Provisionally, yes. The only reason I say "provisionally" is that I often find myself analogizing to some other natural phenomenon when speaking with critics of the ToE. Some critic will bring up the improbability of some aspect of the evolutionary theory and claim that it means there must have been some direct intervention, and I'll point to the equal improbability of some other phenomenon that no one claims requires particular intervention. But I'll try to stick to the subject.
Given the extraordinary "fine tuning" of the universe which makes biological life possible, or extremely likely to occur, the idea of "bias" becomes useful, especially in light of the fact that there is no principle in pure chance that could lead to the fine tuning.
This is the main hypothesis seemingly endorsed by a majority of evolutionary biologists today, though a minority still cling to the "pure chance" argument.
I'm going to try to pick my way very carefully through your next paragraphs. (Don't worry, I'm not going to discuss every step.) I worry a bit about your choice of words. Having chosen the word "bias," you've introduced a sense of purpose, even though you refer to "non-intentional bias." I don't completely understand your statement that "there is no principle in pure chance that could lead to the fine tuning." Isn't there no principle in pure chance period, sort of by definition? It seems to me that if pure chance can lead to a particular outcome, it's not in itself evidence of bias if it does lead to that outcome, no matter how unlikely the outcome is.
And what hypothesis is it that you see the majority of evolutionary biologists endorsing? That the universe is biased towards producing the particular set of organisms we see? Towards producing life?
At this point in the book, Nagel cites Roger White, a colleague and professor of philosophy at M.I.T...
If I'm understanding White's argument, then I think I disagree with it. He's claiming that outcome S can confirm intentional bias but can't confirm non-intentional bias. It seems to me that all it can do is confirm bias--whether the bias is intentional or non-intentional is a separate question.
There's another problem I have with his argument, well illustrated by the sentence in your next quote,
But there is no conceivable reason that blind forces of nature or physical attributes should be biased toward the marvelous.The world of living creatures is not necessarily marvelous in itself. It's marvelous to us because we're in it and of it. It's like saying "why should the sky be such a beautiful blue color if there's no bias towards beauty?" But is life or a blue sky, inherently and indisputably, more marvelous by some extrinsic standard than the lifeless hunk of rock we call Pluto? I think he'd have a really hard time making that case.
And I think my last two points illustrate a fundamental issue with these lines of thought. Note I didn't say "problem:" speculating about these questions is a fine use of our God-given brains, and that's what philosophers are for. But I'm not sure science can find an answer, because science is operating from within the effect of chance/intentional bias/non-intentional bias/whatever. It's like (analogy alert!) one fish arguing that the fishbowl is so well suited to living that an external agency must have designed it that way, and another fish saying no, that's just the way goldfish bowls are. From outside the bowl, of course, we know which is true; but I don't think there's anything the fish could do from inside the bowl to determine it one way or the other. (Which won't stop them from arguing about it forever, of course.)
I think we need to revisit what we mean by pure chance, “bias,” and also the meaning of “S.” Regarding “S,” my definition — “the physical outcome as the effect of bias” — is trivially true but not complete, as a re-reading of White’s paper makes clear to me now.
Regarding chance: You asked, “Isn’t there no principle in pure chance, sort of by definition?” Yes, chance is by definition “unprincipled.” And yet, as Roger White observes,
Not so long ago, scientists suggested that the very earliest living organism was the result of a “chance collision of molecules” in a pre-biotic soup, where this was not meant to be incompatible with determinism. I think we have a good enough grip on what they had in mind: some simple molecules were shuffling about in the soup — much like shaking Lego pieces in a box — until they just happened to form a stable structure capable of reproduction. It is this kind of view that is being denied when contemporary theorists insist that life did not originate by chance.However, White avers that today, “there is almost universal agreement that life did not first come about merely by chance.”
