The basic 737 has been a long trusted workhorse. This max version unfortunately was an example of Boeing reengineering it as a larger sized aircraft. That way money was saved compared to designing a new plane from scratch. This cutting corners approach may now imperil the entire company There’s a lesson in all this somewhere.
That way money was saved compared to designing a new plane from scratch. This cutting corners approach may now imperil the entire company There’s a lesson in all this somewhere.
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It’s not just the stupidity of the 737 MAX and lack of clean sheet design. Why are not nuts and bolts being installed and torqued? That’s not maintenance.
Certainly Boeing is facing some challenges, but they have also been subjected to the media “if it bleeds it leads” treatment. It’s not Boeing’s fault that a United Flight crew drove their plane onto the grass at IAH, or that a United flight dropped a tire on takeoff at SFO — that’s clearly on United maintenance.
And the design flaw story that surfaced a couple of years ago about the 737 Max and their new, larger and forward-mounted CFX manufactured engines may not be quite as straightforward as the media has presented. I’m no pilot, but I have talked with a couple of 737 left seaters who vehemently disagreed with the media narrative when it first came out. This pilot, with a very interesting YouTube channel does a good job of providing some context and a much more balanced presentation than any major media outlet that I’m aware of.
Episode is here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ue400BhW0aY
This is my summary of what he says in that video:Yes, the 737 was originally designed with an unusually low ground clearance (but not unreasonably in historic context), and the newer extended length versions did put more pressure on the pilots to avoid “tail strikes”, but the story that the media ran with regarding the CFX engines isn’t as one-sided as we’ve been lead to believe. He points out that moving the engines slightly forward probably makes the aircraft slightly more stable, but more importantly, these engineering decisions are, like all design decisions, trade-offs and compromises. The original engine placement, and low ground clearance was itself a result of exactly this type of decision making — the low ground clearance was to allow the use of the aircraft in smaller airports, which in the early 1960’s didn’t all have passenger jet bridges, or access to high lift baggage loading equipment. It turned out that those considerations kind of melted away when air travel became so popular that these features became widely available, obviating the reasoning for the original ground clearance itself.
Now, I have no idea if all of this is right or wrong, but it does seem like a safe bet that the media are playing for clicks, and are not necessarily deeply concerned with finding out and presenting the public with the truth.
[The basic 737 has been a long trusted workhorse. This max version unfortunately was an example of Boeing reengineering it as a larger sized aircraft. That way money was saved compared to designing a new plane from scratch. This cutting corners approach may now imperil the entire company There’s a lesson in all this somewhere.]
So the accountants designed a new airplane from scratch using lego parts and this is what happened. We need to learn to leave engineering to qualified engineers.
Yeah - I’ve flown on more 737 aircraft than any other (though Embraer ERJ is rapidly catching up).
What made Boeing think that “redesigning” the 737 would be a good idea - when it was stretched well-beyond its design parameters? What kind of engineer would sign off on such an idea - then play the cover-up game for the problems that inevitably came?
My suspicion - it wasn’t just about $, but also about unqualified people (DEI hires?)