And no Denys Davydov... 
Posted on 12/24/2022 8:19:50 PM PST by Cathi
Russia Matters
Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
AUTHOR Alex Vershinin U.S. Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin retired after 20 years of service, including eight years as an armor officer with four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and 12 years working as a modeling and simulations officer in NATO and U.S. Army concept development and experimentation. This included a tour with the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.
The Ukrainian Strategy The Ukrainians’ terrain-focused war of maneuver is constrained by two factors: limited artillery ammunition and equipment production, and coalition considerations. Ukraine started the war with 1,800 artillery pieces of Soviet caliber. These allowed firing rates of 6,000 to 7,000 rounds a day against 40,000 to 50,000 Russian daily rounds. By now this artillery is mostly out of ammunition, and in its place Ukraine is using 350 Western caliber artillery pieces, many of which are destroyed or breaking down from overuse. Meanwhile, Western nations are themselves running out of ammunition; the U.S. is estimated to produce only 15,000 155mm shells a month. This constraint has forced Ukraine to adopt mass infantry formations focused on regaining territory at any cost. Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles. Unless Ukrainian troops close to direct fire fights with Russian troops, there is a significant chance that they will be destroyed at a distance by Russian artillery.
Ukraine’s second constraint is the coalition nature of its warfare. Since running out of its own stocks, Ukraine is increasingly reliant on Western weaponry. Maintaining the Western coalition is crucial to the Ukrainian war effort. Without a constant string of victories, domestic economic concern may cause coalition members to defect. If Western support dries up due to depletion of stock or of political will, Ukraine’s war effort collapses for lack of supplies. In some ways, Ukraine has no choice but to launch attacks no matter the human and material cost.
Ukraine built an infantry-centric army of highly motivated conscripted troops with limited to no training. They support the core fighting force of the prewar professional army and about 14 new brigades equipped with Western-donated weapons and vehicles. On the battlefield, strike groups attack quickly, penetrating deep and fast, then hand over captured areas to draftees to defend. This tactic worked well in areas where the shortage of Russian manpower prevented a solid front, such as in the Kharkiv region. In the Kherson region, where Russia had sufficient density of forces, this tactic resulted in large casualties and little progress, until logistic issues caused Russia to retreat.
The Achilles heel of this strategy is manpower. Ukraine started the war with 43 million citizens and 5 million military-aged males, but according to the U.N., 14.3 million Ukrainians have fled the war, and a further 9 million are in Crimea or other Russian-occupied territories. This means Ukraine is down to about 20 to 27 million people. At this ratio, it has less than 3 million draftable men. A million have been drafted already, and many of the rest are either not physically fit to serve or occupy a vital position in the nation’s economy. In short, Ukraine might be running out of men, in my view.
The Russian Strategy The Russian forces are limited by manpower but strengthened by massive artillery and equipment stockpiles enabled by a robust military industrial complex. While there have been numerous reports in Western media that the Russian army is running out of artillery ammunition, so far there’s been no visible slacking of Russian artillery fire on any front. Based on these factors, the Russian side has relied on a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition. The goal is to force an unsustainable casualty rate, destroying Ukrainian manpower and equipment, while preserving Russia’s own forces. Territory is not important; its loss is acceptable to preserve combat power. At Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army refused to fight under unfavorable conditions and withdrew, accepting the political cost to preserve its forces.
To execute this strategy, the Russian army relies on firepower, particularly its artillery. Each Russian brigade has three artillery battalions compared to just one in each Western brigade. Paired with correction by massed quantities of UAVs and quadcopters, Russian artillery pulverizes Ukrainian forces before infantry mops up survivors. It is a slow, grinding war, but with a casualty ratio that is significantly in Russia’s favor. Russia couldn’t attack because it lacked the manpower to secure the flanks of advancing troops. Up to now, Russians could only advance in Donbas, where advance did not extend the frontline. Even here the intent was more to draw in Ukrainian forces and destroy them rather than capture the city of Bakhmut. Mobilization has the potential to overcome Russia’s manpower shortages and enable offensive operations, while equipping its forces is possible due to the mobilization of industry. Precision munition production is also up, despite consistent doubt in Western press. Video of strikes by Russian "Lancet 3” loitering kamikaze drones is up up by 1,000% since Oct. 13, according to one estimate, indicating a major increase in production.
