If Egypt wants to regain its lost prestige, it must not follow Iran [rare piece by Arab writer]

thenational.ae ^ | Dec 9, 2008

[Righting]

If Egypt wants to regain its lost prestige, it must not follow Iran Emile Hokayem, Political Editor

Last Updated: December 09. 2008 9:24PM UAE / December 9. 2008 5:24PM GMT Middle Eastern politics have often a mild-mannered, almost obsequious quality in public, but less so behind closed doors, where interests and personalities often collide. This is no different from anywhere else in the world, except that Middle Eastern leaders face a disproportionate number of strategic and symbolic limitations that make them even more cautious in their public pronouncements. It only takes an accusation of being weak in support of the Palestinians, or of being a lackey of the US to electrify the hot-heads and cause political havoc. So Arab officials from moderate states tend to steer well away from bombastic or accusatory statements.

All that makes the recent pronouncements of the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, more interesting. For the first time since Egypt launched a mediation effort between the warring Palestinian factions of Hamas and Fatah, he publicly slammed Hamas for its “lack of enthusiasm toward reconciliation”, a polite way of blaming them for the failure of the negotiations. A week earlier, a similar spat took place at an Arab League meeting, when the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem, recommended that the Egyptian mediator “maintain an equal distance from all [Palestinian] factions”, a veiled accusation of partiality against Hamas, a Syrian ally. To which Egypt responded that “It is Syria that should adopt an impartial position.”

A few days ago, Aboul Gheit issued a statement supporting “international efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons”, an unprecedented Egyptian acknowledgment of the military nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s response was swift: demonstrators in Tehran protested against “the Zionist regime’s severe crimes in Gaza” and, surprise, “Egypt’s collaboration with the pressure exerted on the Palestinian people”.

Then came the handshake last month between the Israeli president Shimon Peres and Sheikh Mohammed Ali Tantawi, Egypt’s senior Sunni cleric, which is creating a frenzy in the Arab media. Suddenly but predictably all the regional crises were linked at the symbolic as well as the political level.

One need not dig deep to recognise in these disputes the enduring political divide in Middle Eastern affairs. On one side, the moderate states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, all supporters of a negotiated peace with Israel and suspicious of the Iranian agenda. On the other, the radical, bullish alliance of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

The arm-wrestling between the two groups over Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine is no small affair. While some ridicule the “moderate” label attached to the first alliance (Saudi Arabia is more authoritarian and theocratic than Iran, they say), the reality is that the rejectionist front threatens regional stability. Egypt and much of the Arab world want to avoid being dragged into a self-defeating escalation with the US and Israel that would harm their development.

Cairo, in particular, wants to avoid the repeat of last January, when thousands of desperate Gazans broke through the border into Egypt. This requires reconciling the Palestinian factions and advancing the peace process – an arduous affair.

But there is another aspect to the struggle between the two blocs that dates back to 1979, when Egypt and Iran swapped roles, albeit unwillingly. Egypt, once the anti-Western champion of pan-Arabism, signed a peace deal with Israel and, dropping its alliance with the Soviet Union, aligned itself with the West. At the same time, Iran, once America’s – and Israel’s – close ally in the region, became their sworn enemy.

The two countries were moving in such radically different directions that when the Shah was looking for asylum, Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian president who had masterminded the country’s westward shift, welcomed him to his capital. And when the Islamic republic named a major Tehran avenue after Khaled Islambouli, the assassin of Sadat, Cairo broke off relations.

There has never been a full rapprochement. Cairo rightly perceives Iran’s rise and transformation into a power in the Levant, once Egypt’s backyard, as coming at the cost of its own influence. With no radical agenda able to mobilise the masses – and with little to show in the way of development or political progress – Egypt has lost considerable power and prestige since 1979. Its own people have not warmed to the cold peace with Israel, and the ruling elite are busy consolidating their positions. No longer the leading economic powerhouse, vibrant cultural centre or military giant, Egypt is losing its claim to Arab leadership to the more agile and wealthier Gulf states.

Despite all that, Egypt is not to be written off. Its size, history, location, and close relations with the West make it a pivotal power. Its influence with the various Palestinian factions remains significant, even if disputed by Syria and Iran. And in the Gulf, it still finds more partners than competitors.

