Form pages xiii-xiv of the report:
The
agents and SSAs also did not follow, or appear to even
know, the requirements in t he Woods Procedures to reverify the factual assertions from previous applications
Executive Summary
Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire
Hurricane Investigation
that are repeated in renewal applications and verify
source characterization statements with the CHS
handling agent and document the verification in the
Woods File.
That so many basic and fundamental errors
were made by three separate, hand- picked teams on
one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was
briefed to the highest levels within the FBI, and that FBI
officials expected would eventually be subjected to
close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the
FBI chain of command’s management and supervision
of the FISA process. FBI Headquarters established a
chain of command for Crossfire Hurricane that included
close supervision by senior CD managers, who then
briefed FBI leadership throughout the investigation.
Although we do not expect managers and supervisors to
know every fact about an investigation, or senior
officials to know all the details of cases about which
they are briefed, in a sensitive, high-priority matter like
this one, it is reasonable to expect that they will take
the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently
familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting
and potentially undermining a FISA application in order
to provide effective oversight, consistent with their level
of supervisory responsibility. We concluded that the
information that was known to the managers,
supervisors, and senior officials should have resulted in
questions being raised regarding the reliability of the
Steele reporting and the probable cause supporting the
FISA applications, but did not.
Mark Meadows
@RepMarkMeadows
·
1m
BREAKING: IG report officially released. It reveals FBI “fell far short” in vetting accuracy of FISA applications, knowingly withheld exculpatory information, used ‘defensive briefings’ to secretly asses the Trump campaign, used known illegitimate sources, and more.
The general public won’t read this report and will only know what the drivebys tell them.
We identified at least 17 significant errors or omissions in the Carter Page FISA applications, and many additional errors in the Woods Procedures. These errors and omissions resulted from case agents providing wrong or incomplete infor mation to OI and failing to flag important issues for discussion. While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the case agents who assisted OI in preparing the applications, or the agents and supervisors who performed the Woods Procedures, we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or problems we identified. In most instances, t he agents and supervisors told us that they either did not know or recall why the information was not shared with OI, that the failure to do so may have been an oversight, that they did not recognize at t he time the relevance of t he information to t he FISA application, or that they did not believe the missing information to be significant . On this last point, we believe that case agents may have improperly substituted their own j udgments in place of the j udgment of OI, or in place of the court, to weigh t_he probative va lue of t he information. From page 358:
We determined that, on August 15, 2016, Case Agent 1 sent a written summary by email to the OGC Unit Chief describing Page's Russian business and financial ties, his prior contacts with known Russian intelligence officers, and his recent travel to Russia. In this email, Case Agent 1 stated his belief that the information provided "a pretty solid basis" for requesting authority under FISA to conduct surveillance targeting Page. The next day, August 16, the OGC Unit Chief emailed Stuart Evans, then NSD's Deputy Assistant Attorney General with oversight responsibility over 01, to advise him of the possible FBI request for a FISA order to surveil Page. The email from the OGC Unit Chief stated that "I don't think we are quite there yet, but given the sensitivity and urgency of this matter, I would like to get 01 involved as early as possible." On or about August 17, 2016, in response to the Crossfire Hurricane team's prior Carter Page name trace request, the Crossfire Hurricane team received a memorandum from another U.S. government agency detailing its prior interactions with Page, including that Page had been approved as an "operational contact" for the other agency from 2008 to 2013. 489 The memorandum also detailed the information that Page had provided to the other agency concerning his prior contacts with certain Russian intelligence officers. As detailed in Chapters Five and Eight, the Crossfire Hurricane team did not accurately describe to 01 the nature and extent of the information that the FBI received from the other agency, which we found was highly relevant to an evaluation of the FISA request. Additionally, in August 2016, Page made statements to an FBI CHS that, if true, were in tension with the reporting the FBI received subsequently from Steele, alleging that Page was being used as an intermediary by Manafort to conspire with Russia. The FBI did not inform 01 of Page's statements before any of the four FISA applications were filed, and did not inform 01 of the CHS operation until June 2017, shortly before filing the last FISA application.
Here's some nice coverup on page xv:
Ethics Issues Raised by Nellie Ohr's Former Employment with Fusion GPS Fusion GPS employed Nellie Ohr as an independent contractor from October 2015 to September 2016. On his annual financial disclosure forms covering calendar years 2015 and 2016, Ohr listed Nellie Ohr as an "independent contractor" and reported her income from that work on the form. We determined that financial disclosure rules, 5 C.F.R. Part 2634, did not require Ohr to list on the form the specific organizations, such as Fusion GPS, that paid Nellie Ohr as an independent contractor during the reporting period. In addition, for reasons we explain in Chapter Eleven, we concluded that the federal ethics rules did not require Ohr to obtain Department ethics counsel approval before engaging with the FBI in connection with the Crossfire Hurricane matter because of Nellie Ohr's prior work for Fusion GPS. However, we found that, given the factual circumstances that existed, and the appearance that they created, Ohr displayed a lapse in judgment by not availing himself of the process described in the ethics rules to consult with the Department ethics official about his involvement in the investigation.
How about this?:
“On September 19, 2016, the same day that the
Crossfire Hurricane team first received Steele’s election
reporting, the team contacted FBI OGC again about
seeking a FISA order for Page and specifically focused
on Steele’s reporting in drafting the FISA request.”
They got denied on their first request, and then, as soon as the Steele reports hit their hot little hands, they were already using them to file another request. How did they even have time to read them, much less try to verify anything in them?