“I haven’t seen evidence of some deep worry on the part of Southerners from the Deep South that the states of the Upper South had “a flagging commitment to slavery”. Southerners viewed it as a matter for the people of each state to decide.”
That is the dogma. But it’s clear that militants further South viewed the weakening of slavery in the Border States as a threat and feared that it would spread.
In “The Disruption of American Democracy,” Roy Nichols describes Southern fears in the Summer and Fall of 1860.
This fear was not the fear of property loss, of slave uprising, or of the destruction of white supremacy; these might be felt by the voters, but among the leaders there was the fear of loss of power. They would lose their preferred position in Washington; that was bad enough, but it was not their greatest dread. Their very real and often overlooked fear was loss of power at home. The victory of Abraham Lincoln, one time Kentucky poor white, might have consequences little related to the much talked-of abolition. It might stir up the submerged whites to whom Helper had appealed.
If elected, Lincoln would have the federal patronage at his command. He would be appointing a postmaster in every community. Where would he find the men. Not among the aristocracy, not among the fire eaters, not among the Democrats. Might they not be men of his own humble origin? Already that idea was stirring in the minds of some of the ambitious. One Indiana Republican alone, by election day, had received six hundred applications for office from men in the South.
Worse still, Lincoln might appoint free Negroes Undoubtedly, the Republicans would endeavor to use the federal patronage to build up their party. The new postmasters would not censor the mails, would not burn abolition papers. They would preach to the poor against the rule of the rich and would stir up a class struggle to create a new order in the name of democracy. They might even be abolitionists.
This fear already had been voiced in the Senate during the last two sessions. When a North Carolina member heard of the breakup at Baltimore and reflected upon the character of the times, and “the dirty influences which in this day prompt action,” he confessed that he was not surprised. “The democratic proclivities of the age pervade our whole country — nothing can arrest our downward tendency to absolute Government — the idea of a Republic is cherished by but few. What a season for Demagogues and Charlatans!”
The fear of a shift of power to the poorer farmers and artisans was contributing to local political contests in a fashion big with danger. In several of the southern states the Democratic machines had to deal with this election under local conditions which had nothing directly to do with it. The crisis of 1860 illustrates very well a fundamental characteristic of American politics; namely, that federal issues are frequently used in state politics in an artificial and opportunistic fashion. This local use of federal issues is not always apparent and is difficult to understand if too constant focus is kept on the federal angle. Such local use was particularly marked in South Carolina during this fateful summer.
The Helper referred to is Hinton Rowan Helper, whose “appeal to the non-slaveholding whites of the South” entitled “The Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It” advocated that sort of class conflict. The book set off a panic among slaveowners.
I think Nichols sees things too much through the prism of class. A large number of Southerners, elite or not, feared that Republicans would build up a party in the Border States and the South that would support an eventual end to slavery and possibly to White Supremacy.
The Corwin Amendment appeased many in the Upper South, but it wasn’t enough to calm those fears in the Deep South states that had already succeeded. It was never going to bring them back into the union.
Right.
Corwin simply tried to match one protection for slavery that was already in the new Confederate constitution.
"Article I Section 9(4) No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed.[13]"The 1861 Confederate constitution included several other protections for slavery which neither Corwin nor the existing 1787 Constitution could ever match.
The dogma is that the big concern was over the continuance of slavery when slavery simply was not threatened in the US.
In “The Disruption of American Democracy,” Roy Nichols describes Southern fears in the Summer and Fall of 1860. This fear was not the fear of property loss, of slave uprising, or of the destruction of white supremacy; these might be felt by the voters, but among the leaders there was the fear of loss of power. They would lose their preferred position in Washington; that was bad enough, but it was not their greatest dread. Their very real and often overlooked fear was loss of power at home. The victory of Abraham Lincoln, one time Kentucky poor white, might have consequences little related to the much talked-of abolition. It might stir up the submerged whites to whom Helper had appealed.
All politicians fear loss of power. What most of the Southern voters feared was not for the continuance of slavery. It was not threatened in the US and the vast majority of Southerners did not own any slaves to begin with. What they feared was the reimposition of the equivalent of the Tariff of Abominations which would crush their economy just as the original had a generation earlier prior to the Nullification Crisis. That was the obvious threat given the Morrill Tariff had already passed the House, was sure to pass the Senate and sky high tariffs was one of the key planks of the Republican platform.
