citizenship of the child at its birth is determined by...

http://books.google.com/books?id=qrgDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA469&dq=Vattel++%22natural+born+citizen%22&as_brr=4&cd=1#v=onepage&q=%22Important%20Instructions%22&f=false

The following correspondence will explain the reason of the changes recently made by the Secretary of State in the diplomatic instructions in reference to the law of citizenship, domicile and marriage:

Sir: I beg to call your attention to two sections in oar Consular Regulations and in our Diplomatic Instructions, which call for grave consideration. In our Consular Regulations we have the following: __________________________________________________

In reference to the first point of change, distinctly set forth in page 4 of Dr. Wharton's report, and in further support of it you will find that Vattel, in his Law of Nations, book 1, ch. 19, p. 101, fully sustains it; and further, in book 2, ch. 8, p. 17-'!. Our own Supreme Court has of late years announced the same doctrine, with a clearness and force that cannot be misunderstood. Carlisle v. United States, 10 Wall. 147; and still more recently in the case of Radich v. Hutching, 95 U. S. 210.

The other change suggested by Dr. Wharton in these regulations as stated in his report, p. 7, touching "the domicile of children of citizens of the United States born abroad," is based upon principles that are as universally recognized and established as the first ohange already discussed ; and I call your attention to Savigny on Private International Law, pp. 50-7. Our Supreme Court at a very early date, before the case in 3 Peters referred to by Dr. Wharton recognized this principle, and quoted all the leading authorities then known to the profession in the case of McJlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 209 (1808). Again, in the year 1817, in the case of The Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat. 76; and in 1852, in Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; in Jones v. Afo-Waster, 20 id. 8; in White v. llurnley, id. 235; in Mitchell v. United Slates, 21 Wall. 350; and in Desinare v. United Slates, 93 U. 8. 605; but more recently, and yet with more emphasis if possible, in the case of Lamar v. Mieou, 112 id. 452. ______________________________________________________

Mr. Dicey, an authoritative English cotemporary writer and a member of the Institute of International Law, in a treatise on the Law of Domicil, published in London iu 1879, thus speaks:

" Every person received at (or as from) birth a domicil of origin. (1) In the case of a legitimate infant born during his father's life-time, the domicil of origin of the infant is the domicil of the father at tbe time of his birth. * * * The domicil of every deprudent, person is the same as, and changes (if at all) with the domioil of the person on whom he is, as regards his domioil, legally dependent." Pp. 4, 5.

"A domicil cannot be acquired by a dependent person through his own act. P. 106."

Mr. Westlake, a leading English author on Private International Law, in the 2d ed. of his work on Private International law, says:

" Section 233. The original domicil of a child born in wedlock to a living father is the domicil of its father at the time of its birth.

"Section 237. The domicil of a legitimate or legitimated unmarried minor follows that of his or her father."

Mr. Hall (International Law, Oxford, 1880, p. 188) after a recapitulation of the law of different countries (in which he gives an erroneous statement of the law in the United States), says:

"From the foregoing sketch of the various laws of nationality, it may be concluded that the more important States reoognize, with a very near approach to unanimity, that the child of a foreigner ought to be allowed to be himself a foreigner, unless he manifests a wish to assume or retain the nationality of the State in which he has been born."

"La definition la plus exacte,d noire avis,a ite, donnee par lejuge des Etats-unis Hush, lorsqu'il dit que la domicile est ime residence dans un lieu particnlier accompagnee de preuves positives ou presutnees de Vintention de s'y fixer pendant un temps illimiti.

"Le domicile de V enfant est celui de ses parents on de ceux qui les remplacent suivant la loi." Manuel de Droit International Public et Pi-ive. JPtir M. Charles Calvo. Paris, 1882, pp. 211, 212.

The late Professor Blunschll, in an article in the " Revue de droit int." for 1870, p. 107, states the rule as follows:

"Legitimate children acquire by their birth the nationality of their father; nor does it matter whether they were born at home or abroad."

