Shahab 3: an Advanced IRBM(Iran Space Program is a cover for their ICBM program to hit the USA.)

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others ^ | 8-9-05 | VARIOUS (See Below)

[vannrox]

This is a compilation of articles related to the Iran ICBM missile program. Most space magazines and organizations are praising Iran for their efforts to space launch and explorations. This is my attempt to pull the pieces back into context.

Shahab-3 / Zelzal-3

Technical Details
Range (km)	1,350-1,500
CEP (m)	190 (Previously thought to be several thousand meters)
Diam. (m)	1.32-1.35
Height (m)	15.852-16
Launch Weight Mass (kg)	15,852-16,250
Stage Mass (kg)	15,092
Dry Weight Mass (kg)	1,780-2,180
Thrust (Kg f)	Effective: 26,051 (-709) Actual: 26,760-26,600
Burn time (sec.)	110
Isp. (sec.)	Effective: 226 - SL due to vains steering drag loss of 45 sec. Actual: 230 Vac.: 264
Thrust Chamb.	1
Fuel	TM-185     20% Gasoline     80% Kerosene
Oxidizer	AK-27I     27% N2O4     73% HNO3     Iodium Inhibitor
Propellant Mass (kg)	12,912
Warhead (kg)	760-987-1,158
Type	MRBM

The Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile means Meteor-3 or Shooting Star-3 in Farsi [alternatively designated Zelzal (Earthquake)] is derived from the 1,300-1,500 kilometer range North Korean No-dong missile. The Shahab-3 reportedly has a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram warhead.

Design Heritage

The No-Dong ballistic missile was developed by the North Korean's with Soviet Gorbachev era technical participation along with Chinese contributions and Iranian financial assistance. The former Soviet Union's technology transfer contribution is circumstantially strongly suspected as having come from the Acad. V. P. Makeyev OKB Design Bureau developers of the Soviet era Scud-B, and its follow on SLBM's. The 9D21/S-2.___ Isayev OKB Scud-B engine was already in the North Korean's possession. While the Isayev OKB, S-2.713 rocket engine design used on the Soviet SS-N-Shahab-4 SLBM is also thought to have been a part of this technology transfer. This was directly the results of strategic arms reduction treaties creating unemployment in a large Cadre of technically qualified personnel in the Makeyev OKB's essentially cancelled liquid propellant SLBM programs of the Former Soviet Union. This was because no other form of employment was successfully offered to them. That highly modified Isayev OKB, S-2.713M rocket engine design strongly reflects its Scud-B design heritage but represents an entirely new liquid propellant rocket engine far beyond the growth potential of the modified Scud-B and C class engines for application to the No-Dong. That No-Dong engine also reflects modern Soviet rocket engine start up design technology such as the solid charge starter to spin up the turbo-pump, instead of start up propellant tanks, and the pyrotechnics used to open the propellant flow and to cut it off. It also reflects the typical on off rocket engine design philosophy used by the Soviets. All Soviet era SLBM's owe their design heritage to the Scud-A and Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles.

China's contribution to the No-Dong project came from the joint North Korean/Chinese project conducted between 1976-78, the cancelled DF-61 missile, essentially a Scud-C capability ballistic missile with a range of 600 km. carrying a 1,000 kg warhead that also featured a strap-down guidance system. Iran in fact decided to totally rework the North Korean No-Dong design to their liking with Russian and now Chinese help but they have yet to successfully indigenously produce the whole vehicle to North Korea's standards.

Build Up and flight Test Analysis

Iran was slated to receive the first shipment of the missiles late in 1993. However it was suggested that the delivery was halted due to American pressure on North Korea. According to some reports, as of 1995 Iran had not received the missiles. However Israeli press reports in 1996 cited intelligence reports which claimed that at least a dozen No-Dong missiles had been delivered to Iran from North Korea. But General Peay, USCINCCENT, claimed during a spring 1996 interview that attempts by Iran to buy No-Dong missile from North Korea had failed for financial reasons. The Washington Times, on September 11, 1997 reported that Iran had received from China's, Great Wall Industries Corporation, "guidance, and Solid propellant motor technology" as well as general missile testing technology. The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 programs appear to be getting considerable assistance from China and Russia. (1) For the first time publicly the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile programs were identified in this article. Shahab-3 is said to have a range of 930 miles (1,496 km.) while the Shahab-4 is credited with 1,20 miles (1,995 km.) the prototype of which was expected to be only 2-3 years away. (1)

This was followed on October 18, 1997 in The Washington Times, with the information that "Iran is just three years (2000) from fielding the first of two versions of the North Korean, No-Dong missile called the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4". (2) However, active Iranian development of this missile continued. According to mid-1997 Israeli reports, at the rate of current development, the project will be completed and operational within two years -- by the end of 1999.

