While Fletcher showed the Japanese that they were not alone, the Port Moresby Invasion Group had departed Rabaul on May 4th, and turned west-south-west, toward the Jomard Passage between New-Guinea and the Louisiade Archipelago. In the meantime, Admiral Takagi guided his heavy carrier around the Solomons, rushing down the eastern side, and turning into the Coral Sea around San Cristobal Island on May 5th, to engage the U.S. carrier(s?).
Unlucky Takagi missed his chance that day, when both Yorktown and Lexington, having finally met, topped off their fuel tanks, in which situation they were extremely vulnerable. Having done that, Fletcher set off toward New-Guinea, there to intercept the transports of the Port Moresby Group.
Over the next day, May 6th, both groups were prowling the Coral Sea, and the night from 5th to 6th had seen the two foes pass each other at a mere 70 nautical miles, half-an-hour of flying time for the Japanese.
The day of May 6th passed without major events. Admiral Inoue at Rabaul saw himself with only a few floatplanes left to do reconnaisance, and the failure of one to return - Yorktown's planes had caught it - indicated to Inoue the presence of a carrier once again.
Fletcher had spent the day sitting a hundred miles south of the Jomard Passage, waiting for the Port Moresby group. Takagi, relying on Rabaul's air assets, failed to utilize his planes properly. Neither side saw each other. However, over the day B-17 bombers of MacArthur's command spotted the entire Port Moresby assets including the light carrier Shoho.
With this information, Fletcher got nervous. He feared that he would get engaged by Japanese carriers and be unable to stop the Port Moresby group. Accordingly, he thought, he would have to detach forces. Crace's cruisers were chosen, and by early morning on May 7th, left the circle of protection around the carriers and headed north toward the Louisiades. Fletcher's decision is odd; he violated the main principle of warfare, massing of force against a seperated enemy. Crace's ships would have made the defense of his carriers easier; if the carriers were destroyed, as Fletcher feared could happen, Crace's cruisers would stand a chance neither. Crace got lucky; successfully evading damage from repeated high-level bomber attacks, he turned back to Australia after receiving reports that the Port Moresby group had abandoned its mission, upon its escort force having been hit by planes.
But anyway, the battle proceeded. It seemed the early morning had seen a change in fortunes for the Japanese. Launched earlier that day, a search plane radioed back a sighting report. "A carrier and a cruiser" were supposed to have been found on 0730 hours. Takagi, thinking this to be his chance, ordered an all-out attack. When the planes appeared overhead their target at 1038, however, disappointment spread. The ships were identified wrongly - actually it was the oiler Neosho, a Pearl Harbor veteran, and the destroyer Sims. While some of the planes continued to search for more valuable targets, in the final effect the whole load of two carriers struck the two ships. After fighting for two and a half hours, three bombs ended Sims' wartime career, and several more put Neosho out. The tanker was sunk several days later by a U.S. destroyer.
At about the same time, planes from Yorktown were scouting forward of the US forces, and hit the Support Force of Rear-Admiral Goto. Wrongly identifying the group as containing two carriers, the report triggered Fletcher into action, and attack planes found the group at tenhundred hours, off guard. Shoho had send fighters to support the Port Moresby force, and was unable to put up a proper defense. Ninety-two planes swooped down on her, delivering thirteen bombs and seven torpedoes into the small carrier. Half an hour after the attack had begun, Fletcher on Yorktown received the famous message, "Scratch one flattop", issued by Lt.Cmdr.R.E.Dixon. The rest of the Port Moresby groups returned to Rabaul.
Fletcher meanwhile decided that the destruction or interdiction of the Port Moresby group was the prime goal, and set of toward the Louisiades again. Takagi turned his planes around after their landing, hoping to find the U.S. carriers. Luck was not with the Japanese aviators. Bad weather made for visibility measured in only a few kilometers, and again, the close proximity of both forces made for interesting situations. Heading back for their carriers rather late in the evening (having only been launched at 1630 hours), they ran into the US carriers, and their air units. Nine bombers fell while two Wildcats did the same, and the day was not yet over for the Japanese. Finding a carrier at the edge of their fuel supply, several planes descended.
Shortly before touchdown, however, the Stars and Stripes marked the carrier as an American. Without bombs, or torpedoes, all dumped to save fuel, the Japanese could not do anything about the carriers. However, the equally surprised Americans were only able to account for one plane. Only seven of twenty-seven planes made it back to the Japanese flattops.
Eighth May, 1942, would be marked in history as the first day of carrier-vs.-carrier battle. The day began as the last four had as well. Both sides launched search planes, but this time, both sides would find what they searched for. Eighteen planes from Lexington shot into the skies, and only an hour after the planes had launched, the Japanese carriers were sighted. Admiral Fletcher ordered an all-out strike again, and by 0915, 82 planes were on their way.
