The Heart of the Party

The American Enterprise Online ^ | August 8, 2006 | Will Wilson

[neverdem]

Connecticut's contest between incumbent Senator Joseph Lieberman and challenger Ned Lamont has been described as a battle for the “heart of the Democratic Party.” More than that, though, the race underscores the fundamental problem of American politics: the disproportionate power of the political parties.

 

The proof is in the primary. Independents constitute the plurality (44%) of registered Connecticut voters, but because they cannot vote in the party primaries, they have merely residual power in the election of representatives. Come November, the independents have to play the hand they’re dealt by the 10% of Connecticut’s voting age citizens who vote in the primaries.

 

Parties are oligopolistic suppliers of political power. We can buy what Democrats sell or we can buy what Republicans sell. And if we don’t like what Democrats or Republicans have to offer? We have to buy it anyway. Perhaps, then, “democracy” doesn’t describe America as well as “oligarchy,” the partisan few ruling the moderate many.

           

Neither the Constitution nor logic requires political parties as part of the American political process. Yet Lieberman has been criticized for “holding himself above the democratic process by which his party chooses its candidates,” by Eli Pariser, the director of the interest group MoveOn.org, whose slogan is “Democracy in Action.” No doubt, partisanship is the smart way to play the political game—the structural and procedural properties of our political system are conducive to precisely two parties—but we conflate the democratic process with political parties at our own peril. In the polarized “Us vs. Them” mentality, clear-headedness dissolves as crude litmus tests of party loyalty replace policy contemplation (witness Washington). At the extreme, political dialogues become all-or-nothing contests of party strength in which the plumpest red herrings are disputed and compromise is considered treachery. The Terror was the Jacobin Terror.

 

If that comparison seems a stretch, consider the senatorial seat in question. Lieberman gained it in 1988 by ousting Republican incumbent Lowell Weicker (who later formed a one-man party) when members of Weicker’s own party bounced him for being “too liberal.” Weicker himself had seized the seat in 1970 when anti-war Joe Duffey won the Democratic nomination from the “too conservative” incumbent Democrat Tom Dodd (father of Senator Chris). Dodd ran as a third candidate, but lost. (In point of fact, Connecticut itself was something of a splinter colony, founded by Reverend Thomas “Third Party” Hooker, who led the breakaway settlers when the ruling party in Massachusetts got “too churchy.”) At all times, in all places, puritanical partisanship has dominated democracy.

 

It has been suggested that the fracas in Connecticut might be bad for the parties—that a Lieberman win as an independent would be a win for the moderate middle. Ah, but that is the tragic twist of the tale. The parties have such control over the political market that, upon forming a third party, Mr. Lieberman immediately proclaimed that he would caucus with the Democrats. By fleeing back into the arms of his partisan torturers, Mr. Lieberman succumbs to the Stockholm Syndrome that threatens the moderate deliberation necessary for healthy American political life.

 

Why do independent voters let the partisans push them around? The difference between party members and independents is one of quality, not degree. By definition, non-partisan moderates lack ideological solidarity. Their beliefs don’t schematize such that politicians could easily pander to them, or such that they could easily construct a “moderate” party. And without a unifying party, whatever collective power they might have had dissipates.

 

Heretofore, independents have cycled between the two parties, reclaiming some portion of their rightful power by balancing bad and bad. But that approach seems to have lost whatever moderating influence on the parties it might once have had. Washington’s partisan rancor is as strong as it’s ever been and the parties have offered more partisanship, not less, in response. Perhaps the time has come to toss both parties.

 

The partisan pathology on exhibit in Lieberman v. Lamont should spur Connecticut independents—and independents everywhere—to a new candidate: None of the Above. Most famously applied in the Richard Pryor movie Brewster’s Millions, None of the Above is no joke; it is a real (though non-binding) ballot option in Nevada, has recently received attention in Tennessee, and exists in a small host of foreign countries. As an alternative to abstention from disappointing candidate options or dismal approval of the “ least-bad” choice, None of the Above allows voters to reject entire slates of sub-par candidates and, depending on the format, to force a re-run of the election.

 

None of the Above procedures can be structured in a variety of ways. Nevada’s non-binding NOTA cannot “win,” but serves as a thermometer of the unpopularity of candidates—a useful polling tool for possible future candidates and an improvement on apathy as a mechanism of protest. More strictly binding NOTA structures may re-open the election process, allowing all, some, or none of the previously rebuffed candidates to re-enter. The NOTA method can be tailored to suit the existing electoral framework and voter preference; the only essential is that voters be able to vote against—as opposed to “not for”—the party submissions.

 

Arguably, None of the Above procedures (at least in binding forms) could make elections interminable if frustrated voters rejected every option repeatedly. To this, I answer, so what? If voters don’t like the proffered candidates, they should not have to accept one of them. The gains from NOTA might far outweigh the occasional slowdown in government activity. “Best of some bad options” is a method for ordering late-night takeout, not a program for sensible governance.

 

Perhaps most significantly, None of the Above doesn’t have to “win” to be effective. The option functions as a referendum on the appeal of candidates and party platforms, providing voter feedback information beyond that available in head-to-head numbers. And if the threat alone makes elections more competitive, NOTA is worth it.

 

Let the parties have their fights “for the heart of the party.” None of the Above would put their hearts on a platter for independent voters.

 

 

Will Wilson is a research assistant with the American Enterprise Institute.