On 15 December 1997 satellite reconnaissance of the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group research facility, just south of Tehran, Iran detected the heat signature of an engine static test firing for this new missile. The test was either the sixth or eighth conducted in 1997, depending on conflicting interpretations of available intelligence. It is believed that Iran may have purchased up to 10 of these No-Dong missiles from North Korea. Iran's missile design bureau organizations for their Shahab-3 missile are made up of the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bagheri Indusral Group (SBIG).

It was further revealed by the Washington Times on June 16, 1998 that Iran had purchased "telemetry equipment" from China for missile test monitoring "China Great Wall Industries" provided an entire "Telemetry infrastructure" for the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 MRBM based on No-Dong. China was also said to have helped in the Iranian NP-110 short-range tactical solid propellant missile project with a 105 miles (168.95 km) range. (3) The CIA predicts that the first test flight of the Shahab-3 would occur in 1998, while the DIA predicted a first flight test would occur in 1999. The tests of the missile engines, according to US intelligence, used monitoring equipment supplied by Russian sources.

On July 22,1998 Iran conducted the first flight test of the Shahab-3 MRBM missile based on No-Dong. The following information was revealed about this test in the Washington Times, on July 24, 1998, "The missile exploded 100 seconds after launch ---- after traveled about 620 miles (997.58 km. down range) over a missile test (range) site in Northern Iran. --- It is uncertain whether that was an accidental explosion or they terminated the flight after achieving what they had to do or because of other reasons." (4) This certainly indicates that the flight was not a total failure but at least a partial success. The Washington Post added it would take one or two years before the Shahab-3 MRBM would be deployed and that, "One government expert described it as "a flight-test for technical purposes" in which the dummy warhead exploded before hitting the ground well down (the test) range." (5)

No-dong / Shahab-3 Range to Payload/Throwweight Trade-offs
Stages	Payload		Range		Country
	kg	Pounds	km	Miles
One-Stage	1,158	2,553	1,350	839	Iran
	760	1,676	1,500	932	Pakistan
Official figures

The missile was launched at 06:00 from a firing range about 100 miles southeast of At (Qom?) Two or three American early warning and SIGINT signal intelligence satellites detected this first launch of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. After launch the missile flew approximately 100 seconds to the southeast. The rocket exploded or was deliberately detonated about 100 seconds into the 110 seconds burn of the single stage, either because of engine steering vanes disintegration failure or instrumentation/guidance failure which may have caused the premature warhead detonation. There is also the possibility that the Iranian's, were satisfied with its Shahab-3 rockets performance, and had decided to detonate it by remote control. However this is highly questionable as a missile testing procedure. Almost certainly the missile had gone out of control and was deliberately destroyed. The flight ended near the time the fuel on the single stage missile would have been exhausted at 110 seconds from start up, at which point in an operational flight, the warhead would normally separate from the missile and fly to its target.

Due to the missile's mid-air explosion, which was picked up by American satellites, it was initially believed that the test was at least a partial failure. However, following careful examination of the initial technical data, some experts reportedly concluded that the test was in fact successful. They were wrong. The US Government expected that there would be additional tests, and that several more tests would be required before Iran was confident of the abilities of the missile. The Washington Times also suggest that the CIA knew that the flight would be in 1998 and also knew of the flight being prepared "first test was imminent" . (6) It was to be a modified No-Dong missile.

In passing it is interesting to note that Pakistan flew its direct copy No-Dong missile (Ghauri-II) on April 6, 1998 some three months before Iran's Shahab-3. The question is why and what does this imply? It would seem to imply that Iran reworked the North Korean No-Dong design while Pakistan bought the whole package missile and its (TEL) Transport Erector Launcher and its simpler mobile support equipment. Iran apparently not only reworked the No-Dong design but also developed its own Mercedes Benz based (TEL) and its extensive separate mobile support equipment but has also probably done the same reworking the two Taep'o-dong launch vehicle designs.

On February 7, 1999 Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkani said the following as documented in The Washington Times on March 2,1999 "confirmed that the Shahab-3 is now in production, and that no further flight test are needed." . (7)

Florida Today stated that Iran's defense minister Ali Shamkhani's had said, "The Shahab-3 missile is the last military missile Iran will produce,--- We have no plans for another war missile." (8)

By March 1999, fifteen Shahab-3 missiles would have been produced domestically by Iran based on the Defense Ministers comments after the July 22, 1998 flight test. Reuters, on September 19, 1999 noted that Tehran "struts missile Zelzal which took 4.5 years to develop." (9)

The Washington Times, on September 22, 1999 quoted the Air Intelligence Agency, National Air Intelligence Center of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio report entitled "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat." Which discussed several issues related to the Iranian missile programs. Those quoted comments from the NAIC publication were as follows:

"Iran is working on the development of at least two medium-range ballistic missiles, The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 (10)

On February 9, 2000, The Washington Times revealed the following details on North Korea's acquired help from Iran. "North Korea recently sold Iran a dozen medium range ballistic missile engines" ---- (in November 1999)

"The (12) engines arrived in Iran on Nov. 21, after they were spotted being loaded aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747 cargo jet that left Suinan International Airfield about 12 miles north of-----Pyongyang" . These are the same engines used in No-Dong". (11)

Quoting from "Mr. Robert Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs from Congressional testimony in the Washington Times of February 10, 2000 "Those engines are critical to the Taep'o-dong Program,-----of the North Korean's Long-range missile. And they would be critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the Shahab-3 program".

b--------" The CIA analysis also said North Korea has not stopped developing its Taep'o-dong long-range missile----". (12) The CIA considered the No-Dong derived Shahab-3 to be operational as of February 2000.

