Well put! As I've complained before, one would think that Napoleon, with his interest in antiquity, would have looked at Herodotus' account of the failed Persian attempt to invade the Scythian territory and say, hmm, this won't work. But after Napoleon's failure, there's really no excuse for the Germans not having learned that mistake, especially the second time. In WWI the terrain in the east meant more forces in the east, and that led to large occupied territories, and a long front. In WWII, Hitler appeared to be mitigating that problem by the non-aggression pact -- but that was just a feint, followed by the elimination of the western front (through 1944), and then the resumption / replay of the WWI scenario. Hitler wasn't a general, but also wasn't a strategic thinker. Not much of a tactical thinker, either.
Napoleon existed at both levels: tactical and strategic. His plotting of entire campaigns created a recognition of a third level of warfare — the operational level. So, in effect, Napoleon operated at all 3 levels of warfare while his opponents continued to think in terms of 2-levels.
The author makes your distinction. He rates them as tactical, not strategic, generals. IMO, Grant ranks very high as both. Washington as a strategist. OTOH, Lee is underrated as a strategist.
I’m sure other, more knowledgeable, folks will pick this apart.