going to come to fruition overnight. But the president has put in place a fundamentally strong strategy that gives us the best chance to get the North Korean program dismantled, and to do it in a way that cannot be — where it cannot be reinvigorated the way that it was after the agreed framework.

SNOW: Condoleezza Rice, thanks for joining us today.

RICE: Thank you very much.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,96651,00.html

Iranian Youths Seeking to Escape

September 07, 2003
The Washington Post
Afshin Molavi

TEHRAN -- A freshly minted fake passport in his pocket, forged work papers in his folder and a scribbled Istanbul address in his wallet, Hamid seemed well prepared for his journey: an illegal trip across Europe that would, he hoped, end in Holland with a new job and a better life.

"I'll go by bus to Turkey," said the 25-year-old part-time computer instructor as he sat on a green bench in a tree-filled park in downtown Tehran. "My uncle is a trucker there. We will then go by truck, across many countries, to Holland. He says he can get me the required visas, a job in Amsterdam and the necessary papers."

Hamid, who spoke on condition that only his surname would be used, explained why he chose this journey: "I just want a good job, some basic freedoms and hope for the future. I can't get those things here. I know it won't be easy, but I think it is worth the price."

"Besides," he said, "I don't want to end up like my brother. He is 30 years old, jobless, hooked on drugs and bitter at the world."

To much of the outside world, the anger and frustration that young Iranians feel toward their government is embodied by the dramatic student protests that periodically grab headlines. But in this country of 67 million people -- more than two-thirds of whom are under 30 and more than half under 21 -- Hamid and his brother embody more common responses to the difficulties of life under the Islamic Republic: One is heading for the border, the other collapsing inward.

Frustrated by bleak job prospects, restricted freedoms and a stagnant economy, thousands of young Iranians try to emigrate illegally each year. In addition, more than 200,000 of Iran's most educated professionals left the country legally last year, according to government statistics, plucked by companies and governments in Canada, Australia, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Eastern Europe and the United States -- one of the highest rates of brain drain in the world.

An alarming number of those who stay behind, like Hamid's brother, turn to drugs. Iranian officials estimate that the country has about 2 million addicts, the majority of whom are young people.

"We call ourselves the burnt generation," Hamid said. "We were burned by our parents' revolution and burned by a system that has given us nothing but troubles."

Sociologists and psychiatrists say the fabric of Iranian society is under substantial stresses. Parents spend less time with their children because fathers often must hold two jobs to make ends meet. Depression, drug use and suicide rates among the young are at all-time highs. The number of runaway youths has increased 12 percent since 2000, according to sociology professor Majid Abhari. The majority of the runaways are girls, many of whom are lured into Tehran's growing prostitution rings.

Iranian authorities estimate that nearly 1 million jobs need to be created each year to keep up with the country's youthful population. In each of the last three years, an average of 400,000 jobs -- at most -- have been created, economists estimate.

"The lack of jobs fuels much of the social problems and anguish young Iranians face and poses a serious challenge to the government," said Karim Sadjadpour, a Tehran-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, a Belgian research organization "But it's not just about jobs. Youth also want increased social and political freedoms and possess an angst-ridden sense that the world is moving on without them."

Though Iranian officials often speak about "a social crisis" besetting youth, few venture into specifics.

"Clearly, our youth are frustrated by the lack of jobs and limits on their freedoms," said Mohammad Ali Abtahi, the vice president and a top aide to reformist President Mohammad Khatami. "We have done our best to address these issues, but the right-wing faction does not want us to succeed," he said, referring to the conservatives who control the key levers of power and have blocked most reform proposals.

Iranian youths, most of whom supported Khatami's reform program and were captivated by the charismatic cleric who called for greater democracy and freedom, have been largely frustrated by the reformists' inability to deliver on their promises.