According to Jane's Defence Weekly, of March 22, 2000, suggest that "Iran on Feb. 20, 2000 carried out an operational test on a Shahab-3 missile in country. ---- It was launched from a TEL from a new base of the IRGC at Mushhad. The Shahab-3 used a inertial guidance system with a CEP Circular error probability of 3 km." (13)

It remains unclear how accurate this report is based on subsequent events in the Iran's ballistic missile program development. This appears to actually have been a vehicle engine static test firing to test the vehicle systems and engine operation integration.

Additionally it would also appear that a cluster of Shahab-3 class engine was static tested during February 2000 in Iran but only the subsequent history seems to confirm this event. This is separate from the North Korean engine static test firings and from the subsequent launch pad Taep'o-dong-2 first stage systems integration vertical static test firing conducted during the week of June 26th through July 2, 2001.

Iran successfully conducted a full end to end flight test of a Shahab-3 on 15 July 2000. Following the test, the Iranian Defense Ministry told Iranian State television that the Islamic Republic had no intention of using its missiles to attack other countries. This launch appeared to have been quite successful. This launch vehicle probably utilized one of the engines purchased from North Korea instead of a domestically produced engine.

Iran carried out a second flight test of the Shahab-3 as noted in a Reuters news reports, in The Washington Times, July 16, 2000, on July 15, 2000 test which achieved a velocity of 4,320 mph (1,931.04 M/sec.) with a 1 ton warhead. (14)

Another flight test of the Shahab-3 was predicted by the Washington Times on Sept 8, 2000, --- "delayed from the previous week "---. ---"test expected later this month" ---.(15)

Iran then conducted a further third test launch of Shahab-3 or 3D on September 21, 2000, but the missile apparently failed or exploded shortly after liftoff.

On Sept 21, 2000 the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio-1, stated the following, "The first Shahab-3D missile using liquid and solid fuel, was successfully test-fired on the first day of the Holy Defense Week. Announcing the news the Minister of Defense and armed forces logistic said: The missile was built and tested for the purpose of gaining the necessary technology in order to enter the design and production stage of Satellite guidance systems. Vice-Admiral Shamkhani added: The Shahab-3D missile has no military use and only for achieving the preliminary stage of new non-military operations." (16)

The Associated Press further stated, "Iran has successfully test-fired its first solid-liquid fueled missile, which the Defense Minister said was part of a program for launching satellites, ----" (17)

The Washington Times on September 22, 2000 added that the Iranian had tested the Shahab-3D, MRBM for a third time, but "the rocket exploded shortly after liftoff, U. S. Intelligence officials said." " Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told the official IRNA News Agency that the test of the Shahab-3D-----". The Iranian spokesman went on to say that the missile was "solid and liquid fueled" and will be used only for launching communications satellites and not warheads." (18)

Jane's Intelligence Review, in its November 2000 issue stated the following "The Sept. 21, 2000 flight test was a failure according to U. S. officials. It was flown from near the city of Semnan ." (19)

On September 21, 2000 during testimony before the U.S. Senate Mr. Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs discussed the Shahab-3D first launch.

Mr. Walpole " Iran's Defense minister announced the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space launch vehicle with no military applications. -------

Sen. Cochran,

"As we have said in open session before, Iran procured No-Dong and then sought Russian assistance to modify that into the Shahab-3, which is a little different approach than Pakistan used to get the Ghauri, which is also a No-Dong. They did not mind trying to change it. They just decided to change its name and buy them outright." (20)

The Shahab-3D test was detected by US space sensors, and announced by an Iranian government spokesman in Tehran. Although Iran claimed the test-launch was a success, US officials said the Shahab-3D exploded shortly after launching. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that the test of a "Shahab-3D" was conducted in connection with the anniversary of the start of the war with Iraq, which began in 1980 and ended in 1988. The Iranian spokesman said the missile was "liquid and solid-fueled" and would be used for launching communications satellites and not warheads. Iranian sources characterized the missile as being "liquid and solid fueled" but it is known that the Shahab-3 missile consisted of a single liquid propellant first stage. If a smaller solid propellant second stage were added to the Warhead or as a payload boost stage then this would be perhaps the first appearance of the "IRIS" launch vehicle. The IRIS launch vehicle is a Iranian space program related derivation of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. A launch vehicle of this configuration is ideal as a vertical probe sounding rocket but would almost certainly not be capable of launching a satellite of appreciable mass or capability unless it were intended to be a second and third stage of a larger launch vehicle. However, it would finally give the Shahab-3 missile the range required to cover all of Israel.