"XC. (a) The domioil of the legitimate uuemancipated minor who is notsui juris, and whose will therefore cannot conour with the fact of his residence, is the domicil of the father, or of the mother during widowhood, or—though it will be seen this is a disputed point—of the legally appointed guardian.

"XCI. It is an undisputed position of all jurists,that of his own accord, proprio morte (to borrow the expressionof Bynkershock), theminor cannot change his domicil. In our own country this maxim was enunciated by Lord Alvanley, master of the rolls, in the case of Somerville v. Somerville, and in America, in the oase of Outer v. 0'Daniel.

"It should seem, from all analogy, to follow that such change may be effected by the parents or guardians of the minor."

Iu Udny v. Udny, L. It., 1 Sc. App. 444, it was held that the Hiatus of a child as to legitimacy is determined by the laws of his father's domicil at the time of the child's birth. The distinction between civil status and political status is thus put iu this case by Lord Westbury:

"The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions; one by virtue of which he becomes the subjeot of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and whioh may bo called his politioal status; another, by virtue of whioh he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country; and as such is

possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter charaoter is the civil status or oondition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status. The political status may be dependent on different laws in different countries; whereas the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicil, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil stains. For it is on this basis that tho personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testaoy, or intestacy, must depend. International law depends on rules which, being in great measure derived from the Roman law, are common to the jurisprudence of all civilized nations. It is a settled principle that no man shall be without a domicil, and to secure this result, the law attributes to every individual as soon as he is born the domicil of his father, if the child be legitimate, and the domicil of the mother if illegitimate. This has been called the domicil of origin, and is involuntary. Other domicils including domicil by operation of law, as ou marriage, are domicils of choice. For as soon as an individual is sui juris it is competent to elect and assume another domicil, the continuance of him to which depends upon his will and act. When another domicil is put ou, the domicil of origin is for that purpose relinquished, and remains in obeyance during the continuance of the domicil of choice; but as the domicil of origiu is the creature of law, and independent of the will of the party, it would be inconsistent with the principles on which it is by law created and ascribed, to suppose that it is capable of being by the act of the party entirely obliterated and extinguished. It revives and exists whenever there is no other domicil, and it does not require to be regained or reconstituted animo et facto, in the manner which is necessary for the acquisition of a domicil of choice.

In Ludlam v. Lntllam, 26 N. Y. 356 (1883), it appeared that Richard L. Ludlam, a citizen of the United States domiciled in New York, went at the age of eighteen to Peru for business purposes, but took no steps toward naturalization iu Peru, or toward a permanent change of domicil. He remained iu Peru fourteen years and when in Peru married a Peruvian woman, who also was a native of that country. A child was born to him iu Peru. This child was held by the Court of Appeals to be a citizen of the United States, domiciled in New York. From the opinion of the court which was delivered by Selden, J., the following passages are extracted.

"It seems to me to result of necessity from these principles, that the children of English parents, though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common law as natural born citizens of England. The decision upon the plea in Calvin's case, which was merely repeating what was decided in Cobbledike's case, as early as the reign of Edw.I, see Calvin's case, p. 9 b., necessarily implies that a child may owe allegiance to the king (f. e., not merely local or temporary, but natural and permanent allegiance), although born out of the king's dominions; nnd also that this was a broad general rule, not confined to a few exceptional cases, because if this was an exception the plea could not have been held bad on demurrer, as it was in both Cobbledike's and Calvin s cases; but the exception must have been pleaded."

"Now, upon what ground cau allegiances in such cases be olaimed ? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth, does not depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's case asserts, upon what does it depend? There cau be but one answer to the question. It is impossible to suggest auy other ground for the obligatiou than that of parentage. It must, I apprehend, be transmitted from the parents to the child, or it could not exist. This being then the nature of permanent allegiance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim allegiance from the children of his subjects, wherever born. If then the child of English parents, though born abroad, is subditus natus a born subject of the king, he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the consideration of the other. So long therefore as the parents continue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship.

