A Dangerous Transformation Donald Rumsfeld means business. That's a problem.

The challenges facing the military today, however, are no less daunting than the opportunities are promising. Most leaders and observers agree that the U.S. military will have to "transform" itself in order to maintain its lead as well as to be able to meet the challenges of the present and the future for which it was not designed. At the same time, the U.S. is engaged in a war on terrorism, in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, and in a massive peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and reconstruction effort in Iraq. Tensions over nuclear proliferation remain high on the Korean peninsula and in Iran. Tensions also remain high over the cooperation of states like Syria in the war on terrorism and operations in Iraq.

The issues of transformation and military overstretch are inextricably linked. The secretary of defense has adopted a vision of transformation that relies on high-technology weapons systems rather than on soldiers. He has continued to pursue this program even as the armed forces have been stretched thinner and thinner. He has even resisted efforts by Congress to expand the military--a virtually unimaginable stance for a sitting secretary of defense--in order to preserve his program of military transformation. As a result, the U.S. is now attempting to transform its military in ways that hinder the conduct of current operations, even as those operations literally rip it apart. Worst of all, the current program of transformation turns its back on the approach that had brought America success so far, and flies in the face of the historical lessons about how to transform a military. If these problems remain unacknowledged and unaddressed, the U.S. may lose its predominance and endanger its security.

The willingness to accept redundancy and inefficiency in defense programs that characterized the Army and Air Force transformations around the 1970s reflected a larger willingness to balance the development of capabilities, sometimes different, sometimes similar, across the services. At the same time the Army was developing the Patriot antiaircraft missile, the Air Force was fielding the planes that convinced all of America's subsequent foes not even to try to fly. As the Army was planning a tank that was both nearly indestructible and indescribably lethal to enemy armored vehicles, the Air Force was fielding an aircraft specifically to kill enemy tanks. The examples of redundant development are legion.

The most recent wars have made the virtues of this redundancy manifest. On numerous occasions, including as recently as the 2003 Gulf War, weather conditions restricted the Air Force's ability to fly sorties against enemy armored concentrations. The ability of the tanks and Bradleys of the Third Infantry Division to survive encounters with those enemy armored forces saved American lives. The Patriot has proved largely unnecessary in its role as a system to shoot down enemy aircraft. Its transformation into a ballistic missile defense system, however, gave the coalition much greater confidence in its ability to handle Saddam Hussein's missiles during the last war. Redundancy in war can yield flexibility and security. It ensures that when one system fails for whatever unforeseen reason, another can take its place. It provides the ability to meet unexpected challenges. In military affairs, redundancy is a virtue.

Redundancy, of course, is expensive. During the Vietnam War and the Reagan buildup, the overriding threat of Soviet military power helped overcome America's traditional reluctance to spend money on its defense. Even Jimmy Carter, at the height of an economic recession that would cost him his presidency, felt obliged by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to begin the massive rearmament program that Ronald Reagan inherited and enlarged still further. The excellence of the American military in the 1990s owes a great deal to those days of open coffers.

The focus on efficiency and economics led to an effort to adopt "business practices" into the work of the military. This effort has a long history. Robert McNamara, himself a retired Ford Motor Co. executive, attempted to bring business models into the Pentagon in the 1960s. He applied new metrics to the Vietnam conflict, centering on body counts. He introduced a "game theory" approach to war in the form of "graduated pressure" in which military forces were explicitly used to send messages to the enemy, whose responses could then be predicted. In general he preferred the advice of his "whiz kids," who understood the new way of thinking, to that of the professional military officers who clung to the "outdated" modes of conducting war. The results of this approach are well known.

These proposals received a powerful support when Donald Rumsfeld became secretary of defense in January 2001. Like Mr. McNamara, Mr. Rumsfeld came from the business community, and was determined to bring his business expertise to bear on the Pentagon bureaucracy. He believed enthusiastically in the Network-Centric Warfare model then being propounded, and he went even further. Determined to transform the military in accord with NCW ideas, Mr. Rumsfeld was also determined to do it at the lowest possible cost. He adopted a business approach to that problem as well.

A business can improve its bottom line by focusing its resources on the few things it does very well and abandoning markets in which it is performing poorly. Efficiency is all in business, a fact reflected in the many mergers that have taken place during the recent economic downturn. By eliminating redundancy and focusing on the areas in which they can excel, companies can dramatically improve their competitive position in some markets, even at the cost, sometimes, of abandoning others. Mr. Rumsfeld has adopted this approach in the area of military transformation.

The watchwords for the Rumsfeld Pentagon have, therefore, been focus and efficiency. The Pentagon has repeatedly stated that all new weapons systems will be evaluated primarily on the degree to which they further the armed forces' ability to conduct Network-Centric Warfare. Systems that bring other capabilities to the force have received less attention and less funding, and have sometimes been canceled.

The Rumsfeld vision of military transformation, therefore, is completely unbalanced. It will provide the U.S. with armed forces that do one thing only, even if they do it superbly well. They will be able to identify, track and destroy enemy targets from thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves. The suite of capabilities that the transformation of the 1970s and 1980s provided will be narrowed into a confined band of excellence. The business model that brought success to many companies in the 1990s will be adopted as the basis for this transformation, and all of America's future success will rest upon this one capability and the applicability of this single model. It is one of the most seductive and dangerous visions of modern times.

To hyper-condense the message, the author suggests that Rumsfeld is repeating the errors of McNamara.

Concur. He is also repeating the error of Britian in its late empire period. That error was concentrating on a small highly trained military cadre to be augmented by local levies during conflict.

Unfortunately, when the cadre is all but wiped out in the initial stage of conflict things become very tense. Think early WWI.