Early in 2001 it appeared Iran was preparing for another flight test of the Shahab-3 missile as noted in the January 12, 2001, The Washington Times. "Iran is preparing to conduct another flight test soon-----" full range " flight test gauged a failure on Sept 21, 2000 but it was successful on its second flight test. (21)

More North Korean produced No-Dong class storable liquid propellant rocket engines were apparently shipped to Iran in spite of being held up by a financial disagreement that had delayed the shipment, according to the Washington Times of April 27, 2001. " New shipments of North Korean missile components and technology ----". The article went on to state that the latest shipment of missile parts and their associated documentation was shipped in late February 2000 from North Korea's Sunan international airport which is north of Pyongyang. (22)

This second shipment was apparently delivered to Iran after April 2001. Presumably this latest shipment to Iran from North Korea was flown over China with its permission as was done previously for other shipments.

It was reported in the Middle East Newsline of October 17, 2001 that Iran has placed the domestically produced Shahab-3 MRBM into "serial production" earlier in 2001. (23) It goes on to say that they can produce about "20 missiles a year" domestically with the purchased North Korean No-Dong engines. (23) It suggest that Iran continues to have problems in the production of it own copies of the No-Dong engine.

Of greater significance it would appear according the Middle East Newsline that Iran is attempting to develop a solid propellant equivalent capability Shahab-3 class missile with similar performance requirements based on assistance from the Chinese like was done in Pakistan. It suggest that the Chinese will supply a different guidance system for this project. (23)

There have been only a few test firings of the No-Dong missile and its direct copy Pakistan's, Ghauri-II and improved Iranian Shahab-3 descendants.

Excepted No-Dong Derivative Flight Test to Date:

1. The first known flight test of No-Dong occurred in North Korea on May 29 or 30th 1993. Based on the long known historical record from the U.S. Intelligence experience of failing to detect first flight test of various countries ballistic missiles it can be said that this may not have been the only flight test of No-Dong prior to this date.
2. The second known flight test was of the No-Dong renamed Ghauri-II in Pakistan on April 6,1998.
3. The third flight test of a Iranian domestically produced No-Dong reworked by Iran was the Shahab-3 launched on 22, July, 1998. It failed at 100 Sec. into its flight after it was launch from south east of Tehran, Iran at (possibly Qom) where previous test of the Scud-C had been launched.
4. The fourth test was a second Ghauri-II launched in Pakistan on April 14, 1999.
5. The fifth flight test of the Shahab-3 using a North Korean produced engine took place from Mushhad on July 15, 2000 was very successful apparently clearing the way for its operational field deployed.
6. The sixth flight test from Semnam of a derivative Shahab-3 was the first flight test of the Shahab-3D on Sept. 21, 2000. It appeared to have failed shortly after launch. This could have been the initial flight test of the IRIS space launch vehicle but that is uncertain. If it was an IRIS launch then the program has suffered a potential program set back for Iran.

Developing Nations and Warhead Dynamic Performance

Recently, it was suggested that the developing nations missile program warheads would be tumbling about their center of gravity during re-entry, which would then make it difficult to identify. This was because they were not being spun-up along their longitudinal axis prior to re-entry through the atmosphere.

A warhead is much like a bullet fired from a rifle barrel. If the barrel is grooved to spin up the bullet along its longitudinal axis it tends to fly through the atmosphere to its target more smoothly and accurately. If the barrel is not built with this capability, the bullet tumbles uncontrollably about its center of gravity throughout its flight in the atmosphere to its target. This tumbling reduces the accuracy of the projectile.

This kind of missile warhead tumbling was noted in the ballistic flights of Iraqi's Scud-B, Scud-C/Al-Hussein, Scud-D/Al-Abbas ballistic missiles during the Gulf War. In this particular case all of the warheads remained attached to the Scud derived rocket bodies. The length of the Scud-C and D missile bodies and the failure to spin up either the missile with its warhead or separate the warhead after missile spin up made them extremely unstable and in accurate during re-entry to their target.

Today this is not the case with North Korean derived warhead technology. North Korea successfully demonstrated payload spin up with its Taep'o-dong-1/Paeutsan-1, solid motor third stage and satellite during that satellite launch attempt. This can plainly be seen in the publicly available North Korean videos released to the press on the Paeutusan-1 launch. Both the solid motor stage and the attached satellite are seen in the video rotating along the centerline longitudinal axis of the two elements. When you think about it technically applying basic Junior high school physics it had to be that way to perform its mission. The only way the stage and satellite combination could be stabilized was to spin them up along the centerline longitudinally axis in order to properly position the third stage solid motor for the orbital insertion burn which is confirmed by the video. While the combination payload rotates about its center of gravity that solid motor has to be precisely positioned and fired in order to place itself in Earth orbit. If it is positioned left or right or up or down from that centerline firing position the payload will be de-orbit by the burn. The Paeutusan-1 solid propellant third stage both demonstrated a near full duration burn and the spin up of the stage and satellite along its longitudinal axis. However, the third stage solid motor ruptured, de-orbiting the satellite, almost immediately after achieving orbital velocity. For further information see the North Korean Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-1 web site.