" I suppose the doctrine that ohildren, if legitimate, follow in regard to their political rights and duties,the condition of their fathers, to be found in natural law, and to be substantially the same in most, if not all, civilized countries. Vattel says: " Society not being able to subsist and perpetuate itself, but by the children of its citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to all their rights." B. 1, ch. 19, S 212. In a subsequent action the same author says: " It is asked whether the ohildren born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens, the laws have deoided this question in several countries, and it is neoessary to follow their regulatious. By the. law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights. The place of birth produces no change in this particular, and canuot of itselt furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given, him. 1 say of itself, for the civil law, or politics, may order oUierwise from particular views. Id., § 215.

" It is shown by Vice Chancellor Sandford, in Lynch v. Clark, 1 Saudf. Ch. 583, 675, that the law of France, Spain, and Portugal is in accordance with this doctrine, by express enactment it is true, as it is now in England and in this country. But the uniformity goes to show that it is founded upon a law of nature, and of course prevails in every country, unless, as Vattel says, it is changed from the municipal law'from particular views.' ______________________________________________________

State v. Adams, 45 Iowa, 99 (1876), was a suit brought to determine whether Adams, the defendant, was a citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa, the object being to test his right to hold the office of the mayor of the town of Avoca. The following passages are extracted from the opinion of Seevers, C. J.: " The right of the defendant to hold the office in question depends upon the fact, whether or not he was a citizen of the United States and State of Iowa. The Circuit Court made the following finding of facts:

" 1st. That the defendant's paternal grandfather was born in Connecticut in the year 1764, and from there emigrated to Canada, in the year 1790, with the intention of making Canada his permanent domioil, and that he remained in Canada until his death in the year 1838.

"2d. That the defendant's father was born in Canada in the year 1795, and resided there until the year 1834.

"3d. That the defendant was born in Canada in the year 1834, and during the same year came with his father to the United States, where tbey have ever since resided.

"4th. The defendant has resided in the State of Iowa over sinoe its admission into the Union, and in the town of Avoca, for the two years last past.

"5th. That the defendant's father, while a resident iii Canada, served in the Canada militia in the war of 1812, but that such services were involuntary on his part.

"6th. That in the year 1875, the defendant's father received of the Canadian government a bounty of f20 for such services.

"7th. That neither tho defendant nor his father has ever been naturalized under the laws of the United States for the naturalization of aliens.

"We are of the opinion that defendant's grandfather, at the time he removed to Canada, in 1790, was and had been for several years a citizen of this country, and that he remained such notwithstanding his removal to and subsequent death in Canada. In this conclusion we are sustained,we think.by the following authorities: Calais v. Marshfield, 30 Me. 411; Peck v. Young, 26 Wend. 612; Inalisv. Trustees Sailor's Snug Ilarbor, 3 Pet. 99. "The father of plaintiff was born in Canada, in 1795,at which time his father, as we have seen, was a citizen of this country. Ordinarily the citizenship of the child at its birth is determined by that of the father. If there be a doubt as to this principle, it must be regarded as removed by the act of Congress passed in 1802, which provides, * * * 'children of persons who now are, or havo been citizens of the United States shall, though bom out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens thereof.' Rev. Stat. U. S., § 2172. "This language clearly aud unmistakably includes the plaintiff's father, and he thereby (if not otherwise) became entitled to all the [rights of oitizenship.

(snip)
Every member of the Supreme Court, every member of congress, every member of the Joint Chiefs, most members of the DOD, CIA, FBI, Secret Service and state run media, ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, PBS, NPR, MSNBC, Fox and print news, knows that Barack Hussein Obama does NOT meet Article II – Section I constitutional requirements for the office he holds. By his own biography, there is NO way he can pass the test. The hard evidence is so far beyond overwhelming, it is ridiculous.

(snip)
But not ONE member of America’s most powerful people will dare confront Obama and his anti-American cabal on the subject. The Constitution does NOT stand.

(snip)
Half of the people you expect to stop this insanity are quiet co-conspirators in the silent coup. The other half is paralyzed by fear, motivated only by political self-preservation.

