Free Republic

Under federal law the Department of Homeland Security has general superintendence over the merchant marine, the industry and its seafarers.

Seafarers already have been burdened with extra security duties aboard ship under the Code of Federal Regulations.

There are 95,000 miles of coastal shorelines for the U.S. that the Coast Guard cannot fully patrol.

The U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary would augment coastal patrols in addition to serving as a resource for privateers under Letters of Marque and Reprisals.

This is a constitutional approach for the "Common Defence."

Yes!

Just as I proposed to the U.S. Coast Guard the creation of an armed U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary modeled after the unarmed U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliry. A proposal that fell on deaf ears and blind eyes.

Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden
September 30, 2001
Larry J. Sechrest
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=119
http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec/congrec2001/cr120401.htm

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1153347/posts
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/543657/posts

#@$&^)%$

Thank you. I'll get it corrected ASAP.

FOR EVERYONE!

http://amricancommondefencereview.blogspot.com/

But I am still hung-up on the missing "United States" ... It is a thorn sticking in my skin.

OH YES THEY DO!

Everything about the 5th is about what the Executive and Judicial branch can do to an individual for their propensity to violate constitutional rights.

Section 1, 2nd sentence specifically states "make and enforce any law." That implies the Legislative and Executive (arrest) branches. Although the Judicial branch can be thrown in as "after the fact" (adjudication).

Damn it. I think you just blew a hole in that part of my theory.

The clauses of the 5th refer to the powers of the Executive and the Judicial branch of the U.S. Government.

And the 14th refers to the powers of the Legislative branch of the State governments.

Uhhhhh...

I still maintain that the 5th is directed to the Executive and Judicial branches of the FedGov and to the State governments through the 14th. And I maintain that the 14th is directed to the Legislative branch of the State governments.

I'm struggling with this but that is how I read it.

Uhhhhh...

I still maintain that the 5th is directed to the Executive and Judicial branches of the FedGov and to the State governments through the 14th. And I maintain that the 14th is directed to the Legislative branch of the State governments.

I'm struggling with this but that is how I read it.

Some selected reading:

http://www.kennedytwins.com/publications.htm
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1565540247/qid=1017979684/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-6912821-3550540?n=283155
http://southernevents.org/why_the_south_was_right.htm
http://www.fff.org/freedom/1100f.asp

"Because XIV was passed to empower the United States against individual States, so that a State could not pass a Black Code which would impair rights granted either by the Constitution or otherwise at the Federal level."

But isn't "federal gun control laws" a form of the "Black Codes"?

And do "federal gun control laws" violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery and "involuntary servitude"?

I posted on the premise that the Constitution is a contract between three parties (i.e., the Tenth Amendment). My contention is that because of the Civil War, South v North or States v Federal Government, the Fourteenth Amendment was a Reconstruction Era amendment in that the United States imposed conditions on what the States cannot do. But on the premise of a superior government imposing conditions upon the subordinate government would it not be logical that the conditions placed on the subordinate and not on the superior would imply by omission that the superior can do what the subordinate may not do?

As suggest by someone above, let's compare the Fifth Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Isn't the Fifth Amendment a prohibitive declaration against the Executive and Judicial Branches of the U.S. Government?

And isn't the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibitive declaration against the Legislative and Executive Branches of State Governments?

NOW FOLLOW MY LOGIC (EVEN IF FLAWED. I WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM - NOT INSULTS).

The Fifth Amendment, in the literal sense, does not prohibit the U.S. Government from legislating for the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Once such legislation becomes law it becomes "due process" for the Judicial and Executive Branch of the Federal Government to determine constitutionality.

Fifth Amendment

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Fourteenth Amendment, Sec. 1, 2nd sentence

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

---

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit the same things to the same branches of the comparable governments. If this logic is worth building, even though it may be weak or flawed I hope to improve it with your criticisms and critiques.

Thank you.

Here's another one of my countless arguments:

The Dirty Little Secret about the Fourteenth Amendment

A. THE TEXT OF SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

B. “NO STATE SHALL” IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES?

In the second sentence of Section 1 in the Fourteenth Amendment the “United States” is omitted from the prohibitive declaration “No State Shall.”