Therefore, it would be correct to assume that besides North Korea's, No-Dong (first stage of Taep'o-dong-1), both Pakistan's Ghauri-II and Iran's Shahab-3 all benefit from this spin-up technology. The Shahab-3/Ghauri-II both apparently spin up the single booster stage and warhead combination starting at about 10 seconds before the termination of the powered flight at 110 seconds. At this point after 110 seconds of powered flight the warhead is then separated from the booster stage to fly on a re-entry trajectory that remains stable to its target. With the addition of GPS targeting the warhead accuracy is greatly enhanced. There are still many in the analytical community that question, perhaps correctly, this suggested accuracy of 190 meters, over the excepted 3 kilometers CEP. There can be no doubt that this spin-up technology does improve the accuracy of these warheads over the previously demonstrated poor ballistic capability. Since the warheads are not tumbling it in fact enhances the interceptor sensor signature identification capability verses that of a tumbling warheads signature.

Equally revealing is the fact that this is the area where the Iranian Shahab-3 has repeatedly failed in flight test. If the steering vanes are not equally positioned correctly or are defective in any way the missile and warhead combination would tumble about its center of gravity out of control destroying the missile. The resulting tumbling warhead whether attached to the remaining missile body or not would in all probability be destroyed during its re-entry. It is known that Iran has and continues to suffer from a steering vain quality control problem for its Shahab-3 ballistic missile that the Germans during WW-II solved and that the United States and former Soviet Union were able to easily resolve with out using specialized coating.

It is reported in the Middle East Newsline from a study by the Washington, D.C., Institute of Near East Policy, suggesting that both Iran and Iraq are having considerable trouble adapting nuclear warheads because of their size to their existing MRBMs, Shahab-3 of Iran, the Scud-C's and Scud-D's of Iraq. The report goes further suggest that they may choose to develop aircraft based delivery systems. (24) It is known that Iran has been developing a unmanned cruise missile capability through the use of the existing aircraft available for this potential weapons system as reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology some years ago.

SSMs - NODONG-1
Warhead type	HE, CHEM (thickened VX)
Range (km)	1,300-1,500
CEP	3-4,000 m 90m (w/GPS guidance)
Reaction time (min)	60
Maximum road speed	70 km/h
Maximum road range	550 km

Sources and Methods

1. Gertz, Bill, "Missiles In Iran of Concern To State," The Washington Times, 11, Sept. 1997, pp. 1 & .A14.
2. Gertz, Bill, "House, seeks sanctions on Russia for Iran arms," The Washington Times, 18, Oct. 1997, pp. A4.
3. Gertz, Bill, "China assists Iran, Libya on Missiles," The Washington Times, 16, June 1998, pp. A1 & A14.
4. Gertz, Bill & Sieff, Martin, "Iran's missile test alarms Clinton," The Washington Times, 24, July 1998, pp. A1 & A13.
5. Pincus, Walter, "Iran may soon gain missile capability," The Washington Post, 24, July 1998, p.?
6. Gertz, Bill, "Iran tests medium - range missile," The Washington Times, 23, July 1998.
7. Hackett, James, "Growing missile threat from Iran," The Washington Times, 2, March 1999, pp. A13.
8. "Iran says missile for satellite launching," Florida Today on line, AP Tehran, Iran, 8, February 1999.
9. "Iran Revolutionary Guards build new missile," Reuters, 19, Sept. 1999.
10. Gertz, Bill, "Tehran increases range on missiles," The Washington Times, 22, Sept. 1999 pp.?
11. Gertz, Bill, "N. Korea sells Iran missile engines," The Washington Times, 9, Feb. 2000, pA1.
12. Gertz, Bill, "Critical " N. Korean missile parts seen aiding Iran's Program, The Washington Times, 10, Feb. 2000, p.A3.
13. Rodan, Steve, "Iran now able to deploy Shahab-3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22, March 22, 2000, p. ?
14. "Iran tests upgraded missile able to hit Israel", Reuters news reports, The Washington Times, 16, July 2000, p. C3.
15. Gertz, Bill, "Iran set for another flight test of missile," The Washington Times, 8, Sept. 2000, pp. 1 & A20.
16. "Iran: Shahab-3 "non-military" missile successfully test-fired," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio-1, 21, Sept. 2000.
17. "Iran test-fires missile," AP article, 22, Sept. 2000,
18. Gertz, Bill, "Iran's missile test fails after takeoff," The Washington Times, 22, Sept. 2000, p. A5.
19. Koch, Andrew, "Third Iranian Shahab test "a fizzle"," Jane's Intelligence Review, Nov. 2000, p. 5.
20. Iran's Ballistic Missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Hearing before the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, September 21, 2000.
21. Gertz Bill, & Scarborough, Rowan, "Shahab-3 test set," (Inside the Ring), The Washington Times, January 12, 2001, p. A8.
22. Gertz, Bill & Scarborough, Rowan, "North Korea-Iran spat," Inside the Ring, The Washington Times, April 27, 2001, p. A9
23. Rodan, Steve, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab-3", Middle East Newsline, Oct. 17, 2001.
24. " Iran, Iraq Unable To Weaponize Missiles", Middle East Newsline, October 16, 2001.