In interviews on college campuses, at movie theaters and in parks where young people congregate, they expressed frustration with the reformists, growing fear of conservative reprisals against dissenters and a widespread desire to leave the country. They also embraced the ideas underpinning secular democracy, exhibited a growing anti-clericalism and an increasing sense that political involvement poses too many dangers.

Last June, student protests against potential tuition hikes broadened into public demonstrations on issues of national discontent, the most serious unrest since the 1999 student protests that rocked the country and left at least five people dead and hundreds in jail.

A severe crackdown that included the detention of about 4,000 people, severe beatings and the jailing of pro-democracy student leaders sent a chill across Iran. A daily barrage of government propaganda describing the protesters as "American mercenaries" and "anti-Islamic hooligans," combined with threats of further crackdowns and the successful jamming of opposition satellite television programs beamed from Los Angeles, slowed the momentum for future protests.

Ali Reza Alavitabar, a leading reformist intellectual and academic who is widely known as a liaison between pro-democracy students and the reformist leadership, said he worries about disillusionment among the young.

"I have noticed a very disturbing trend of hopelessness among our youth," Alavitabar said. "This hopelessness is very dangerous because we need these young people to fuel the movement for change. Without them, nothing will happen."

For Hamid, the heavy crackdown, which put one of his friends in jail, only confirmed his decision to depart.

Compared to what internal dissenters faced, the risks of illegal flight are not severe. If caught and sent back home, Iranians who have yet to complete military service face fines or extended military service terms. Others have reported facing mild interrogation, then being set free. The biggest risks awaited Hamid in Europe, where he could end up in prolonged asylum proceedings, unable to work legally, subsidized by the state and drifting into the underground economy.

Others like Jalal, a 16-year-old playing a video game at the Shahid Chamran Cultural Center here, do their best to ignore politics. "I don't have time for such things," he said. "Of course I want more freedom, but what can I do?"

Besides, he said, he has a plan: "I will study medicine in Iran, work for two years, then go to Canada and join my older brother."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36528-2003Sep6.html

The Mullahs' Shock

September 07, 2003
New York Post
Amir Taheri

Until just a few weeks ago, Iran and Britain, having completed a diplomatic honeymoon, appeared to be destined for a mutually enjoyable partnership.

On Tuesday, however, the British government, having recalled its ambassador Richard Dalton, announced the "temporary closure" of its embassy in Tehran. The decision came hours after shots had been fired at the embassy building in the center of the Iranian capital.

Asked who might have been responsible, the Iranian authorities said they did not know. But this seems hardly credible -since hundreds of people, including more than a dozen policemen, some of them supposed to be guarding the embassy, watched the whole bizarre episode.

It is clear that the Islamic Republic wished to pass a "strong message" to "perfidious Albion," and in the only way it knows best: by threatening violence and murder.

Tony Blair's government has invested a great deal in courting Iran's ruling mullahs. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Tehran four times in less than two years, equaling the record set by his Syrian counterpart, Farouq al-Shara.

Even before Baghdad had been liberated, both Blair and Straw announced that Britain would not join the United States in any "regime change" move against Iran. In all his meetings with President Bush, Blair hammered in the theme of "constructive dialogue" with Iran as alternative to "regime change."

BY last March, Britain had emerged as Iran's most ardent supporter in the European Union, assuming a role that Germany and France had played for more than two decades. The British assumed the leadership of efforts to conclude a trade agreement between the EU and the Islamic Republic.

London also supported Tehran's bid to join the World Trade Organization, despite Washington's reservations. The Blair government allowed Tehran to organize a major economic "roadshow" in London to attract British and other Western investment, especially for Iran's oil industry, which is now in a state of crisis.

Relations got so warm that some of the ruling mullahs began to come to London for medical checkups while others dispatched their offspring to British schools. Some Khomeinist militants received scholarships to study at British universities. It was one such student who became the cause of a sudden end to the Anglo-Iranian courtship.

