Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
A Russian military convoy that was outside of Ivankiv, Ukraine, on Sunday has since made it to the outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show.
On Sunday, the convoy was roughly 40 miles northwest of the Ukrainian capital, according to images provided by Maxar Technologies.
Maxar said that roughly 17 miles of roadway is chocked full of the convoy, which consists of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other logistical vehicles.
The private US company said the convoy was located on the T-1011 highway at Antonov air base around 11:11 a.m local time.
Antonov is roughly 17 miles from the center of the Ukrainian capital.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
He believes too much in himself and in the help of dead ancestors. The Kremlin has revealed one of the reasons for Shoigu’s resignation.
Oe of the reasons that Sergei Shoigu changed his post and lost the position of Minister of Defense could be the “mysticism” into which he has fallen recently. Three sources in the Kremlin told us about this at once. “In recent months, Sergei Kuzhugetovich, one might say, has frightened Vladimir Vladimirovich. Judge for yourself: he declared, without any rational justification, that the SVO would end this year. He dug up the ashes of commander Suvorov and organized prayer services at the front, which were fired upon by the enemy. He prayed over these ashes and over the ashes of Prince Potemkin. He tried to intrigue. And so on. It's difficult to count on success at the front with such an attitude towards reality,” explained one of the interlocutors.
“Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich decided to appoint Andrei Belousov, a much more rational person, as Minister of Defense. And the mysticism of Sergei Kuzhugetovich may come in handy in the Security Council. There are certain plans in this regard,” he added. By the way, in light of the fact that Valery Gerasimov remains in his position. It should be noted that, most likely, the president heard his opinion - that the NWO will last for several more years . And it will be guided precisely by this forecast.
In this regard, sources predict that Belousov will begin an active transfer of the country's economy to a war footing. And they call this one of his most important tasks as Minister of Defense.
We talked with sources in the Kremlin, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff and tell important details of the personnel changes that have occurred in our country.
Firstly, Sergei Shoigu has not been formally demoted and may even seem to be satisfied with his new post. But that's not true. Sergei Kuzhugetovich really wanted to remain Minister of Defense, and for him the president's decision came as a big and unpleasant surprise. As is the case for the vast majority of our sources. Although it should be noted that some interlocutors predicted problems for Shoigu in early May.
“This is Patrushev - the head and strategist, he did great things in the Security Council. But Shoigu doesn't know what to do there. For him, this appointment is an honorary exile. He is terribly disappointed,” said a Kremlin source.
Secondly, Shoigu was fired, according to a high-ranking source in the Ministry of Defense, “for a long-term lack of serious successes at the front.” Avdeevka and the advance of our troops on a number of sectors of the front, including in the Kharkov region and the DPR, were not enough for Vladimir Vladimirovich. To be fair, Shoigu promised the president much more than he was able to achieve. And Putin is tired of these promises. This fact is recognized in the ministry itself. Of course, the situation with the arrest of Timur Ivanov and the strange intrigues that emanated from Sergei Kuzhugetovich and his entourage played a role . But the discrepancy between the promises of the now former minister and the situation on the battlefield is one of the main reasons for the resignation. Thirdly, almost all of our interlocutors expect Andrei Belousov to transfer the country's economy to a military footing, to attract additional funds for the [invasion of Ukraine], the defense industry and the army as a whole. Belousov spoke almost directly last year about the need to introduce a special tax on SVO. Sources are sure that he will lobby for this tax and others, in particular the tax on deserters, which we wrote about the day before. And this is understandable, money is needed for SVO. Belousov is also expected to carry out “rational and economically justified mobilization.” Most likely, with his appointment, partial demobilization will become closer . But sources in the Kremlin promised to tell more about this in the coming days. By the way, our insight was confirmed: the president decided not to let Sergei Lavrov resign . The Foreign Minister is not very happy, but promises to “continue to serve Russia faithfully.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov as Russian Minister of Defense on May 12, moving Shoigu to the position of Security Council Secretary in place of Nikolai Patrushev. These high-level reshuffles following the Russian presidential election strongly suggest that Putin is taking significant steps towards mobilizing the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to support a protracted war in Ukraine and possibly prepare for a future confrontation with NATO. The Russian Federation Council posted a list of Putin's proposed cabinet ministers on May 12, which notably confirms that Putin has “proposed” Belousov as the new Minister of Defense (Putin's proposals are orders).[1] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Kremlin newswire TASS that Shoigu, who has served as Russian defense minister since 2012 — will assume the position of Security Council Secretary and act as Putin's deputy on the Russian Military-Industrial Commission.[2] Peskov also announced that Putin dismissed Patrushev from his former position as Security Council Secretary “due to [his] transfer to another job,” which was not specified and that the Kremlin will announce his new role in the “near future.”[3] Peskov also noted that Army General Valery Gerasimov will remain Chief of the Russian General Staff, and a change in this position is not foreseen at this time.[4] Gerasimov is also currently the overall theater commander for Russian forces in Ukraine.
