Little known and/or realized that General Keane was to become Army Chief of Staff upon the retirement of General Eric Shinseki in 2003. He chose to retire at the end of his term as Vice Chief of Staff rather than to become the new Army Chief of Staff because he, quietly, disagreed with the plans for invading Iraq and the projected aftermath.
There was a disagreement about the strategy for going into Iraq with President Bush siding with General Tommy Franks for a quick invasion and rapid withdrawal. Generals Shinseki and Keane had the Army staff and historians do in depth study and planning for what it would take for and AFTER an invasion. That research showed that an occupation would need to occur and that it would take about 100,000 soldiers for a period up to 10 years.
They were over ruled by Bush and Cheney who approved Frank’s “lightning strike” with a quick withdrawal. Of course the disbanding of the Iraq Army by the US civilian ‘overlord’ was a failure.
I will not say that he wanted to stay in Iraq for years, but he knew that not to plan fo r it, and for the administration to accept the possibility of that as irresponsible.
The lack of national will to follow through after the second Persian Gulf war by maintaining a significant military presence in Iraq stands in contrast to the U.S. posture after WWII, in which we maintained forces in Germany, Italy, and Japan for generations.