True, but in the hands of a poor pilot, like all other aircraft, it is a hole in the ground waiting to happen.
Unfortunately, the “big sky, little airplane” theory only goes so far. I’d guess the Kenyan pilots were not operating under the guidance of a tactical air control party or any other sort of forward air controller. Whatever “separation” plan they had was covered in the pre-mission brief and probably forgotten in the heat of combat.
Sadly, many third world air forces are little more than high speed flying clubs, with marginal flight skills and discipline.
Back in the 80s, I was an intel officer for an F-4E squadron at a southeastern USAF base. One of our pilots had just come from Williams AFB, AZ, where they trained foreign F-5 drivers. He said the skill (and dedication) of the pilots varied greatly; F-5 pilots from Singapore were outstanding flyers and committed to learning everything they could from the USAF. Most taped their academic lectures and studied 4-6 hours a day—at a minimum. He described the South Koreans as good, but not on the same level as their counterparts from Singapore.
The former F-5 instructor said the Jordanians were also good, largely because King Hussein sent only the best to “Willie.” He also told me that all returning Jordanian pilots got an audience with the King upon their return, and you did not want to face the monarch after flunking out of the F-5 course at Williams.
He also told me that F-5 pilots from places like Kenya, Mexico and even Saudi Arabia were more interested in looking cool than improving their aeronautical skills or tactical abilities. He said flying with them was an adventure, to say the least.