The view which is almost universally rejected by researchers in the field is that the numerous and prima facie improbable physical and biological requirements for life all fell together just by a fluke, like so many dice tumbling out of a bag and landing all sixes…. The conviction that life did not arise largely by chance [C] is treated as epistemically prior to the development of alternative theories [i.e., it is the foundational premise that motivates their research in the first place and “even if their theories are shown to be false, they would retain this basic assumption”]…. The suggestion that the origin of life might be due to any kind of purposeful agency [BI] is not considered as a serious option, and does not play any explicit role in theorizing…. The kind of explanations of life’s emergence that scientists look for appeal to ordinary physical properties, forces, and laws [BN], having nothing to do with the purposes of any agent.Now, both BN and BI are forms of bias— in effect, against the C hypothesis. I believe this is what White means by “bias” — nothing more, nothing less. From either form of bias we would expect to see “a kind of robustness or stability” that is absent from C, acting on S, here redefined as the actual state of affairs that we observe. But science finds BI inadmissible as a form of bias, on grounds that it is “unscientific.”
So science is left with BN. According to Manfred Eigen,
The physical principle that we are looking for should be in a position to explain the complexity typical of the phenomena of life at the level of molecular structures and syntheses. It should show how such complex molecular arrangements are able to form reproducibly in Nature.According to Christian de Duve,
… unless one adopts a creationist view … life arose through the succession of an enormous number of small steps, almost each of which, given the conditions at the time had a very high probability of happening … the alternative amounts to a miracle … were [the emergence of life] not an obligatory manifestation of the combinatorial properties of matter, it could not possibly have arisen naturally.White wants to assess whether there is a “very high probability” that the requisite number of “very small steps” are the result of a non-intentional cause (BN). Or whether an intentional cause (BI) is the better explanation. He writes,
Does the fact that certain values are necessary for life make them more likely to be favored by laws? … While there is at least room to argue that a rational agent is likely to influence the physical parameters [“fine tunings” attributable to necessary yet arbitrary universal physical constants that must exist in order for life to occur] in order to allow for the evolution of life, to suppose that impersonal physical laws are likely to constrain the constants in this way can only be based on a confused anthropomorphism.He concludes that “Blind physical laws [(BN] are no more naturally drawn toward states of affairs with value than blind chance is.”
In assessing the probabilities of BN and BI, White relies on the methods of Bayesian statistics. According to José M. Bernardo of the University of Valencia,
Statistics is the study of uncertainty. Bayesian statistical methods provide a complete paradigm for both statistical inference and decision making under uncertainty. Bayesian methods are firmly based on strict mathematical foundations, providing a coherent methodology which makes it possible to incorporate relevant initial information, and which solves many of the difficulties faced by conventional statistical methods. The Bayesian paradigm is based on an interpretation of probability as a conditional measure of uncertainty which closely matches the use of the word ‘probability’ in ordinary language. Statistical inference about a quantity of interest is described as the modification of the uncertainty about its value in the light of evidence, and Bayes’ theorem specifies how this modification should be made. Bayesian methods may be applied to complex, richly structured problems, which have been fairly inaccessible to traditional statistical methods. The special situation, often met in scientific reporting and public decision making, where the only acceptable information is that which may be deduced from available documented data, is addressed as an important particular case. [Itals added]So, what does “a conditional measure of uncertainty” mean? The mathematical notation for this is
P(A | B)which translates into English as “the probability of event A occurring given that B occurs.”
White is asking whether P(S | BI) is more likely than P(S | BN) to explain what we actually observe about the evolution of S. As noted above, he sees little practical difference between C and BN; so he opts for BI.
In general, if BI raises the likelihood of S, then S confirms BI to at least some degree, and may thereby disconfirm C. But it does not follow that S confirms BN one iota. S confirms BN only if BN raises the likelihood of S.Which it doesn't appear to do.
I hope this further explanation helps.
You wrote:
It’s like (analogy alert!) one fish arguing that the fishbowl is so well suited to living that an external agency must have designed it that way, and another fish saying no, that’s just the way goldfish bowls are. From outside the bowl, of course, we know which is true; but I don’t think there's anything the fish could do from inside the bowl to determine it one way or the other.Forgive me if I think this analogy is a tad weak. For it puts fish and humans on the same “footing.” True, both are living beings. But of the two, only man is self-conscious, only man is capable of apperception. That is to say, man is aware, not only of events occurring in the "outside world" via perception, but of subjective. mental events as well, especially the internal processes of rational analysis that occur “inside his head.” There are psychologists who suggest that there is order and structure in apperception itself. A fish presumably is capable of perception. But no fish has a rational mind that possesses such structure.
Thank you dear HHTVL for your correspondence on these issues! You ask great questions, and “hold my feet to the fire” with graciousness that I much appreciate. Please forgive me for running on so long.