• July 2000 News Reports
• July 1998 News Reports

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Iran gained considerable experience in the use of ballistic missiles already during the long war with Iraq, when it deployed SS-1B/C SCUD tactical ballistic missiles for striking Baghdad and several other cities in central Iraq in response to similar Iraqi strikes by FROG-7 and SS-1 Scud missiles. Original Iranian SS-1B/Cs were supplied via Libya and Syria. (Photo: ACIG archives)

The Scud Terror
The original SS-1 SCUD-A battlefield support missile was developed as a simple weapon, based on German V-2, intended for use against such large targets like marshalling areas, major storage dumps and airfields - preferrably armed with nuclear weapons, then their precision was very poor. During the Iran-Iraq war and several subsequent conflicts, however, "the SCUD" developed into a major propaganda-tool and a weapon of terror.

Especially during the IIPGW, in 1991, by repeatedly hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia with their Project 144.5 al-Hussayin "stretched"-range versions of the SS-1B, the Iraqis threatened to destroy the cohesion within the mighty Coallition put together by the USA to fight them. Had the US-administration at the time not found the way to successfully suppress the activity of two Iraqi brigades that were firing these weapons at Israel, while simultaneously keeping Israel back from attacking Iraq, that war might have easily ended in a complete chaos in which Arab countries would fight the USA and Israel - instead of Iraq.

The Iranians learned from their own experiences with Iraqis attacking their cities by FROG-7 and SS-1 Scud missiles, as well as from striking Baghdad by Scuds during the 1980s, and also from Iraqi experiences in striking Israel and Saudi Arabia. With an increasing number of neighbouring countries being equipped with similar weapons of advanced capabilities, in the early 1990s they launched their own project for development of an indigenious intermediate-range ballistic missile.

The resulting Shahab-3 is a liquid-fuelled medium range ballistic missile, and the longest-ranged of all Iranian ballistic missiles. It emerged from Iranian-sponsored cooperation in research and development about ballistic missiles with North Korea, in the 1980s, where the Project Nodong was developed on the basis of SS-1 SCUD series.
The most important part of the Nodong was its new rocket motor. The North Koreans concentrated most of their research and development work on constructing an enlargened copy of SCUD motor, then such an aggregate could supply more thrust, and with additional thrust the missile could also be significantly enlarged - which was something that could not be done with the basic SS-1 or its motor.

First tests with Nodong-1 missiles were conducted jointly by Iran and North Korea in the early 1990s, but subsequently the cooperation was cancelled and each country continued pursuing own projects, Iran starting the development of the missile that is today known as Shahab-3 on the basis of a shipment of trial Nodong-1 missiles received in 1993. According to unconfirmed reports, ever since the work on such missiles in Iran is concentrated within Shahid Hemat Industrial Group research facility, south of Tehran.

Having a good motor and a basic Shahab-3 missile well-advanced in development and expected to reach initial operational capability by 2002, the Iranians meanwhile decided to concentrate on optimizing different parts of the weapon for their purposes, foremost with the target of developing an advanced guidance system and re-entry vehicle. Contrary to the SCUD-series, namely, the Shahab-3 was to eject the booster stage with the motor and empty fuel tanks when reaching its designed apogee, and then continue towards the target only with the warhead mounted in a re-entry vehicle.

Such a manoeuvre is undertaken for several important reasons. The booster stage is becoming useless once the cruise altitude is reached, and, when empty, is increasingly instable, then its main method of steering is thrust from the main motor, most of which is spent during the early booster stage of the flight. Besides, the large booster stage makes the missile also very visible for radar systems and more susceptible to atmospheric influences and earth gravity, especially in later stages of the cruise phase and during the re-entry phase. Accuracy of the basic Shahab-3A depends on its capability to compensate course changes at the boost phase and placing the re-entry vehicle in the right trajectory: once reaching a high altitude of over 100km, where no atmospheric factors affect the missile, it travels unguided until impact.

The end of the guided flight shortly after the boost phase is the point at which the impact point is selected, after that, the re-entry vehicle/missile comes down by itself at the calculated impact point. Since most of the accuracy of such weapons depends on the relative short boost phase the Gyroscope/INS has to be extremely accurate: Iranians invested heavily in developing the capability to build such systems during the 1990s, and the Iranian defence industries eventually achieved this capability.


Shahab-3A: No Super-Scud
Combined with a heavy warhead, the basic Shahab-3A should be considered an effective conventional ballistic missile against anything but targets heavily protected by anti-ballistic missile defences, even if the usual reports about the precision of its guidance system cite a CEP between 100 and 200m.