Belousov’s appointment to the position of Russian Defense Minister is a significant development in Putin's efforts to set full economic conditions for a protracted war. Belousov has no military experience and is an economist by trade — he served as Russian Minister of Economic Development from 2012–2013, following a career in economic analysis and forecasting between 1981 and 2006.[5] His lack of military experience is not anomalous — Shoigu also lacked experience in uniform before he took over the Defense Ministry.[6] Belousov then served as First Deputy Prime Minister from 2020 until his new 2024 appointment.[7] Belousov is also a known advocate for greater government involvement in the economy.[8] Peskov announced Belousov’s appointment to state newswire TASS on May 12 and explained that “it is very important to fit the economy of the security bloc [domestic security power vertical] into the country's economy,” suggesting that the Kremlin intends for Belousov to integrate and streamline the DIB and industries affiliated with Russia's security and defense forces with wider domestic economic policy.[9] Several Russian insider sources similarly responded to Belousov’s new position and claimed that it shows that Putin has serious concerns over corruption levels and misuse of funds within the Russian military, conflicts between the military and the Russian DIB, and the perceived inefficacy of the Russian MoD as a whole.[10] An unnamed Russian federal official told Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii that Belousov will work in his new role to “competently organize work and logistics processes, ensure the necessary production and supplies, orient the economy towards the ‘special military operation,’ and squeeze the technological maximum out of the defense industry.”[11] A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger noted that Belousov’s new role “means the beginning of a large-scale audit and restructuring of all financial models” in the Russian MoD.[12]
Belousov’s nearly decade-long tenure as an economic minister in the Russian federal government and his more recent involvement managing various domestic DIB innovation and drone projects, prepare him well to lead the struggling Russian MoD apparatus. The Russian MoD under Shoigu struggled with allegations of high-level corruption and bureaucratic inertia, facing constant scathing critiques from Russian military commentators.[13] Belousov has a stronger reputation for being an effective technocrat, and insider sources have claimed that he has a positive relationship with Putin.[14] Belousov met with Putin in November 2023 to discuss DIB projects and technological cooperation and has spoken to Putin about issues with Russia's domestic drone production.[15] Belousov also more recently highlighted a draft state order for 4.4 billion-rubles (roughly $48 million) for the production of drones until 2030, as well as plans to financially support drone producers and train drone developers and operators.[16] The focus on maximizing the technological innovation and output of the Russian DIB, particularly in the drone sphere, is likely to be extremely valuable to the Kremlin's war effort —the Kremlin has recently had to reckon with a gap between Russian drone production and contemporary battlefield realities.[17] Belousov personally announced in January 2023 that Russia had finalized the “Unmanned Aircraft Systems” project, which provides 696 billion rubles (about $7 billion) for the production of 32,000 drones per year until 2030.[18] Putin likely intends Belousov to use his experience in a civilian government position to bridge federal economic policies with the Russian MoD agenda, thereby more fully mobilizing the Russian DIB at a larger and longer-term scale and integrating it with domestic economic policy. This effort sets conditions for a fuller economic mobilization, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine.