The man in question is Hadi Suleimanpour, who had enrolled at Durham University to study Islamic civilization. Now in his early 40s, Suleimanpour was no ordinary student. Having joined the Khomeinist revolution in his teens, he had been one of the first to join the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a paramilitary force created by Khomeini in 1979 to crush his opponents.

Suleimanpour served as a bodyguard for various political mullahs and, eventually ended up as the Islamic Republic's ambassador in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

His tenure as ambassador coincided with the blowing up of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires - an attack that killed scores of Argentines, many of them Jews. Iran always denied any involvement in the attack, and blamed Argentine pro-Nazi police and army officers. By the mid-1990s, the episode seemed to have been shelved amid reports that then-President Carlos Menem received a fat bribe from Tehran to hush things up. (Menem says this is a slur.)

LAST year, an Argentine court reopened the case and ended up formally pointing the finger at Tehran. It issued arrest warrants for a number of Iranian officials - including the unfortunate Suleimanpour, who had just landed in Britain to start a new life as a middle-aged student.

Contacted by Interpol, the British police picked up Suleimanpour without informing the Foreign Office in London.

That led to what could only be described, if not as "a clash of civilizations," as a clash of political cultures.

TEHRAN'S mullahs simply cannot understand that the British government may well be unable to just order the police to let Suleimanpour loose. They see the episode as part of a sinister "Zionist-Crusader" plot whose aim is to prepare international public opinion for a "regime change" plot against the Islamic Republic.

The mullahs' anger at Britain is partly understandable. After all, on many occasions, EU states have ignored their laws to let Iranian suspects escape police arrest. In 1996, a Berlin court issued an arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, a mullah who was the Islamic Republic's Minister for intelligence and Security at the time. Fallahian had been charged with participation in the murder of four Kurdish dissidents in Berlin in 1992. At the time the warrant was issued, Fallahian was visiting Germany at the invitation of his counterpart, Brend Schmidbauer. Learning of the warrant, the German authorities arranged for the mullah to fly back to Tehran before the police arrived.

The French have done even better. In 1994, Prime Minister Eduarad Baladur ignored a Swiss demand for the extradition of two Iranians charged with political murders in Switzerland and helped them fly back to Tehran - first class.

Before that, in 1986, President François Mitterrand allowed Tehran's key terror agent in Europe to return home without answering any questions by the French government's own anti-terrorist judges.

Even earlier, the Italian government ignored the fact that Tehran's embassy in the Vatican had become a center of terrorism in Europe. Four Iranians involved in a series of assassinations in Italy were never troubled, although they had been called in for questioning by Italian courts.

Britain's own record wasn't so bright. John Major's government allowed an Iranian agent, convicted by a British court of murdering two Iranian dissidents in London, to return home after serving half of a three-year prison term. The man was received as a hero in Tehran and, when he became a candidate for parliament, based his campaign on his success in "eliminating two evil anti-Islamic elements" in Britain. There are similar cases concerning other European countries.

BETWEEN 1979 and 2000, Tehran's agents murdered 46 Iranians, 17 of them in France, and killed more than 80 non-Iranians in various terrorist operations in the European Union. On each occasion, the European country concerned made some angry noises, and, in some cases, gestures such as closing the embassy and recalling the ambassador. In the end, however, they all ended up eating humble pie at the hand of the triumphant mullahs.

The Islamic Republic exerted pressure on the Europeans in a number of ways. These included kidnapping their citizens on fake charges and releasing them in exchange for Iranian officials arrested in Europe. The Islamic authorities also organized raids on various European embassies, beating up staff, seizing documents and setting parts of the buildings on fire. In one case, the French ambassador, Guy Georgy, was held hostage until France allowed an Iranian terror mastermind to leave Paris before he could be arrested.

In every case, the blame was put on "angry volunteers for martyrdom" who had supposedly acted against the wishes of the Iranian government.

THE biggest showdown, of course, concerned Salman Rushdie, the Anglo-Indian novelist who was sentenced to death in a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989.

