As that you are probly right, good luck in fighting the federal goverment & the leagions of lawyers that they employ to enforce the so-called federal laws that they enforce down our throats everyday. There is no way we [the everyday folks] can fix this other than another civil war. And thanks to the fine folks in congress they now know where our fire arms are, and come get them on the grounds of public safty! Thus keeping themselves in power longer!
Everyone knows that the Commerce clause, the Necessary clause, and the General Welfare clause were put in so that Congress could wield power over anything it deems necessary. At least that's what one would gather by reading some Supreme Court decisions, this board, and the opinions of modern (and some past) Americans.
-Ashcroft V Raich
The Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). By limiting the states and Congress to their proper prerogatives, the People would enjoy greater freedom since the structure of federalism would prevent Congressional overreaching into local affairs. The people would have two servants, not two masters. Federalism is concerned with individual liberty, not "state sovereignty" or "power."
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Viewing in the abstract the question whether the power of regulating trade, to a certain degree at least, ought to be vested in Congress, it appears to me not to admit of a doubt, but that it should be decided in the affirmative. If it be necessary to regulate trade at all, it surely is necessary to lodge the power, where trade can be regulated with effect, and experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that it can never be so regulated by the States acting in their separate capacities. They can no more exercise this power separately, than they could separately carry on war, or separately form treaties of alliance or Commerce. The nature of the thing therefore proves the former power, no less than the latter, to be within the reason of the foederal Constitution. Much indeed is it to be wished, as I conceive, that no regulations of trade, that is to say, no restriction or imposts whatever, were necessary. Source
"If it be necessary to regulate trade at all ..." Madison doesn't know whether such regulation will be necessary. "It surely is necessary to lodge the power, where trade can be regulated with effect, and experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that it can never be so regulated by the States acting in their separate capacities." He doesn't want the states to have that power. But he does leave open just how and how much the federal government will do to regulate trade.
In his old age, he was apt to fudge things. There's a lot in what he says about the reasons for giving the federal goverment the power (he doesn't want the states meddling). But it's clear that he did at least admit the possibility in his youth that the federal goverment would make use of the power given to it and denied the states by the Constitution.
The Commerce clause isn't a grant of sweeping powers to the federal government to do what it likes, but it is a pretty clear authorization of regulatory power over interstate commerce to the federal government.
No.
The clause gave exclusive authority to collect revenue from imports from foreign countries, and prohibited States fortunate enough to posses ports from collecting taxes from their not-so-fortunate neighbor States.
The Federalist No. 42 James Madison
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade
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Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
§ 1075 The constitution is one of limited and enumerated powers; and none of them can be rightfully exercised beyond the scope of the objects, specified in those powers. It is not disputed, that, when the power is given, all the appropriate means to carry it into effect are included. Neither is it disputed, that the laying of duties is, or may be an appropriate means of regulating commerce. But the question is a very different one, whether, under pretence of an exercise of the power to regulate commerce, congress may in fact impose duties for objects wholly distinct from commerce. The question comes to this, whether a power, exclusively for the regulation of commerce, is a power for the regulation of manufactures? The statement of such a question would seem to involve its own answer. Can a power, granted for one purpose, be transferred to another? If it can, where is the limitation in the constitution? Are not commerce and manufactures as distinct, as commerce and agriculture? If they are, how can a power to regulate one arise from a power to regulate the other? It is true, that commerce and manufactures are, or may be, intimately connected with each other. A regulation of one may injuriously or beneficially affect the other. But that is not the point in controversy. It is, whether congress has a right to regulate that, which is not committed to it, under a power, which is committed to it, simply because there is, or may be an intimate connexion between the powers. If this were admitted, the enumeration of the powers of congress would be wholly unnecessary and nugatory. Agriculture, colonies, capital, machinery, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, the rents of land, the punctual performance of contracts, and the diffusion of knowledge would all be within the scope of the power; for all of them bear an intimate relation to commerce. The result would be, that the powers of congress would embrace the widest extent of legislative functions, to the utter demolition of all constitutional boundaries between the state and national governments. When duties are laid, not for purposes of revenue, but of retaliation and restriction, to countervail foreign restrictions, they are strictly within the scope of the power, as a regulation of commerce. But when laid to encourage manufactures, they have nothing to do with it. The power to regulate manufactures is no more confided to congress, than the power to interfere with the systems of education, the poor laws, or the road laws of the states. It is notorious, that, in the convention, an attempt was made to introduce into the constitution a power to encourage manufactures; but it was withheld. Instead of granting the power to congress, permission was given to the states to impose duties, with the consent of that body, to encourage their own manufactures; and thus, in the true spirit of justice, imposing the burthen on those, who were to be benefited.