The problem that Rumsfeld is trying to address is that we no longer live in a world where we can count on a 6 month lead time to build up forces before taking action. The greatest threat we face are anonymous terrorists (backed indirectly by rogue states) who are willing to use weapons of mass destruction to kill people for no other purpose than that they enjoy killing people, including, most of all, themselves. Going after people like that, you simply don't have the luxury of waiting half a year to build up your forces before you strike.

As a result, the U.S. is now attempting to transform its military in ways that hinder the conduct of current operations, even as those operations literally rip it apart.

Which explains the tens of thousands of casualties we had in the bloody, months-long attempt to capture Baghdad. </sarcasm>

That's as far as I read. The author may, in fact, have a point to make, but this idiotic hyperbole is not worth wading through to try to find it.

I am not sure whether the author's points are valid -- certainly at least some of what he says makes sense -- which is why I put the article up for discussion on FR

I meant no criticism for the posting. This place is about discussion.

I just think the author is likely exagerating more to shoot down Rumsfeld - who the left hates almost as much as they hate Ashcroft - than out of any concern for America's military effectiveness.

Individual points, shorn of such noise, may still be worth considering. For example: I've worried for quite some time that our military is becoming so dependent on fancy technology that one EM pulse weapon could leave them nearly helpless.

That's an interesting question. Do they train for situations where they lose the electronics, or their satellites go down, or some other problem knocks out the tech? I don't know. Anybody?

The military has always loved their high-tech toys. We watch in amazement as the smart bomb hits the target in a precision strike. Our artillery can be as precise but it does not have the appeal to a television audience. Our armored forces and aviation can inflict enormous damage but cannot contol any ground. We have the capability to punish an enemy but no capacity to control anything.

The events in Iraq show the weakness of our ground forces and the training they have received. The biggest problem is the number involved. It is disgraceful to maintain that we are a super-power when we can't control the ground in a country the size of Iraq. We are so weak that it is affecting our foreign policy.

Both Iran and North Korea thumb their nose at us because they realize we are so occupied with the troops we have that we are unable to respond to any further problems. An alternative we have is removing our troops from garrison duty in countries like Germany, Okinawa, Japan, South Korea, and other countries where we aren't needed. It is better to have a smaller, united force than a large disorganized force such as we now have.

While Rummy is no military magic wand waver, he is making an effort to transform the Army and Air Force, both VERY reluctant to change ANYTHING, into a more efficient fighting force to deal with terrorist. We no longer have an enemy like Russia where slow buildup and massive men and material are needed. What he is essentially trying to do is make those branches more like the Marines, which anyone with even a cursory knowledge of the Army knows does not sit well with the Army brass.

OK, so the case might be made that China would be like Russia, but the Chinese seem to be learning from the Russian's mistakes. They know they cannot out spend us on military buildups like the Russians found out when Reagan bankrupted them. They also are more willing to change to a more technological approach to military needs, especially in areas we may be lacking vision. (see sattelite destruction capabilities - thanks a lot Bill Clinton!)

While I am reserving judgement until I get more details about the exact plans, the idea seems pretty logical to me. If we had a huge enemy force, like Russia, to contend with, then the argument could be made that we would still need the tanks and large machinery of war we have. While some are still going to be necessary, the Army and Air Force certainly DO need to rethink some of their strategic needs and gear their planning more towards a quick deployment, smaller strike task force.

As for the article, you can bet the writer has no love loss for Rummy & that is the premise behind most of his arguments.

Just my humble opinion.

I think the article omits the tactical and strategic value of American military training that incorporates all of this new technology, and actually allows it to work as designed under combat situations. I agree that redundant systems that have proved useful in the past will get a more ctritical look in the future, but I don't agree that the only capability planned for the future is PGM at a distance. The capabilities displayed by American SOF recently seem to me to make that clear.

It is disgraceful to maintain that we are a super-power when we can't control the ground in a country the size of Iraq.

I partly disagree. Occupation is a hugely different thing than war fighting and we have simply not trained for it. We're making things up in Iraq as we go along, trying to create order where there was chaos, without using oppressive police state tactics. It's hard. I think we're doing pretty well, considering.

The real test will be ten years down the road, when we've conquered and occupied Syria, Iran and maybe a couple others besides (assuming a new administration hasn't completely given up on the terror war by then). We should have learned a lot of tricks (and traps) of the game, by then.

the Army and Air Force certainly DO need to rethink some of their strategic needs and gear their planning more towards a quick deployment, smaller strike task force.

Interestingly, considering your comments, it's the Marines who are asking for a sub-orbital insertion vehicle for very fast response. Basically, a space plane.

The Air Force is also giving some thought to what's coming. See Air Force 2025. But coming up with cool ideas is not the same as convincing the brass to implement them.

I haven't looked to see what the Army is working on lately. Could be interesting.

Not to sound like a Marxist here, but what about our economic power and strength? No country can do squat without the bucks to fund weapons, research, and military training. Hence, we are truly a hyperpower - both militarily and economically.
China and India have potential but they aint there yet. The EU has the raw material but no willpower.

We can defeast any military on earth right now. The problem is fihgting 2 wars at once. Add to that multiple other assignments and our military is constantly taxed.

The only way we would be a hyperpower is if we could defeat the next two most powerful militaries, have peacekeeping garrisons, and defend the US all at the same time. We are no hyper power.
We can't deal with Iraq, Afghanistan, mutliple terrorist groups, and homeland security alone. We are too constrained to do anyhting about Iran and North Korea.

Going after people like that, you simply don't have the luxury of waiting half a year to build up your forces before you strike.

No argument there.

My point is that we're throwing the baby out with the bath water. We need both highly-mobile rapid-response hi-tech forces, and massive punch forces. Always have.

To limit ourselves to one or the other is to invite failure.

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