“...I think it’s funny how Canadians get all unctious about so-called War of 1812 (really should be the British War) as being Americans invading THEIR country.
They were not a country; they were colonies. Under the thumb of Britain (and still largely beholden to them). It was BRITAIN we were attacking and how else were we going to do it? Go over the sea with a couple ships and attack? Better to start near home.”
Too preoccupied with the land forces (a common error - it is the simplest venue of military endeavor. Many of us Americans refuse to see the world in any other terms).
Also historically out of phase … in 1812, the USA wasn’t the economic and industrial powerhouse it became 100 years later. It was closer to a tenth-rate agricultural experiment. The fledgling US national government was entirely out of its reckoning, declaring war on the UK. It was only by the greatest good luck Americans avoided getting squashed like the bugs they were - and by timing, as the preponderance of British power and most of the attention of its leadership was engaged in leading the coalition that was beating Napoleonic France.
Victories on the high seas by isolated units of the fledgling US Navy were electrifying to US civil morale, and caused consternation to the British. Just some of the uses of sea power - a lesson still wasted on too many Americans. But in the end, not even the most spectacular ship-to-ship contests could overcome the strategic dominance of the Royal Navy.
When in 1814 the British got together enough force to mount a serious raid US land forces in Maryland did not cover themselves in glory; the entire central government came within inches of being wiped out.
But British moves on land were afflicted with terrible luck, losing a number of key personnel. Only through a fluke did Baltimore (then a thriving seaport and a keystone in the US economy) avoid the fate that befell DC. Night operations are always risky, and theirs came to naught. Fort McHenry withstood bombardment: resistance had been fearless, but American forces were not strong enough to thwart enemy incursions; if the British raiding parties had extended their efforts one more hour, or hadn’t missed each other in the dark, that would have been that.
As the war dragged on, the British became the laughingstock of the diplomatic circles of Continental Europe, as they kept failing to deliver a killing blow to the Americans. As it was, the USA was on the verge of splitting; a delegation of prominent New Englanders was waiting to petition President Madison on a unilateral peace proposal, backed by their threat to dissolve the Union if they did not get their way, when word of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent reached the New World. The fact that in the aftermath a great many New Englanders and New Yorkers were never hanged for treason is more of a comment on the American generosity of spirit, than on their innocence (they weren’t).
And as Paleo Conservative pointed out in post 8, the American victory at New Orleans made it extra clear to the Euro powers that the tenth-rate agricultural experiment was determined to go its own way, in its own way. “Strange new respect” was engendered.
And it was driven home to American military establishment, that the militia was inadequate for national defense. The fortunes of military technology were on the rise; citizen soldiers, bursting with national fervor and armed with nothing more than republican virtue (the small-r sort) were not equal to national defense. Professionalism was needed, and so was naval power. The sort of thing that cannot be done on the cheap. Nor on short notice.
Respect garnered for American arms came in handy later; many historians view the outcome as the genesis of what’s now called the “special relationship.”
A good summary of the war and its impact can be found in _Amateurs, To Arms!_ by John R Elting (Da Capo, 1995. ISBN-10: 0306806533; ISBN-13: 978-0306806537).
Excellent post! Fits with what I have read.
Oh my sir, while I agree essentially with many of your statements, I take issue with a few factoids or at least their interpretation.
Indeed Britain was occupied with concern about Napoleon. And undoubtedly had to be vigilant about his actions. But at this specific time period, I don’t know that UK was overly embroiled in fighting with Nap and I think their protestations on this are overstated; I believe their hottest contest being the Peninsular campaign (no expert on European wars, me). Reasonable summary from Wiki:
“The French launched a major invasion of Russia in the summer of 1812. The campaign destroyed Russian cities but resulted in the collapse of the Grande Armée and inspired a renewed push against Napoleon by his enemies. In 1813, Prussia and Austria joined Russian forces in the War of the Sixth Coalition against France. A lengthy military campaign culminated in a large Allied army defeating Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, but his tactical victory at the minor Battle of Hanau allowed retreat onto French soil. The Allies then invaded France and captured Paris in the spring of 1814, forcing Napoleon to abdicate in April. He was exiled to the island of Elba off the coast of Tuscany, and the Bourbon dynasty was restored to power. However, Napoleon escaped from Elba in February 1815 and took control of France once again. The Allies responded by forming a Seventh Coalition which defeated him at the Battle of Waterloo in June”
Recall Nap was missing for an entire year of our so-called W1812, when the southern theaters were invaded.
As to the navy - that was my whole point. We had virtually no navy and we might still have to back that up with amphibious forces, after a 2-month journey or so on the high seas. Foolish to try that move on the mother country when it’s so much easier to invade the local colonies.
I stated before Baltimore was not merely a Ft. McHenry action. While the troops failed to hold the Brits through North Point (though Ross had been killed), they found that the entire region had entrenched on the east of the city covering 5 miles, and concentrated all kinds of support from local volunteers to regional militia and some regulars. Coupled with the failure with Ft. McHenry, the Brits gave it up and left.
As for the New Englanders, I’d generally agree, and add it is more proof indeed Americans believed in the right of secession, before those kinds of Yankees declared it not so a little while later.