Posted on 10/10/2017 12:49:31 PM PDT by re_tail20
A collection of 30 Mistakes made in the “Vietnamese War” - and “Lessons Learned”
i just finished watching all ten episodes of Ken Burns’ “The Vietnam War”, and I think that, while far from a totally complete view, which would take about 1,000 hours, it presented a much more fleshed out story than previous attempts, incorporating many new declassified tapes and conversations, and presenting many new photos, film footage, and perspectives.
i came of age after the Vietnamese War, and have constantly heard and read about the “Lessons of Vietnam.” When this happens, i would always scream, “What Lessons?”, because they always stopped on that. Usually, this phrase was mentioned by people who thought that the Vietnam experience had showed that the U. S. should not intervene anymore in world affairs at all.
Over the years, i’ve tried to figure out what happened in the Vietnamese War and why it happened, and it’s been very hard. Going through countless books, articles, and columns, there’s been so many myths, lies, distortions, hypotheticals, and what if’s over the years, all caused by either the government, the anti-war movement, and the media. All are guilty, I’ve learned.
Here we go with the Mistakes
1.
First off - with what it is called.
You’ll notice I say “Vietnamese War” instead of “Vietnam War”
The reason is this.
Do we call our war with Mexico the Mexico War? No. it’s the Mexican war, or the Mexican-American war.
Do we call our war with Spain the Spain war? No. it’s the Spanish-American war.
Do we call our war with Korea the Korea war? No. it’s the Korean war.
So why do we call our with with Vietnam the Vietnam war?
To be standardized and consistent, it’s the Vietnamese war.
For consistency, I’ll also say “Afghani War”and “Iraqi War.”
1945 - 1950
2.
The U. S. allowing France to take back Vietnam as a colony under the threat from Charles De Gaulle to put France in the “Russian orbit” if it didn’t happen
1950 - 1960
3.
Using the Korea template for Vietnam - and trying to create a Capitalist South and a Communist North
In 1954, North Vietnam and South Vietnam were arbitrarily created. The Vietnamese had wanted their one Vietnam for centuries, and they finally got in in 1945. in their hearts, both the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese didn’t recognize the division, and viewed North Vietnam, and not South Vietnam, as the true one Vietnam, even if it was communist. Many South Vietnamese civilians supported the VC or NVA by setting up booby traps, and many ARVN soldiers supported the VC or NVA by leaking info on military plans.
So the South Vietnamese and us both had the odds stacked against us from the beginning, and trying to legitimatize a free and independent South Vietnam was almost an impossible task. Just like in our Civil War, the only way the South could have prevailed and established itself is if the North did nothing or gave up after one lost battle, and the North did neither.
In one of his columns, retired Col. David Hackworth said,
“In the July 5, 1971 issue of Newsweek, I said, “The North Vietnamese flag will fly over Saigon in 1975.”…I’m still often asked how I knew. My reply: I’d been there five years commanding U. S. infantry units and advising (South) Vietnamese (ARVN) Airborne, Ranger and Special Forces. After three years of eyeballing the (South) Vietnamese firsthand, I damn well knew that their "elite" units couldn't hack it and that ordinary ARVN grunts would cave-in when put to the test. I felt like a doctor with his hand on a dying patient's pulse. There was no medicine, no transfusion, no magic pill that could have saved the corrupt South Vietnamese government and its equally corrupt and inept military.”
Nevertheless, I still think and believe that if all the below and above mistakes weren’t made, then there was a very small chance that Vietnam could be made to follow the Korea template, with a Capitalist South and a Communist North taking root in the hearts of the Vietnamese people. But it would have taken several decades, with no room for any mistakes, and too many mistakes were made
1960 - 1964
4.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff being excluded and marginalized from the Vietnam decision making process by John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and not able to get an official Vietnam strategy with objectives and action steps for those objectives adopted which the military people could use.
5.