Shoigu’s replacement of Patrushev as Security Council Secretary is in line with Putin's general pattern of quietly sidelining high-level security officials by granting them peripheral roles within the Russian security sphere rather than simply firing them. The Russian Security Council is an advisory body that also plays a role in executing security-related policies and developing Russian strategic culture, making Shoigu’s appointment as Security Council Secretary and de facto demotion from the prestigious post of Russian Defense Minister less humiliating.[19] Putin has removed Shoigu from the direct MoD chain of command but granted him continued influence in the security space. Shoigu has remained an important and loyal subordinate, and sometimes a scapegoat, and Putin likely benefits from maintaining Shoigu’s leadership and experience in some official capacity. Shoigu’s removal also follows two high-profile incidents — the removal of his reported ally Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on corruption charges and Putin's meeting with Shoigu’s political adversary and Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin to discuss DIB updates, which were likely leading indicators of the Kremlin's preparations to remove Shoigu from his long-held position.[20]
Putin has previously similarly sidelined his failed generals by appointing them to peripheral security and defense related positions outside of the direct chain of command, sometimes allowing them to redeem themselves and return to Putin's favor as ISW has assessed.[21] Putin's removal of Patrushev from the Security Council is noteworthy, however, since several Western and Russian reports that Patrushev is a close personal ally of Putin—the Wall Street Journal alleged in December 2023 that Patrushev was the individual responsible for the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.[22] WSJ reported that Patrushev’s 2008 appointment as Security Council Secretary was largely a formality and that Patrushev serves as de facto head of all Russian security services, making him the second most powerful person in Russia.[23] WSJ also reported that Patrushev acts as a “hybrid intelligence official and diplomat” and routinely pays visits to world leaders on Putin's behalf. ISW cannot yet confirm what Patrushev’s new role will be but considering Patrushev’s reported personal importance to Putin's regime stability and Putin's longtime tendency to balance Russian siloviki (strongmen with political influence) such as Patrushev within the power vertical, Patrushev’s next position will be an important reflection of Putin's intent. The Kremlin may establish a new role or office for Patrushev to lead, such as establishing a higher-ranking position to manage the siloviki faction.
Aside from Patrushev’s dismissal, Putin largely reappointed the heads of core Russian security services, suggesting that he maintains a core cadre of loyal siloviki. Putin reappointed Vladimir Kolokoltsev as Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergei Naryshkin as Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Alexander Bortnikov as Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and Viktor Zolotov as Director of Rosgvardia.[24] ISW previously assessed that Russian security services and affiliated siloviki, particularly Bortnikov, were key constituencies for Putin's election to his fifth term, and Putin has relied heavily on the work of the aforementioned security agencies to maintain regime stability, particularly following the failed Wagner Group rebellion.[25] Kolokolstev has been instrumental in coordinating the Kremlin's migrant policy (which has been especially relevant in the aftermath of the March 22 IS attack on Crocus City Hall); Naryshkin has been an important player in establishing information conditions and propagating justifications for the war; Putin has personally praised Bortnikov and the FSB for protecting Russian sovereignty; and Zolotov has spearheaded efforts to absorb former Wagner Group fighters into Rosgvardia.[26] These siloviki form the backbone of Putin's core cabinet, and their reappointment suggests that Putin will continue to rely on, and empower them, into his next term.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024
The “minor” reshuffles in the Russian Government have almost been completed, but this is precisely what indicates a crisis in the country's governance system. Having irreconcilable positions on the formation of the facade of power, the main towers of the Kremlin, having come close to the point of transition of the crisis into the information space, decided to settle on small rearrangements that should “strengthen” the positions of the two main Kremlin groups, but even here it seems that one of them has strengthened a little more.
First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov, who has also dumped the ballast of responsibility in the form of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia, this is certainly a strengthening of the position of Sergei Chemezov, who openly shows, jointly with Manturov, demonstrative campaigns to the person appointed by the president and similar to Vladimir Putin, who controls everything. It is worth noting that now Denis Manturov will actually control almost all processes in the Government and will be the “chief” of the Government from the so-called “Politburo 2.0”.