1. The Fourteenth Amendment is a tool for usurpation by the United States.

"Because the U.S. Constitution is a social compact, (a contract), between three parties, and the United States is omitted in the prohibitive declaration in the second sentence of Section 1 to the Fourteenth Amendment that second sentence is the classic example of a parent telling the child “Don’t do as I do! Do as I say!”

To illustrate that example and to expose the unconstitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment I will take the strict literal meaning of the second sentence and flip its logical meaning in reverse in order to explicitly include all three parties of the Constitution. That portion of the Fourteenth Amendment then rewritten as follows:

“The United States shall make and enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and shall deprive any person of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law and deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but the States shall not.”

That sentence conveys the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in its original grammatical meaining as ratified. To take that reverse logic further, the Petitioner alleges that the Fourteenth Amendment is the authorization for the U.S. Congress, the President, and any damn federal judge to do whatever they want and to Hell with the Constitution as the President himself has said that the Constitution is just a goddamn piece of paper.[FN108] Perhaps the President can even go around assassinating political dissidents! Why not? The question of whether the President can order the assassination of terrorist on U.S. soil is already being floating for public comment. It is that “slippery slope” theory of politics that is transforming our country into another third world military regime unless our Second Amendment rights are restore to their original state of constitutional, legal and social norms!

This establishes grounds proving that President Bush has a clear duty to act.

[FN 108] Chuck Baldwin, pasper, Did President Bush Really Say That?, NewsWithViews.com, December 13, 2005 http://www.newswithviews.com/baldwin/baldwin271.htm

Geoff Metcalf, More than a ‘Piece of Paper’! NewsWithViews.com, December 13, 2005 http://www.newswithviews.com/metcalf/metcalf163.htm

Doug Thompson, Bush on the Constitution: “It’s Just a Goddamned Piece of Paper” Capitol Hill Blue, December 9, 2005, http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/article_7779.shtml

WILL SOMEONE PLEASE RELAY THIS TO THE NRA FOR ME?

The "Negotiated Rulemaking" and "Federal Preemption" of state laws via my Second Amendment case is EXACTLY why the NRA ought to be backing my Second Amendment case.

As far as I am conerned the fact that they are not backing my case is prima facie evidence of political stupidity and self-centered foolishness on the part of the NRA.

YES. This litigation has been going on for 4 years now. I got my first "win" with the DC Circuit on February 26, 2006 when they remanded my case back to the U.S. District Court/DC for further procedings on Second Amendment grounds.

However, I filed a Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc refuting the dismissal of my RICO claims amounting to $9 million in damages.

Thanks for catching that. I saw it earlier and forgot to correct it. It is a typo.

Should read "Federal Gun Control Laws"

PLEASE! STOP POSTING REPLIES TO THIS THREAD!

I CONFESS! I WAS HAVING A BAD DAY WHICH PUT ME IN A BAD MOOD. I MOUTHED OFF WITH THAT ORIGINAL POSTING. I WAS A JACKASS THAT DAY.

CAN I PLEASE LIVE IT DOWN NOW?

THANK YOU.

;^)

THE FOLLOWING IS A MOTION THAT I AM PRESENTLY DRAFTING. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN FILED. "NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING" WITH THE U.S. COAST GUARD AND THE BATFE FOR NATONAL OPEN CARRY HANDGUN IS ONE METHOD WILL PUSH FOR. IT IS WHAT WE ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking under Special Procedures of Rule 16(c)(9) Fed.R.Civ.P. with the Defendants, the BATFE and the U.S. Congress (See 5 U.S.C. § 560 and 33 C.F.R. § 1.05–60) To Enact Federal Preemption of State Gun Control Laws and the Repeal/Revision of Seclected Federal Gun Control Lawsal and Regulations for the National Open Carry Handgun Endorsement on Plaintiff’s Merchant Mariner’s Document and for the People as One Condition for Settlement Case Remanded on Second Amendment Grounds

While Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc refuting the DC Circuit’s affirmation of the U.S. District Court/DC’s dismissal with prejudice of his RICO Act claims the Plaintiff construes the DC Circuit’s order remanding his case for further proceedings on Second Amendment grounds as presently binding on the U.S. District Court/DC to proceed.

