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L’Audace (The war plan)
National Review ^ | March 25, 2003 | Mackubin Thomas Owens

Posted on 03/25/2003 9:05:27 AM PST by conservativecorner

During the Allied breakout from Normandy, Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and Field Marshall Montgomery chose to employ a cautious operational approach that stressed gaining territory. Bradley's subordinate, Gen. George Patton, pleaded for the opportunity to execute an encirclement of the German trapped in the "Falaise pocket" He was rebuffed. He then asked for permission to turn his Third Army to the northeast and sweep down both banks of the Seine. Such a bold stroke would most likely have trapped the entire German western army before it could escape to the east. Once again, Patton was overruled and the Germans, although pounded mercilessly by Allied air power, were able to extricate some of their forces from the Falaise pocket. These forces survived to fight again on the Siegfried Line, most likely extending the war in Europe by several months.

I thought about this when I, along with several others, received an e-mail from a well-known military correspondent on the eve of the war, asking for our assessment of the plan of action for the upcoming campaign, at least as it could be ascertained from open sources. Among other questions, he asked for an assessment of the risk of the plan as compared to the plan for Desert Storm, and if there might be a danger of a bold plan executed cautiously.

My own answers to these queries were that: 1) the plan, at least as it had been reported in the press, did seem to incur substantial risk, but the alternatives were less attractive and 2) I saw no reason to believe that the plan would not be executed boldly. I believe that my responses have been vindicated. Central Command has developed a bold plan and it is being implemented in the same spirit. Some of the events of Sunday illustrate the risks of the plan, but in the greater scheme of things, these risks will prove to be manageable.

The best chance for the coalition to achieve its postwar goals is to rapidly take down the Iraqi regime. What Clausewitz called the "center of gravity" of this effort is Baghdad. Anything that gets allied forces to Baghdad early benefits the coalition; anything that delays this outcome redounds to the advantage of the Iraqis.

It seems clear from the conduct of the war so far that Central Command is willing to accept risk to reach Baghdad early. It could have opted for a cautious, deliberate attack to the north, consolidating control of southern Iraq before closing on Baghdad. Instead, it chose the audacious approach. The dash for Baghdad by the 3rd Infantry Division and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) is akin to Patton's plan for a rush to the Seine in order to envelop retreating Germans after Normandy.

For both strategic and political reasons, it has been necessary to secure control of the Shatt-al-Arab and the port of Umm Qasr, but Basra essentially has been isolated and bypassed, with the attack continuing to the north. The allies control the bridges across the Euphrates at Nasiriyah, As Samawa, and An Nijaf, but have attempted to avoid drawn-out urban combat.

The ambush of a convoy in support of the 3rd Infantry Division, resulting in the capture of several Americans, illustrates the risks of this approach. This event and others indicate that Iraqi irregular forces have slipped in behind the coalition forces in an attempt to interdict lines of communication and supply. This is a distraction.

There is little to indicate that Iraqi forces can launch anything beyond spoiling attacks such as the ambush of the convoy in Nasiriyah. It is likely that air strikes have destroyed the ability of the Iraqi high command, to the extent it is still functioning, to communicate with subordinate commanders and control their actions. In addition, the Republican Guard divisions guarding Baghdad have been, and will continue to be, subjected to massive air strikes. Allied air supremacy makes it impossible for any major Iraqi formation to execute tactical moves.

One of Patton's favorite quotations was from Frederick the Great: "L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace." War rarely goes according to a script. Friction and the fog of uncertainty have a way of waylaying even the best plan, well executed. I can almost guarantee that there will be further setbacks as the coalition closes on Baghdad. But I think that both Patton and Frederick would approve of Central Command's plan and its execution to this point.

— Mackubin Thomas Owens, an NRO contributing editor, is on leave from the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., to write a history of U.S. civil-military relations.


