Rufus King and Elbridge Gerry proposed an amendment to the 4th Clause from Mr. Brearly’s report from the Committee of Eleven from September 4th. It would prevent any Presidential elector from being a member of Congress or who held an office of “profit or trust” under the US. The motion passed without opposition.
Elbridge Gerry motioned, that if a sitting President was not reelected with an outright majority for a second term, the election outcome should be decided by the entire Congress. By this fashion, he would not be dependent upon the Senate for continuing terms.
Rufus King and Hugh Williamson supported the idea as amenable to particular delegates since it reduced the influence of the Senate over the President.
George Read opposed it precisely because it was designed to satisfy particular members.
Roger Sherman could accept minor amendments, but insisted that should the entire Congress decide, it should be by States, since the Large States had the advantage in nominating the candidates.
Governeur Morris supported Mr. Gerry’s motion. It would liberate the President from having to look over his shoulder at the Senate when deciding who to appoint to offices.
James Wilson probably summed up what many were thinking. The plan had tended way too far toward an aristocratic Senate. It had the de facto power to appoint the President, name his officers, appoint Judges, make treaties and try impeachments. This constituted something very close to entitling Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers to a small group of men (the very definition of Tyranny). The power to make treaties involved “subsidies” and foreign intrigue.
(Hmm, by subsidy did he imply that Senators could be bribed to vote or not vote for imposts?)
The President would be nothing more than a “minion of the Senate,” rather than a man of the people.
(Recall that Mr. Wilson’s State of PA had the most radical democratic government of all. He supported popular election of the House, Senate and President. Most States had weak Executive branches where the Legislatures rolled over Governors.)
Mr. Wilson said the President could not hire a tide waiter without Senate approval. (New term to me, this tide waiter. It was a customs official who boarded incoming ships.) The Senate was too numerous to make appointments. It would be in constant session and would command high salaries. Combine these with dominance over the President, it was inevitable they would depress the House and increase their power by an equal amount. The Senate was certain to contrive to throw the Presidential election to their house. Given the big picture, the sum of powers, he could not agree to it.
Governeur Morris had more trust in the proposed system. He doubted the Senate would be called upon to elect the President, but if they did they were restricted to consider five men not of their choosing. This was hardly an increase in power. He mostly dismissed any problem with Senatorial appointment of judges nominated by the President. Make treaties? No problem. As for officers, the sense of the Convention was to deny the Executive sole appointment power.
Hugh Williamson said the aristocratic nature of the Senate arose from the President’s dependence on it.
George Clymer (PA) would not agree to the plan’s aristocratic bent of Senatorial appointments to offices.
(Alexander Hamilton was the remaining delegate from NY. His fellows Robert Yates and John Lansing departed July 10. With two of three absent, NY had no vote.)
Alexander Hamilton (NY) only grudgingly supported the new plan of government. It was better than nothing. Extending the Presidential term to seven years and be ineligible for another, would invite abuse. (Think what an unrestrained Obama will pull if he wins in 2012.) Mr. Hamilton agreed the Senate would connive to keep their President in office. His solution was to let the highest number of votes from the State Legislatures determine the President.
Richard Spaight, Hugh Williamson (Both from NC) moved to insert “seven” v. “four” for Presidential terms, which lost on an 8-3 vote.
They then motioned to insert “six” years, which failed 9-2.
The question to have State Legislatures appoint a slate of electors equal to the number of their Congressional delegations passed 9-2.
A motion to have the Presidential Electors meet at the seat of government failed 10-1.
Several motions then passed which dealt with the handling of Elector votes from the States.
Richard Spaight I believe asked for State Electors to meet at the seat of government, cast their votes, and the plurality winner would become President. After seconding by Mr. Williamson, his motion was defeated.
Words were added to ensure the election was held on the same day throughout the US by an 8-3 vote.
Two motions passed, the significance of which eludes me.
James Madison and Mr. Pinckney motioned for at least a 2/3 quorum of Senators. Nathaniel Gorham disagreed. The motion passed 6-4.
Hugh Williamson (here we go again) motioned to substitute the entire Congress and vote by State rather than per capita.
Roger Sherman motioned and George Mason heartily supported, to substitute the House of Reps instead, each State having one vote.
Mr. Sherman’s motion passed 10-1.
Governeur Morris made a novel suggestion that would remove a sitting President from Congressional reelection.
James Madison pointed out that with only a quorum necessary in the House, VA and PA could theoretically elect the President.
A motion to refer the election to the House of Reps in the event of a tie passed 6-3.
(See the Journal Notes for the final, amended section relating to the Election of the President)
“The Legislature may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and of their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes- But the election shall be on the same day throughout the U. States.”
Adjourned.
James Madison wrote a letter today to Thomas Jefferson, then an envoy to France. Mr. Madison was not entirely pleased with the emerging Constitution.
Philada. Sepr. 6. 1787,
As the Convention will shortly rise I should feel little scruple in disclosing what will be public here, before it could reach you, were it practicable for me to guard by Cypher against an intermediate discovery. But I am deprived of this resource by the shortness of the interval between the receipt of your letter of June 20, and the date of this. This is the first day which has been free from Committee service, both before & after the hours of the House, and the last that is allowed me by the time advertised for the sailing of the packet.
The Convention consists now as it has generally done of Eleven States. There has been no intermission of its Sessions since a house was formed; except an interval of about ten days allowed a Committee appointed to detail the general propositions agreed on in the House. The term of its dissolution cannot be more than one or two weeks distant. A Governmt. will probably be submitted to the people of the States, consisting of a president, cloathed with Executive power; a Senate chosen by the Legislatures, and another House chosen by the people of the States, jointly possessing the legislative power; and a regular judiciary establishment.
The mode of constituting the Executive is among the few points not yet finally settled. The Senate will consist of two members from each State, and appointed sexennially. The other, of members appointed biennially by the people of the States, in proportion to their number. The Legislative power will extend to taxation, trade, and sundry other general matters. The powers of Congress will be distributed, according to their nature, among the several departments. The States will be restricted from paper money and in a few other instances. These are the outlines. The extent of them may perhaps surprize you. I hazard an opinion nevertheless that the plan, should it be adopted, will neither effectually answer its national object, not prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts agst. the State Governments. The grounds of this opinion will be the subject of a future letter. . . .
Nothing can exceed the universal anxiety for the event of the meeting here. Reports and conjectures abound concerning the nature of the plan which is to be proposed. The public however is certainly in the dark with regard to it. The Convention is equally in the dark as to the reception wch. may be given to it on its publication. All the prepossessions are on the right side, but it may well be expected that certain characters will wage war against any reform whatever. My own idea is that the public mind will now or in a very little time receive anything that promises stability to the public Councils & security to private rights, and that no regard ought to be had to local prejudices or temporary considerations. If the present moment be lost, it is hard to say what may be our fate. . . .
Mr. Wythe has never returned to us. His lady whose illness carried him away, died some time after he got home.