The Cuban Missile Crisis giving birth to the flawed “graduated pressure” strategy concept - which was later wrongly applied to Vietnam
6.
The strategy, training, and equipment for the South Vietnamese not matching what was needed on the actual ground.
1964 - 1968
Here is where the bulk of the mistakes occurred - made by what Lewis Sorley called, in paraphrase, “A perfect storm of bad people”
Political culprits
John Kennedy - President of the United States
Lyndon Johnson - President of the United States
Robert McNamara - Secretary of Defense
Military culprits
Gen. Maxwell Taylor - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Earle Wheeler - Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. William Westmoreland - Commander of Army Forces in Vietnam
Gen. William De Puy - Gen. William Westmoreland’s chief deputy and chief advisor
7.
Not having an overall U. S. Commander of the Sea, Land, and Air Forces of the U. S. Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force units in Vietnam to coordinate all strategy
8.
In 1964 - on the recommendation of Gen. Maxwell Taylor - appointing Gen. William Westmoreland, an artillery and staff general only open to conventional warfare, to replace Gen. Paul Harkins as Army Commander of MACV - instead of Gen. Creighton Abrams, Gen. Bruce Palmer, or Gen. Harold Johnson, the other three Generals on the list, all three of which viewed Vietnam as the majority counterinsurgency situation that it was.
9.
Gen. Earle Wheeler telling Gen. William Westmoreland, following the flawed “graduated pressure” strategy, “The North (Vietnamese) can’t match us in a build up.”
10.
Not eliminating the entrenched Viet Cong infrastructure in place in the South Vietnamese villages early enough via a “Phoenix Program” - and not doing the “clear and hold” around the population areas
11.
With no strategy in place approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with objectives and action steps to achieve those objectives, on the recommendation of Gen. De Puy - Gen. Westmoreland’s adoption of the bad “search and destroy” military plan
12.
Not mining the harbors of Hai Phong at the beginning
13.
Not invading Laos and cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail at the beginning
14.
President Lyndon Johnson telling the Army, “Kill me more Viet Cong”, which caused the Army to start the infamous “body count” policy
15
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s worship of metrics - thinking everything could be solved or made more efficient by them, and not understanding their limitations
“if you fire “x” number of bullets or “x” number of artillery shells, you are expected to kill “y” number of Viet Cong guerrillas or “y” number of NVA soldiers”
16.
President Lyndon Johnson picking bombing targets
17.
Deploying U. S. units over as a whole, but breaking their cohesion by transferring their non-commissioned officers out after six months, and transferring their enlisted men back home one at a time, arbitrarily, after 12 months.
18.
Not calling up the Reserves and declaring total mobilization and commitment by doing so
19.
Not changing the draft to be a 100 % lottery - like in World War II and the Korean War - instead keeping the peacetime draft rules with all its college deferments in place
20.
Not giving (then) state of the art M-16 rifles to the South Vietnamese Army early enough - instead leaving them with (then) obsolete, and too big for them, M-1 Garands and (barely adequate) M-1 Carbines.
21.
Creating a culture of dependency on the U. S. in South Vietnamese society
22.
Not imposing media restrictions on the media - as had happened during World War II and the Korean War.
23.
The corrupt South Vietnamese governments assigning jobs to family connections instead of ability, having a military configured to fight internal power struggles just as much as the communists, and either cancelling elections or rigging elections
24.
The South Vietnamese government being a catholic minority ruling over a buddhist majority, instead of a buddhist majority ruling over a catholic minority
1968 - 1975
25.
Again, equipment, strategy, and training not matching what was sustainable for the South Vietnamese and proper for the war they were actually fighting
26.
Not including a South Vietnamese delegation at the Paris peace talks so both the U. S. and South Vietnam could be on the same page regarding the negotiations - and not communicating with the South Vietnamese about negotiations strategy and results.
27.