The second and equivalent, as planned, but the “second” Deputy Prime Minister and “supervisor” from the “Politburo” will be the son of the former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai Patrushev, Dmitry, who also dumps ballast in the form of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. True, by agreement, Dmitry Patrushev still has prospects of entering the transit line to the chair of the head of the Government by the end of the year and the presidency by the spring of next year. In the absence of the opportunity to agree on a new head of the Government, Sergei Chemezov played an interesting game, supporting the claims of the Chinese leadership that Mikhail Mishustin remain in his chair for some time. This is not a game in favor of China, but a way to keep both the sheep intact and the wolves well-fed, and the “sheep” in this case is the Chinese leadership in an embrace with Mishustin, who, just as he has not decided anything globally, will not decide. The recent meeting between Chemezov and Mishustin is a prelude to the appointment of Mishustin as the old-new prime minister. It is worth paying attention to the unusual media activity of Sergei Chemezov lately; usually he prefers to stay in the shadows, but now is a special case; a clear signal is needed to the second and third echelon elites about who is in the leading positions in the country.
In response to the strengthening of Chemezov, Nikolai Patrushev played almost all-in, exchanging his official post as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for increased influence on the security bloc and “guarantees” of his son's presidency. In his place, Patrushev put Shoigu, who is essentially a puppet idiot like Putin's double. Sergei Shoigu in the Security Council is an understandable step by Patrushev, the goal of which is to weaken the influence of the Security Council by moving the center of decision-making into the shadows and further closing the power bloc to itself. All reassignments of security forces were lobbied by Nikolai Patrushev.Zolotov and Kolokoltsev become even more devoted and obligated to “Sokratych.” The current status quo also suits the leadership of the FSB Bortnikov-Korolev. Belousov in the Ministry of Defense is an agreed candidacy between Chemezov and Patrushev; he must stop the total theft of the military budget by taking the main flows under the control of the Politburo. Patrushev’s all-in is a serious step and raising the stakes to the limit. Deception of Sokratych’s ambitions with a claim to the presidency of his son Dmitry, in the future for no more than 10 months, will lead to paralysis of power or total superiority of one of the towers and, in fact, to the seizure of power.
Yes, and... Nikolai Patrushev will certainly come up with a new position for himself, whatever he wants.
What does Putin expect from Belousov and what will happen to Shoigu?
Everyone has already digested a little the personnel changes in power made the day before by the president. We were in no hurry to catch the hype, talked with several high-ranking interlocutors, and now we are ready to give you a more detailed breakdown. Shoigu failed to hold on to the post of Defense Minister, which means that in the near future he will lose his influence.
First of all, due to the fact that the Ministry of Defense is now not just an ordinary department. The Ministry of Defense now oversees the construction of many facilities in new regions, builds housing for the military, pays money for the death and injury of military personnel in the regions (including the so-called “coffins”). Combined with the power component, this was a very powerful tool in Shoigu’s hands. Don't forget about the Africa Corps (Африканский корпус), which has largely replaced the Wagner PMC and really influences the geopolitical situation on the continent, washing away gold, diamonds and other metals.
Belousov should conduct an audit and, as Minister of Defense, make the department more efficient from an economic point of view. The last straw for Shoigu’s dismissal was the investigation into his deputy Timur Ivanov. Combined with weak progress at the front, this persuaded Putin to make a decision. Compared to Shoigu, Belousov looks like a more advantageous candidate, since he has quite successful cases of reformatting the Russian economy in the context of sanctions and the implementation of successful managerial decisions. He was also not involved in any corruption scandals. Belousov’s appointment also indicates political changes. He is not only loyal to Putin, but also comes from the Gref-Kiriyenko group. And it was Sergei Vladilenovich who “improved greatly” against this background. Belousov is expected to build a strategy for a long-term [invasion of Ukraine] and provide funds for all this. The same transfer of the economy to a war footing. At the same time, Gerasimov will directly lead the troops for now. It is worth noting here that a civilian minister of defense is a completely adequate solution to current problems. By the way, everything is structured similarly in NATO countries and beyond.
