New chancellor will give Germany, U.S. a chance for a new dialogue (Henry Kissinger Op-Ed)

On Nov. 22, the German parliament elected Angela Merkel as the new chancellor. It could mark a seminal event. Ms. Merkel is the first female chancellor in Germany's history; the first leader who spent most of her life under Communist rule; and the first head of a coalition between the two major German parties since 1969.

She takes over in a country that has been, in effect, without a government since May, when the outgoing chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, announced his intention to bring about new elections. Angela Merkel becomes chancellor at a moment of crisis for her country, poised between domestic reform and economic doldrums and social deadlock; between stalemate and new creativity on European integration; and between tradition and the need for new patterns in the Atlantic Alliance.

When I first saw the close election results and the makeup of the Grand Coalition, I feared deadlock. How would a chancellor with disappointing electoral results tame a coalition of parties historically in strident opposition to one another, which had bitterly split on almost all issues in the recent election? How does one lead a government in which cabinet posts are evenly divided between heretofore antagonistic parties? This problem seemed especially acute because several disappointed aspirants to the highest office were within Merkel's own party and might therefore lack the incentive for a truly collegiate relationship. And the foreign policy issues especially the disputes with the United States had become so embedded in German public opinion that significant modifications might prove unfeasible, especially as the new foreign minister is one of the closest associates of the outgoing chancellor.

All this might yet happen. But there is also an alternative prospect to which I am increasingly leaning. Both coalition parties know that if they frustrate each other, the coalition will break up, and each of them would face the dilemmas that obliged them to form the coalition in the first place. When Schroeder attempted marginal reforms, it threatened to split the Social Democratic party. When Merkel offered a sweeping market-oriented alternative, it divided the electorate almost evenly indeed, with a slight majority for the left if one includes former Communists. Thus a deadlock compounding the crisis might make the dominant parties irrelevant by producing a major electoral shift to currently minor parties or to new ones at the extremes of the political spectrum.

The personality of the new chancellor provides additional hope. It has been fashionable to deprecate Angela Merkel's apparent charismatic deficit during the electoral campaign. But for the chancellor's office, the extraordinary achievement of her rise may prove more relevant. Within a decade, she advanced from obscure scientific researcher in Communist East Germany to chancellor without representing a special constituency of her own against opponents in her own party who had devoted a lifetime scrambling up the political ladder. There are many explanations for Angela Merkel's in retrospect inexorable advance some of it due perhaps to her adversaries' competition among each other. But in the end, her single-minded persistence in the pursuit of substantive goals may create its own impetus in the day-to-day business of governance.

Foreign policy is the field where the scope for leadership is greatest. When Germany was unified in 1871, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli called it a greater event than the French Revolution. He feared that a power in the center of Europe stronger than any of its many neighbors would prove difficult to integrate into a European equilibrium. German unification in 1991 implied the same potential challenge that had led to two world wars. Fortunately, two great initiatives of the postwar period European integration and Atlantic partnership blunted and absorbed Europe's national impulses in an overarching framework. Both of these achievements have been strained by the German-American differences of the recent past. Iraq has been the proximate cause and occasional abrupt American actions the trigger. But the real difficulties between Berlin and Washington have gone deeper.

During the Cold War, Europe needed American power for its security. And the trauma of its wartime history produced a moral impulse in Germany to return to the world community as a partner of the United States. A sense of a common destiny evolved within which tactical differences could be submerged. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended Europe's strategic dependence on the United States; the emergence of a new generation ended Germany's emotional dependence on American policy. Those who came to maturity in the 1960s and afterward had not experienced the war, the postwar reconstruction, and the forging of allied unity. They increasingly replaced the identification with the United States with a quest for a differentiated European and German identity. Their great emotional political experience has been opposition to the Vietnam War and to the deployment of medium-range missiles in Germany. This dissociation from the United States gradually escalated into massive demonstrations, especially in 1968 and 1982. The so-called '68 generation was restrained for a time by the continuing Soviet threat and the opposition of the war generation to its views. When the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a change of government in Germany, the stage was set for a modification in the tone as well as the substance of allied relationships. A similar shift of generations in the U.S. moved the center of gravity of American politics to regions less emotionally tied to Europe and less acquainted with it than the leaders from the northeast of the immediate postwar phase.

It is likely that any German chancellor would have been reluctant to join the war in Iraq. But no chancellor or foreign minister not of the '68 generation would have based his policy on overt and systematic opposition to the United States and conducted two election campaigns on a theme of profound distrust of America's ultimate motives. Nor would demonstrative joint efforts with France and Russia to thwart American diplomatic efforts at the U.N. have been likely.

integration. It tempted France to magnify its opposition to the United States lest all European disaffections be rallied by a national Germany policy. In the process, Germany and France elaborated a vision of European identity defined by opposition to the United States. On the other hand, the new members of the European Union from Eastern Europe would never reconcile themselves to such a Europe. They still shared the perceptions about America of the immediate postwar generation in Western Europe. When Secretary Donald Rumsfeld contrasted old Europe with new Europe, he was not encouraging a rift but describing it.