Fletcher had due reason to be worried, however. Lexington had intercepted radio traffic from a search plane, and knew he had been found. His force was in bright sunshine. Takagi had had his planes in the air since 0915 as well, and his attack planes were already spreading to search for their foes when the message came in. Shortly later, 69 planes were headed toward the U.S. forces. It was the U.S. however to strike first. Yorktown's 39 planes found their targets at 1050, and proceeded to attack. However, their attack was not timed well. Dive-bombers had to circle uselessly to wait for torpedo-planes, a fact which allowed Zuikaku to escape into a rain squall, and Shokaku to strengthen her air defense groups. When the attack finally began, Yorktown's planes hit twice with bombs, severely damaging Shokaku's bow and denying her air-operations, and destroying her plane-engine shops. Lexington's following strike, numerically reduced by a lack of fuel, did no damage at all, despite scoring a bomb hit. On the other side, three Wildcats fell in the defense of their bombers. Shokaku was dropped from the battle, but her launch capability was renewed, and forty-two of her planes landed on Zuikaku.
At the very moment the dive-bombers decended on Shokaku, Japanese planes struck with deadly force at the US fleet. The Japanese had all the advantages they needed: a good composition in their strike, and extremely deadly ordonance. Their sharp swords were soon at Lexington. Her fighter protection out of place, the carrier saw itself confronted with a deadly "anvil-attack" scheme: from both sides, and a 45 degree angle forward, torpedo-planes came in. Twenty-three Dauntless dive-bombers caught four torpedo-planes, at the cost of four of their own to Zeros, and had not helped: Lexington ran into two torpedoes, and her inadequate maneuverability made the maneuvers her younger compatriot executed impossible for her: only luck prevented more than two bombs from hitting her. Her smokestack destroyed, her hull flooding, and a battery of her flak destroyed, she burned furiously in her interior.
Yorktown had her design to help her: smaller and more maneuverable, she evaded eight of eight torpedoes launched on her, and Captain Elliott Buckmaster did his best to help against the bombs, with some successes. Only one bomb hit, causing casualties but no severe damage.
When the Japanese planes headed back to their carriers, both US flattops were swimming, and both looked good. Lexington had seven degrees port list, but that was repaired by moving around the fuel to the starboard side, and the fires were extinguished rapidly.
By 1247 however, a huge explosion rocked the ship from deep below. More explosions occured, but with her steady 25 knots, Lexington looked salvagable, and Captain Frederick C. Sherman was still in good hope of saving his hip. Soon, however, more explosions occured. Connections to vital areas were severed, and several more fires rose in the ship, soon to go out-of-control. When the fires reached vital - potentially deadly - areas, including bomb and torpedo storage, Sherman orderd all hands abandon ship, at 1707 hours.
USS Phelps torpedoed the carrier, dubbed the "Lady Lex" by it's crew, and at 2000 hours, she cut under the waves of the grey-blue Coral Sea - America's first carrier had been lost.
The aftermath was quickly decided. Having Yorktown patched together and ready for action, Fletcher awaited the Port Moresby group, or a new carrier battle, but neither Zuikaku nor Shokaku were battle worthy, and both retired northward. Yorktown was soon recalled by Nimitz to Pearl Harbor, arriving there for quick repairs.
The Battle of the Coral Sea had given the sailors and the pilots aboard the Yorktown battle experience. These men could now know what to expect. Also they were able to hone their skills. A great deal about air warfare had been learned from the first great carrier battle. The flaws of the American aircraft were exposed and brought to the fore. It became evident that the Navy needed better fighters and better torpedo planes. It was also learned that fighters in combat air patrols needed to fly at 20,000 feet instead of 10,000 feet. If the fighters would have been at that elevation, they could have thinned out the Japanese bombers with greater efficiency and reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese attack.
Admiral Aubrey Fitch saw that the Japanese had been using their land based aircraft more effectively than the Allies had. Fitch then recommended that more planes be stationed in the South Pacific and that those planes cooperate with naval units.
The advancements in technology and tactics were not only relegated to how planes and ships were to be used in the future. The development and the effective use of radar played a major role in Coral Sea. Radar officers were able to use this relatively new technology to aid in the victory of the U.S. forces in Coral Sea. Radar officers were able to track Japanese bombers at one point in the battle. This tracking enabled the American forces to set up an ambush for these bombers. Also, the effective use of "Magic" gave the Allies a good idea of what the Japanese were planning. The code breaking was not fulproof by any means, but the Allies at least had a clue to what the next Japanese move was going to be.
Coral Sea also brought about a change in strategy. Admiral Chester Nimitz and Admiral Ernest King agreed that it was in the best interest of the Navy not to fight the Japanese fleet head on. The Navy could no longer afford to "slug it out with the probably superior approaching Japanese forces." They agreed on a strategy of attrition. Given some time, the surging American economy would be able to produce multiple navies. Even Admiral Yamamoto was aware of this fact. He knew that Japan's resources were severely limited, and that a war of attrition would eventually result in an American victory.
This new strategy advocated stealth over strength. This was the only course of action that Nimitz could pursue, especially after seeing what had happened in the Coral Sea. They would attempt to use all naval resources to reduce the Japanese forces. Nimitz and King were in favor of increasing submarine attacks and air bombing, especially on isolated Japanese units. Nimitz, however, reluctantly elected this strategy. He saw this not as giving credit to the strength of the Japanese Imperial Navy, but as a defficiency of the American navy. These American inadequacies led to the decision by Nimitz to strengthen his long range striking capabilities. The slow and inefficient battleships would be relocated to the west coast of the United States. Nimitz was going to rely on the carrier striking forces combined with land based air power, similar to those that participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Additional Sources:
www.hazegray.org
history.acusd.edu
www.homeofheroes.com
www.brooksart.com
www.history.navy.mil