Allowing 145,000 North Vietnamese Army troops to stay in South Vietnam in the final peace settlement
28.
Not leaving a small number of regular U. S. troops and Special Forces in South Vietnam to make it harder for funds and equipment to be cut off
29.
Cutting off all funds and military equipment to South Vietnam
30.
Gen De Puy becoming head of training at West Point after the war, and banishing Vietnam from the curriculum, saying that nothing could be learned from it.
So, doing a little “Reverse Engineering“, lets find out the “Lessons Learned”
One overall lesson - don’t have bad people in office and power
1.
Have all your wars named properly
2.
If any ally of yours threatens you with blackmail, call his bluff
3.
Make sure your ally is legitimate and has, or can have, the support of the populace, and has the fire in the belly to stand on his own
4.
Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision making process
5.
Be extremely careful about applying lessons from one international event to a different one
6.
Equipment, strategy, and training should match what is sustainable to your ally
7.
Have an overall Commander of the Sea, Land, and Air Forces to coordinate strategy
8.
Have the right Generals and Officers in place in the top ranks - the ones with the right kind of experience and background and outlook.
9.
Have not just a strategy, but one that is sound, valid, and solid.
10.
Focus on the population areas, destroy any entrenched enemy infrastructure in your ally’s cities and villages, and force the enemy to come to you, on your terms
11.
Have a strategy with objectives and action steps to achieve those objectives so commanders on the ground aren’t forced to, or feel they have to, make up their own strategy
12.
Cut off the enemy’s supplies at the beginning from wherever they are coming from
13.
See number 11 above
14.
Don’t evaluate military progress by body counts
15.
Metrics should only be used within their limitations
16.
The President should not pick bombing targets
17.
Units should be deployed as a whole - and the non-commissioned officers not transferred out - and the units should be brought back as a whole
18.
The Reserves should be called up and made available - meaning total national mobilization and commitment and investment
19.
Military ranks should be filled by either an all volunteer force or a 100 % draft lottery - with no draft deferments for going to college or doing social work
20.
Your ally should receive state of the art weapons and training on how to use them, as long as it is sustainable
21.
Don’t create a culture of dependence in your ally’s society on you
22.
In war and battle, there should be restrictions on the media with censorship
23.
Your ally should not be corrupt, and should not cancel elections or rig elections
24.
In your ally’s domestic politics, a minority should not rule over a majority
25.
See number 5
26.
Include your ally in any peace talks so you and your ally will be on the same page - and don’t shut out your ally
27.
Don’t allow the enemy’s troops on your ally’s soil in the final settlement
28.
Leave a small contingent of troops as an investment
29.
Don’t cut off funds and equipment to your friends and allies
30.
Never say that nothing can be learned from the last war or battle or incident, even if it was failure and defeat
Regarding the subsequent battles and wars of the Persian Gulf War, the Afghani War, and the Iraqi War, I think that the bulk of the lessons were followed.
To all of you Vietnamese War Veterans, i salute you, and it wasn’t all for nothing. In one interview I read with Gen. Bui Tin, who commanded the tank that crashed through Presidential Palace in 1975 and who took the surrender of the South Vietnamese government, he said that the Communists were riding “piggyback” on anti-imperialist movement, and had ambitions to expand to surrounding countries like Singapore and Indonesia. But the U. S. decision to fight in Vietnam bought time for Singapore and Indonesia to configure themselves to resist the Communists, which they did. So, while you weren’t able to save South Vietnam, you were able to help Singapore and Indonesia save themselves.
1. Not cracking down on the Communist’s allies here in the US.
It was known now that the KGB funded the Peace Demonstrations.
That gave the commies something to manipulate -- our media.
Thanh Tran appreciates your salute and says that your capitalization is lacking.
Thanh apparently learned English.
Sending “messages” to the enemy by taking nonstrategic hills and then giving them back for absolutely no reason other than “to send a message” that the other guy isn’t listening to nor cares about.
