Replies

3/1/1999

To The Respected Mr. Health Minister

Subject: Order

Following our leeter numbered (5372) on 18/12/1998 an agreement was obtained for the following:

1. Re- Test the sites after the removal of debris.

2. Limit a period of two weeks to a month to take Biological Samples from the sites and return to the periodic testing and in a normal fashion later on.

3. Study the subject of AGM 186 missiles that contain ready round shrapnels and that is used for mass destruction through the targeting of human forces.
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Excerpts:

III. IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. For this reason, we have used the same shorthand in this paper. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.

(snip)

All of Iraq's Scuds used kerosene as the fuel and some form of red fuming nitric acid, probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)[11] as the oxidizer. Iraq told the United Nations Special Commission inspectors after the war that they had not experimented with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a more powerful (and toxic) fuel than kerosene, for their Scuds, which would require engine redesign. However, inspectors subsequently uncovered evidence that Iraq did experiment with UDMH,[12] but this investigation found no evidence that Iraq switched to UDMH during the Gulf War.

To extend the Scud's range, Iraq cut Scud Bs apart and inserted airframe sections from these missiles into other Scud Bs to increase the capacities of the fuel and oxidizer tanks from about 8,700 pounds to about 11,000 pounds.[13] Iraq also reduced warhead weight from 2,200 pounds to less than 1,100 pounds.

(snip)

IV. SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The evidence clearly shows that Saddam Hussein eventually intended to field operational Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads, and he committed substantial resources to that end.[16] However, did Iraq successfully achieve that goal by the time of Operation Desert Storm?

(snip)

According to an intelligence source, the Al Hussein missile could carry either chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) warheads. Iraq could mount a biological agent warhead on the Al Abbas version of the Scud. This source reported Iraq planned to use cholera for biological warfare against targets in the Gulf region (but weaponization of cholera could not be verified later).[21]

Intelligence agencies may have put less emphasis on Scuds as a biological threat, but they considered that threat real. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed:

We have no information to confirm that Iraq has developed or manufactured BW warheads for its ballistic missiles. However, Iraq has the ability to weaponize its BW agents'including anthrax spores'and we believe it is well within Iraq's technical capabilities to produce BW warheads for its Scud missiles'. It probably would take only one BW warhead to neutralize any one given target. Our analysis indicates that the Al Husayn [alternate spelling], carrying about 100 kilograms (KG) of dried anthrax spores, would theoretically produce a maximum area of lethal contamination of 1,600 square kilometers [579 square miles]. That would be a dispersion area about 90 KM long and 15 KM wide at the widest point [56 by 9 miles]. Other of Iraq's BW agents would be equally potent: Botulinus toxin would produce a maximum lethal area of contamination of about 21 square kilometers [8 square miles] and anthrax spores in solution would produce an area of about 110 square kilometers [42 square miles].' Iraq only needs a few BW-tipped missiles in its stockpile to cause significant casualties.[22]

Another CIA document stated:

If Saddam concluded his personal position was becoming hopeless, this could convince him to use biological weapons to shock the Coalition into a cease-fire. In such a situation, the use of anthrax against a coalition military installation or a major Saudi oil facility might seem an attractive option.' Iraq is almost certain to use chemical weapons tactically to avoid serious battlefield defeats.[23]

(Snip)

V. IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

B. Total Scud Firing Incidents

At one of our veterans' outreach programs in 1998, a veteran questioned the number of Scud missiles fired against Coalition forces during the Gulf War. He based his opinions on an internal working document produced by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) and provided by that Department of Defense organization to some veterans. The listing had 179 incident entries totaling 344 missiles. A junior officer of the Center had compiled a list of Scud launch information from hundreds of operational reports, many with inconsistent data. Not knowing which accounts were correct, this officer included all versions of what happened. CURR designed the list to serve as a reference for responding to veterans' communications regarding Scud incidents at particular times. Our research and analysis confirmed that Iraq fired 46 Scuds into the KTO.