After these upheavals, Patrushev will remain in the cage. Dmitry Patrushev is getting promoted , and Nikolai Platonovich will have less routine work in the Security Council. There will be small reforms in this body, aimed at Shoigu’s new functionality. But this is provided that Belousov’s audit does not show large-scale thefts in the Ministry of Defense and will not be made public. A Kremlin source said the president is once again trying to balance the influence of groups within the elite. It is obvious that people and companies that worked with Shoigu will be forced to either negotiate with Belousov or retreat. And this is a big redistribution of financial flows
During searches of his home, funds in the amount of more than 100 million rubles, gold coins, collectible watches and luxury items were discovered, the department reported. Kuznetsov was taken into custody on May 13, as specified in a post on the SK telegram channel
Putin's decision to remove Shoigu from the Russian MoD appears to have also opened the door for the departure of certain Shoigu affiliates from the MoD, likely one of the intended effects of Putin's recent cabinet reshuffles. Several Russian milbloggers and insider sources claimed on May 13 that two deputy defense ministers—Ruslan Tsalikov and Alexey Krivoruchko—submitted their resignations to Shoigu a week before Putin removed Shoigu as defense minister.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Tsalikov was “Shoigu’s right-hand man” for many years and oversaw troop support and the Russian MoD’s department on information policy and information warfare.[26] Krivoruchko is also reportedly close with Shoigu and oversaw military-technical support, weapons development, special equipment, and the implementation of state defense orders.[27] Russian sources claimed that both Tsalikov and Krivoruchko were embroiled in corruption scandals, and one Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger noted that frontline troops directly suffered as a result of their corrupt practices.[28] Russian insider sources claimed that Russian authorities questioned Tsalikov over possible corruption charges in late April, and suggested at the time that Tsalikov would be forced into retirement.[29] Russian authorities recently removed former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, also a reported close Shoigu ally, from his position on corruption charges.[30] Tsalikov and Krivoruchko may have resigned in hope of receiving new positions outside of the MoD in order to avoid criminal prosecution on charges similar to Ivanov’s charges. Kremlin-awarded milblogger suggested that Tsalikov will also take a new role in the Russian Security Council following Shoigu.[31] Russian insider sources speculated that Belousov, as new defense minister, will only want to leave a maximum of two to three officials affiliated with Shoigu in the Russian MoD, suggesting that more Shoigu affiliates may still resign or be fired in the coming weeks.[32]
One Russian milblogger speculated that Shoigu and his affiliates were part of the alleged “pro-China” party in the Russian MoD and suggested that other MoD officials associated with Russia's China policy will be removed or resign alongside Shoigu, Ivanov, and others, although ISW cannot verify these speculations.[33] Putin likely used the constitutionally mandated ministerial resignations following his inauguration and subsequent nomination of new senior officials as a convenient moment to dismiss ineffective officials. Putin likely assessed that Shoigu’s constitutionally mandated resignation, almost a year after deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion to remove Shoigu and Russian Chief of the Army General Staff Valery Gerasimov from power, was the appropriate time to remove Shoigu from the Russian MoD without appearing to give in to Prigozhin’s demands.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2024
By the same decree, Putin reassigned the composition of the presidential administration - Anton Vaino remained its head. Sergei Kiriyenko and Alexey Gromov - first deputies of the administration. Maxim Oreshkin moved from the position of assistant to the president to the position of deputy. A similar position was occupied by Vladimir Ostrovenko, Dmitry Kozak and Magomedsalam Magomedov.
The president has ten assistants in the new administration. They also include foreign policy assistant Yuri Ushakov, head of the State Legal Administration of the President Larisa Brycheva, former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, who is responsible for coordinating state policy in the historical and humanitarian spheres, former Minister of Education and Science Andrei Fursenko, former Yaroslavl Governor Dmitry Mironov, former prime minister of Chechnya Ruslan Edelgeriev, head of the Kremlin Control Directorate Dmitry Shalkov and head of the presidential reference office Dmitry Kalimulin.
Alexey Dyumin is 51 years old. In 1994, he graduated from the Voronezh Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics, and in 1995 he began working in the Federal Security Service (FSO). In August 1999, Dyumin became part of the personal guard of Vladimir Putin, who had just been appointed head of government. After Putin was elected president in 2000, Dyumin continued to work with him. In 2007, Dyumin became the head of security for Viktor Zubkov during the period when he served as prime minister. After Putin took over as prime minister in 2008, Dyumin again became involved in his security. Dyumin, in an interview in 2016, said that he was not the president's adjutant, but was “Putin's foot soldier,” working as part of a group of officers who ensured security in Russia and abroad.
In 2014, Dyumin was appointed commander of Russian special operations forces and took part in the events that preceded the annexation of Crimea to Russia. In 2015, he became the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. At the end of the same year, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. He oversaw combat training, as well as construction, housing, and military medicine.
