Another stand-down discussion:
Turner: Now, do you know why they were told to stand down? Did Colonel Gibson give you any information or understanding?
Hicks: I actually don’t know why.
Turner: Is there any reason to believe that the situation in Benghazi was over? There were a number of series of attacks, as you’ve described it to us. Any reason to describe that there was no longer any danger in Benghazi?
Hicks: No, it was every reason to continue to believe that our personnel were in danger.
Turner: Mr. Hicks, Mr. Chaffetz has given me an article that appeared in USA Today just this week. And just as early as last Monday, Major Robert Firman, a Pentagon spokesman, said that the military’s account that was first issued weeks after the attacks hasn’t changed. “There was never any kind of stand-down order to anybody.” Now, that’s a pretty broad statement, “anybody.” What’s your reaction to the quote by Mr. Firman?
Hicks: I can only again repeat that Lieutenant Colonel Gibson said he was not to proceed to board the airplane.
Turner: So your first-hand experience being on the site, standing next to Colonel Gibson, who was on his way on that C-130 transport and being told not to go, contradicts what Mr. Firman is saying on behalf of the Pentagon?
Hicks: Yes sir.
The Turner/Hicks testimony (post 71) in context
TURNER: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here today. Without your statements there is a tremendous amount of information that we just wouldn’t know. And certainly it’s important that you’re giving us this information, as we all have deep condolences for the families.
As we look at the information that we’ve gotten today, we basically have two standdown decisions that we’ve been able to discuss. One, the Foreign Emergency Support Team that Mr. Thompson has told us about. And Mr. Hicks, you told us of Colonel Gibson.
Mr. Hicks, I’m a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and I’m very fascinated with the standdown order to Colonel Gibson. As we pursue that we want to know who gave Colonel Gibson the order and why. And so we — I would like to review that standdown order with you and what you experienced that night since you were with him as he was receiving that standdown order.
You told us that there was a C-130 Libyan transport that had been provided and that you had indicated to Colonel Gibson that he should go to reinforce Benghazi and help to withdraw personnel. Colonel Gibson was told to stand down, and that plane left without him, landing about 7:30 in Benghazi without Colonel Gibson’s team.
Let’s start first with the review of what is Colonel Gibson’s team. What were those personnel, Colonel Gibson’s team, what were they doing in Libya?
HICKS: They are the — the remaining members of the special security teams group of special — 16 or — 14 special forces personnel assigned to protect Embassy Tripoli after the return and re- establishment of the embassy in September of 2011. And on the 1st of August the secretary of defense signed an order changing their status from being a security team to a training team, and transferring the authority — their authority from the chief of mission, the ambassador to General Ham.
And in — on August 6th, two members of that team were in a carjacking incident as they were driving early in the morning outside — outside the compound, and they had to use their weapons in order to escape that armed attack on their vehicle.
In light of that incident, General Ham decided to draw down the team from 14 personnel to four personnel. And Lieutenant Colonel Wood and nine others — Lieutenant Colonel Wood testified before this committee last October — left Tripoli in the middle of the month. So the Lieutenant Colonel Gibson and the other three members of that team are the remainder of that group.
TURNER: So their chain of command had been changed and they — and they had been reduced. But as you were just describing, these are highly trained individuals with specialized skills that would have been useful in the situation in Benghazi?
HICKS: Yes, absolutely, and particularly given the fact, again, that the personnel in Benghazi were — were exhausted from a night of fighting against very capable opponents.
TURNER: Now, do you know why they were told to stand down? Colonel Gibson give you any information or understanding of...
HICKS: I actually don’t know why.
TURNER: Is there any reason to believe that the situation in Benghazi was over? I mean, there were a number of — series of attacks you described to us. Any reason to believe that — that there was no longer any danger in Benghazi?
HICKS: No, there — it was every reason to continue to believe that our personnel were in danger.
TURNER: Mr. Hicks, Mr. Chaffetz has given me an article that appeared in USA Today just this week. And just as — as early as last Monday, Major Robert Furman (ph), a Pentagon spokesman, said that “the military’s account that was first issued weeks after the attack hasn’t changed. There was never any kind of standdown order to anybody.” And that’s a pretty broad statement, “anybody.” What’s your reaction to the quote by Mr. Furman (ph)?
HICKS: I could only, again, repeat that Lieutenant Colonel Gibson said he was not to proceed to board the airplane.
TURNER: So your firsthand experience being on the site, standing next to Colonel Gibson who was on his way on that C-130 transport and being told not to go contradicts what Mr. Furman (ph) is saying on behalf of the Pentagon?
HICKS: Yes, sir.
TURNER: Mr. Hicks, did the embassy have a defense attache on staff whose role it was to interface with the Defense Department? And did you ask him that evening, was the — were there any resources coming from the U.S. military? And what was your — your reaction to his responses as the evening unfolded?
HICKS: My reaction was that, OK, we’re on our own. We’re going to have to try to pull this off with the resources that we have available.
TURNER: Were the Libyans surprised?
HICKS: I don’t know, but I think they were.
TURNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ISSA: Thank you.
Before we go to Mr. Connolly, just because most people in the audience, including on the dais, don’t understand chief of mission authority, would you as chief of mission run us through who was under your chief of mission authority and who wasn’t? In other words, who did you have command-and-control of? And we’re talking about military assets. Because I think a lot of folks up here are hearing two chains of command, and it’d be helpful for you to explain it as a career State Department person — quickly.
HICKS: All — all civilian personnel in civilian (inaudible) personnel in Libya were under chief of mission authority, which was...
(CROSSTALK)
ISSA: ... which was yours.
HICKS: ... until he was — we knew that he was dead and then that passed to me.
The four members of the special forces team were under General Ham’s authority. We had two other military special forces personnel in country, and I was at that time unclear as to whether they were under my authority or not.
ISSA: So anyone you had under your authority you gave orders to, they responded, they went down range if you asked them to. The others were not allowed to?
HICKS: Yes, sir.