Russian border guards are withdrawing from much of Armenia as Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continues to face domestic backlash for decisions regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 9 that Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed during a meeting on May 8 to stop Russian border guard operations in a number of Armenian regions due to “changed conditions,” likely referring to Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[33] Peskov noted that Russian border guards will remain stationed on the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian international borders.[34] Meanwhile, thousands of protestors have completed a multi-day march to Yerevan, Armenia, where they are currently protesting in Yerevan's Republic Square against Pashinyan’s decision to transfer control over four border villages in Tavush Province to Azerbaijan in the wake of Armenia's loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[35] Armenian Apostolic Church Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, who serves as the Primate of the Tavush Diocese, has emerged as a leader of these protests and issued a public call on May 9 for Pashinyan to either resign within the hour or face a vote of no confidence in the parliament.[36] Galstanyan met with Armenian opposition parliamentarians after the deadline elapsed to discuss initiating a vote of no confidence to oust Pashinyan.[37] Armenia's constitution stipulates that at least a third of parliamentarians or the president must support a draft resolution of no confidence to bring a vote, and at least half of parliamentarians must then vote in favor of the final no confidence resolution.[38] The constitution also stipulates that the final vote of no confidence occur between 48 and 72 hours of the draft's initial submission. Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party holds roughly 54 percent of the seats in Armenian parliament, so it is unlikely that a vote of no confidence would oust Pashinyan without defectors from the Civil Contract party voting for the opposition.[39]
The Kremlin may seek to capitalize on opposition outrage in Armenia to punish Pashinyan for increasingly pulling away from Russia. Russian state media has closely followed the protests and is widely amplifying Galstanyan's calls for Pashinyan’s resignation or a vote of no confidence.[40] A prominent, Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger has tracked the protest march from Kirash, Tavush Province to Yerevan and expressed support for the protestors.[41] This milblogger and other Russian officials and pro-Kremlin voices have frequently spread information operations accusing Pashinyan of “weakness” and incompetence for ceding territory to Azerbaijan after Russia failed to prevent the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.[42] Pro-Kremlin actors may amplify reports of discontent or perpetuate ongoing Kremlin information operations in the wake of Armenian opposition protests to further pressure Pashinyan into mending relations with Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2024
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is retaining his position in the Russian government for Russian President Vladimir Putin's new term of office, and there have been speculations but no confirmations of changes to Putin's cabinet. The Russian State Duma voted overwhelmingly in support of Mishustin’s renomination as prime minister, and Putin signed the corresponding decree reappointing Mishustin on May 10.[41] Russian outlet RBK, citing three sources familiar with personnel consultations in the Kremlin, reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov will retain his title as Deputy Prime Minister but will relinquish his post as Minister of Industry and Trade, and RBK reported that Kaliningrad Oblast Head Anton Alikhanov will take over this position.[42] Putin publicly embarrassed Manturov in January 2023, and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu heavily criticized Manturov on May 2, 2024, but RBK’s source stated that the new appointment is “logical and expected” as all the possible candidates for the Minister of Industry and Trade are “in one way or another, from Manturov’s team.”[43] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin stated that the Duma will consider appointments for deputy prime ministers and ministerial positions on May 14.[44]
Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko announced on May 10 that she delivered a list of candidates to Putin for the head of the Federation Council Accounts Chamber, which notably includes Presidential Control Directorate Deputy Head Boris Kovalchuk.[45] Boris Kovalchuk is the son of Putin's “personal banker” Yuri Kovalchuk, who is often credited with being Putin's close confidant and influential ideologue, including reportedly being one of three Russians to convince Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[46] Yuri Kovalchuk is also a close associate of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko, whose own influence has expanded following the start of the full-scale invasion.[47] Putin only recently appointed Boris Kovalchuk to his post in the Presidential Control Directorate on March 15, before which Boris Kovalchuk headed the Russian energy company Inter RAO for 15 years.[48] The other two candidates for Federation Council Accounts Chamber head include Accounts Chamber Acting Head Galina Izotova, who has served in this position since the former head resigned in 2022 and served as deputy head since 2019, and Anatoly Artamonov, chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Budget and Financial Markets.[49] Boris Kovalchuk is the only one of these three candidates to lack a doctorate in economics and extensive experience in the field.[50] Boris Kovalchuk's candidacy for a Federation Council post given his lack of experience and newness to the presidential administration is notable given Yuri Kovalchuk's closeness to Putin, indicating that Kovalchuk's favor with Putin may be increasing. Putin will consider Matvienko’s list of candidates and choose one for the Federation Council to consider in the coming days.[51]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2024