Having defined the issue as "a matter of fundamental principle," the Europeans withdrew their ambassadors for a while only to send them back later with "apologies" to Tehran. The issue was fudged to cover the cowardice of the Europeans. But the fatwa was never annulled.

The mullahs believe that international politics consist mostly of plots and conspiracies, and that the Western powers, devoid of moral scruples, would sell their mothers to secure profit for their businessmen who, in turn, finance the political parties.

Suleimanpour is not the only senior Iranian official to be subject to an Interpol arrest warrant on charges of terrorism. The latest list of wanted Iranians contains 48 names, including that of the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi, former President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati.

(On Wednesday, the Islamic Republic decided to forbid, until further notice, all foreign travel by those on the list.)

Will the latest tussle between Tehran and London confirm the mullahs' opinion of the West?

Sadly, one has to say: Yes.

JAVIER Solana, the European Union's "foreign minister," has just completed a visit to Tehran in which he spent more time criticizing the United States and Britain for the "quagmire in Iraq" than telling the mullahs that they cannot send agents around the globe to kill people without, one day, being held accountable.

Almost two decades ago, Khomeini summarized his policy toward the Western powers thus: Kick them in the teeth, and they will kiss your hand!

E-mail: amirtaheri@enadorassociates.com - Benador Associates

http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/557

IRAQI SHI’ITES ACCUSED OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" AGAINST THE SUNNIS

PARIS, 6 Sept. (IPS) Senior Sunnis Iraqi religious authorities have accused their counterpart from the majority Shi’ite community of "ethnic purification" on order from Iranian ayatollahs, according to the influential French daily "Le Monde".

This is the first time that the Iraqi sunnis, who are in minority, make such accusation, warning that if the policy continue, it might lead to a fratricide war between Iraq’s 20 millions Muslims, 60 per cent Shi’ite who, despite their majority, had no word under the toppled regime of Saddam Hoseyn.

In the Sunnis mirror is the young Shi’ite firebrand Hojjatoleslam Moqtada al-Sadr, the 26 years-old son of Ayatollah al-Sadr, a leading Shi’ite cleric killed by the former dictator.

The turbulent Moqtada is suspected for the assassination of Hojjatoleslam Abdolmajid al-Kho’i, a pro-west cleric killed in the holy city of Najaf days after his return to Iraq from London last April as well as raids on the residences and offices of several leading Iraqi Shi’a dignitaries known for their moderation, including Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the nation’s highest religious authority but of Iranian blood.

"We used to have a minimum of co-ordination with Moqtada al-Sadr, but he has changed ever since his return from Tehran, some forty days ago, where he met with Ayatollah Ali Khameneh’i (the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Sheykh Abdal Salam al-Kubaisi, the spokesman for the Committee of Sunni Ulemas told the French news agency AFP.

"Iran has entered on the Iraqi scene. It does not like meetings and fraternisation between mosques", he has added, accusing the followers of Moqtada for "ethnic cleansing" of the hawzahs, or religious centers, "Le Monde" said on its Saturday issue dated for Sunday and Monday.

After having created his own army, the young cleric took over the former "Saddam City", a poor suburb of Baghdad inhabited by two millions Shi’ites, now renamed "Sadr City" after his father, Moqtada started a campaign of intimidation against Iraqi religious personalities opposed to the mixing of religion and politics while multiplying strong worded anti-American declarations, urging the Iraqis to boot out "infidels and Zionist occupiers", a rhetoric which is also heard by hard line Iranian ayatollahs.

"One after another, the Shi’ites first took control over the al-Hamza mosque, the only one we have in Najaf, then that of Hasan Ben Ali in Karbala (where is burried Hoseyn, Ali’s second son and the Shi’ites third imam, also a holy city for the Shi’ites) and sixteen others we have in Iraq, twelve of them in the Capital", Sheykh al-Kubaisi informed.

"Emptying Najaf and Karbala from Sunnis presence is not only a very dangerous practice, a reminder of ethnic cleansing, but it would also herald the balkanisation of Iraq", Mr. Kubaisi warned.

