Posted on 10/06/2004 1:16:19 PM PDT by cogitator
The remark by Kerry concerning a supposed "global test" for a preemptive war made me recall George Will's column from last year in which he asserted that the "Bush Doctrine" had failed in Iraq due to the inability to find WMD. Here is Will's quote:
"Overshadowing the military achievement is the failure -- so far -- to find, or explain the absence of, weapons of mass destruction that were the necessary and sufficient justification for preemptive war. The doctrine of preemption -- the core of the president's foreign policy -- is in jeopardy." (First published on June 22, 2003)
This made me wonder if the "Bush Doctrine" is something more than a vague concept. So I Googled on "Bush Doctrine", and was educated. Below are some of the resources I found. My own inserted comments are preceded by "---".
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSSUSA for short)
--- This section contains this:
"For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack."
"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning."
(skip a paragraph) "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
"The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:
* build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
* coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
* continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."
"The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."
--- So I think that's a fairly long-winded version of the Bush doctrine. More searching provided:
Bush Doctrine (this is a summary, which I think significantly glosses over finer points in the above)
The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine
--- This is quite informative, and contains this:
"Any comprehensive U.S. "threat assessment" would conclude that the normal constraints of international politics--counterbalancing powers--no longer immediately inhibit the exercise of American might. (note: So a "global test" can't be applied!!) At the same time, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction promises to upset the "normal" rules of power among nation-states, devaluing the conventional military strength (and other kinds of power, as well) amassed by the United States. This undercuts the general peace won by the victory in the cold war and would complicate any future great-power competition or challenge to the American-led international order. Small "rogue" states and violent, but nevertheless weak, international movements like Islamic radicalism are coming to have a disproportionate "weight" in global security calculations. Moreover Islamism represents a kind of ideological threat to the Western political principles that made the end of the cold war against the Soviet Union also seem like the end of history."
--- This paragraph goes back to the point I underlined earlier. The slippery difficulty of this entire concept is "imminent threat" -- as the NSSUSA says, the concept of "imminent threat" must be adapted from the conventional concept of "troops massing on the border" to a more flexible one where accurate intelligence regarding what a rogue state is doing becomes paramount. Because it would probably not take long to go from production capability to production actuality (and because a small amount of material could wreak havoc, destruction, and death), the activities of rogue states must be precisely determined with an immense amount of effort. If a country has production capability and intent (but not production actuality), that does not necessitate preemptive unilateral war (and the NSSUSA clearly indicates that preemptive force is not always the method of choice) -- but it certainly means that it must be a viable option when these situations arise. North Korea is a pertinent case.
--- This is excellent, but long, by Norman Podhoretz:
Enter the Bush Doctrine: The four pillars of the president's strategy for winning World War IV
--- Regarding preemption, read the "Third Pillar" section. I've taken this quote from the article, from Bush's West Point speech, and the subsequent commentary by Podhoretz.
"If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."
At this early stage, the Bush administration was still denying that it had reached any definite decision about Saddam Hussein; but everyone knew that, in promising to act, Mr. Bush was talking about him. The immediate purpose was to topple the Iraqi dictator before he had a chance to supply weapons of mass destruction to the terrorists. But this was by no means the only or--surprising though it would seem in retrospect--even the decisive consideration, either for Mr. Bush or his supporters (or, for that matter, his opponents). And in any case, the long-range strategic rationale went beyond the proximate causes of the invasion. Mr. Bush's idea was to extend the enterprise of "draining the swamps" begun in Afghanistan and then to set the entire region on a course toward democratization. For if Afghanistan under the Taliban represented the religious face of Middle Eastern terrorism, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was its most powerful secular partner. It was to deal with this two-headed beast that a two-pronged strategy was designed."