How Egypt adapts to the changing and fluid environment will be key to the future of the region. If it decides, as some speculate it might, that its status requires it to match Iran’s nuclear advances, the region is in for troubled times. If, however, it uses Iran’s rise as a reason to reform and modernise, it could recover much of the respect it has lost at home and abroad.

Hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives were lost to revolutionary folly but what keeps Iran going is a sense of a higher calling. This, of course, is no substitute for a performing economy and efficient government. Egypt currently has neither to offer, even as its people, and the Arab world, need some visionary guidance from Cairo.

ehokayem@thenational.ae

[ChetNavVet]

I had a short stay in Egypt, They get lots of tourism, The people I met seemed cool, though most of them were Aussie tourists, and the locals were shop owners or beachside bartendes. I think if you got rid of the radical Imams in the Muslim world, (and reform the NEA here at home) we’d probably get along way better. It’s not the govenments of Egypt, and Saudi so much, or many of the people, It’s the fudamentalist religious leaders that stir the hate..

I just get the sense that most forigen people don’t want to die over something goofy.
I’ve known 3 Palistinians in my life, When you mention anything political or religious, they act like little kids whose toys have been taken away, and the one guy, (what a peice of work that guy was, I once said to him “You want to pray to whatever, go for it. But when you start this Infidel Jihad thing, we’re gonna have a problem”)wanted to hate me and all I stood for.
I’ve known a few Jews, and they don’t seem to have a problem no matter what I say, and they don’t want to kill me, (and no, they weren’t tring to sell me anything).
I’m sure there are lots of moderate Muslims out there, That know the goofiness has gone on long enough, but can’t do much about said goofiness, cause they’d be stoned or imprisoned, so I hope and pray that guys like Ahmed Aboul Gheit are listened to.

[Jabba the Nutt]

"On one side, the moderate states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, all supporters of a negotiated peace with Israel and suspicious of the Iranian agenda."

Come on, does the word 'moderate' mean anything at all. The division is between Arab States, which would like to maintain their existence, pretty much in the Status Qul and Want-more States, which want agressive expansion at their expense of their neighbors. Syria wants to expand back into Lebanon and into Israel. Iran wants to expand into the rest of the Muslim world. Iran and Syria work together to support sub-State organizations to aid them as 5th columnists. Hezballah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and militias in Iraq. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia are all just trying to maintain themselves with no goals other than expanding their influence in the tradition Statecraft game.

[SunkenCiv]

For the first time since Egypt launched a mediation effort between the warring Palestinian factions of Hamas and Fatah, he publicly slammed Hamas for its "lack of enthusiasm toward reconciliation", a polite way of blaming them for the failure of the negotiations. A week earlier, a similar spat took place at an Arab League meeting, when the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Muallem, recommended that the Egyptian mediator "maintain an equal distance from all [Palestinian] factions", a veiled accusation of partiality against Hamas, a Syrian ally. To which Egypt responded that "It is Syria that should adopt an impartial position." A few days ago, Aboul Gheit issued a statement supporting "international efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons", an unprecedented Egyptian acknowledgment of the military nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's response was swift: demonstrators in Tehran protested against "the Zionist regime's severe crimes in Gaza" and, surprise, "Egypt's collaboration with the pressure exerted on the Palestinian people". Then came the handshake last month between the Israeli president Shimon Peres and Sheikh Mohammed Ali Tantawi, Egypt's senior Sunni cleric, which is creating a frenzy in the Arab media. Suddenly but predictably all the regional crises were linked at the symbolic as well as the political level.

Egypt has historically relied on geography to maintain its sovereignty, and Israel (in one sense) is the buffer state between Egypt and the rest of the mideast crazies. Southward, Egypt has Sudan -- embroiled in a long civil war, or rather a war of genocide being conducted by the Muzzie regime in Khartoum, Somalia (a mess), Iran's missiles in Eritrea, and hell, most of the rest of southern Africa; and Libya is to the west, oh joy. Perhaps it has taken this long for internal enemies to get the attention of Egyptian leaders and get them focused on the threats posed by Islamic terrorism.