Very interesting Veritas. Can you tell if this is an offensive or a defensive type unit. For example, we have units that are for detection and decontamination that would be defensive vs. a unit that would have custody of the chemical weapons and the means of their delivery.
Yep, actually militaries all over the world that don't have chemical weapons have "Chemical" units that are decontamination units.
However, I predict this thread will grow to hundreds of replies without anyone even noticing or acknowledging your question.
I am not military myself, but perhaps something can be learned about the 1991 Iraqi chem units by anaylzing orders concerning their chem units during the Iraq/Iran war. This is excerpted from a Leavenworth translated document. No official seal. Looks like translated military orders.
CMPC-2004-002219-0
...
B. Bases of Iran Agents in the Basin of villages of (Tkiyyeh,Bilkjar,Siyuisnan) annexing Karah Dagh. 4. The above mentioned targets, in paragraphs(A-B)under item 3, are important bases for Iran’s agents and members of Iranian enemies, are far away (as targets for special equipment)from our units. They are considered more appropriate than others to strike with our equipment for being located in low regions which helps the chemical fumes to settle. We can also treat them with available ways (air force, tubular bombers, Samtiyyat (Helicopters) and at night
5. Our directorate suggested striking both targets, referred to in item 3, during this period using two thirds of available special equipment (Ricin) plus one third of available special equipment (Mustard Gas) and keeping the balance for emergency situations that might arise in the operation theater.
6. The top secret, personal and urgent letter No.953/965/k dated March 29, 87 from the President’s Office Secretary, stated the following: “Approval of striking has been obtained provided the results are exploited… for the purpose is not only to inflict losses among the saboteurs, but also to coordinate with the Corps… please advice prior to striking”. Please be informed and order the execution of what was stipulated in the above letter of the President’s Office- Secretary, and advise your sanction. With esteem.
Signed
Major General
Chief of General Military Intelligence
...
3. Due to limited supply of Special Equipment at the present time, it is preferable we adopt one of the following options:
A. First Option
Striking the two chosen targets during this period by using two thirds of available special equipment (Ricin Gas) plus one thirds of available special equipment (Mustard Gas), and keeping the balance for emergency situations in the field of operations.
B. Second Option Postpone executing the strike till mid-April 1987, and until such time enough supply of special equipment is available, and production improves.
4. We support the first option. Please be informed, and what action you want to take and advise. With esteem.
Signed
Staff General
Chief - General Military Intelligence
Note: Regarding obtaining the approval of the Presidency generous than us
Office of the President Secretary
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Top Secret, Personal and Urgent
Number?M1/Sh3/Q2/6414
Date/March 18, 1987
To/Presidency Office-Secretary
Subject/Utilizing Special Equipment
Your top secret -, personal and urgent letter 7/J2/808/K dated March 12, 87
1. The following are our available capabilities to utilize the special equipment against the Khomeini Guards bases located within the saboteur’s quarters of Barazanis First Division.
A. At the present time, climate conditions do not help in Utilizing (Sarin) due to snow coverage of the designated targeted areas, which could lead to diluting the said element and transforming it to a non-poisonous element. This condition applies to (Tabun) element too.
B. A large quantity of (Mustard) gas is available, but its potential effect is considered a (miracle) except in cases where a concentrated dose is taken. In addition, its evaporation becomes slow in snow regions.
C. Air force, tubular bombers and (Samtiyyat?) can be used at night for this purpose.
2. We recommend the following:
A. Postpone executing the strike against Khomeini Guards located within the Barazani Group’s quarters until next June. Because the targets lie in the Iraqi/Turkish boarders, it is preferable we choose targets that will not impact the Turkish boarder units, or the Turkish villages.
B. Start planning to execute similar limited operations against the bases of Iran’s agents.
Please review, and advise us suggestions... With esteem (signed)
Staff Major General
Chief - General Military Intelligence Directorate.