--- Finally, this is another long and fairly informative article:
The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq (from Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly)
--- with this section:
"The judgment that we are dealing with enemies who are prepared to “strike first,” “to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States,”14 who “would [not] hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction if they believed it would serve their purposes,”15 inevitably dictates a policy of what the Bush Administration has chosen to call “anticipatory self-defense.”16 The policy is billed as a strategy of preemption. In his West Point speech, President Bush announced that the “war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”17 The National Security Strategy declares that the “United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security,” and given the risk of inaction against enemies prepared to strike first, “the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”18 The National Security Strategy goes on to say, “Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing for attack.” However, “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” Because rogue states know they can’t win with conventional weapons, “they [will] rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.”19
The Bush Administration does not regard preemption as a substitute for traditional nonmilitary measures such as sanctions and coercive diplomacy or for proactive counterproliferation and strengthened nonproliferation efforts. Preemption is an “add-on” tailored to deal with the new, non-deterrable threat. But the question does arise as to whether “preemption” best characterizes the new policy. The Pentagon’s official definition of preemption is “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”20 In contrast, preventive war is “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve great risk.”21 Harvard’s Graham Allison has captured the logic of preventive war: “I may some day have a war with you, and right now I’m strong and you’re not. So I’m going to have the war now.” Allison went on to point out that this logic was very much behind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, “and in candid moments some Japanese scholars say—off the record—that [Japan’s] big mistake was waiting too long.”22
The difference between preemption and preventive war is important. As defined above, preemptive attack is justifiable if it meets Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s strict criteria, enunciated in 1837 and still the legal standard, that the threat be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”23 Preemptive war has legal sanction.24 Preventive war, on the other hand, has none, because the threat is neither certain nor imminent. This makes preventive war indistinguishable from outright aggression, which may explain why the Bush Administration insists that its strategy is preemptive, although some Cabinet officials have used the terms interchangeably."
--- I think this last paragraph is a good indication of how the phrase "imminent threat" (or perhaps Websters's "instant" and "overwhelming" threat) becomes difficult to apply under these modern circumstances, and therefore the distinction between "preemption" and "prevention" becomes similarly confused.
THe reason the media have done all things possible to obscure the meaning of the Bush doctrine is because it is so politically inexorable. Putin's statement that Russia had solid intelligence Iraq was planning attacks on US interests is good enough. Game set match. But the media don't ahve any fun reporting the truth, they have fun keeping a game alive even after its over.
Bookmark this one...
=== Putin's statement that Russia had solid intelligence Iraq was planning attacks on US interests is good enough. Game set match.
What's the equivalent for "game, set, match" in judo ... if you know.
Good research.
President Kennedy said something along the lines that we cannot wait until the threat is imminent, that we can't wair for "the launch of a missile", or something like that, he said it during the Cuban missile crisis. I don't have the link, but it was a good comment, it was in a speech he made.
Are you telling me to, or are you going to do it?
B u m p
"Mr. Bush's idea was to extend the enterprise of "draining the swamps" begun in Afghanistan and then to set the entire region on a course toward democratization. For if Afghanistan under the Taliban represented the religious face of Middle Eastern terrorism, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was its most powerful secular partner. It was to deal with this two-headed beast that a two-pronged strategy was designed."
"The fact that some people don't recognize this reality, is an indication that they are not prepared to defend this country. "
For the human brain in general, and for a prosperous society such as ours specifically, I think it is VERY difficult to continuously perceive that the #1 threat is nuclear terrorism, which can remove one or more of the largest cities in the US from the functional map, crash our economy, close the banks, etc. etc.
A fair amount of the voting population lives in a fantasy world where this is not going to be allowed to become a daily concern. It is human nature, and if it nightmare does happen, human nature will then be to blame the government for not stopping it.
Yep. WIN! Case closed.
Who was the first person to label it "Bush Doctrine?" Does anyone know?
It's also because it inexorably is grounded in American style constitutional republicanism that is designed to sustain and enlarge democracy within manageable bounds, as opposed to high sounding "progressive" Eurosocialism that serves as a screen for the same kind of centralized command and control that characterized monarchism as opposed to American republicanism from our beginnings. Our media are fundamentally Eurosocialist, including Will, who, for all his astuteness, is at heart a Tory who longs for a system more like that of Jolly Old.
Good question. I don't know the answer. It was probably used close after the West Point Speech on September 20.
"The larger question is how, or even whether, decisions about preemptive war can be made in the absence of unambiguous intelligence. This is not hypothetical: Whoever wins November's election may face a similar dilemma. Extremist anti-American governments or terrorists may acquire weapons of mass destruction, and neither al Qaeda nor the rulers of Iran and North Korea are inclined to transparency. The case of Iraq has shown that it is possible that the intelligence on which a war decision may be based may later prove to be mostly wrong. Does that mean the president cannot act in such cases? That's a question Mr. Bush and Mr. Kerry would do well to discuss."
In my discussion, I said:
"The slippery difficulty of this entire concept is "imminent threat" -- as the NSSUSA says, the concept of "imminent threat" must be adapted from the conventional concept of "troops massing on the border" to a more flexible one where accurate intelligence regarding what a rogue state is doing becomes paramount. Because it would probably not take long to go from production capability to production actuality (and because a small amount of material could wreak havoc, destruction, and death), the activities of rogue states must be precisely determined with an immense amount of effort."
Quite a parallelism.
And a short follow-up: we have unambiguous intelligence about North Korea. We know exactly what they're doing. So the decision process here is much simpler.
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