There is nothing preventing the Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) from granting this Motion but for his ideological predilection against the Second Amendment as an individual right.

On that basis the Plaintiff files this Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking in defiance of the U.S. District Court/DC’s demonstrated hostile bias against the Second Amendment

“Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules of juridical interpretation. They are different in different men. They are different in the same men at different times. And when a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean. When such a method of interpretation of the Constitution obtains, in place of a republican Government, with limited and defined powers, we have a Government which is merely an exponent of the will of Congress; or what, in my opinion, would not be preferable, an exponent of the individual political opinions of the members of this court.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).

The Plaintiff cites the law review by Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and Political Questions, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 2, May 2001, Pp. 365–391; Princeton University, as background for this Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking.

In Plaintiff’s original case, U.S. District Court/DC, No. 02-1435, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle misconstrued the law and facts in her Memorandum dismissing the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice when she stated:

“. . . no court has ever so much as suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment confers any right to bear arms, and it is entirely fanciful to suggest that its prohibition of involuntary servitude somehow unambiguously requires the overturning of a whole variety of gun control legislation.”

Judge Huvelle’s statement above reveals either a criminally willful misrepresentation of the law and facts based on her political ideology over the Rule of Law or an incompetence in applying case law or the law itself to the facts of Plaintiff’s case. Either way it is evidence of misconduct. The Dred Scott case not only pre-dates the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment but it was also the caustic origin for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing from the Dred Scott opinion:

“The legislation of the States therefore shows, in a manner not to be mistaken, the inferior and subject condition of that race at the time the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards, throughout the thirteen States by which that instrument was framed; and it is hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they regarded at that time, as fellow citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized; whom, as we are bound, out of respect to the State sovereignties, to assume they had deemed it just and necessary thus to stigmatize, and upon whom they had impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation; or, that when they met in convention to form the Constitution, they looked upon them as a portion of their constituents, or designed to include them in the provisions so carefully inserted for the security and protection of the liberties and rights of their citizens. It cannot be supposed that they intended to secure to them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State.”

Dred Scott v. Sanford,60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857) (Chief Justice Taney).

As to Judge Huvelle’s remark “. . . unambiguously requires the overturning of a whole variety of gun control legislation.”she ignores the face that federal preemption of State laws is found in the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” and delegatedly in the Rulemaking Process of federal agencies and of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Citing from J. Norman Heath, Exposing the Second Amendment: Federal Preemption of State Militia Legislation, 79 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev.39 (2001):

“Professor Laurence H. Tribe identifies in Supreme Court jurisprudence three modes of federal preemption exercisable by Congress against the states:

(1) “express preemption,” where Congress has in so many words declared its intention to preclude state legislation of a described sort in a given area;

(2) “implied preemption,” where Congress, through the structure or objectives of its enactments has by implication precluded a certain kind of state regulation in an area; and

(3) “conflict preemption,” where Congress did not necessarily focus on preemption of state regulation at all, but where the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law, or otherwise (p.44) stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal statutory objectives.

In addition, Professor Tribe recognizes:

Because congressional purposes can be either substantive or jurisdictional, a state action may be struck down as an invalid interference with the federal design either because it is in substantive conflict with the operation of a federal regulation or program or because, whatever its substantive impact, it intrudes jurisdictionally upon a field that Congress has validly reserved for exclusively federal regulation. It is this latter phenomenon that some describe as field (or "occupying the field") preemption - which, it is worth stressing, may fall into any of the three categories set forth above.”

Excerpt from the Conclusion of J. Norman Heath’s law review endorses Plaintiff’s allegation that the U.S. District Court/DC possesses a hostile bias against the Second Amendment:

“The suspicious obstinance of the lower federal courts in clinging to the "states' right" interpretation presents a serious obstruction to the proper adjudication of the nature and scope of the Second Amendment right, and thus serves only to exacerbate and prolong the current public-policy impasse regarding gun ownership. The American public deserves a more considered, consistent, and constitutional approach to the delineation of the Second Amendment right. The decisions of the lower federal courts in Second Amendment cases cannot ultimately withstand high court scrutiny; a consistent body of Supreme Court jurisprudence spanning 180 years places federal preemption of state militia powers among the most well-settled propositions in American constitutional law.”