At the beginning of February 2016, by presidential decree, he was appointed acting governor of the Tula region. In September of the same year, he was officially elected to office. In the gubernatorial elections in 2021, Dyumin was re-elected for a new term, gaining 83.6% of the vote.
In June 2023, some telegram channels, in particular Brief, disseminated information that in June 2023 Dyumin was sent to negotiate with the founder of the Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, during the PMC’s “rebellion” and its march to Moscow. Later, the press service of the government of the Tula region denied this information, saying that such issues are beyond the authority of the governor.
The last public meeting between Putin and Dyumin took place on May 2. In the part of it open to journalists, Dyumin spoke in detail about the support that the region provides to the special military operation - from assistance to defense enterprises to assistance to military families. The President praised the region for the good growth in the industrial production index and the share of manufacturing production.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/14/05/2024/664318ea9a79474413c61609
A few years ago, it was “common knowledge” that Alexey Dyumin would succeed Putin, but Nikolai Patrushev has maneuvered himself into the leadership role. We will know more in a few weeks.
Russian authorities detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister and Russian MoD Main Personnel Directorate Head Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov on May 13 on charges of accepting large-scale bribes. The Russian Investigative Committee and Russian media reported on May 14 that the Russian 235th Garrison Military Court detained Kuznetsov on suspicion of accepting a large bribe in the period 2021-2023 while serving as the head of the Russian General Staff's 8th Directorate, which is in charge of the protection of state secrets.[11] The Russian Investigative Committee reported that authorities raided Kuznetsov’s home and discovered over 100 million rubles (about $1 million) worth of cash, including foreign currency, and luxury items. Moscow's Basmanny Raion Court also detained Russian businessman Lev Martirosyan as part of Kuznetsov’s case.[12] Russian outlet Kommersant reported that Martirosyan bribed Kuznetsov with a total of 30.5 million rubles ($333,935) to help Martirosyan’s hotel companies win government contracts.[13] Kommersant reported that the same Investigative Committee department is investigating Kuznetsov’s and detained Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov’s cases and that the Investigative Committee is forming a special team to investigate similar cases involving high-ranking military personnel. Russian authorities detained Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes.[14] Ongoing speculation about further changes within the Russian military and political leadership prompted Russian sources to speculate about the possible return of disgraced Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin to Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor, but Russian sources concluded that insider reports that Surovikin is in Moscow are inaccurate.[15]
Putin appointed former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev as his presidential assistants on May 14, further re-balancing his ministerial cabinet for his fifth term.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that Dyumin will oversee issues regarding the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), State Council, and sports policy, while Patrushev will oversee the strategic development of the Russian shipbuilding industry as well as “other areas, perhaps.”[17] Russian presidential assistants typically help the Russian president in the execution of their powers, including by preparing proposals for presidential work and by participating in official meetings alongside the president.[18] Presidential assistants may perform other tasks as the president orders. Dyumin’s appointment as Putin's assistant on DIB issues is consistent with Putin's apparent effort to restructure the Russian economy for a protracted war — Dyumin generally has a positive reputation amongst Russian commentators and is seen as a solid and effective professional, and Putin likely is hoping to leverage Dyumin’s good reputation to manage his own.[19]
Russian commentators received the news of Patrushev’s new position less certainly, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing sources close to the Kremlin, stated that its sources were “stunned” when they saw that Putin had removed Patrushev from the Security Council, and even more “shocked” that his new position is to be Putin's assistant on shipbuilding.[20] Putin may have moved Patrushev to this new position in order to rebalance the siloviki-run power vertical that exists within the Russian security services, as ISW previously reported Putin tends to do with powerful siloviki.[21] Patrushev is reportedly a close Putin ally, the individual personally responsible for the assassination of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Putin's personal diplomat who frequently conducted diplomatic trips on Putin's behalf, according to Western reporting.[22] Putin can continue to use Patrushev’s connections and experience even if Patrushev is nominally acting as an expert on “shipbuilding” strategy. The new position is nevertheless an obvious demotion.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024
What really happened to Patrushev?