Mistakes were made on both sides of the Atlantic. The proclamation by the Bush Administration of a new strategic doctrine of pre-emptive war was one of them. The doctrine was intellectually defensible in light of changed technology, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. But announcing unilaterally what appeared as a radical change of doctrine ran counter to traditional alliance practice.

In the end, the issue of multilateralism versus unilateralism does not concern procedure but substance. When purposes are parallel, multilateral decision follows nearly automatically. When they diverge, multilateral decision-making turns into an empty shell. The challenge to the Atlantic Alliance has been less the abandonment of procedure than the gradual evaporation of a sense of common destiny.

Even before the German elections, there was ample discomfort with this state of affairs on both sides of the Atlantic. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outlined a new, more consultative approach in American Atlantic diplomacy in February 2005 in a significant speech in Paris. On its part, the German government reciprocated with a more conciliatory approach on a number of important issues. Still, mutual trust was so little restored that, during the election campaign, the outgoing chancellor again based his claim for leadership on his party's willingness to stand up to the alleged American proclivity for unnecessary wars.

Both sides seem committed to restore a more positive collaboration. In America, the legacy of two generations of Atlanticist foreign policy has persisted despite the tensions of the recent period. In Germany, the Merkel government marks the advent of a third postwar generation: less in thrall to the emotional pro-Americanism of the 1950s and 1960s but neither shaped by the passions of the so-called '68 generation.

The generational change is especially pronounced in the case of the chancellor. Merkel lived under Communist rule during the controversies of the Cold War. To many in Eastern Europe, the internal Western debates over security seemed like self-indulgence compared to the challenges of life under Communist rule. In Eastern Europe, on the whole, the Atlantic Alliance represented hope, not controversy. Similarly, European integration was significant as a vision for a better future rather than as a device to loosen ties with the United States. Merkel understands from personal experience the psychological adjustments unification requires from the East German population, though she refuses to appeal to it in a demagogic manner. In the early days of unification, I asked her what she considered the great psychological challenge for an East German view of foreign policy. She replied: To learn on vacation to feel as comfortable in France as they now do in Bulgaria.

With her systematic scientist's approach, Merkel will avoid choosing between Atlanticism and Europe or confusing sentimental moves toward Russia with grand strategy. Matter-of-fact, serious and thoughtful, she will strive to be a partner for a set of relationships appropriate to the new international order one that refuses to choose between France and the United States but rather establishes a framework embracing both. She will defend her perception of German interests, and the fate of her domestic adversaries shows just how formidable an opponent she can be. But these interests will be defined in terms of a vision of the future rather than the ideological combat of decades past.

The Bush Administration has shown every willingness to cooperate. Indeed, one concern is that cooperation may shade into an enthusiasm that overwhelms the dialogue with short-term schemes drawn from the period of strain. The administration needs to take care to restrain its proclivity to conduct consultation as a strenuous exercise in pressing American preferences. Scope needs to be left for the elaboration of a German view of the future. The key challenge before the Atlantic nations is to develop a new sense of common destiny in the age of jihad, the rise of Asia, and the emerging universal problems of poverty, pandemics and energy, among many others.

Don't think they're back in the fold. Hank is over-optimistic. In fact, he himself is one of the stereotypes he describes in the article - a northeastern policy maker with historic and cultural ties to Europe. As he points out, the center of gravity in America has shifted away from people like himself.

Red state folks are not going to forget Germany's betrayal. And they're not going to be swayed by friendly-but-empty gestures coming from Berlin. The "shared vision" that kept the Atlantic Alliance together is history. All that's left is a bilateral alliance with Britain (for a while yet anyway) and sympathy in Eastern Europe which, as Kissinger suggests, is likely only generational.

Kissinger was America's Metternich: playing off aggressive nations against each other when the U.S. was disunited and disspirited. Unfortunately, he exemplified and continues to exemplify a politic devoid of morality, optimism, and spunk.

The Germans are sincere about their beliefs, not smug and conceited like the French. We can reach them with moral arguments. Maybe Kissinger can redeem himself and his Fatherland by carrying the torch for the new Republicans (GWB et al) in this effort.

"...he exemplified and continues to exemplify a politic devoid of morality, optimism, and spunk."

Don't think I've heard it put that way before - well said.

I'm not sure any Western Europeans can be reached with any moral arguments. The World Wars mortally wounded the idea of Judeo-Christian morality in Europe, and I think the '68 generation has killed it off. Western Europe is where the American Left would like to be - an environment where there is no right or wrong, no social sanction for bad behavior, no God but themselves, and the government prevents social disintegration by handing out goodies. Sterile. Decadent.