2]Vietnam, as is Afghanistan and Iraq is/was not just those countries. But involves resources being brought into such countries. Outside actors continuously resupplied NVA. Those have to be contained or either you kill everyone in the country. That was never done.
2. The draft should have been ended after WWII. One of the big mistakes was putting disgruntled conscripts into the Air Force and Navy where they had access to very expensive equipment to sabotage. Keeping the draft gave radical groups much more power than they otherwise would have had. Nixon campaigned on ending the draft in 68'. He instead went to Congress in 71' to get an extension.
3. It should have been realized even before 64' that the North Vietnamese Politburo wasn't going to settle for anything less than unification no matter how many lives it took. Regime change was never on the menu.
Ken Burns is a left wing propagandist.
Shut up, hills have eyes.
1, and only 1, running the war like a liberal.
To me, the problem since Vietnam is that the politicians took control of the fight rather than the professional soldiers. Politicians have no spine and cannot make the tough decisions it takes to win a war. Rather, they want to fight a “nice war” and the other side knows that. Get the politicians out of the decision making and the rules of engagement and the war will be shorter and end up saving American lives.
#19 - The eventual national Lottery for WW2 was for the duration of the war + 6 months.
WW2 had 66% draftees. Korea has over 50% draftees. Vietnam had 25% draftees in-country.
An incorrect correlation would say that the more draftees the greater chance of victory.
in the end, it was a uneducated, peasant society that really could have cared less how they were governed..thats why the ARVN quit so easily in 1975. Very much like the Arab nations like Iraq etc...just too stupid and dont really care either way.
You seem to stick on this “shut up” business even though it clearly does nothing.
Perhaps consult some folks who are a bit keener or more sober.
Cheers.
MacArthur was right either wage the war for a quick decisive end or don't do it at all.
Two major blunders that turned victory into defeat during the war.
1. After the Tet offensive the war was over by all accounts. The Russians said so. The North Vietnamese said so. Everyone except one person. Walter Cronkite whom made it seems like the North Vietnamese won a major victory. This inspired the North to keep going.
Our mistake was not using military personal only as war reporters.
2. After our final pull out the South won the war it was over. They had the military strength the hold their ground no one contested that except our media. It was Ted Kennedy that pushed a bill through to cut funding for the South. The word alone disrupted the military in the south. Every division broke up except one.
One other point I think should have been done. The war was to stop communism. That should've been an all volunteer bases. If they couldn't get enough soldiers for the volunteer effort we had no business requiring kids to fight.
Communism is evil but it wasn't a national threat to keep them at bay. It wasn't a direct threat to the US.
Shut up, huckleberry.
Drug use by troops was a mistake but whose fault was that?
After the Bay of Pigs fiasco the US was clearly on the geopolitical defensive. Rostow, who was a Deputy National Security Advisor at the time, sent a memo to Kennedy detailing three places where the US could push back in order to restore our position vis a vis the Soviets - Berlin, where we had the most to gain but where the risk of triggering WW III was greatest. Laos, where we could probably defeat the communists but who would notice. South Vietnam, which seemed perfect in terms of visibility, and strength of the opposition.
Kennedy went to Berlin and made a speech in which he declared himself to be a breakfast pastry. ("Ich bin ein berliner" as opposed to "ich bin berliner".)
Laos, and the NVA's whole right flank, were publicly written off in negotiations. (None of the geniuses apparently could read a map.) CIA operations there were reactive and on too small a scale to interdict supplies to the NVA and VC.
The South Vietnam conflict was escalated and escalated but with obvious results. (None of those geniuses had apparently read Sun Tzu or studied any Asian history either.)
Anyway, it has always been my opinion that Walt Whitman Rostow didn't get near the kicking around he richly deserved.
I'll be sure to let Obama, Hillary, Bernie, Pelosi, Shumer, Antifa, Black Lives Matter know of this fine theory of yours.
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