TOPICS: Foreign Affairs; Front Page News; Government; News/Current Events; War on Terror
KEYWORDS: iraqifreedom; warplan

1 posted on 03/25/2003 9:05:27 AM PST by conservativecorner
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To: conservativecorner
Heh, I broke out the "Audacity, audacity, always audacity" in one of the hand-wringing "we're too overextended WAAAAAHHHH!" threads from yesterday.
2 posted on 03/25/2003 9:09:52 AM PST by John H K
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To: conservativecorner
The only critic I have of the war planners is we should have more troops for the bold dash. I believe we should always have the firepower of a Starfleet Cruisier but in numbers that will rival the Chinese Human Wave.
3 posted on 03/25/2003 9:10:48 AM PST by Fee
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To: conservativecorner
Owens is a marvelous commentator, and usually spot-on in his assessments, but in this case, he errs in his assessment of Allied strategy. Patton's plan had two flaws. First, control of air space over the battlefield was NOT assured, and armour was, and is highly vulnerable to aircraft. Secondly, there was no assurance that Patton's proposed campaign could be supplied with POL and ammo. It was a dicey proposition. Patton was a great battlefield commandr, but he was probably more successful knowing that Bradley wouldn't hesitate to yank him if he overstepped his bounds..
4 posted on 03/25/2003 9:11:09 AM PST by ken5050
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To: conservativecorner
Sure would be nice to see the 4ID enter the battlefield.
5 posted on 03/25/2003 9:14:07 AM PST by The Vast Right Wing (Some drink from the fountain of knowledge, the French and Germans only gargle)
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To: conservativecorner
This is an outstanding war plan, very much as Patton would have conceived. Saddam has pulled his best units back to the Baghdad region. The sooner we get to it, the sooner this will be over. No reason to delay by chasing small units and irregulars down gopher holes in Southern Iraq, that would just delay things and drive up casualties.
6 posted on 03/25/2003 9:20:42 AM PST by colorado tanker
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To: conservativecorner
It was sad that some of our support troops were captured and killed as a result of the rapid advance and a wrong turn on their part, but in all likelihood the number of casualties from a slow war of attrition would have been greater.
7 posted on 03/25/2003 10:07:32 AM PST by Cicero (Marcus Tullius)
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To: Fee
You can't use Blitzkrieg tactics in a massive formation.

The Blitzkrieg works with a small mobile force with secure logistical lines to the rear. An attack against a standard entrenched army using this method has been shown time and again to be enormously successful and quick.

The troops following behind the strike force can be counted on to pacify the territory and process the enormous number of prisoners in encirclments.

It only took a few hundred thousand German attackers to take much of European Russia in 8 weeks in 1941. The rest of the German army was left to process the 5 million prisoners encircled.

The important thing in a Blitzkrieg is to cover lots of ground towards your objective, generaly the command and control center of the country under attack (Warsaw in 1939, Paris in 1940, Moscow in 1941, now Baghdad in 2003) and to disrupt the supply lines of the defenders. A place like Basra can be slowly mopped up as they run out of food and water and ammunition and fuel.

8 posted on 03/25/2003 10:25:43 AM PST by Hermann the Cherusker
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To: conservativecorner
"L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!" was said by Danton...but I can't say for sure that Frederick the Great had not said it earlier.
9 posted on 03/25/2003 11:04:41 AM PST by Verginius Rufus
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To: Verginius Rufus
Luckily, the sentiment is valid in any language.

10 posted on 03/25/2003 11:10:14 AM PST by headsonpikes
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To: Verginius Rufus
You are correct.

The quote from Georges Jacques Danton was, "Il nous faut de l'audace, encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace." - Speech to the Legislative Assembly August 28, 1792

Audacity, more audacity, always audacity.

Garde la Foi, mes amis! Nous nous sommes les sauveurs de la République! Maintenant et Toujours!
(Keep the Faith, my friends! We are the saviors of the Republic! Now and Forever!)

LonePalm, le Républicain du verre cassé (The Broken Glass Republican)

11 posted on 03/25/2003 11:20:35 AM PST by LonePalm (Commander and Chef)
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To: conservativecorner
The key to Patton's success was George Patton himself, and Eisenhower's brilliance to use that genius of maneuver warfare in the right place at the right time. I don't know if we have another Patton - if we do he will rise to the occassion - if and when the brass recognize talent and use it well. That is a lot to ask. On the other hand, the slow deliberate Bradley also was quite successful in his own way and could not have pulled off the moves Patton did. Nonetheless, the combined force of these Generals added up to victory - and that is the only thing that counts in the end.
12 posted on 03/28/2003 10:33:54 PM PST by efnwriter (http://efreedomnews.com)
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