The Coming Winter If the Ukrainians decide to launch a major offensive, they could do so in two places, in my view. The first is in the north, in the Kharkiv region, but limited crossing over the Oskil River generates the same logistical challenges the Russians faced at Kherson. The second is in the south, to cut off the Russian land bridge to Crimea, eventually capturing the peninsula. This is unlikely to succeed. The Ukrainian army would be attacking in terrain ideal for Russian artillery. It could become a repeat of the battle at Kherson, but without Russian logistics difficulties, stemming from a limited number of crossings over the Dnipro River, with just as little gain and the same heavy losses marked by whole mechanized companies wiped out, endless scenes of ambulance convoys and new cemeteries all over Ukraine. The levels of attrition would play right into Russian hands. The political pressure on the Ukrainian government to justify the losses taken from Russian artillery in Donbas by retaking territory elsewhere, as well as the pressure from the Western coalition, may drive Ukraine to attack regardless.
For the Russian leadership the question is: When and where to attack? The timing depends on Russian artillery ammunition stocks. If they are high, Russia may attack in winter, otherwise it may stockpile and attack in spring after the mud season. Timing is also driven by the training requirements for the mobilized reservists. Longer training increases the effectiveness of the reservists and reduces casualties, thus lowering political risk for the Kremlin. Ultimately, the pressures that the Russian leadership views as most important will decide the outcome. Will the pressure from domestic politics for a quick victory win out, or will military considerations favor delaying until the end of spring mud season in March/April? So far, the Kremlin has gone with military considerations ahead of political ones, suggesting that Russia will launch only a limited offensive this winter.
Location is another factor. The Kharkiv front is heavily wooded, restricting the effectiveness of firepower, and it is strategically meaningless without attacking the city of Kharkiv. This major urban center would take months to capture at very high cost. A limited attack to regain the Oskil River line would improve Russia’s defensive line but present no strategic gain. In Donbas, the Russian army is already maintaining pressure. Extra manpower and artillery units won’t speed up that offensive much. For the Russian army, the Zaporizhzhia front holds the most promise. The Pologi-Gulai Polie-Pokrovskoye railroad is ideally placed to supply a Russian offensive driving north from Pologi. Eventually capturing Pavlograd would allow the capture of Donbas by cutting off two main railroads and highways supplying the Ukrainian army in Donbas and attacking the Ukrainian army there from the rear. The open terrain is ideal for the Russian firepower-centric strategy, and a chance to draw in and destroy the last of the Ukrainian operational reserves and further attrite its manpower is directly in line with Russian objectives. Lastly, the hard frozen ground would make new defensive positions hard to dig without heavy equipment. The limited attack vicinity of Ugledar could be a shaping operation to secure the eastern flank of the future offensive.
Conclusion Wars of attrition are won through careful husbandry of one’s own resources while destroying the enemy’s. Russia entered the war with vast materiel superiority and a greater industrial base to sustain and replace losses. They have carefully preserved their resources, withdrawing every time the tactical situation turned against them. Ukraine started the war with a smaller resource pool and relied on the Western coalition to sustain its war effort. This dependency pressured Ukraine into a series of tactically successful offensives, which consumed strategic resources that Ukraine will struggle to replace in full, in my view. The real question isn’t whether Ukraine can regain all its territory, but whether it can inflict sufficient losses on Russian mobilized reservists to undermine Russia’s domestic unity, forcing it to the negotiation table on Ukrainian terms, or will Russian’ attrition strategy work to annex an even larger portion of Ukraine.
Zelensky has probably dispersed the 42 billion to the Ukranian Ogliarchs on the French Riviera just like last time. He will be begging for more money in oh......two weeks.
I expect 100 years from now they will still be finding shallow graves in Russia with the remains of those propagandists after this war.
One must feel at the very least, a small amount of morbid curiosity on the location of such a grave, I would expect.
The gaming tables in Monaco are LIT.
I looked around for it earlier, and couldn't find it.
Merry Christmas! :)
And no Denys Davydov...
From the Washington Post’s, “Inside the monumental, stop-start effort to arm Ukraine”
It says (link to full article here (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/23/ukraine-weapons-biden/)):
“...the initial war supply operation clearly wasn’t built for the long haul.
As the grueling conflict continues with no end in sight, it has exposed flaws in U.S. strategic planning for its own future battles, and revealed significant gaps in the American and NATO defense industrial base.