If elected, Lincoln would have the federal patronage at his command. He would be appointing a postmaster in every community. Where would he find the men. Not among the aristocracy, not among the fire eaters, not among the Democrats. Might they not be men of his own humble origin? Already that idea was stirring in the minds of some of the ambitious. One Indiana Republican alone, by election day, had received six hundred applications for office from men in the South.
LOL! The Post Office was about all the federal government had in most states. In fact, for the majority of people in the country, the Post Office was their only encounter with the US Federal government. The federal Leviathan that currently extends its tentacles into nearly every corner of our lives did not exist then. The power to appoint postmasters was an insignificant one in terms of exercising any real influence in the Southern states. There weren't enough postal jobs by a factor of at least 1000 to give Lincoln any real influence in the Southern states.
Worse still, Lincoln might appoint free Negroes
There's no way that would have happened. The entire country - indeed the entire world - was flamingly racist at that time. Lincoln was no less a public exemplar of racism and White Supremacy than anybody else. He certainly wasn't going to give appointments to free Negroes. Its laughable to even suggest it.
Undoubtedly, the Republicans would endeavor to use the federal patronage to build up their party. The new postmasters would not censor the mails, would not burn abolition papers. They would preach to the poor against the rule of the rich and would stir up a class struggle to create a new order in the name of democracy. They might even be abolitionists.
This is pretty funny. There were incredibly few postal jobs to offer. There were certainly nowhere near enough for Lincoln to have any real influence in the Southern States.
This fear already had been voiced in the Senate during the last two sessions. When a North Carolina member heard of the breakup at Baltimore and reflected upon the character of the times, and “the dirty influences which in this day prompt action,” he confessed that he was not surprised. “The democratic proclivities of the age pervade our whole country — nothing can arrest our downward tendency to absolute Government — the idea of a Republic is cherished by but few. What a season for Demagogues and Charlatans!”
Southerners were very much opposed to centralized power and the federal government's usurpation of ever more power for itself that the sovereign states never expressly delegated to it in the US Constitution. That was true in 1787 and its still true today. Then and now New England supports ever more centralized power and the South opposes it.
The fear of a shift of power to the poorer farmers and artisans was contributing to local political contests in a fashion big with danger. In several of the southern states the Democratic machines had to deal with this election under local conditions which had nothing directly to do with it. The crisis of 1860 illustrates very well a fundamental characteristic of American politics; namely, that federal issues are frequently used in state politics in an artificial and opportunistic fashion. This local use of federal issues is not always apparent and is difficult to understand if too constant focus is kept on the federal angle. Such local use was particularly marked in South Carolina during this fateful summer.
There were political power struggles that went on in each state. Obviously social class was a major issue then just as it is now. Support for secession however was widespread in the Southern states and was not confined to just the rich or just slaveowners - indeed they were a very small minority of the total White population in the Southern states yet those states voted either directly or indirectly for secession overwhelmingly.
I think Nichols sees things too much through the prism of class. A large number of Southerners, elite or not, feared that Republicans would build up a party in the Border States and the South that would support an eventual end to slavery and possibly to White Supremacy.
I don't think this was a real concern among any but a tiny handful. There was no real support for abolition. Abolitionists could not get more than single digit percentages of the vote even in the North. Even had there been support for Abolition, how would the federal government go about it? It did not have that power. In any case, it would have had to come up with a lot of money to compensate slave owners for emancipation just as had been done in other countries. That would take considerable time and even more considerable money. Northerners were fiercely opposed to diverting federal funds they were getting in order to compensate slave owners for their slaves.
The Corwin Amendment appeased many in the Upper South, but it wasn’t enough to calm those fears in the Deep South states that had already succeeded. It was never going to bring them back into the union.
the Corwin Amendment shows both that the North was not fighting over slavery - if anybody really doubted it. It also shows that the original 7 seceding states weren't seceding over slavery. Slavery wasn't threatened in the US as is and they could have obtained even more explicit protections of slavery by coming back in. Slaveowners were after all a relatively small minority of the total White population in the Southern states. Secession enjoyed widespread popular support.
Also the Upper South was content to stay in the union without the offer of the Corwin Amendment. Their only condition was that the federal government not try to impose a government the people in the 7 seceding states did not consent to by violence. They only seceded when the federal government made clear it intended to impose its rule by violence and without the consent of the governed in those states.