The question remains, then, how should the United States weigh in? Venezuela is, particularly now, central to U.S. interests, since it is the world's fifth-largest oil producer and supplies America with 14 percent of its imported oil. Crude oil futures have risen past the psychologically significant $30 level, primarily as a result of the turmoil in Venezuela.
But charting a policy course for Venezuela is tricky. Last week, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the best way to defuse tensions in Venezuela would be by holding new elections. This week, though, the administration retreated, saying Venezuela should find a resolution in accordance with its constitution and recommending Venezuela hold a referendum on Mr. Chavez's rule. This brings the White House closer to Mr. Chavez's position. The Venezuelan president has said he would be willing to hold a binding referendum, but that according to Venezuela's new constitution, which Mr. Chavez in effect drafted, it can't be held until August, midway through his term.
Mr. Chavez's stated reverence for the constitution is tragicomical. This isn't, after all, a document penned by founding fathers, but rather by a Constitutional Assembly populated by Chavez loyalists that were elected in July 1999. And as Mr. Chavez surely recalls, he illegally dissolved congress and had the assembly take on legislative powers in August 1999 ? until the public outcry was so great, Mr. Chavez was forced to let lawmakers continue legislating until the following year, when new elections were held.
So while changing the constitution to allow for an early, binding referendum wouldn't violate any time-honored democratic traditions in Venezuela, the caution the White House has demonstrated in making demands of the Chavez government is understandable. In the interests of reaching a peaceful resolution, the White House should privately urge Mr. Chavez to try to strike a deal with the opposition regarding a referendum or election. A mediator for these talks must also be found. The negotiating table ? not bloodied streets ? is where this dire situation must be settled. [End]
The Bush administration's public call for early presidential elections bolstered the opposition, agitated the president and indirectly undermined a pro-government but moderate representative's constitutional amendment proposal for early elections. Chavez is loath to appear in concert with a U.S. policy torn between oil interests and a thinly veiled preference for regime change. The recalcitrant opposition refuses to wait for August, when a binding referendum on Chavez's rule can be held. So again Venezuela faces civil war or dialogue. With hesitant and muted diplomacy from the United States and fruitless mediation efforts led by the Organization of American States, the former is more likely. ***