Not only has the “Phase One” trade deal now been signed by the United States and China, but official texts have now been released. And my initial read indicates that the Trump administration just might have come up with an effective enforcement regime – though success here will depend on U.S. governments (including this one) displaying nerves of steel.
At the same time, the enforcement terms raise the question of why the President felt the need to reach this point via a treaty, rather than simply punish China unilaterally for economic transgressions – as his tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of imports from the People’s Republic (most of which remain firmly in place) already accomplish.
By way of background, from the beginning, I’ve doubted that any such agreement could be adequately verified from the U.S. standpoint. The main reasons: The bureaucracies China uses to implement the various features of its trade and broader commercial predation are too big and secretive for any outsider to monitor in any meaningful sense. (Further complicating matters – many of the worst culprits are provincial and city governments.) Therefore, documenting abuses in any kind of detail – or verifying any Chinese promises of structural change – has looked like an insurmountable obstacle to standard, legalistic dispute-resolution systems that could actually work satisfactorily for American plaintiffs.
As a result, I’ve argued that the best way to handle these transgressions is for the U.S. government to impose sweeping tariffs on China (because its predation is a systemic plan, not the product of individual entities’ decisions), and to deal with additional, individual complaints by acting as judge, jury, and court of appeals. And because of my conviction that the United States holds the clear upper hand in its relations with China, I saw no need to permit any Chinese involvement in these processes.
The Phase One deal certainly can’t be relied on to eliminate or even reduce Chinese opacity. But the way the treaty reads, it doesn’t need to. The key appear to be these passages (on page 7-3), which set out the procedures to be followed if the United States and China can’t, after a series of meetings and “consultations” agree on resolving a complaint. Here’s the first:
“…the Complaining Party may resort to taking action based on facts provided during the consultations, including by suspending an obligation under this Agreement or by adopting a remedial measure in a proportionate way that it considers appropriate with the purpose of preventing the escalation of the situation and maintaining the normal bilateral trade relationship.”
“Remedial measures” clearly means punitive tariffs, and just as clearly, they can unilaterally applied.
It’s true, as some trade policy critics have fretted, that the agreement gives the Chinese the same rights – as well as the option of retaliating if Beijing believes the United States has been acting in “bad faith.”
But here’s where the nerves of steel come in. The retaliation that’s permitted isn’t tit-for-tat – as in the case of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Indeed, even challenging such retaliation isn’t allowed – a right that can always frustrate justice by delaying it. Instead, the retaliation required is no less than exiting from the entire deal. The system can work in America’s favor if U.S. leaders either display confidence that China won’t take such a dramatic step (because the export-heavy Chinese economy still needs the American market much more than vice versa), or if they resolve to tariff China heavily if this U.S. bluff is called.
Incidentally, the language also makes clear that, in order to go ahead with tariffs, Washington won’t need much evidence any kind of Chinese failure to respond adequately to complaints. In fact, no meaningful evidentiary standards are specified at all. In other words, it’s entirely up to the United States to decide on the threshold for action.
Can China take advantage of the same provisions? In theory, yes. But nothing in the deal would prevent the United States from treating as treaty violations any Chinese complaints it regards as unmerited – and credibly threatening to retaliate by withdrawing unless Beijing backs down.
The deal also could well prevent a big potential problem from emerging – fear of Chinese retaliation (which itself might be tough even to identify because of Chinese bureaucratic secrecy) by U.S. victims of Chinese predation (and especially by victims that are operating in China). Such fears have prevented many of these victims from complaining publicly about Chinese abuses in the first place.
But the text on pages 7-2 and 7-3 appear to permit Washington to keep the name of the plaintiff’s business confidential. So, at least in theory, problem preempted.
As suggested above, however, the deal looks so promising, and permits so much implicit U.S. unilateralism, that it’s difficult to understand why President Trump decided to proceed bilaterally t begin with. Was he worried about being criticized for being reckless and not going the extra mile to deal with the Chinese respectfully and accommodate their legitimate concerns? Perhaps. But I strongly suspect that, at least if the agreement works out as I expect, he’ll face such accusations anyway. And by negotiating, he’s lost precious time to provide tariff relief for U.S.-based producers who need it, and to permit other companies to adjust their supply chains to a new tariff-heavier era sooner rather than later (and to make adequate progress well before November, 2020).
Clearly, however, the negotiating train has left the station. And between this effective enforcement system, Chinese promises of big import increases from the United States, and steep tariffs remaining on most imports from China (which cope with the systemic issue), it looks like a major and important economic and political win for a self-proclaimed master negotiator, and the entire domestic economy – if he makes full use of it.
About the Blogger:
Alan Tonelson (that's me) is RealityChek's founder and voice. I've just finished more than 30 years of senior positions at leading US think tanks and publications to strike out on my own. I've written and lectured on trade, manufacturing, and their interaction with the rest of the economics world, plus national security issues, for the U.S. Business and Industry Council and the Economic Strategy Institute. And I've served as Associate Editor of FOREIGN POLICY magazine. Perhaps you've heard of or read my book on globalization and the US economy, The Race to Bottom> Published in 2002 by Perseus Books, it's available at all major on-line booksellers. And it's held up awfully well since it first appeared. In addition, my articles and reviews have appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic, Harper's, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Republic, BloombergView, Marketwatch.com, The Hill, FOREIGN POLICY, and many other leading national publications and news sites. If you're a TV news junkie, you may have caught one of my many appearances on CNBC, BloombergTV, and CNN. I'm a quasi-regular on John Batchelor's nationally syndicated radio show, and have provided analysis and commentary for many other leading talk radio programs as well. I've testified before numerous Congressional committees and U.S. government commissions, and lectured in fora ranging from the National Defense Univesity and the State Department's Foreign Service Institute to numerous world affairs councils and labor and business groups in the USA, along with government and academic institutions in the UK, Germany, China, and Japan. I hold a B.A. with highest honors in history from Princeton University and, as you'll see am an avid fan of the NY Yankees, Giants, and Knicks. I love a good, vigorous (but respectful) debate, so I'm always interested in your questions and comments. Feel free to include some snark (I sure do!), but please also leave the profanity and the ad hominem attacks at home.