(snip)

2. Details on Selected Incidents

a. January 20^th Attack on Dhahran (Event 1 in Table 3)

Shortly before 10 PM on January 20^th, Iraq fired the first two Scuds at the Dhahran area.^[66]One report noted that Patriot units fired five missiles at three (rather than the actual two) Scuds and that M8 chemical agent alarms went off, but subsequent tests proved negative.^[67]A separate United States Air Force unit at Dhahran logged an entry at 9:50 PM noting multiple explosions. Checks revealed that none of that unit's chemical agent detectors had alarmed. A later entry reported a possible impact near a barracks and the United States Army Component United States Central Command headquarters as well as near a Saudi police camp and the port area. Subsequent investigation turned up no building damage, casualties, or unexploded ordnance.^[68]A witness to the January 20^th attack remembered that a Patriot battery took out the Scuds near a pier in Dhahran and that everybody went to MOPP Level 4 (full chemical protection ' see glossary at Tab A) for about six or seven hours while tests and assessments were made. He did not know the test results, but an "all clear" was sounded permitting a termination of the chemical alert.^[69]A chemical company soldier remembered witnessing repeated M8A1 chemical agent alarms and positive M256 chemical detection kit tests the first night of Scud attacks in the Dhahran area and recalls remaining in MOPP Level 4 for seven hours. He believed no one had chemical agent symptoms.^[70]

b. January 22^nd Attack on Dhahran (Event 4 in Table 3)

Shortly after 7:00 AM on January 22^nd, Iraq fired three Scuds toward Dhahran. The first two flew outside of the Patriots' defended area with at least one landing in the desert about 50 miles west of town. The other reportedly went down in Gulf waters north of Qatar. Most unclassified sources credit Patriots with intercepting the third Scud.^[71]Debris reportedly struck on a Dhahran Air Base runway just as an aircraft took off to the south, but the aircraft apparently escaped damage.^[72]Most pieces of debris were described as small (less than 3 inches), but something falling out of the sky caused a crater 23 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep on the air base. All but one field test indicated no presence of chemical warfare agent. In that one positive chemical warfare agent test, a chemical agent monitor registered a very low concentration on the nerve agent scale. Subsequent testing at that location proved negative.^[73]A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle (see glossary at Tab A) took samples from the crater area for additional testing, but we found no specific results of any Fox tests.

Alternative reporting included a fourth Scud that appeared in some chronologies at this time as a target for two Patriot launches. However, this track represented a false target (radar interference ' see Section VI.B). One summary suggested that Patriot units fired two missiles at each of three Scuds.^[74]

c. February 16^th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3)

Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16^th.^[75]The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud.^[76]The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile's impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier.^[77]Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.

Figure 4. Map of Jubayl harbor Scud impact

One witness recalls hearing a loud explosion and seeing white-hot objects falling.^[78]The Scud caused no casualties or damage, but it exuded a blue, green, and yellow substance and bubbled a strong-smelling gas for some time (probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid ' see Section VII). United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialists eventually recovered the missile in parts using divers, flotation bags, and a crane. Test results performed on this Scud determined that it did not have a chemical or biological warhead.^[79]Figure 5 shows the recovered high explosive warhead.^[80]

Figure 5. Recovered Scud warhead

d. February 25^th Attack on Dhahran (Event 10 in Table 3)

Iraq launched one Scud toward Dhahran early in the evening of February 25^th. One Patriot battery on Dhahran airfield was not operational and another nearby did not track the Scud, apparently because of a software problem.^[81]The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The strong explosion and resulting fire killed 28 United States soldiers from the 475^th Quartermaster Group (a United States Army Reserve unit) and injured 100, about half of them seriously. According to one source, most of the injured suffered burns. Initially, some 40 soldiers were believed missing.^[82]Most of the soldiers in the warehouse had just arrived and had not completely processed into their units. This, plus the presence of their personnel files and computer records in the same devastated warehouse, played havoc with the ability to account for people.^[83]Helicopters eventually evacuated 70 to 100 soldiers to six hospitals including five Saudi facilities.^[84]This single incident caused more combat casualties than any other in Operation Desert Storm.^[85]

Some documentation includes alternative details to this horrific event. One message stated that this incident involved three confirmed launches (one against Dhahran, one against nearby King Fahd Airport and one against Qatar).^[86]A press briefing attributed the lack of Patriot engagement to a combination of the warehouse location (housing) and debris trajectory from a disintegrating Scud.^[87]The media quoted another senior officer as explaining that "because it [the Scud] had gone into a tumble ' it wasn't within the parameters of where it would be attacked by our missile defense system."^[88]

See Link for more details on other scud incidents.

