I don't believe that is correct. Do you remember where you came across the number?
From his book:
Throughout our planning of 1003, we discussed Phase IV--"the Day after." . . . We considered the pros and cons of senior U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers and British military commanders working with Iraqi tribal sheiks all across the country. And we studied the feasibility of an interim government in Iraq formed with international support, along the lines of Hamid Karzai's administration in Afghanistan.
[. . .]
. . . And our planning assumption was that we would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and a paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army. These units would serve side-by-side with the Coalition forces to restore order and prevent clashes among the religious and ethnic factions . . .
[. . .]
There was no question: Phase IV would be a crucial period. Having won the war, we would have to secure the peace. And securing the peace would not be easy in a country that had been raped and massacred for more than three decades under Saddam Hussein. There were deep divisions among Sunnis and Shias, Kurds and Arabs, haves and have-nots; the regions traditional tribal rivalries would be hard to overcome. It would take time--perhaps years. And the costs would be high, certainly in money and conceivably in lives.
[. . .]
On one hand, larger Coalition military forces and martial law might be required to stay in country for years, in order to preserve security. On the other, the Iraqis might claim their country as their own: they might welcome the liberation and organize themselves swiftly to control Iraq without Coalition help.
[. . .]
But the challenge was daunting, and it was clear that certain practical steps would be required as soon as Saddam's regime was removed:
- Securing massive funding for the immediate needs of the Iraqi people
- Hiring tens of thousands of Iraqi ex-soldiers, all of whom needed money to care for their families
- Identifying political leadership that would be trusted by Iraqis, and capable of assisting and ultimately replacing an occupying military force
- Implementing a de-Baathification policy that wasn't so cumbersome that it essentially disenfranchised Iraq's educated middle class
- Adjusting American expectations that the process would be fast and painless
The military coalition would liberate Iraq, set conditions for civilian authority to stand-up a provisional government supported by Coalition stability forces, and provide security until Iraq could field her own security forces--a common-sense approach to a complex problem.
[. . . ]
The plan depended on two equal imperatives--security and civil action. Only if we achieved both could Iraq be transformed into an example of the power of representative government.
I was glad that we had finally reached the stage in the iterations where a plan--not just a Commander's Concept--was emerging. For one thing, we were finally able to move beyond the hypothetical environment we'd been working in for months, and start deploying ships, planes, and troops.
For another, I had already spent longer than I liked skirting the issue of a "war plan" in my dealings with the press.
And prophetically from his Epilogue:
In these difficult months, the resolve of the United States will be sorely tested. The news media, whose embedded correspondents did such splendid work during the major combat of Operation Iraqi Freedom, will focus almost exclusively on casualties. All of us, especially those who have worn our nation's uniform, will grieve each time we hear of a young man or woman killed in a suicide bombing or mortar attack, or by a roadside mine. And the relentless glare of the media spotlight on casualties will continue to obscure the Coalition's accomplishments since the Baathist regime was removed.