Being developed and built by the Iranian Aerospace Industries Organization (IAIO) on a direct order from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), the missile was successfully tested since 1998, when the basic guidance system was not only confirmed to be precise, but even further optimised. Simultaneously, the manufacturing infrastructure was developed and improved to enable mass production, then – other than in most other countries that attempt to develop similar weapons – the IRGC wanted the Shahab to be cheap, to be built in large numbers and be used for conventional purposes, but still so accurate that it could also be used effectively against military targets.
Essentially, the IAIO achieved this target by using only one motor/noozle on Shahab-3, powered by liquid fuels such as Kerosene, filled in a single stage, and without using an active terminal guidance system. The Shahab-3A can also be fuelled and stored for a relatively long time during war, so that prepared missiles are ready for use over stretched periods of time but on a very short notice.

The new missile is carrying the warhead mounted in a re-entry vehicle that is separating from the booster stage during the cruise phase. Subsequently, the vehicle is put into a spin – apparently with help of simple boosters at its rear. Such capability is of significant advantage also because during the re-entry all objects can easily become instable, begin to tumble and have little or not capability of course corrections, which decreases their precision dramatically.

The Shahab-3 eventually entered service in summer of 2003, and is now in use by two of ten Surface-to-Surface Missile Squadrons of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). While manned and maintained by the IRIAF, these units, however, are effectively under IRGC-control.

Each squadron has at least six transport&erector launchers (TELs), towed by Mercedes trucks. At least four different TEL variants were meanwhile observed in service in Iran, some of which can also drive on dirt, and all of which have not only a wide range, but are also easy to be camouflaged as standard commercial 40t tilt-trailers that are in widespread use not only in Iran, but in whole Middle East and Europe. An already fuelled missile can be erected and launched within a very short period of time, with support solely from GPS-data, or by the crew comparing markings in the local terrain.

In the public there is still quite some confusion regarding the range and payload of the Shahab-3A. Credible sources put the range at 1.300km, with a warhead weighting around 1.200kg, or 1.500km with a 1.000kg warhead, and 1.700km with a warhead of 800kg.

Being interested foremost in use of such missiles for military purposes, the Iranians knew very well that large warheads are more effective, especially given the Shahab-3A’s terminal warhead velocity of between mach 6 and 7.

The accuracy of the missile, combined with its warhead, gives it the capability to destroy non-hardened or even hardened targets with single hit: already in its 1.300km-range configuration the warhead of Shahab-3 is nearly four times as heavy as that of Iraqi Project 144.5 al-Hussayin SCUD-variants used against Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. For striking hardened military targets, on the other side, Shahab-3As would be launched in salvos. The Iranian strikes against MKO-terrorist bases in Iraq, in 2001, for example, clearly demonstrated the will and capability for simultaneous deployment of between 50 and 60 missiles against a single target - to increase the effects of attack.

The total war-fighting effectiveness of the basic Shahab-3A against anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems remains questionable, nevertheless. It is a very fast missile and because of its separating re-entry vehicle system, its radar cross section in the terminal flight phase is very small. Compared with the SS-1 SCUD or – especially – the Project 144.5, it travels at a much higher altitude, entering the range of anti-ballistic missile defences at a much later stage and a higher speed. Its fixed trajectory, however, makes it also much more predictable, and once detected it is much easier to track.

Nevertheless, on its way towards the target the re-entry vehicle of Shahab-3A passes through a kind of a “stealth phase”: this is an effect based on the fact that the plasma at the heat shield makes it very hard to detect and track with radar when entering the Earth atmosphere.

Above and bellow: The Shahab-3A was presented in the public for the first time during the military parade in Tehran, on 22 September 2003. The original form of the re-entry vehicle with conventional, unguided, warhead can clearly be seen on these photographs.

Shahab-3B: a JDAM with Ballistic Trajectory?
However, faced with the fact that their likely opponents have a well-developed anti-ballistic missile system in service, and having experienced the imprecision of Iraqi Project 144.5 al-Hussayin missiles first-hand, the Iranians wanted to develop a missile that would not only be precise by itself, but also deploy a steerable re-entry vehicle during the terminal dive phase. Shahab-3B is a result of this effort.

Shahab-3B with its guided re-entry vehicle was presented on the most recent military parade in Tehran, held on 22 September 2004. (Photo: ACIG.org above, Yahoo.com bellow)

During the recent testing the Shahab-3B proved several significant differences over the basic production variant, with the most important changes being done on its guidance system and the warhead, but few small also on the missile body.

The most significant change is a new re-entry vehicle, with terminal guidance system and a new steering method, completely different from the normal re-entry vehicle with spin stabilization of the Shahab-3A.

The new re-entry vehicle has now place for a rocket-nozzle control system so that no spin stabilization is needed anymore - at least not during all of the flight after the boost phase. Nevertheless, this new nozzle-control system enables the Shahab-3B guidance and steering in all phases of the flight, so that course corrections can be done at any time.