VII. SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS

As Israeli officials pointed out to us, when reentering Scuds were intercepted or broke up on their own, they sometimes released a yellow-to-reddish-to-brownish cloud of the Scud's residual propellant oxidizer. People on the ground observing these clouds voiced concerns that the airborne releases involved chemical warfare agent. Incoming Al Hussein missiles contained about 300 pounds of residual oxidizer and 100 pounds of fuel. The oxidizer and accompanying oxides of nitrogen were dangerous in their own right and caused a range of symptoms in people exposed on the ground.^[149]

Iraq's Scud oxidizer, inhibited red nitric acid (IRFNA), can cause deep and painful burns on the skin or in the lungs. When inhaled, the oxidizer and its nitrogen oxide decomposition products can produce immediate or delayed symptoms including throat dryness, cough, headache, dizziness, anxiety, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, labored breathing, inflammation of the lungs, choking, fluid build-up in the lungs, and suffocation, depending on the extent of exposure.^[150]In interviews with our investigators, or during testimony before government panels, Gulf War veterans reported a variety of symptoms consistent with oxidizer exposure. Extracted from their accounts, these symptoms included tearing eyes, runny noses, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sleeplessness, headaches, and blurred vision.^[151]Kerosene, the fuel component of Scud propellants also escaped during breakups. Kerosene is not particularly toxic, even after acute exposure, and is used, for example, as barbecue lighter fluid and in jet fuels.^[152]

Readers wanting additional information on Scud oxidizer should consult our information paper on IRFNA.^[153]

(snip)

IX. THE RESIDUAL THREAT

The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised.^[166]However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:

In 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that Iraq retained "perhaps hundreds" of missiles, and his successor estimated the residual force at 100-200 missiles.^[167]
Israeli sources indicated Iraq may have as many as 100 Scuds of all versions.^[168]
In 1995, Iraq eventually admitted to the United Nations Special Commission that in 1987 it had begun a full-scale program to indigenously manufacture Al Hussein Scuds largely from scratch and had established specialized factories for this purpose. Iraq planned eventually to produce 1,000 missiles, but it claimed that by January 1991 they had failed to produce a single operational missile.^[169]
In mid-1996, a general officer defector from Iraq said that he believed Saddam Hussein had retained some 40 Scud-type missiles.^[170]
By 1996, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-like missiles indigenously that inspectors could not locate.^[171]After UNSCOM unwillingly withdrew from Iraq in 1998, some estimated that Iraq could resume production of Al Hussein missiles within one year.^[172]
According to a United States government white paper in 1998, Iraq maintained a small force of Scud-type missiles and may have pieced together Scuds by integrating original guidance and control systems it concealed from UNSCOM with parts produced in Iraq.^[173]

X. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:

During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, almost all of them Al Hussein models, with 46 striking in the KTO and 42 in or near Israel. Several more firings probably resulted in early in-flight failures within Iraq.
An internal working paper produced and released to veterans by the Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) included 179 entries appearing to involve approximately 344 missiles. In it, CURR listed each variation in attack detail, however minor, as a separate Scud attack entry. For example, if separate reports covered an attack, one using coordinated universal (Z) time and the other using local time in the KTO (C time - three hours difference) the CURR report generated two entries, one for each time, even if all the other details coincided. The officer that prepared the compilation knew the entries involved duplications, but CURR released the list before they could scrub it to consolidate different reports of the same incident. Our analysis of CURR's incident record revealed massively redundant counting based on various second-hand accounts of individual attacks and included false alarms where Iraq launched no Scuds. When we subtracted these duplications and false alarms, the total number of attacking Scuds very closely matched the counts published by other expert sources. See an accounting of the CURR list at Tab D.
Iraq worked to develop extended-range Scud variants capable of delivering both chemical and biological warfare agents. As of early 1991, they had produced and filled such warheads on Scuds. However, the evidence suggests that they could not carry out an effective attack with these weapons because of fusing and flight stability problems.
We uncovered no convincing evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological agent warheads at Coalition forces or Israel. Technical problems, threats of retaliation, and risk-benefit considerations may have affected Iraq's decision not to employ them.
A substantial proportion of the Al Hussein Scud models spontaneously broke up on reentry, probably due to faulty design and unstable flight characteristics.
During disintegration on reentry or impact, some Scuds released a yellow, red, or brown cloud containing corrosive inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Observers sometimes mistakenly believed these releases of oxidizer were releases of chemical warfare agents. While not nearly as toxic as chemical warfare agents, IRFNA and accompanying nitrogen oxide decomposition products can cause, as described previously, distressing symptoms in exposed people.
The extended-range Scuds fired by Iraq demonstrated even poorer accuracy than the original Soviet design but had modest success as a terror weapon against large population concentrations. As the Scud attacks progressed and it became apparent that Iraq had used no chemical or biological agent warheads, the missiles became less effective as a terror weapon.
Iraq probably retains some Scud-type missiles and may be able to produce more.
(snip)

That report says there are still docs classified. I bet between the classified docs and the ones JV is translating....The UN wasn't just incompetent, but involved.