According to this cleric, it the Sunnis keep a low profile, it is because of the present situation, where every Iraqi, Sunni or Shi’a, must avoid confrontation and bloodshed, "the very trap laid by the (American) enemy", according to both AFP and Le Monde.

The unprecedented -- though not unexpected – accusations comes nine days after the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim, the leader of the Iran-backed Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI) and one of Iraq’s senior Shi’ite dignitary in a powerful car bomb explosion that damaged the main entrance of the golden shrine of Ali, world’s Shi’ites first and most revered imam, in Najaf, 150 kilometres south of Baghdad.

So far, there has been no official reaction from Mr. Moqtada al-Sadr. For its part, the SAIRI, now led by Hojjatoleslam Abdelaziz al-Hakim, the younger brother of the assassinated Ayatollah, has expressed its "surprise" over the accusations.

It is in such a climate that attacks on Shi’ite and Sunni mosques as well as their leaders are on the rise. Hojjatoleslam Ali Wadi al-Musavi, a personal representative of Grand Ayatollah Sistani escaped an assassination attempt on his life last week as he was entering a mosque in the Kazemiyah district of Baghdad almost at the same time that a Sunni mosque was attacked by unidentified armed men, wounding three worshippers.

"Some are doing their best to bring a war between Sunnis and Shi’as", Le Monde quoted Sheykh Walid al-Azzaoui, a Sunni cleric, accusing "mercenaries" who have entered Iraq and works hand sin hands with followers of the former tyrant.

"The Americans are more terrorists than Saddam’s regime", claims Moqtada, suspecting "forces of occupation" of being behind all these "terrible tragedies".

http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2003/Sept-2003/iraq_sunni_cleansing_6903.htm

September 01, 2003

Iranian dissident is war’s first casualty

Although it has been more than 24 centuries since Alexander the Great invaded Persepolis, Iranians still remember two of their heroes of that era: Aryo-Barzan, the brave Persian commander who fought to the death at the head of his Khaledoon Brigade but failed to check Alexander’s advance after 48 days of fighting; and a local village headman who betrayed his homeland by guiding the invading Macedonians through the mountains to the rear of Aryo-Barzan’s lines. That was how Alexander managed to defeat the Iranians and subjugate the Pars Empire.