The key challenge before the Atlantic nations is to develop a new sense of common destiny in the age of jihad, the rise of Asia, and the emerging universal problems of poverty, pandemics and energy, among many others.

Merkel will do her part. And me thinks, now that the generation of the "68-ers" has left the stage within the left parties in Germany, even her coalition partner will follow her.

A good commentary by Mr. Kissinger, by the way.

It was official. Every Chancellor visits Paris first, as an expression of friendship - I mean, France was our traditional enemy. :-) Still, while Chirac spoke of an "axis", Merkel avoided that word. She sets other priorities - as promised.

And in Brussels, she met with NATO and EU officials. Americans shouldn´t make a mistake by underestimating the EU for the internal politics of EU members. This isn´t NAFTA.

On the other hand, Merkel has although met with PM Blair, and she´ll meet Bush in Washington before Christmas, sources say.

> Red state folks are not going to forget Germany's betrayal.

which betrayal? you faked yourself some reasons for attacking iraq (take powell's word for it). we didn't fall for it. you hear our arguments against the war. you still decide to leave afghanistan half-finished and invade a country only held together by its dictator.

this war is stupid and though i wish you luck because democracy would sure be better for iraq, there are several reasons (ethnic groups, religious extremism, US bridgehead to middle east) why i think you will not be able to stabilize this land. and this was plain to see before the war.

and you're already looking for betrayers, for reasons why iraq doesn't work out. we just said what we thought about the plans. if the US had developed some civilian strategy for taking over iraq administration BEFORE the invasion, there would perhaps not have been so much looting, but electricity and water in the first weeks.
but criminal incompetence is not betrayal, so keep searching europe for reasons your middle east adventure isn't running well.

yeah, and what do you find? germany. it's terribly easy to tell a german he betrayed the american way (or whatever we betrayed by speaking our mind freely). just visit him in afghanistan finishing your half-done war. or leave the american military plane on your trip to iraq while it is refueling in germany and tell them that the lack of support is a betrayal. we don't expect anything else from you.

A bit too smug.

Had Germany said "we don't agree, we're not joining you on this one" that would have been disappointing but understandable. Instead, Schroeder ran on a vicious anti-American campaign, appealing to the worst German nationalist instincts. Twice. That's the betrayal.

That said, America will not win or fail in Iraq based on teh decision of Germany or France (or Spain) to join or not. Our success or failure will depend entirely on the will power of the American people to see this through - amid conscious attempts by the worldwide left to undermine that will power.

In terms of the aftermath of the war, you have fallen into the trap of thinking everything was fine in Iraq before the invasion. Looting and electricity/water failures did not start with the American invasion. Hussein and his family/cronies looted that country for years. He used utility cutoffs to specific areas of the country (especially Shiite areas) as a punishment and intimidation tool. If anything, its gotten a lot better there. Know how I can tell? Because the left-wing media don't report on shortages anymore (they wouldn't actually report good news, but an absence of bad news is meaningful).

Like I said earlier in the post - if Europeans would just say "we think you are wrong" that's disappointing but understanable. But to taunt smugly from the sidelines while doing nothing about the worldwide threat of islamofacism is failure of principle that won't be forgotten. Good luck with the French the next time you need help.

Schroeders campaign ran on the NO to the war. You may interpret his hidden strategical goals how you want, you may even see a anti-american campaign behind that, because hey, your thoughts are as free as you can manage to think them.

You are right with your opinion concerning the independence of the american campaign in Iraq. I would even go as far as to say that Germany and it's rather small military would not have been able to support the US more than they are doing it now in Afghanistan and by granting air transport route access.

But you should not confuse the standards I use to judge a dictatorship with those i have regarding the USA because my overall picture of the US ain't so bad. Saddam was a murderer, your postwar strategy was just bad to non - existent. Saddam being a murderer is no excuse for bad planning that raises questions regarding your ability to democratize a country.

As I see it, the ethic reasons why Saddam should be shot down like the mad dog he is are obvious. But the way the US started the war and the way they handle post-war Iraq made their own morals look questionable and made their strategic thinking look flawed in my eyes. A democratic Iraq should have been an example for the other bullshit countries in the Middle East, motivating the people of the surrounding countries to give democracy a try instead of supporting extremists fighting power wars. A lighthouse of democracy in the middle east. The way things look it will have the opposite effect. And that was not unpredictable at the time the invasion was planned.

The way this war is lead, it will cause more problems than it will solve. I am not hoping that, I am just concluding that from what I saw and see. This was my opinion when the war started and I saw no reason to change it up to now.

I can understand you are pissed that we taunt from the sideline. But that's whats left to do if your big friend insists on doing something stupid, saying: "We told you so.".

All differences aside, I wish your troops and their leaders luck. I dont care whether you care about that.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.