It is interesting to observe how a number of telegram channels, which only yesterday praised Nikolai Patrushev, rushed to throw mud at him after his appointment to a new position . Here it is worth making a small remark about him and the former Tula governor Dyumin, who saw himself, if not as prime minister, then AT LEAST as minister of defense. In two months, Patrushev will turn 73 years old. During my time working for the state, some health issues have accumulated that need to be resolved. Under Patrushev, the Security Council became a truly strong body that has influence. And Patrushev Sr. will largely retain this influence personally.
He is one of the most prominent hawks of the Vladimir Putin era, and Vladimir Vladimirovich himself understands this. People like Nikolai Platonovich cannot simply be thrown away . Now Patrushev is moving on to more specific work, and his influence little by little (and this is important to clarify) will pass to his son Dmitry Patrushev, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister.
“Few during this rotation managed to get a promotion. But Dima was able to (talking about Dmitry Patrushev - Ed.). And Borya Kovalchuk was able to (the son of billionaire close to Putin Yuri Kovalchuk was appointed head of the Accounts Chamber - Ed.),” noted the political strategist, working with the Kremlin.
At the same time, Sergei Kiriyenko, who successfully organized the next elections of Vladimir Vladimirovich, remained in his position. Although he strengthened himself informally at the expense of his people in the government. Therefore, only a person who is completely unfamiliar with the real situation in the elites can say that Patrushev was “written off” or “thrown out.”
Let's return to Dyumin - he saw himself in a much higher position than assistant to the president. However, you must understand that there are many people interested, but the number of Chairs is limited. Therefore, Dyumin was given the opportunity to gain more experience. Despite the fact that the former governor is already 51 years old. He understands that in the next year or two, if the SVO does not end, he is unlikely to be transferred to another Chair. And this is even a little offensive, because Dyumin was as loyal to Putin as possible. His interlocutors say that his handshake with Prigozhin let him down.
The Chinese leadership intends to obtain for use vast territories of Russia located in Siberia and the Far East. These are precisely the territories that Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to his Chinese comrades several years ago and the long-term lease agreements for which he personally certified more than a year ago. For the Russian leadership, even the publication of this information at the official level threatens a crisis situation in the country, not to mention the implementation of these agreements. Despite the repressions, the population of Russia is unlikely to applaud the actual alienation of the country's territories, which are larger in size than the territory of Ukraine. The Chinese insist that implementation of the agreement begin on January 1, 2025, as previously agreed. During their visit to China, the Russian leadership plans to try to agree to postpone this date by one year, while appeasing their Chinese colleagues with economic preferences. A permanent crisis will haunt the Russian government until the end of the regime.
Dark red is Chinese Manchuria (part of China) and in pink is Russian Manchuria. Resource-rich Sakhalin Island is offshore.
Russia's Manchuria (also called Outer Manchuria) belonged to China until 1858. It is an area the size of Nigeria which includes a long coastal area along the Sea of Japan and Vladivostok as well as Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands, both obtained in 1945 from Japan. These territories have a population of 4.5 million, untapped natural gas and iron ore along its coastline, and significant amounts of oil and gas on Sakhalin Island. By contrast, China's Manchuria (also called Inner Manchuria) is a dynamic province with a population of 107 million that is industrialized and a trade hub. Beijing would gladly reclaim all of Manchuria, and there is little doubt that a weak and crumbling Russia might be forced to divest these lands for a price.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 15, 2024
Russian sources speculated that the May 13 detention of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov is only the beginning of a wider effort to root out corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 15 that Kuznetsov’s detention and the April 24 detention of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on charges of accepting bribes prompted rumors that Russian authorities may arrest other unspecified corrupt officials serving in the Russian MoD’s Main Operational-Mobilization Directorate, Main Directorate of Combat Training, and other high-level directorates.[32] The milblogger noted that bribery schemes have been incredibly common and pervasive in Russia over the last 15 years and that Russian authorities may limit their efforts to corruption cases that have caused tangible issues with Russian forces’ combat effectiveness or operational security. Several Russian milbloggers lamented the pervasiveness of corruption and ineptitude among the Russian high command, and one Russian milblogger called on the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Investigative Committee to “shake out” all of the corrupt officials within the Russian MoD.[33]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024
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