[Old Teufel Hunden]

Patton was one General out of hundreds. There was no other General that thought it was a good idea at the time, at least on the American side. The German side certainly wanted to do it. However, who is to say we would have had any better chance to succeed where the Germans and before them Napoleon failed?

Yes, the President knew about the Manhattan project. They also knew they only had three bombs (one was used for the test) and there was no guarantee that they would have surrendered after dropping the second bomb. McArthur, Nimitz and the rest were planning an invasion of Japan. It’s a good thing the Japanese didn’t know we only had two bombs. It would have taken a long time, perhaps 6 months or more to build more bombs and the Army and Navy weren’t going to wait around. Besides, Russia was already invading Manchuria and kicking the Japanese out of there. In six months time who knows where they would have been. Perhaps they land on the Japanese soil and they had no qualms about sacrificing soldiers.

[Vaquero]

Two bombs but there were more on the way. We were shoring up supplies as they were being dropped. We’re talking weeks.

The United States expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August [1945], with three more in September and a further three in October. On August 10, Major General Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum to General of the Army George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, in which he wrote that “the next bomb . . should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August.” On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, “It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President.” There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in production until Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. “The problem now [13 August] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use.” “