The Plaintiff alleging that there is ample evidence proving that state and federal gun control laws and federal regulations since the National Firearms Act of 1933, in their accumulative effect, have served to defeat the common defence against violent crimes in society hereby takes action to promote the common defence with this Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking.

U.S. Senate Document No. 103-6; 103d Congress, 1st Session The Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and Interpretation:

Annotations of Cases Decided By the Supreme Court of the United States to June 29, 1992

PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE

Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. “Its true office,” wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, “is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, ‘to provide for the common defense.’ No one can doubt that this does not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any measures which they deem useful for the common defence. But suppose the terms of a given power admit of two constructions, the one more restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words, but is, and ought to be, governed by the intent of the power; if one could promote and the other defeat the common defence, ought not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation, to be adopted?”

Special Procedures under Rule 16(c)(9)

The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard has the authority under 14 U.S.C. § 2; 93(a); § 141; § 631; § 632; § 633; and 33 C.F.R. § 1.05–1; § 1.05–5; § 1.05–10; § 1.05–60; to not only issue the Merchant Mariner’s Document with the “National Open Carry Hand/Small Arms and Light Weapons” endorsement but to initiate Negotiated Rulemaking, under the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 569, and 33 C.F.R. § 1.05-60 with the Plaintiff and with representatives from the:

■ Office of the President ■ U.S. Senate’s Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. 271), ■ U.S. House of Representatives’ Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 281), ■ U.S. House of Representatives’ Office of the Law Revision Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 285). ■ U.S. House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation ■ U.S. Department of Homeland Security ■ U.S. Department of Justice ■ U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety and Security Council ■ (National Governors Association), ■ (National Association of County Officials), ■ National Rifle Association ■ Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership ■ Second Amendment Sisters ■ Second Amendment Foundation ■ Gunowers of America ■ Seafarers International Union and other seafaring labor unions.

Negotiated Rulemaking With the U.S. Government

5 U.S.C. § 569. Encouraging Negotiated Rulemaking

(a) The President shall designate an agency or designate or establish an interagency committee to facilitate and encourage agency use of negotiated rulemaking. An agency that is considering, planning, or conducting a negotiated rulemaking may consult with such agency or committee for information and assistance.

5 U.S.C. § 566. Conduct of Committee Activity

(a) Duties of Committee. - Each negotiated rulemaking committee established under this subchapter shall consider the matter proposed by the agency for consideration and shall attempt to reach a consensus concerning a proposed rule with respect to such matter and any other matter the committee determines is relevant to the proposed rule.

(b) Representatives of Agency on Committee. - The person or persons representing the agency on a negotiated rulemaking committee shall participate in the deliberations and activities of the committee with the same rights and responsibilities as other members of the committee, and shall be authorized to fully represent the agency in the discussions and negotiations of the committee.

(c) Selecting Facilitator. - Notwithstanding section 10(e) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, an agency may nominate either a person from the Federal Government or a person from outside the Federal Government to serve as a facilitator for the negotiations of the committee, subject to the approval of the committee by consensus. If the committee does not approve the nominee of the agency for facilitator, the agency shall submit a substitute nomination. If a committee does not approve any nominee of the agency for facilitator, the committee shall select by consensus a person to serve as facilitator. A person designated to represent the agency in substantive issues may not serve as facilitator or otherwise chair the committee.

(d) Duties of Facilitator.

A facilitator approved or selected by a negotiated rulemaking committee shall -

(1) chair the meetings of the committee in an impartial manner;

(2) impartially assist the members of the committee in conducting discussions and negotiations; and

(3) manage the keeping of minutes and records as required under section 10(b) and (c) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, except that any personal notes and materials of the facilitator or of the members of a committee shall not be subject to section 552 of this title.

(e) Committee Procedures.

A negotiated rulemaking committee established under this subchapter may adopt procedures for the operation of the committee. No provision of section 553 of this title shall apply to the procedures of a negotiated rulemaking committee.

(f) Report of Committee.