Iranian history deals extremely harshly with those deemed to have joined the enemy at crucial points in time. Even their names are not mentioned; they are only referred to as traitors.
In other words, while the invaders themselves men like Alexander, Genghis, Hulagu and Teimour have gradually gained acceptance by Iranians, those who aided and abetted them have not. They are still referred to as traitors who helped the foreign invaders gain access to the Iranian heartland.
It has to be said that there were not many traitors in Iranian history. Yet in the years following World War I, and with the advent of the Communist Party and other left-wing and Islamist political movements, the concept of treachery lost its significance under the weight of different ideologies. It was Tudeh, the Iranian communist group, that first introduced the idea that “the party’s interests precede those of the homeland” into the Iranian political lexicon. What this idea meant in practice was that Tudeh leaders and cadres had become a fifth column for Soviet intelligence.
When, under the shah, Iranian military intelligence caught active communist cells in the Iranian armed forces, arrested communist officers testified that they believed giving secret documents to the KGB was a patriotic act, since they were helping the Soviet Union in its struggle against world imperialism. A Soviet victory, the Iranian communist officers believed, would liberate countries like Iran from the shackles of colonialism that were holding them back.
This concept was not abandoned with the fall of the shah; at the height of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war under Iran’s Islamic regime, Captain Bahram Afzali, the Iranian Navy’s commander in chief, and eight other senior officers were arrested for providing the director of the local KGB station with a large number of secret documents over many years.
Before he was shot for treason, Afzali said he had agreed to hand over the secret documents to the KGB after having been convinced by Tudeh first secretary Noureddine Kianuri that the United States was plotting to prolong the war, and that the Soviet Union could bring it to an end if only it had more information about Iranian military plans.
When, after fleeing Iran in 1981, Mujahideen-e-Khalq leader Masoud Rajavi signed a peace agreement with then Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarek Aziz, he justified his action by saying the resistance (i.e. his organization) was the legitimate representative of the Iranian people and was thus authorized to sue for peace with Iraq.
Yet former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (who was Rajavi’s erstwhile ally, besides being his father-in-law), who had fled along with him to Paris in 1981, considered Rajavi’s action to be treasonous. Not only did he break with the Mujahideen leader, but his daughter Firouzeh divorced Rajavi as well.
When Rajavi decided to relocate to Iraq together with his followers, it transpired that Bani-Sadr’s fears that the Mujahideen would become subservient to Iraq were well founded.
Rajavi committed political suicide by choosing Iraq as a base for his organization at a time when Iraqi missiles were raining on Iranian cities, and Iraqi chemical weapons were killing thousands of Iranian soldiers and civilians. Despite the fact that he formed an armed force (called the Army of National Liberation) with hundreds of tanks, guns and modern helicopter gunships (courtesy of the Iraqi Army), and despite having a strong propaganda machine, Rajavi failed to cultivate support for his organization inside Iran. In fact, his insistence on being the sole alternative to the Iranian regime was one of the main reasons why the regime survived.
Domestically, fear of the possibility that Rajavi would seize power should the regime fall was an important reason why widespread disaffection and anger among the Iranian population did not spill over into a mass revolt like it did back in 1979.
It now seems that the association between the Mujahideen-e-Khalq and the Iraqi regime is not a marriage of convenience. Rajavi’s men have been incorporated into the Iraqi Army and intelligence forces. In the Iraqi uprising of 1991, Rajavi’s men played a prominent role in subjugating Shiites and Kurds. They donned Iranian uniforms and infiltrated Shiite towns as liberators but soon initiated a war of genocide against the Shiites. In the north, they fought side by side with the Iraqi Army against the Kurds.
Even though they lacked popular support inside Iran, the Mujahideen nevertheless managed despite Mohammad Khatami’s resounding victory in the presidential election of 1997, in which voters largely ignored Rajavi’s call from Baghdad to boycott the poll to maintain their position as the only credible alternative to the Islamic regime.
President’s Khatami’s victory, however, was bad news for Rajavi’s group. Within two years, the United States (followed by Britain and the European Union) named the Mujahideen-e-Khalq as a pro-Iraq terrorist organization. Its offices in London, Washington and other cities were closed down. Rajavi’s hopes of addressing the United Nations one day (like Nelson Mandela and other Third World leaders of the 1960s did) thus went up in smoke.
The Mujahideen’s fate will not be any better than that of its Iraqi sponsors. In fact, there are already indications that Iraq is prepared to ditch the organization in exchange for better relations with Iran in these critical times.
According to sources in the Iranian presidency, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein wrote a letter to Khatami (which Foreign Minister Naji Sabri delivered on Feb. 9) offering several concessions, including delineating the border between the two countries, going back to the 1975 Treaty of Algiers and giving the Iraq-based Mujahideen a choice between returning to Iran and relocating to a third country.
It is not unlikely that the autonomous Kurdish area in northern Iraq will witness an influx of fleeing Mujahideen cadres in the next few days. Meanwhile, a Mujahideen delegation is already touring European capitals in a quest for a safe haven for Rajavi, his wife Maryam and other senior cadres.
Rajavi’s place in Iranian history looks secure together with that village headman who betrayed his country to Alexander the Great 2,400 years ago.

Ali Nourizadeh, one-time political editor of the Tehran daily Ettelaat, is an Iranian researcher at the London-based Center for Arab-Iranian Studies and the editor of its Arabic-language newsletter Al-Mujes an-Iran. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star

http://www.nourizadeh.com/archives/000041.php

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.