The same peeps that told us a Prez not cooperating fast enough - deserved Federal Raids via Gunpoint.
Posted on 02/09/2023 1:47:51 PM PST by AnthonySoprano
This!
We are living in a surreal terror laden dream.
Via legal counsel.
Hunter Biden’s lawyers are trying to play the long game by running out the clock, refuse to cooperate in way, make the committee go to court to force a response, just keep fighting and delay hoping in 2 years the power in congress changes hands.
Running to China, are you?
It doesn’t actually say except Hunter;
ArtI.S8.C18.7.1 Overview of Congress’s Investigation and Oversight Powers
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18:
[The Congress shall have Power . . . ] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Congress’s power to conduct investigations stands on equal footing with its authority to legislate and appropriate.1 Although the “power of inquiry” was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it has nonetheless been acknowledged as “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function” derived implicitly from Article I’s vesting of “legislative Powers” in the Congress.2 This implied constitutional prerogative to gather information related to legislative activity is both critical in purpose, as Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information,” and extensive in scope, as Congress is empowered to obtain pertinent testimony and documents through investigations into nearly any matter.3 Included within the scope of the power is the authority to initiate investigations, hold hearings, gather testimony or documents from witnesses, and, in situations where either a government or private party is not forthcoming, compel compliance with congressional requests through the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas.
While Congress’s investigative tools can be used to achieve a number of different purposes, congressional practice suggests that legislative inquiries primarily serve to either gather information valuable for considering and producing legislation (what may be called the self-informing or legislative-informing function)4 or to ensure that existing laws are being properly administered (what may be referred to as the oversight function.)5 Although functionally distinguishable, the self-informing and oversight functions often merge during the conduct of significant investigations.
In the absence of explicit constitutional text, the scope of the investigatory power has been molded and defined primarily by congressional practice, negotiations between the political branches, and opinions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has only rarely engaged in any significant discussion of Congress’s investigatory power, and in fact has only once issued an opinion directly addressing an investigative oversight conflict between Congress and the Executive Branch.6 A variety of factors contribute to the reduced judicial role in this area, including legal principles of judicial restraint and the separation of powers. But at least historically, the chief constraint appears to be the infrequency in which cases involving the investigatory power have been adjudicated.7 As a general matter, the Judicial Branch generally has become involved in subpoena disputes in only three classes of cases: (1) when a party is subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with congressional demands;8 (2) when the House or Senate itself initiates a lawsuit in an attempt to enforce a subpoena—though the Supreme Court has never heard such a case;9 or (3) when a subpoena seeks an individual’s documents from a third party, and the individual brings suit to block the third party from complying with the subpoena.10 The majority of cases have historically come from the first category, arising either in the context of a criminal prosecution for contempt of Congress, or a habeas proceeding stemming from a detention carried out pursuant to an exercise of Congress’s inherent contempt power.11 The relative dearth of jurisprudence means that historical practice, especially Congress’s views of the reach of its own authority established through hundreds of years of investigations, plays a substantial role in establishing the outer bounds of the investigatory power.
Although Supreme Court decisions in this area are limited, they illuminate the basic constitutional foundation of Congress’s investigatory power and establish key legal limitations on its exercise. The Court’s early jurisprudence began with a focus on establishing the source of the investigatory power before considering the power’s scope.12 In that vein, the Court established that the authority to conduct investigations was implied from the “legislative power” vested in Congress by Article I of the Constitution, but only to the extent that an inquiry actually served a “legislative purpose.”13 By the mid-twentieth century, judicial recognition of the investigatory power had been well established, and the Court’s focus shifted to legal limitations on congressional inquiries, generally in the context of the tension between congressional investigations and the individual rights of private citizens.14 These judicially identified limitations on Congress’s power of inquiry emanated principally from the Bill of Rights, including the First and Fifth Amendments, as well as from the internal rules of the House and Senate, which can act as self-imposed constraints on the investigatory power. Intervention by the Supreme Court into investigative disputes has generally been confined to scenarios in which Congress is seeking information from a private citizen, rather than a government official. Trump v. Mazars, decided in 2020, was the first time the Supreme Court directly addressed an interbranch investigatory conflict. Even then, the case was technically brought by President Donald Trump in his private rather than official capacity, though the Court chose to treat the conflict as one between the branches.15 Instead, the historical reality has generally been that inter-branch investigative conflicts are resolved through an informal tug-of-war between the political branches rather than through adjudication by the courts.16
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Of course not, his Dad is the Big Guy.
Is there a link?
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Thank you!
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There's this key item: "Congress may imprison a person for a specific period of time or an indefinite period of time, except a person imprisoned by the House of Representatives may not be imprisoned beyond adjournment of a session of Congress.
The current session started January 3, so he would get 11 months in the Congressional Cooler. He deserves 11 years minimum.
He’s claiming diplomatic immunity.
I know he hasn't served his sentence because he's out while it is on appeal, so I hope the appeal goes well.
Enough republicans are on the take. Joe made sure of that insurance policy.
I’d tell the FBI their budget (except for foreign counterintelligence programs) is about to be zeroed out, unless they cooperative fully with Congress and charge Hunter under the appropriate statutes.
Does a judge determine whether something has standing?
He operated with Secret Service escorts and protection. Seems he was operating as an administration member under color of law.
Yep- that crackhead can sure afford a team of high priced lawyers and live in a $20,000 oceanfront home but can’t afford to pay child support.
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