During the late 1980s, I was a member of a Mission Area Analysis study group at what was then called the MAGTF Warfighting Center aboard Quantico. (The Center was later folded into the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Requirements Branch.). At one point, we were studying the Assault Support mission area and became interested in the Falkland Island campaign as a proxy for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) operating from a sea-base and operating at the extreme limits of the logistics chain.
Since the Falkland Island campaign had just been recently fought, we contacted the military attaché at the British Embassy and invited him brief us on the campaign. The attaché came to Quantico with a small team of officers and spent the day giving us a comprehensive briefing on the campaign from the British perspective.
One of the more interesting revelations was the fact that the Argentines had more luck in hitting British warships in San Carlos Sound than had been reported at the time. (You may recall the photos of Argentine jets jinking among the thicket of amphibious ships and escorting destroyers.). However, due to the attack techniques they were using, many Argentine bombs were only exploding after they had passed entirely through British warships from side to side above the waterline.
Afterwords, my boss, who was a very experienced A-4 pilot, discussed the problems of fighter jet pilots being tasked to attack ships.
Ideally, a ship attack is delivered from a couple thousand feet altitude and at a 45 degree angle for maximum accuracy. The bomb is delay fused because it shouldn’t explode until it has passed through the ship from top to bottom and is under the keel where the explosion can break the ship’s back. Since the attack jet is very vulnerable during the actual release process, a lot of training goes into the specialized techniques used to minimize exposure time.
The Argentine Navy had a limited number of A-4s and Etendards but they were subsonic and, IIRC, the A-4s were at the limit of their range at San Carlos. The Etendards were few in number and since they were the only Exocet-capable warplanes the Argentines had, were being carefully sheparded.
Argentine Air Force Mirages were employed for many attacks because they had the range to reach the target area and the speed needed to survive at low level in the very hostile environment being created by the NATO-level air defense systems aboard Royal Navy warships. To avoid detection by the system radars (and interception by the RAF Harrier CAP) , the Argentine pilots flew the missions at full throttle and at wavetop height.
On arrival, they had just a few seconds to quickly gain altitude, acquire a target, line up, dive, arm and release their dumb bomb, then break away and try to avoid interception. Even for trained attack jet pilots, that is a lot to do.
There is an alternate, easier attack method: don’t climb; fly straight at the target ship, release the bomb and make a climbing breakaway. The released bomb has the same direction and velocity as the aircraft when released and should fly straight to the target.
However, if your bomb has the standard ship attack delayed fusing setup...
Special mention was made by the British military attaché that the embedded U.K. press correspondents knew this information at the time and DID NOT report it due to its value to the enemy. To deal with Argentinian counter claims, a cover story about defective bombs not exploding was put out.
I wonder if that same self-censorship and issuing a cover story would be exercised today.
The issue today is not about media policy, it is about the quality of the reporters. Also about the media being bought by foreign money.
It is all happening now.