Posted on 04/22/2020 5:39:31 AM PDT by marktwain
Very informative and wise post. Thanks for the safety tips.
There are door reinforcement kits. Door Devil, and StrikeMaster II. Under $100.
It does help to have a vestibule...and a security system. I live in a very low-crime area but I have cameras all over the place.
Also helps to live in a gun-friendly state. :)
I’ve long been uncomfortable with the term “public servant”, as it conveys an incorrect relationship with negative connotations. I think a better term would be “public agent”, as it more accurately describes things.
A “servant” has to perform tasks outside of their scope, based on the orders of others, which accurately describes most LEOs, overburdened with extraneous duties not directly related to their job.
“Agents” have a much more defined and professional job description. They are not “workers” or “gophers”, but court officers, comparable to military commissioned and non-commissioned officers.
Not all insanes are locked in an asylum.
I don’t understand why they were in plain clothes are grabbed her, rather than in uniform and made an arrest.
Best guess. They set up a sting. They were in civvies. When she did not show they went to her house and tried to grab her there without changing into uniforms. Boom!
> Don’t the police have anything better to do?
To be fair, this incident was in 2015. They didn’t have any lock down or “social distancing” orders to enforce.
There have been a few no-knock cases in Texas in which law enforcement officers have been killed by residents. Grand juries refused to indict the residents.
Unless there is a hostage situation in which a hostage is about to be murdered, there is no good reason for a no-knock raid.
Cops should always wait and snatch suspects when they are walking on a street.
In the November 7, 2019 opinion regarding whether the trial court had properly considered DeRossett's pleading of self-defence under the Castle Doctrine, the Florida Court of Appeals for the Fifth District found that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof and that it must reconsider the Castle Doctrine. It further found that the trial court must find that DeRossett knew, or should have known, at the time he fired his warning shot that he was shooting at law enforcement officers, or that DeRossett was using his home to further criminal activity, or else grant DeRossett's motion and discharge him from the crimes charged.
DeRossett conceded that a person is not entitled to immunity from prosecution under section 776.032(1) for knowingly shooting at law enforcement officers.
The issue of whether DeRossett knowingly fired at law enforcement officers was initally not properly considered by the trial court. On remand, the trial court found a lack of proof to sustain that exemption from the Castle Doctrine.
In the rehearing, the trial court found DeRossett did not know the cops were law enforcement officers. The issue of knowingly firing at police officers was not before the appellate court in 2020.
The appellate court opinion of April 15, 2020 overturned the trial court finding denying Castle Doctrine immunity due to an exception for furthering criminal activity, which finding alleged only that DeRossett had merely known of his niece's prostitution activity, without more. The appellate court found that to be insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the allegation of "furthering" criminal activity. Therefore, the finding of an exemption from the Castle Doctrine failed.
DeRossett v Florida, FL App 5th Dist 5D19-0802 (7 Nov 2019)
DeRossett v Florida, FL App 5th Dist 5D19-0802 (15 Apr 2020)
The local court refused to apply the immunity which was required by law.
The appeals court required the local court to apply the immunity.
That, de facto, upheld the right of the DeRossett to shot the police officer (deputy) in self defense.
Just because the appeals court did not state exactly that, in so many words, does not change the reality of the case.
Please excuse the typos in the last post.
At a time when "law enforcement" seems engaged in a "catch and release" game, we might do better with fewer police, and more court and prison resources to put away serious criminals who are caught.
The appeals court required the local court to apply the immunity.That, de facto, upheld the right of the DeRossett to shot the police officer (deputy) in self defense.
Just because the appeals court did not state exactly that, in so many words, does not change the reality of the case.
As stated, that is just wrong.
The trial court at first failed to properly consider the plea of immunity, and was overturned for reversing the burden of proof upon the defendant. The appellate court remanded it with an order to properly consider the plea of immunity. For the previously claimed exemption to the Castle Doctrine because DeRossett shot at police officers, the trial court found that no such exemption could be sustained. The appellate court never took up the issue to decide it. That exemption was not decided in the 2019 appellate proceeding and not a subject of appeal in the 2020 appellate proceedings.
The appeals court required the trial court to apply immunity because the claim of exemption for furthering criminal activity failed.
The claim of exemption for firing at police failed at the trial court level.
Even if they were in plain clothes, shouldn’t they show their badges and “say you are under arrest” rather than grabbing her? Are police allowed to grab someone for a misdemeanor rather than make an arrest?
You just restated my argument.
Exactly.
Then the appeals court *required* them to apply the immunity.
I got pulled over late one night for “running a red light”.
The cop gave me a ticket and I decided to fight it in court because I knew I did not run the light. I showed up to traffic court and the cop brought the City Prosecutor! The cop testified she was sitting in her patrol car directly in front of me in the opposing lane, had a clear line of sight at the light, and that I entered the intersection after it turned red.
The judge literally told me the testimony of Police officers had more weight in court than the testimony of regular citizens.