If a committee reaches a consensus on a proposed rule, at the conclusion of negotiations the committee shall transmit to the agency that established the committee a report containing the proposed rule. If the committee does not reach a consensus on a proposed rule, the committee may transmit to the agency a report specifying any areas in which the committee reached a consensus. The committee may include in a report any other information, recommendations, or materials that the committee considers appropriate. Any committee member may include as an addendum to the report additional information, recommendations, or materials.

(g) Records of Committee.

In addition to the report required by subsection (f), a committee shall submit to the agency the records required under section 10(b) and (c) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Federal Advisory Committee Act

5 U.S.C. Appendix - Federal Advisory Committee Act § 2. Findings and Purpose

(a) The Congress finds that there are numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government and that they are frequently a useful and beneficial means of furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal Government.

(b) The Congress further finds and declares that -

(1) the need for many existing advisory committees has not been adequately reviewed;

(2) new advisory committees should be established only when they are determined to be essential and their number should be kept to the minimum necessary;

(3) advisory committees should be terminated when they are no longer carrying out the purposes for which they were established;

(4) standards and uniform procedures should govern the establishment, operation, administration, and duration of advisory committees;

(5) the Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees; and

(6) the function of advisory committees should be advisory only, and that all matters under their consideration should be determined, in accordance with law, by the official, agency, or officer involved.

Coast Guard Regulations for Negotiated Rulemaking

33 C.F.R. § 1.05–60 Negotiated Rulemaking

(a) The Coast Guard may establish a negotiated rulemaking committee under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (5 U.S.C. App. 2) when it is in the public interest.

(b) Generally, the Coast Guard will consider negotiated rulemaking when:

(1). There is a need for a rule;

MY COMMENT: The need exists because the U.S. Congress in their legislative responsibilities, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Cost Guard, and the BATFE failed to acknowledge, legislate or regulate the Second Amendment rights of U.S. seafarers in intrastate and interstate travel.

(2). There are a limited number of representatives for identifiable parties affected by the rule;

MY COMMENT: The Negotiated Rulemaking will be between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. Representatives from the Seafarers International Union may elect to be a party to the Negotiated Rulemaking on the Plaintiff’s behalf. Representatives from other seafaring unions my elect to be present.

(3). There is a reasonable chance that balanced representation can be reached in the negotiated rulemaking committee and that the committee members will negotiate in good faith;

MY COMMENT: The Plaintiff suggests that representatives from theOffice of the President; U.S. Senate’s Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. 271); U.S. House of Representatives’ Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 281); U.S. House of Representatives’ Office of the Law Revision Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 285); U.S. House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety and Security Council; (National Governors Association); (National Association of County Officials); National Rifle Association; Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership; Second Amendment Sisters; Second Amendment Foundation; Gunowers of America; and the Seafarers International Union and other seafaring labor unions.

(4). There is a likelihood of a committee consensus in a fixed time period;

MY COMMENT: The Plaintiff concurs that their will be a consensus in a fixed time period.

(5). The negotiated rulemaking process will not unreasonably delay the rule;

MY COMMENT: The Plaintiff concurs that there will be no unreasonable delay of the rule (or rules).

(6). The Coast Guard has resources to do negotiated rulemaking; and

MY COMMENT: The Plaintiff concurs that the Coast Guard has resources to do negotiated rulemaking.

(7). The Coast Guard can use the consensus of the committee in formulating the NPRM and final rule.

MY COMMENT: The Plaintiff concurs that the Coast Guard can use the consensus of the committee in formulating the NPRM and final rule.

Citing from the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 3:

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."

Therefore, it is Plaintiff’s understanding that since his Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking has origins in the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights the Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) is bound by Oath and/or Affirmation to support the Constitution, the Bill of Rights by granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Negotiated Rulemaking. Denying Plaintiff’s Motion will mean another act of judicial misconduct will have been committed.

If it gets to the Supreme Court they will just "deny" it. See Bach v. Pataki, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-786.htm.

http://www.alphecca.com/mt_alphecca_archives/001226.html
http://keepandbeararms.com/Bach/status.asp

The Bach case is nearly identical to mine. So, there is no real "threat" of ruining the NRA's agenda. If my case goes to trial I will use this fact on the jury telling the jury that their decision will mean nothing to the U.S. Supreme Court. I have a few other tricks up my sleeve.