Pass/fail inspections where anything less than 100% is a failure is the norm in Nuclear Surety Inspections, and that transfers over to regular stand-up testing prior to assuming alert. Reciting rote memorization of rules, meticulous, step-by-step checklists ... these were the norm of SAC, and they continue to be the way the nuclear enterprise is accomplished in the Air Force.
But the Air Force has been struggling for years with this. There is no Cold War to defend against, there is no Soviet Union to deter. The missiles have been "de-targeted". They are incapable of immediate response. But the SAC zero defect mentality remains. The missileers are baby-sitters, guarding an armory, not aiming a weapon.
Combine this with the Millennials' values, where self satisfaction is more important than serving one's country. A Millennial can get self-satisfaction from serving their country if the role is satisfying. Being on the front lines in Afghanistan is more satisfying than sitting in a bunker 60 feet underground in Montana. Operating a Navy ship at sea or an airplane at 30,000 feet is more satisfying than running a checklist on an missile which is not on alert, and guarding against no enemy in particular.
I am not sure if the Navy is having issues with its ballistic missile submarine crews. But the Navy is different, and the submarine crew has the day to day responsibility to operate the submarine.
Ultimately, I think the Air Force ICBM mission needs to be rethought. Perhaps it is time to entertain a "diad" of submarine launched missiles and bombers, last discussed in the 1980s when ICBMs were deemed obsolete and destabilizing because they were susceptible to first strikes.
There are back stories that many of you may not be aware of, and why Major Command is bigtime “gun shy.” It explains why it came down like a ton of bricks:
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A few years ago in 2007, the wing at Minot AFB lost accountability of 6 AGM-129 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads that a B-52 flew to Barksdale, Louisiana. As I recall, these AGM-129s were processed to be de-mil’d or have their nuclear warheads dissociated in accordance with Strategic Nuclear Disarmament Agreement.
I don’t think the public ever found out the details on how or why Minot screwed up, but I’ll give you guys a plausible scenario.
Minot failed to write and publish local Air Force Instructions (AFI) or Air Force Regulations (AFR) to deal with the partially or fully demilling and/or dissociating the W80s from the cruise missiles, or the local instructions were flawed instructions, or someone failed to correctly follow them.
Any who or somehow the nuclear tipped AGM129s got up loaded on the Buff where they were flown undetected as nuclear capable missiles to Barksdale. The air crew did not detect the nuclear AGMs as there was no nuclear weapons custody transfer document to sign? The munitions loaders failed to detect that these AGMs which still had warheads? The munitions line delivery crew that transported them out of storage failed to detect that W80s that were still in place and installed? There were no (or was there?) security forces that escorted the weapons out of the WSA to the flightline? Or did the security forces inexplicably drop there security cordon around the A/C because they believe these were non-warhead cruise missiles?
I think the simplest answer is that these trailerized AGM 129s were schedule to have their nuclear warheads removed. Some how the nuke-tipped cruise missiles with their W80s were mixed up with cruise missiles that were without nukes or something thereof. The loaded trailer and these AGMs were incorrectly documented as demil’d as without warheads. From the very beginning of the transport process, they never thought these missiles were nuclear weapons. I remember a particular AF colonel at Minot who curiously retired about a month earlier before ‘the Minot lost nukes story’ hit the presses. ... Yes, you know who (rhetorical).
And there is more... mess ups that ended general officer careers.
The Air Force in the same year lost or misplaced Nuclear Ordinance Commodity Materials as seen here:
“Audit finds U.S. nuclear weapons parts misplaced”
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1889019/posts
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And a few may recall that the AF Chief of Staff and the Sec AF were ultimately relieved.
“Air Force Leaders Fired Over Nuke Handling”
“Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne on June 5 after a report by Navy Adm. Kirkland Donald highlighted significant oversights in the Air Force’s nuclear security practices.
The ousting of Moseley and Wynne followed several incidents in the past year that have heightened concerns over the Air Force’s ability to properly maintain and secure its arsenal of land-based ICBMs and nuclear-armed bombers.
Last August, a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barskdale Air Force Base in Louisiana wrongly and unknowingly armed with nuclear cruise missiles. (See ACT, October 2007.) In March of this year, it was reported that the Air Force had accidentally shipped four nosecone fuses for nuclear missiles to Taiwan in 2006, drawing complaints from China. (See ACT, May 2008.)
Gates’ action came after another such incident in late May when the 5th Bomb Wing, which is stationed at Minot, received a grade of “unsatisfactory” in nuclear security during a weeklong, highly anticipated inspection by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). “ -end snip-
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3106
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There it is - as to some of this story.