The West is Running Out of Time in Afghanistan

The Jamestown Foundation ^ | October 17, 2006 | Michael Scheuer

[neverdem]

NVM: Modules
Volume 3, Issue 40 (October 17, 2006) | Download PDF Version The West is Running Out of Time in Afghanistan By Michael Scheuer From all observables, the Taliban insurgency is spreading from its deeply rooted base in southern and southeastern Afghanistan to provinces in the west and east. In addition, several Islamist insurgent organizations active during the 1979-89 jihad against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan—the "old mujahideen"—have allied themselves with the Taliban. Among the more important and militarily powerful of these long-established groups are Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami and the forces of Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, which belong to the Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis organization. Historically, both groups have been able to deploy substantial forces in the strategically vital corridors from the Khyber Pass through Jalalabad to Kabul, and along the only major highway running from Kabul to the southern provinces. Prior to the 2001 U.S.-led invasion, the first of these organizations was hostile to the Taliban, while the second was at best neutral toward it (Asia Times, October 5). Also noticeable in 2006 has been the strongly Afghan-centric nature of the insurgency. As in the jihad against the Red Army, the most important insurgent forces are made up of the Afghans themselves. Since Western leaders and the media focus so much attention on Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, the Afghans' dominant role in the war is often lost sight of. While al-Qaeda fighters and other so-called foreign fighters are active in Afghanistan—London's al-Hayat reports that more and more Saudi men are going to fight there since the Taliban assumed the military initiative this year—they are important but secondary contributors to the war effort (al-Hayat, October 3). As in the 1980s, the Afghans publicly and correctly point out that the U.S.-led coalition is increasingly facing a "nation in arms." On this question, for example, Taliban spokesman Abdul-Hai Mutamen highlighted the always intense nationalism and xenophobia of his countrymen when he said that while Afghans and foreign fighters "have spiritual sympathy with each other...Our resistance is a pure Afghan resistance" (Pakistan Observer, October 8). Another aspect of the Taliban's current agenda that is identical to the mujahideen's political tack in the 1980s is its definitive position that it will not participate in, or even negotiate with, President Karzai's government. In words familiar to those knowledgeable about the absolute intransigence of the Soviet-era mujahideen leaders, Taliban spokesman Mutamen recently explained that there would be no peace talks with Kabul because: "There is no independent government in Afghanistan now. The foreigners have established the current government. The occupying forces should first leave Afghanistan. We can then think of future peace talks...Our resistance, which has now spread throughout the country, is not for the sake of power or government. This is a very silly thought. We want to regain independence so our people can live under the system which they desire which is, of course, and Islamic government" (Afghan Islamic Press, October 7). As much as the Taliban's improved military performance is an ill omen for Karzai's government and the U.S.-led coalition, three other factors greatly augment the progress that the Taliban is making on the battlefield: Law-and-order: Western media reporting, newspapers published in Kabul, Herat and Kandahar, and statements by the Taliban show that crime rates are high in urban areas and that much of rural Afghanistan is plagued by bandits, warlords and narcotics traffickers. In other words, the law-and-order situation in most of the country is uncannily similar to the neatly anarchic environment that helped facilitate the Taliban's ascendancy in 1996. The failure of the Karzai government and its Western allies to deploy enough military forces to establish a reliable, country-wide law-and-order regime is the Taliban's most valuable non-military ally. Afghans invariably put the security of their families, businesses and farms above the implementation of elections and parliaments. Pakistan and Waziristan: The Afghan government and some Western officials have condemned Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's peace deal with the Pashtun tribes in the country's Waziristan region as being intended to strengthen the Taliban. The reality, however, seems to be that Musharraf made the deal because his army's presence in the tribal lands had become unsustainable politically. In addition to suffering heavy casualties in fighting Pashtun tribes, the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Waziristan—heavier casualties than those sustained by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan—the Pakistani army's "invasion" of the province smashed Islamabad's 50-year-old modus vivendi with the tribes to live-and-let-live and brought the area to the verge of civil war. In making peace, Musharraf did what he had to do by choosing to protect Pakistan's political stability and geographic integrity over continuing an armed intervention that threatened both and which would ultimately be feckless because of the U.S.-led coalition's failure to defeat the Taliban and control the Afghan countryside. There is no question that the Taliban is stronger because of the deal—if for no other reason than the safe haven it provided—but so is Pakistan's political stability, which was being undermined by the radicalizing impact that the army's incursion had on the country's powerful pro-Taliban and pro-al-Qaeda religious parties (Daily Times, October 3). Time: The old adage that familiarity breeds contempt is no place on earth truer than in Afghanistan, and there it additionally always breeds armed resistance. In the Afghans' view, the U.S.-led coalition has occupied Afghanistan for five-plus years, has failed to deliver a more prosperous and safer society, has killed a large number of Afghan civilians and shows no sign of planning a near-term departure. Always short of patience in regard to foreigners running their affairs, most Afghans probably would concur with Taliban spokesman Mutamen's statement that "the people of Afghanistan...never accept foreign dominance...America has attacked Afghanistan without any reasonable plan or suggestions. The Americans, therefore, get nothing but the death of their soldiers in Afghanistan. We want NATO and other foreign troops to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible" (Afghan Islamic Press, October 7). Ominously, another Taliban leader, Mullah Mehmood Allah Haq Yar, claims that not only has the Pashtun-dominated Taliban's patience run out, but that the forces of the late Ahmed Shah Masood—heretofore backing Karzai—are beginning to decide that they did not defeat and evict Moscow only to be ruled by the West. In late spring 2005, Yar claims to have talked with Northern Alliance representatives who "condemned the foreign presence in the country, but insisted that the Taliban take the lead [in attacking it] and then they would follow suit." Yar claims that the Taliban's contacts with the Alliance commanders are continuing (Asia Times, October 5). Overall, the increasing pace of the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan suggests it is only a matter of time until the commanders of the U.S.-led coalition are faced with telling their political leaders that a decision must be made to either heavily reinforce coalition forces—it appears that more than the 120,000 men Moscow deployed to Afghanistan in the 1980s would be necessary—or begin preparations to withdraw from the country. If taken now, such a decision would be made in the context of polls showing popular opinion in Canada and Britain turning decidedly against continued participation in the Afghan war and media reports that France may begin to withdraw its special forces from Afghanistan next spring (Associated Press, October 15).
	Find this article at: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370167