(Snip)
Americans keep asking what they can do because they see that none of their leaders are doing anything to stop the demise of their beloved country. It’s the right question, because those leaders are NOT going to stop this thing.

JB Williams
Canada Free Press

http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/12999

http://books.google.com/books?id=qrgDAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA469&dq=Vattel++%22natural+born+citizen%22&as_brr=4&cd=1#v=onepage&q=%22Important%20Instructions%22&f=false
Further evidence that there was absolutely no law that conferred citizenship on anyone born within the jurisdiction of the United States to alien parents or an alien father married to an American born mother.

However there are some US Supreme Court decisions that have ruled otherwise:
From the precedent setting US Supreme Court decision in the case of US v Wong Kim Ark (1898):
[An alien parent’s] allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke, 6a, ’strong enough to make a natural subject, for, if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject’

“Subject’ and ‘citizen’ are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives; and though the term ‘citizen’ seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, ’subjects,’ for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.’

and

…every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.

III. The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as originally established.—169 US 649, US v Wong Kim Ark
http://openjurist.org/169/us/649

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939)
The following shows that acquiring dual citizenship does not abrogate the natural born status of a US Citizen.

“And the mere fact that the plaintiff [Elg] may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law….”

The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants [page 350] ….. declared Miss Elg “to be a natural born citizen of the United States,”— Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
http://supreme.justia.com/us/307/325/case.html

Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920)
“It is not disputed that if petitioner is the son of Kwock Tuck Lee and his wife, Tom Ying Shee, he was born to them when they were permanently domiciled in the United States, is a citizen thereof, and is entitled to admission to the country. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. But, while it is conceded that he is certainly the same person who, upon full investigation, was found, in March, 1915, by the then Commissioner of Immigration, to be a natural born American citizen…”
http://supreme.justia.com/us/253/454/case.html

Here the Supreme Court demonstrates the equivalent use of the terms “native born” and “natural born.”

Schneider v. Rusk (1964)
“We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the ‘ natural born’ citizen is eligible to be President. Art. II, s 1.”
http://supreme.justia.com/us/377/163/case.html

Here the Supreme Court notes that only two types of US citizen are recognized.

Elk v Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884)
“The distinction between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly marked in the provisions of the constitution, by which ‘no person, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president;’ and ‘the congress shall have power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.’Const. art. 2, § 1; art. 1, § 8.

Note here that “citizens by birth” are contrasted to naturalized citizens, with the former eligible to be president.

“This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”
http://supreme.justia.com/us/112/94/case.html

And with specific regard to the eligibility of Barack Obama to receive a state’s Electoral College votes as a Natural Born Citizen, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
“Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by [the Supreme Court of the United States in their 1898 decision in the case of U.S. v.] Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person “born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject” at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those “born in the allegiance of the United States natural-born citizens.”—Indiana Court of Appeals, “Ankeny et. al. v The Governor of Indiana, Mitch Daniels,” Nov. 12, 2009
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22488868/ANKENY-v-GOVERNOR-OF-THE-STATE-OF-INDIANA-APPEALS-COURT-OPINION-11120903

jamseeee, you are very drunk

WKA - erroneous ruling based on english feudal law, not a hundered years of American law

Elg - born to immigrant parents who were at the time of her birth US citizens as they had been naturalized prior to her birth

Elk - held that the 14th was constituional based on the decision in Slaughterhouse that a child born to any parents owing allegiance to a foreign nation was not a US citizen.

Rusk - I have not studied the details of it, but Apuzzo & Donofrio have and your little quip there does not reflect the true nature of the case, you are merely mining for quotes to use

Kwock - never heard of it before today, eill have to read it for myself so I sit on the fence as to a reply to that one & then finally

you bring back the Indiana case - bwahahahaha - it never even saw the light of the ocurt room so to say it precedent when the ruling had nothing to do with the definition of NBC, it was merely a ruling on standing

What does this all show? You dear jamseeee are very drunk and desperate.

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