The new Shahab-3B was for the first time officially tested only a very short time after the Israeli Arrow ABM system scored a first hit against a SS-1 SCUD ballistic missile. The Iranian defence minister said that the missile would be Iran’s answer to the Arrow and behind this statement are credible reasons.

The new shape of the re-entry vehicle atop the Shahab-3B is most obvious from this photograph. It is very likely that the warhead of this weapon is now not only being guided during most of its flight, but that it can also fly evasive manoeuvres, making it immensely problematic to intercept by any existing anti-ballistic missile defence systems. (Photo: SSN)

Position of the steering nozzle on the RV of Shahab-3B. (Still from IRINN video)

Around one year ago Iran claimed for the first time to have developed and produced a laser gyroscope INS system coupled with GPS as backup. For full-guided flight with trajectory of the Shahab-3B, an accurate INS and/or GPS is needed: laser gyroscope and GPS are two of the most accurate technologies, used for course calculations.

It is not yet known if this technology is also used in the Shahab-3B, but the coincidence is striking, especially as with such an accurate navigation system the Shahab-3 could archive several objectives. The missile could change its trajectory several times during re-entry and even terminal phase, effectively preventing pre-calculated intercept points of radar systems - which is a method nearly all ABM systems using these days. As a high-speed ballistic missile and pre-mission fuelling capability, the Shahab-3 has an extremely short launch/impact time ratio. This means that the INS/gyroscope guidance would also remain relatively accurate until impact (important, given the fact that the gyrosopes tend to become inaccurate the longer the flight lasts). With that guidance system, the Shahab-3B could archive an accuracy of around 30-50m CEP or even less. The Iranians have already proved of developing even more precise systems, then their Fateh-110 missiles have an electro-optical terminal guidance system: Shahab-3B is not known of having anything similar, but should be fully dependent on INS and – likely – GPS.

This new improved accuracy was apparently the reason why the warhead weight has been significantly decreased - to suggested 500kg. This, namely, is sufficient for pin-point target attack capability. Another reason for the 500kg warhead would be the improved range, which is reported to be meanwhile between 1.700 and 2.500km.

Above and bellow: Launch of a Shahab-3B as shown on the Iranian TV. (Photo: IRIB)

Conclusions
The Shahab-3 programme is extremely important for the Iranian defence capability. This weapon is now apparently the main deep-strike weapon system of Iranian armed services, deployed even ahead of fighter-bombers of the IRIAF.

This step-by-step project was provided with relatively large funding and the mass-production of the Shahab-3 is running already since two years. The Shahab-3B has apparently reached an initial operational capability phase, but it remains unclear if the version is already in production or not.

It is, nevertheless, certain that the new variant should be more expensive than the Basic Shahab-3A, which is why it is believed that the Shahab-3A will remain in production, while the Shahab-3B will only be used against high priority and/or heavily defended targets – perhaps after a salvo of Shahab-3As has forced the opponent to spend his ABMs. Equally, a Shahab-3B might be used to destroy the crucial part of the missile defence area, and the Shahab-3As could then saturate the actual target.

Meanwhile, while a number of sources was announcing a fast development of Shahab-4, Shahab-5 and even Shahab-6 – with some of the variants supposedly becoming capable of carrying satellites into the orbit – there are no traces of anything in this form. Currently, the Iranians first have to build a large number of Shahab-3As and -3Bs. Subsequently they might develop another version, with even more advanced terminal homing. Meanwhile, however, not even such changes like an (expensive) introduction of solid-fuel motor should be expected.

Two out of ten IRIAF Ballistic-missile Squadrons are now known to have Shahab-3A in service. Currently it remains unclear if a separate unit will be equipped with Shahab-3Bs, or if the new version is to enter service with the two existing units, but it is likely that one of the units equipped with older SS-1B Scuds could now be re-equipped with Shahab-3s. (ACIG.org archives)

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[vannrox]

Now, what does our friends who are interested in Space exploration have to say...

[LM_Guy]

This missile is really a short range missle made for Iran's neighbors. I think your real concern should be the following development effort -

Quoting from the Oct. 1, 1998, The Washington Times, "Israeli, Prime Minister Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu said, "Iran is developing the Shahab-4 which can reach well into Europe, and the Shahab-5 and 6, which (will have the capacity) to reach the Eastern Sea board (of the United States)". The article went on to quote from the Blue-ribbon Congressional Commission --- headed by then former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

[RicocheT]

I applaud the Mullah in Space program if it puts a number of the radical imams into orbit without a reentry capability.

[Thombo2]

"The Shahab 4 can reach well into Europe,the Shahab(s)5+6 which will be able to reach the Eastern Seaboard of the US..."Development of these missles continue while we try to negotiate with Islamic Extremists(aka mullahs)?

[TomasUSMC]

Iran is building longer and longer range missiles. The are developing Nukes. They are sending terrorists and more advanced weaponry into Iraq to kill our troops daily. Why does President Bush allow this to go on? We have the means to take out Iran in ONE DAY. Why wait till it takes millions of American casualties?