Stocks of many key weapons and munitions are near exhaustion, and wait times for new production of missiles stretch for months and, in some cases, years.”
review
And I see those same keywords a lot.
I wonder if the Mods will shed some light on who is spamming those keywords?
I saw they did so on another thread a few days ago.
Merry Christmas!
Ukrainian armed forces retreat to the outskirts of Marinka with heavy losses: details
Since 20 December, units of the 79th Airborne Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which occupies positions in the western part of the city, have suffered heavy losses in Marinka.
A howitzer artillery division of the AFU with 122mm D-30 guns suffered serious damage during counter-battery fighting.
According to the “Military Chronicle” serious losses (https://t.me/milchronicles/1417) were recorded in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th airborne assault battalions of the 79th AFU brigade, reconnaissance and tank companies of the Armed forces of Ukraine.
The number of killed and seriously wounded in these units since December 15 is estimated at between 350 and 460. Due to the serious losses, the brigade urgently had to be reinforced and mobilised from the Mykolaiv and Kherson regions, and a security company and engineering units reclassified as assault troops were also sent to the line of battle.
According to the military sources,the key reason for the large losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Marinka was the activity of artillery and armoured vehicles of the Russian Armed Forces. T-72B3 tanks are rapidly advancing towards the western outskirts of the city with the support of drones, allowing crews to reconnoitre dangerous positions and fire on firing points in buildings with minimal risk.
According to radio intercepts by the AFU, units of the 79th airborne infantry battalion have recorded shortages of communication and surveillance equipment, ammunition for machine guns and machine guns and wound dressing supplies, as well as quadcopters, which were used for reconnaissance of AFU positions. Also, AFU units complain of an acute shortage of anti-tank weapons - grenade launchers and ammunition for them are in short supply.
Due to the rapidly deteriorating tactical situation, since the evening of 23 December the Ukrainian armed forces have been amassing their remaining forces on the western outskirts of Marinka near Shakhtyorskaya and Poligraphicheskaya Streets, where field headquarters are gradually being moved from the central fortified area.
In the event of a failure at the last line of defence, Ukrainian army units plan to retreat to reserve positions to the fortified area near the Marinka dam, where batteries of BM-21 Grad complex were previously stationed. However, control over the entire city (including the outskirts) in this case will be definitively lost.
#Source (https://t.me/ukraina_ru/123872)
“The Russian forces are limited by manpower”
So you are admitting that your “partial” mobilization was a failure?
| Action | User | Date/Time |
|---|---|---|
| Append keyword "whyisshestillhere" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:08:14 PM PST |
| Append keyword "whyisshenotbanned" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:08:14 PM PST |
| Append keyword "0iqputintroll" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:08:14 PM PST |
| Append keyword "0iqrussiantroll" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:08:14 PM PST |
| Append keyword "ramzankadyrov" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:55 PM PST |
| Append keyword "wagnergroup" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:55 PM PST |
| Append keyword "yevgenyprigozhin" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:55 PM PST |
| Append keyword "sergeyshoigu" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:55 PM PST |
| Append keyword "vladtheimploder" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:45 PM PST |
| Append keyword "russiansuicide" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:45 PM PST |
| Append keyword "scottritter" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:27 PM PST |
| Append keyword "pedosforputin" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:27 PM PST |
| Append keyword "russianhomos" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:27 PM PST |
| Append keyword "deadrussianhomos" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:27 PM PST |
| Append keyword "deathtorussia" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:18 PM PST |
| Append keyword "russianwarcrimes" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:18 PM PST |
| Append keyword "russianatrocities" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:18 PM PST |
| Append keyword "russianwarcriminals" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:18 PM PST |
| Append keyword "putinsbuttboys" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:09 PM PST |
| Append keyword "putinworshippers" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:09 PM PST |
| Append keyword "zottherussiantrolls" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:09 PM PST |
| Append keyword "putinlovertrollsonfr" | SunkenCiv | 12/24/2022 9:07:09 PM PST |
Knock it off with the keyword abuse!!!
Whoa!!!
Spamalot, SC?
Okee-dokee!
Shill a lot Jane Long?
LOL...please do tell exactly what I ‘shill a lot’ for, SunkenCiv.
“Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles.” Actually, since November they can. The HIMARS out ranges anything you Russians have.
LOL... Your addressees show everyone exactly what I’m talking about.
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