Little did she know, I went back and took pictures of the intersection from exactly where she was parked to show you couldn’t see the lights. I also got footage from the corner gas station, whose camera showed her parked where I said she was parked, perpendicular to the light, and not directly in front of the light. The cop was caught directly lying in court and the case was dismissed.
Fast forward a few months and the same cop pulled my wife over (in the same car I was driving before) for “failure to yield to a traffic device”, which just so happened to be the same light. We went to court. The judge looked at me and the cop and said something to the effect of, “I don’t doubt that the defendant committed the infraction but given the history of the two parties, I’m dismissing the case and asking the prosecutor to carefully consider the next time he brings you to court for a traffic violation.”
Shortly thereafter the cop was assigned to the local high school as the resource officer.
They should, but they did not. And a deputy was shot for their negligence.
The claim of exemption for firing at police failed at the trial court level.Exactly.
Then the appeals court *required* them to apply the immunity.
Not exactly. Not even remotely.
The appeals court did not require them to apply immunity. Try reading the opinion. Neither court ever applied immunity regarding the targets being police officers. If you had read the opinions you would know that. I can't read them for you.
In 2019, the appeals court remanded the case to the trial court to make a determination if DeRossett was eligible or ineligible for immunity. It did not order the trial court to apply immunity.
The appeals court gave the trial court the applicable law to follow.
Accordingly, because the trial court did not apply the correct burden of proof, under Fuller, Derossett is entitled to a new Stand Your Ground evidentiary hearing. See 257 So. 3d at 539. As previously indicated, we have relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to hold this hearing, at which the court shall specifically address whether the State can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) Derossett knew or should have known at the time that he fired his warning shot that he was shooting at law enforcement officers, or (2) Derossett was using his home to further criminal activity. Ultimately, if, following the hearing, the court finds that the State has failed to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof that Derossett’s actions fall under one of these exceptions under section 776.013(2)(c) and (d), then it shall enter an order granting Derossett’s motion and then discharge him from the crimes charged.
The trial court found that immunity applied only pursuant to the assertion of DeRossett's knowledge of prostitution.
As for the shooting at cops bit, in 2020 the appeals court noted:
As more fully discussed below, in our earlier decision, we had withheld the issuance of the writ of prohibition and relinquished jurisdiction back to the trial court with directions that the court resolve at a subsequent hearing two issues that it had specifically declined to address in its prior order. The first issue for consideration was whether the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that at the time Derossett used deadly force, he knew or reasonably should have known that the persons against whom he was using such force were law enforcement officers. Derossett v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2713, 2716 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 7, 2019). Second, we directed the court to determine whether the State had established by clear and convincing evidence that Derossett was using his dwelling or residence to further a criminal activity at the time that he used deadly force. Id.The parties thereafter appeared before the trial court and agreed that a further evidentiary hearing was not needed. Instead, they stipulated that the court could address these two issues by relying on the voluminous record produced from the earlier five-day evidentiary hearing held on Derossett’s Stand Your Ground motion.
Following additional briefing by the parties, the trial court entered its order finding that the State had not established by clear and convincing evidence that Derossett knew or should have known that when he fired his weapon, he was shooting at law enforcement officers.
The court did, however, find that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Derossett was using his home to further criminal activity, thus effectively denying, for a second time, Derossett’s Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss.
The TRIAL court found that the State failed its burden to show proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that DeRossett knew, or should have known that when he fired his weapon, he was shooting at law enforcement officers. That was the end of that issue. That issue did not return to the appellate court. Only the issue of whether DeRossett was using his home for criminal activity (prostitution) returned to the appellate court.
The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a pretrial motion claiming immunity was stated in the 2019 opinion:
Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a pretrial motion claiming immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground statutes is the same as that which is applied to the denial of a motion to suppress. Mobley v. State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Mederos, 102 So. 3d at 11). The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while its factual findings are “presumed correct and can be reversed only if they are not supported by competent substantial evidence.” Id. at 1162 (quoting State v. Vino, 100 So. 3d 716, 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)).
The appellate court's 2020 deciding issue is clearly stated:
Accordingly, because the trial court erred in determining that Derossett’s awareness of his niece’s random acts of prostitution committed in her room equated to him using his home to further a criminal activity, we conclude that Derossett used defensive force as permitted under section 776.013(1) and that the State failed to overcome his immunity from criminal prosecution under section 776.032(1) with clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we grant Derossett’s amended petition for writ of prohibition, quash the order denying his motion to dismiss, and remand for the trial court to discharge Derossett.
On that basis, the APPEALS court granted DeRossett's motion to dismiss. It did not relinquish jurisidiction and remand that issue back to the trial court. The trial court was not given the option of further proceedings.
Had DeRossett been found to have known his targets were cops, he would have gone to trial for premeditated first degree attempted murder of a police officer.
Under the Castle Doctrine, it makes no difference if the target is a cop, unless the accused knows his target is a cop.
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