[hosepipe]

[ The West is Running Out of Time in Afghanistan ]

Yep tribal government is very powerful, and is, also, very popular in England and Canada.. you know, parlimentary(MOB) rule.. Which is similar to Monarchy except with a larger Mob..

Totally unlike America's Republic..

[Cannoneer No. 4]

StrategyPage is the place to go to learn the real deal.

The Taliban is done for the year. The campaigning season is just about over and the bad guys are fixing to hunker down until April or May when the snow melts.

Afghan National Army commandos with Coalition Special Operations Forces and lots of JDAMS and Predators might be busy in Waziristan this winter.

Then we will see how froggy the Taliban is come break up.

[Valin]

1 Tell you son this old zoomie says thanks.
2 (if I may suggest)
Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground
by Robert D. Kaplan
http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-Grunts-American-Military-Ground/dp/1400061326

"I was not concerned about crossing a professional boundary. My goal as a writer was simple and clear. I wanted to take a snapshot for posterity of what it was like for middle-level commissioned and noncommissioned American officers stationed at remote locations overseas at the beginning of the twenty-first century: a snapshot in words that those sergeants and warrant officers and captains and majors would judge as sufficiently accurate, so they might recognize themselves in it. It should be something, I hoped, that they could give to their grandchildren, saying, 'That's sort of like it was, and like those countries were.' It did not mean that I ignored tough issues and problems. It did mean that I wrote about their problems and frustrations, informed by their perspective." (Imperial Grunts, p. 258)
Robert Kaplan's phenomenal book Imperial Grunts is a thorough examination of life on the ground for the American military in faraway lands. The first in a series, the book’s research took him to Yemen, Columbia, extremely isolated Mongolia, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the two current "hot" war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. He lived with the men for months, listening to them, socializing with them, and going out on missions as well. In essence, he became them, at least to as much of a degree as a civilian can. In return, they provided him with a wealth of information and the experience of a lifetime. Kaplan did get some articles out of it, too (he writes for The Atlantic magazine), but most of it was for this book. This is a must-read for anybody interested in what life is like for those far from home, just doing their jobs and loving every minute of it.

Kaplan writes from the point of view of these men, getting across all of their frustration when diplomacy won't allow them to do their jobs (such as when a CIA plane goes down in Columbia and the Special Forces unit there is denied the ability to secure the site until well after the rebels are able to take everybody away), as well as the sheer joy some get out of what they're doing. The most amazing chapter in the book is on Mongolia, where one lone Special Forces officer (Lt. Colonel Tom Wilhelm) is the glue holding the relationship between the United States and Mongolia together, said relationship being partly responsible for the deployment of a small contingent of Mongolian troops to Iraq. He is the man on the ground, making decisions based on the knowledge gained from his time there. While he has the support of American diplomats, it is Wilhelm who has done much to earn the respect of the Mongolian military, and this relationship also makes great strides in keeping an eye on Russia and China, making his job extremely important. This chapter is fascinating stuff as Wilhelm takes Kaplan on a tour around some of the border crossings, introducing him to Mongolian officers, showing him their customs, and immersing him in what Wilhelm has to do here. While there, Kaplan learns much about Wilhelm's history in the Special Forces, and readers learn a lot about the conflicts in Bosnia and Macedonia, as well as his experiences during the unrest in Tajikistan.

