As the NY Times point out in their review of two upcoming histories of The Bomb, Robbert Oppenheimer originally assumed that little could stop anyone from developing nuclear weapons. Thankfully, he was wrong.
With a geek's typical hubris, Oppenheimer assumed that since the laws of physics were universal, very little could stop anyone in getting a nuclear weapon, given the time and resources. Alas, the time and resources needed are indeed scarce, so to this day, only nine countries are nuclear-equipped—the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel. Here we see these links visualized, starting with the Manhattan project and fanning out over the last six decades (click here for the full-size popup).
Instead, three proliferation experts demonstrate how nuclear capabilities were passed as political bargaining chips, stolen via espionage, and limited with diplomacy. Both books seem like fascinating reads. Check out much more at the Times: [NYTimes]
FROM NYT:
The book, in a main disclosure, discusses how China in 1982 made a policy decision to flood the developing world with atomic know-how. Its identified clients include Algeria, Pakistan and North Korea.
Alarmingly, the authors say one of China’s bombs was created as an “export design” that nearly “anybody could build.” The blueprint for the simple plan has traveled from Pakistan to Libya and, the authors say, Iran. That path is widely assumed among intelligence officials, but Tehran has repeatedly denied the charge.
The book sees a quiet repercussion of China’s proliferation policy in the Algerian desert. Built in secrecy, the reactor there now makes enough plutonium each year to fuel one atom bomb and is ringed by antiaircraft missiles, the book says.
China’s deck also held a wild card: its aid to Pakistan helped A.Q. Khan, a rogue Pakistani metallurgist who sold nuclear gear on the global black market. The authors compare Dr. Khan to “a used-car dealer” happy to sell his complex machinery to suckers who had no idea how hard it was to make fuel for a bomb.
Why did Beijing spread its atomic knowledge so freely? The authors speculate that it either wanted to strengthen the enemies of China’s enemies (for instance, Pakistan as a counterweight to India) or, more chillingly, to encourage nuclear wars or terror in foreign lands from which Beijing would emerge as the “last man standing.”