Bengali man and boys massacred by the West Pakistani regime. ['Gendercide Watch: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971' -- "In what became province-wide acts of genocide, Hindus were sought out and killed on the spot. As a matter of course, soldiers would check males for the obligated circumcision among Moslems. If circumcised, they might live; if not, sure death."]
Nixons Pak-China tilt behind India n-test
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nixons-pakchina-tilt-behind-india-ntest/884788/0
Posted: Wed Dec 07 2011, 00:10 hrs
The US tilt towards Pakistan and its overtures to China in the early 70s apparently led India to go ahead with the decision to conduct its first nuclear test in Pokharan in 1974, which caught the entire Western intelligence by surprise.
A secret State Department intelligence note, dated January 14, 1972, acknowledged that US policy had an impact on Indias decision making on nuclear weapons, saying there was little doubt that the then president Richard Nixons announcement of his trip to China changed New Delhis calculations.
The late US President, who was forced to step down in the wake of the Watergate scandal, had troubled relations with India because of his tilt towards Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and his moves to reconcile with China.
Declassified American documents of the era reveal that as of early 1971, all evidence indicated that the Government of India had decided to defer indefinitely the development and explosion of a test device.
In early August, however, the Cabinet undertook a review of Indian nuclear policy in the wake of President Nixons July 16 announcement of his proposed trip to China. There can be little doubt that the July 16 announcement has had major implications for Indias security calculations and its nuclear policy, the six-page intelligence note said, which was released by the National Security Archive.
In New Delhis view, the announcement appeared to rule out all hope that India (not a signatory to the NPT) could anticipate a joint US-Soviet umbrella against the threat of Chinese nuclear attack, it said, adding that the decision to detonate a nuclear device may have been triggered by the deepening crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations.
India may have concluded that an early test would demonstrate its increasing military strength to Pakistan and remind the latters Chinese and American friends of its potential power, the intelligence note said. Although the immediate issue with Pakistan has been settled, a test still would probably be regarded as very useful by the Indians, it added.
The documents claim that US assessment was that a nuclear test would constitute dramatic support for Indias contention that it is the only important power on the subcontinent.
India also may hope that a demonstrated nuclear capability would quash any thoughts of revenge the Pakistanis might still entertain, the State department said.
Six months later in June 1972, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote to President Nixon about intelligence reports which also came from other sources that India has decided to go nuclear.
US forces had orders to target Indian Army in 1971
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2806128/posts
NEW DELHI: A set of freshly declassified top secret papers on the 1971 war show that US hostility towards India during the war with Pakistan was far more intense than known until now.
The documents reveal that Indira Gandhi went ahead with her plan to liberate Bangladesh despite inputs that the Nixon Administration had kept three battalions of Marines on standby to deter India, and that the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise had orders to target Indian Army facilities
PHOTO IN ARTICLE.
(Pakistani Army Commander in the Eastern Command, Lt General AAK Niazi, signing the Instrument of Surrender in front of General Officer Commanding in Chief of India and Bangladesh Forces in the Eastern Theatre, Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora on December 16, 1971.)
The bold leadership that the former PM showed during the 1971 war is well known. But the declassified documents further burnish the portrait of her courageous defiance.
The documents show how Americans held back communication regarding Pakistan’s desire to surrender in Dhaka by almost a day.
That the American establishment had mobilized their 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate US nationals, is public knowledge. But the declassified papers show Washington had planned to use the 7th Fleet to attack the Indian Army.
They also show that Nixon administration kept arming Pakistan despite having imposed an embargo on providing both Islamabad and New Delhi military hardware and support.
They suggest that India, exasperated by continuing flow of American arms and ammunition, had considered intercepting three Pakistani vessels carrying war stores months before the war. The plan was dropped against the backdrop of the Indian foreign ministry’s assessment that the interception could trigger hostilities.
The pro-Pak bias of the then US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is vividly brought out by their decision to keep three battalions of Marines on standby: a decision which has so far not found mention in any record of the 1971 war.
Documents blame Richard Nixon for Pakistan tilt
A six-page note prepared by India’s foreign ministry holds then American president Richard Nixon responsible for the pro-Pakistan tilt during India’s 1971 war with her neighbour.
“The assessment of our embassy reveal (sic) that the decision to brand India as an ‘aggressor’ and to send the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal was taken personally by Nixon,” says the note. The note further says, the Indian embassy: “feel (sic) that the bomber force aboard the Enterprise had the US President’s authority to undertake bombing of Indian Army’s communications, if necessary.” As early as June 1971, New Delhi weighed the possibility of intercepting three Pakistani ships loaded with US weapons. This leaves only two other courses regarding interception: That India may intercept the ships before they reach Karachi, or impose a blockade of the Bay of Bengal. Either of these might involve the use of force and would be treated as acts of war, wrote the director (legal and treaties) of MEA.
On December 14, Gen A A K Niazi, Pakistan’s military commander for erstwhile East Pakistan, told the American consul-general in Dhaka that he was willing to surrender. The message was relayed to Washington, but it took the US 19 hours to relay it to New Delhi. Files suggest senior Indian diplomats suspected the delay was because Washington was possibly contemplating military action against India.