Things like this enable Imperial Grunts to rise above a "snapshot of daily life on the ground" that it could have been (not that that would have been bad). Not only do we see things as they currently are (currently as of 2004, of course), but we get an excellent history of the role Special Forces have played in conflicts for the last twenty-five years or so as Kaplan gets these soldiers to tell him about their life. We learn about the places he visits, but we also hear about Bosnia, Peru, and other areas where Special Forces keep a low profile, going on missions of importance to American interests. These men have led fascinating lives, and Kaplan really seems to have bonded with everybody he meets; they tell him everything.

This includes the frustrations they sometimes feel, and Kaplan does not hide any of it. Those in Colombia chafe at the Rules of Engagement that keep them out of the actual fighting. They are training Colombian troops in counter-insurgency tactics, but their RoE are so strict that they would have to be in imminent danger before they could actually do anything. In Afghanistan, the soldiers Kaplan meets are doing their best in a sticky situation but continually lament the top-heavy planning that won't allow them to do what they feel their jobs are: to get the bad guys. A couple of times, Kaplan does point out that the men he is with do not necessarily have the big picture and that their feelings might be in the wrong, but most of the time he sympathizes with them. Then again, the outlook of the men often overcomes this frustration.

"I learned that honor and integrity are personal qualities, not institutional ones, not ones we should expect the state to always have. If you don't like the policy, tough. Bad things happen in this world. You do the best you can in your job, and let the crybabies write the books." (Pp. 27-28 quoting Bob Innes, a Vietnam Vet and contractor in Yemen, on what he learned in Vietnam)
After numerous chapters with Army Special Forces, Kaplan spends time with Marine units, both in the Horn of Africa, and then in the capstone to this first book: the first battle of Fallujah in April, 2004. Marines are a whole different ball game, and Kaplan illustrates the differences clearly. While the Horn of Africa chapter interested me because I am not familiar with the area, the Fallujah chapter is the crowning glory. Kaplan lays out the differences between the actual invasion of Iraq and the aftermath (the unit that Kaplan is embedded with took part in the invasion, was pulled out, and was now going back), the frustration with higher-ups who don't give them enough to do their jobs, the extremely disciplined manner in which Marines conduct themselves, and the valor of these men as they just do what they are supposed to.
"Despite news reports of low morale in the armed services because of overdeployment, with Army Special Forces and the marines I had met only two kinds of troops: those who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those who were jealous of those who were." (Pp. 323 [Kaplan does go on to say that, since the time of that writing, subsequent events had tempered this problem somewhat])
Honestly, the only fault I can really find in this book is that the map of Iraq at the beginning of the Fallujah chapter has many cities on it, but none of the cities Kaplan actually talks about are on the map. Otherwise, Imperial Grunts is an outstanding book for anybody wanting to get beyond American foreign policy to see what the men who are implementing that policy think. Some of it will surprise you, and some of the locations will, too. I would never have thought of Mongolia, but it is the best chapter in the book. I'm proud to have read it, and Kaplan shows his pride in these men by giving a wonderful portrait of them. The Marines told him that he could write whatever he wanted, report on everything he found out, "warts and all." They had nothing to hide. Kaplan does that. And he does it admirably.

[Westbrook]

What is SF?

[GummyIII]

S'ok....I forgot to look for it 'til just now. ;-)

Thanks...I appreciate the links a lot!

[gleeaikin]

Valin: Thanks for the book review. I have printed it and will give it to my son. If he is interested I may get it as a Christmas gift. As the author points out the forces in the field are often frustrated by Rules of Engagement. My son complained bitterly that everything they did had to go through the Coalition hierarchy and the Afgh. govt. before they could act, seldom in a timely manner. His unit had originally been slated to be sent to Iraq and they were pi##ed they got sent to Afgh. I wasn't though, didn't worry quite so much.

Westbrook: SF is Special Forces. The way Clancy uses it and the way I mean it is various unconventional units, including Army Special Forces, SEALS, Green Berets, etc.

[Valin]

I'm not a big fan of "Must Read!" but this is pretty close to one.

Note: the book is not as negative as the review implies.

Robert D Kaplan is one of my favorite writers. One of the reasons to pick up The Atlantic Monthly...sometimes the only reason..

[Chgogal]

I think you may enjoy this read.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1724104/posts