I believe your dates are wrong re Shensiski. There was much reporting re troop numbers throughout 2002. Much of my info came frome NRO and The WS on this 'war of the numbers'.
That is wrong to say there was no disagreement about troop numbers until 2003. WE entered Iraq in 2003! There was a year long discussion on what was required.
I used quotes re "fired", because of course he was not fired. His replacement was announced aprox 15 months before his retirement date. I hold no brief for him of the black barrets, but he was at least more right than wrong on the numbers of troops required to provide security right after the 3 week war.
The disagreement I'm pointing to, and one I probably ascribed too quickly to you, was the public disagreement drawn out by Senator Levin (who else?) during an Armed Services Committee hearing in February 2003. This is the spectacle most people use to justify the claim Shinseki was forced to retire.
Levin led Shinseki into the trap with the question, "General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?" Shinseki was not given much wiggle room.
Shinseki: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commander's exact requirements. But I think . . .
Levin: How about a range?
Shinseki: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.
But, the truth is there is always disagreement among the service chiefs, not only over how many troops are needed for any particular phase of an operation, but over how operations should be conceptualized and executed.
The working relationship between General Franks and the Joint Chiefs was set during his planning for Afghanistan. Shortly after the first briefing given the Chiefs, reeling from the service specific bickering, Franks bluntly told the Chiefs they had their input into the plan through their respective three stars who served on his CENTCOM staff. If the Service Chiefs did not trust their three stars, Franks told them, they should fire and replace them.
Whether Shinseki will be proven more right than wrong will be debated for a long time to come, and will probably never be decided. Like you, apparently, I have faith in the Powell Doctrine. Overwhelming, crushing force will always carry the day. But, will it?
No one really criticizes Franks' plan or its execution during the first three phases of the war. The major criticism comes from perceived deficiencies in the Phase IV plan, what we did the day after Saddam fell. Among the claims is that a better plan would have prevented or at least curtailed the rampant looting and lawlessness that went on, and would have undermined the sudden appearance of private militias.
But would better planning and a larger force have done that? I don't know and I have come across no recent defense by Franks or his staff concerning the execution of Phase IV. I do wonder whether any number of troops could have dealt with what happened. Here in the U.S., consider how much time and resources were required to control looting and violence during race riots in Detroit, Los Angeles, and Baltimore?
One thing is certain. We'll have plenty of time to talk about it.
(BTW, do you remember the link to the NRO article you mentioned?)